

THE
VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS

WITH THE

ŚRĪ-BHĀṢHYA

OF

RĀMANUJĀCHĀRYA

Translated into English

BY

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PREFACE

It has taken more time than we expected to bring out the second volume of this work. Every care has been taken to see that the translation is accurate and clear. The additions and alterations necessary to make the translation full and complete are enclosed within brackets.

The Analytical Outline is for the most part our work. Many footnotes have also been added by us. The footnotes are based largely on the indispensable *Śrutaprakāśikā*, the *Bhāvaprakāśikā* and the lucid commentaries of Raṅgarāmānuja on the *Upanishads*. The indexes have also been prepared by us.

We are grateful to the Government of India for sanctioning a grant to help in the publication of this work. To the late Sri M. Patanjali Sastri and other members of the Sanskrit Board who must have recommended the grant, our thanks are due, and are gladly rendered.

In the elucidation of the difficult technical arguments in this work, we have received invaluable help from Sanskrit scholars. Particular mention has to be made of Sri Kārappaṅgādu Veṅkaṭāchārya Swami, who has spared many hours to explain Ramānujā's ideas and clear patiently doubts and difficulties.

We have to acknowledge thankfully the help given by Sri T. E. Varadachariar, Sri M. C. Krishnan and Sri T. E. Seshadri in seeing the book through the press. The printing of Volume III has already started.

April 1964. M. R. SAMPATKUMARAN,
M. B. NARASIMHA IYENGAR.

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AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE

CHAPTER I, PART 2.

The first part of the first Chapter of the *Vedānta-Sūtras* is generally concerned to show the *Brahman* as the cause of the world. Thereafter, in the remaining three parts of the Chapter, it is sought to be proved that nothing other than the *Brahman* can be the cause of the world. Alternative theories about the cause of the world are taken up and refuted.

Rāmānuja begins his commentary on the second part of the Chapter with a brief summary of the teachings of the first part. He reminds us that ritualistic works grant transitory results and that knowledge about and worship of the *Brahman* yield infinite and eternal results. Those who understand this from a study of the ritualistic part of the *Vedas* begin to feel the desire for final release from the circle of births and deaths as the highest object of human pursuit. Accordingly, they try to know and worship the *Brahman*.

Vedāntic passages form the means of knowing the *Brahman*. Scriptural texts, such as "From whom, indeed all these beings are born" (*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.) etc., establish the Highest *Brahman* alone to be the cause of the great bliss of salvation and also the only cause of the origin, preservation and destruction of the whole world. The *Brahman* has also been shown to be distinct from the innumerable individual selves and the *prakṛiti* (i.e., non-intelligent things). Moreover, the *Brahman* is also the Internal Self of this world made up of the *prakṛiti* and the individual selves.

In the second, third and fourth parts of the first Chapter, he goes on, it is proved that a few *Vedāntic* passages that appear to describe the *prakṛiti* or the individual self as the possessor of some auspicious qualities do not actually indicate it to be the Highest or the cause of the world. It is only the Highest *Brahman* who is shown as the home of all the auspicious qualities which are mentioned in each of such passages. Among them those that seem to refer to some individual self or the *prakṛiti* in indistinct terms are discussed in the second part ; those that appear to speak of these things in more distinct terms in the third part ; and those that apparently deal with such things directly are discussed in the fourth part.

The second part consists of thirty-three aphorisms which are given below :—

1. In all this (it is the *Brahman* Himself that is meant to be declared) because (it is He alone) that is prominently taught.

2. Because also the attributes intentionally mentioned (immediately in the context) are appropriate (only in relation to the Highest Self).

3. The individual self is not, however, (meant to be declared herein) because it is inappropriate (to apply these attributes to him).

4. Because also the agent and the object (of worship) are (separately) mentioned (in the context).

5. Because (also) there is (in the context) a difference (in declension) between the words (which respectively denote the *Brahman* and the individual self).

6. Because also the *Smṛiti* says the same thing.

7. If it be said that, because He has a very small abode and is declared to be (small in accordance with) that, (the being referred to in the context is) not (the Supreme

Self), it is not right to say so ; because He is to be so realised ; (because again) He is like the ether of space also.

8. If it be said that (owing to His association with the heart which is a part of the body) there results (to Him) the experience (of pleasure and pain), it is replied it cannot be so ; because that (which gives rise to such an association) is different (from mere corporeal association).

9. The eater (of the Brāhmaṇa and the Kshatriya is the Supreme Self) because (the whole of) the movable and immovable (world) is implied (by the expression ' Brāhmaṇa and Kashatriya ').

10. Because also of the context (here relating to the *Brahman*), and also (of what has been stated earlier).

11. Indeed, the beings that have entered into the cave are the two selves, (*viz.*, the individual self and the Supreme Self) ; because it is seen (to be so in that context).

12. Because also of the characteristic attributes (of both the individual self and the Supreme Self being mentioned in the context).

13. He who is (declared to be) within (the eye, is the *Brahman*), because (of all the attributes mentioned in the context) being appropriate (only in relation to Him).

14. Because also, existence etc. (within the eye) are taught (only in relation to the Supreme Self).

15. On account also of the declaration, by itself, of His association with (supreme) happiness (that Person within the eye is the Supreme Self).

16. For that same reason also, that (*ākāśa* or ether of space which is denoted by '*kha* ') is the *Brahman*.

17. (The Being within the eye is the *Brahman*), because also the path (which commences with light and leads to the final release and) which is allotted to him who

has studied the *Upanishads*, is described here (in the context).

18. Other things (than the *Brahman*) cannot be (the Person within the eye), because they do not (always) exist therein, and because also it is impossible (for them to possess the qualities attributed to Him in the context).

19. The Internal Ruler (spoken of) in the passages severally named *adhidaiva*, *adhiloka* etc. (is the *Brahman*) ; because His attributes are declared therein.

20. That which is dealt with in the *Smṛiti* (of Kapila) and also that which is the embodied being do not form (the Internal Ruler) ; because attributes other than those which belong to them are mentioned (in the context).

21. Indeed, both (the Kāṇvas and the Mādhyandinas) declare in their scriptures that this (i.e., the individual self) is different (from the Internal Ruler).

22. That Being who is characterised by invisibility and other such attributes (is the Supreme Self), because His attributes are mentioned in the context.

23. Because also the context mentions the characteristic attribute (of), and the distinction (between the *pradhāna* or matter and the *purusha* or the individual soul on the one hand and the Supreme Self on the other), that (*Akshara*, who is the source of all things) is not those other two things (*viz.*, matter and soul).

24. Because also (His universal) form is described (in the context under reference, that Being who is characterised by invisibility and other such attributes is the Supreme Self).

25. '*Vaiśvānara*' (means the Supreme Self) ; because that common term has (in the context here) a special qualification.

26. What is thus recognised (in the context here as constituting the body of Vaiṣvānara) gives rise to an inference (that '*Vaiṣvānara*' means the Supreme Self).

27. If it be urged that (Vaiṣvānara) is not (the Supreme Self), for the reason, among others (that there is no use) of the word ('*Agni*' or 'fire' in grammatical equation therewith) and also for the reason that he (*Agni*) is firmly seated within the body, it is replied that it cannot be so because it is the worship of the Supreme Self so qualified that is taught (here), and because (also) it is impossible (for the digestive heat of the stomach to possess the qualities attributed here to Vaiṣvānara); moreover, some read of him in their scriptures as the Person (*Puruṣa*).

28. For these very reasons, (Vaiṣvānara) is not the deity (sun), nor the element (*tejas*).

29. Jaimini holds that there is nothing wrong even (in holding) that (the word '*Agni*') denotes directly and of itself (the Supreme Self).

30. Āśmarathya holds that it is for the purpose of easy comprehension (that the infinite and unlimited *Brahman* is looked upon as measured by space).

31. Bādari holds that it is for the purpose of worshipping (Him that the *Brahman* is so described).

32. Jaimini holds that it is intended to make (the *prāṇāhuti*) assume the character (of the *agnihotra* sacrifice); for the scripture shows it to be such.

33. They (i.e., the Chhāndogas) also declare Him (to be) in it.

These thirty-three aphorisms are divided into six *adhikaraṇas*. The first of these is called *Sarvatra-prasiddhyadhikaraṇa*. It may be noted here that this

links up with the *Indraprāṇādhikaraṇa*, which closes the first part of the Chapter. There it has been laid down that whenever particular individual selves or particular non-intelligent things are mentioned in association with the characteristic attributes of the Supreme Self, what is intended to be taught is the continued meditation of the *Brahman* as forming the Inner Self of those particular intelligent and non-intelligent entities. When Indra describes himself as the *prāṇa* and as immortal and enjoins meditation on himself as life and immortality, he is teaching the worship of the Supreme Self who has for His body the *prāṇa* as well as the individual self of Indra. This principle of interpretation, however, seems to fail when applied to a passage like *Chhānd. Up.* (III. 1), where He who has the *prāṇa* for his body is mentioned in terms suggestive of the individual self. The question is raised and answered in the opening *adhikaraṇa* of the second part.

In the passage under consideration, it is first declared that all this indeed is the *Brahman*; and His worship is enjoined on one who has become tranquil. Then again it is stated that man is characterised by worship and that he should perform worship. Thereafter, characteristics like being man-made, having life as the body, light as the form and a small abode, and being atomic are mentioned in connection with the *Brahman*. It looks as if these characteristics could not be applied to the *Brahman*.

The problem here is that the *Brahman* is mentioned both at the beginning and towards the end of the passage. The description of the *Brahman* as given at the beginning seems to conflict with the attributes later mentioned. One way of dealing with the difficulty is to suppose that two different *upāsana*s are enjoined. The first relates to the *Brahman*: but in regard to the second, the doubt may arise whether the object of worship there, who is described as the Possessor of the qualities of being mind-made etc.,

is the individual self or the Supreme *Brahman*. This doubt is stated and answered by Śaṅkara in his commentary. Rāmānuja also adopts this position in regard to the passage in the first of his two alternative commentaries to this *Sūtra*.

Assuming two *upāsana*s, the *pūrvapakṣin* points out that, in the second, *manas* and *prāṇa* are connected with the *Brahman* mentioned later. But they can be only the instruments of the individual self. Indeed, they have been negated in relation to the Supreme Self in other scriptural passages. Therefore, this *Brahman* must be different from Him of whom it has been declared that all this indeed is the *Brahman*. The earlier declaration enjoins the worship of the Supreme Self for achieving tranquillity ; then the worship of the individual self is laid down to one who has become tranquil. The individual self, however, is called '*Brahman*', but in a secondary sense.

As against this, Rāmānuja supports the conclusion stated in the *Sūtra* : "In all this (it is the *Brahman* Himself that is meant to be declared) because (it is He alone) that is prominently taught." (*Ved. Sūta*. I. 2. 1.) He argues that the earlier injunction merely mentions that the *Brahman* who is the Self of the world, is to be worshipped. The later injunction recalls the earlier one and specifies the qualities of the *Brahman* also : He is capable of being grasped only by the pure mind, He supports and controls life, and so on.

Then Rāmānuja gives an alternative interpretation which he prefers. Here he is following Bodhāyana's *Vṛitti*, which he quotes. Now the whole passage is taken as dealing with only one subject. The advantage thus derived is clear. The word, '*sarvatra*', in the *Sūtra* can point to '*sarvam*' in the scriptural text ; and tranquillity is to be attained not after, but before the worship. But this view too is criticised. If the *Brahman* is all, He becomes tainted by evil. The individual selves are everywhere in

various embodiments according to their *karma*. They may be regarded in this sense as creating, sustaining and dissolving the world. The word '*Brahman*' is sometimes used to refer to them also. Mind, life, etc., are associated with them. Thus it is appropriate to understand the whole passage as referring to the individual self.

Rāmānuja denies that the statement, that all this indeed is the *Brahman*, because it is born out of Him, is absorbed into Him and lives by Him, can apply to the individual self. The selves are different from one another, and no individual self can be the all, or can be deemed to be the creator, sustainer or destroyer of the world. The criticism is thus set aside ; and the unity of the *Chhāndogya* passage is shown to be supported by Bodhāyana.

In the other aphorisms in this section, further objections to this conclusion are set forth and refuted. It is first pointed out that the attributes under reference can appropriately belong only to the Supreme Self, and that even the slightest connection with them cannot be predicated of the individual self even when emancipated. Moreover, later in the passage, the worshipper is said to attain unto the *Brahman* after departing from this world. This can only mean that the individual self is the worshipper and the Supreme Self the object of attainment—and not that the bound soul is the agent of worship and its own state of freedom the object of attainment. Further, when it is stated that the *Brahman* is the Self within the worshipper's heart, the individual self is pointed out by the genitive case and the Supreme Self by the nominative case. In a similar context in the *Agnirahasya* a difference in declension is observed between the nouns indicating the worshipper and the Supreme Self as the object of worship. The *Bhagavadgītā* also declares the individual self to be the worshipper and the Supreme Self to be the object of worship. His residing within the heart and being described as smaller than a grain of rice or barley do not mean that

He is minute in His essential nature. The attribution of minuteness to Him is only for purposes of worship. This is made clear by the fact that there is mention only of His unconditioned greatness in the passage.

That out of His abundant mercy He has chosen to reside within our heart does not mean that the experience of pleasure and pain befalls to Him. We experience pleasure and pain because of our being subject to *karma*. He is untainted by *karma* and is the Sovereign Lord. Hence the scripture compares the individual self and the Supreme Self to two birds on a tree, the former eating fruit and the latter shining in splendour without eating. It is thus demonstrated that the *Chhāndogya* passage under reference (III. 1) enjoins the meditation of the *Brahman* as being mind-made, having life as the body and possessing such attributes. (Pages 4-21).

If the Supreme Self is exempt from the experience of *karma*, as is made out from the metaphor of the two birds on the tree, the doubt arises whether He forms, as is claimed, the subject of the *Kāṭhōpanishad*. There He is said to have the *Brāhmaṇa* and *Kshatriya* for His food, death for His condiment and *ṛita* (or the fruits of *karma*) for His drink. This problem is dealt with in the next section, the *Attradhikaraṇa* consisting of four aphorisms (9-12). It is asked about Him: "Who can definitely know how He is?"

In the first *Sūtra*, the eater of the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Kshatriya* is declared to be the Supreme Self, who destroys the movable and immovable things in the world during the state of universal dissolution. "Food" is figuratively understood as that which suffers destruction, while the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Kshatriya* stand for the movable and the immovable things. Death is the condiment for the Cosmic Destroyer, for while helping in the destruction of the world, it also comes to an end.

The implied *pūrvapaksha* argument is that objects of enjoyment can also be metaphorically indicated by food. The individual selves are 'eaters' of and 'food' to one another, and may therefore be the purport of the text. Condiment being subordinate to food, death may be regarded as not hindering such enjoyment. After all, the selves are immortal, and death cannot destroy them. In this view, however, the special meaning of 'condiment' is not brought out, and the metaphor becomes weak and partly useless.

Moreover, the context in which this text occurs obviously refers to the Supreme Self, who is described as great and omnipresent and attainable only through His grace. If it is objected that the eater and another are presently said to drink in the reward of works, having entered a cave, and that therefore the eater must be the individual self and his companion the *prāṇa* or the intellect, the reply is that the two are the Supreme Self and the individual self. Earlier, the Supreme Self has been described as having entered the cave of the heart, and in a later passage, the individual self, denoted under the name of *aditi* or the eater of the fruits of *karma*, is also stated to be in that cave. The goal of the individual self, the other end of his path, is declared to be the seat of Viṣṇu or the Highest Lord.

Thus the drinking of the *rita* by the Supreme Self cannot be taken as literally true. A group in which a few carry umbrellas, may be referred to as the men with umbrellas. The experience of the fruits of *karma* is thus attributed to the Supreme Self, even though He is exempt from it. Alternatively, the Supreme Self is the agent of the drinking in a causative sense: He causes the individual self to drink the *rita*.

The last *Sūtra* of the *Adhikaraṇa* then proceeds to give an additional reason to confirm the identity of the

Eater. It is to the effect that throughout the context the individual self and the Supreme Self are differentiated and defined by the attributes of being the worshipper and the worshipped, the attainer and the attained. The objection that the subject under consideration is only the individual self on account of the question raised in an early passage as to its post-mortem existence is effectively answered. The question is put by Nachiketas to Yama, and answer to it is requested as the third boon from the god of death. The two earlier boons have assumed the existence of the individual self after death. So the third boon, requesting knowledge about whether or not the departed individual self continues to exist, can only relate to the state of final release. It can only mean : "Let me know the essential nature of final release and the means of attaining it."

In this connection, Rāmānuja makes a survey of the *Kāthopanishad* as a whole. The story of Nachiketas is told—how an angry father gifted him away to the god of death, how he was kept waiting in the place of the god and how thereupon the god felt obliged to give him three boons. Various theories about the state of final release are referred to briefly, and Rāmānuja declares that, according to those well versed in the *Vedānta*, final release is the natural experiential realisation of the Supreme Self by the individual self on the removal of the latter's ignorance. It is pointed out that Yama teaches Nachiketas that the *Brahman* is hidden within and cannot be seen, and that His worship in the proper manner leads one to the supreme abode of Viṣṇu. (Pages 21-31).

If the Eater is the *Brahman* who dwells within the cave of the heart and is difficult to be seen, how can the Person within the eye whose worship is taught to Upakosala (in *Chhānd. Up.* IV. 10-15), be identified with the *Brahman*? It is more reasonable to suppose this Person to be the reflected image, or the sun-god who is declared in the scripture to reside in the eye, or the individual self whose

presence in a body is ascertained by looking at the eye. For of him it is said that he is 'seen'. This doubt is now cleared in the six aphorisms (13-18) of the *Antarādhikaraṇa*. It is shown conclusively that the Person within the eye also is the *Brahman*. He is so described only to fix Him in an abode for purposes of meditation ; and He is seen by adepts in *yoga*.

Upakosala is taught twice about the *Brahman*. He is a devout disciple, impressed with a sense of the evils of *samsāra* and eager to learn about the *Brahman*. To relieve his dejection when his preceptor goes on a journey without giving him instruction, the preceptor's Fires teach him something about the *Brahman*, and the preceptor later completes the teaching.

The Fires first teach that the *Brahman* is life, that He is supreme happiness and that He is the ether of space. According to the preceptor, the Person who is seen within the eye is the Self, is immortal, is fearless and is the *Brahman*. All blessed things go to meet in Him. He is the Giver of good things and the Shining One.

The *Brahman* first taught by the Fires is again taught by the preceptor and identified with the Person in the eye. The qualities attributed to Him are appropriate only in regard to the Supreme Self. Moreover, we know from other scriptural texts that the *Brahman* dwells in the eye as its Internal Controller.

This view is criticised on the ground that there is a break in the context between the first and the second teaching given to Upakosala. The Fires teach severally something about themselves. One who worships them in the way indicated is assured of worldly results such as good health, long life etc. Thus between the initial teaching about the *Brahman* and the subsequent instruction by the preceptor, there intervenes the subject of the worship of the Fires whose fruits are worldly and antagonistic to the

realisation of the *Brahman*. Hence the preceptor's teaching may well be about a different subject.

This criticism is refuted by Rāmānuja who points out that the *Brahman* with His characteristic attributes is mentioned by both the Fires and the preceptor. The Fires speak of Him as characterised by supreme happiness and the preceptor describes Him as One in whom all desirable things gather together. The intervening worship of the Fires forms an auxiliary part of the worship of the *Brahman*. The results attributed to it may be taken as mere panegyric (*arthavāda*), or preferably, as helpful to the worship of the *Brahman*.

The context bears this out. Upakośala is taught when he is in sore distress about his preceptor's delay in teaching him about the *Brahman*; he has no hankering for worldly joys. Moreover, the Fires specially say that the preceptor will teach him about "the path". This is obviously meant to indicate that their teaching is not complete. Indeed, they have no intention of superseding the preceptor, which is highly improper. Just to console him, they describe the essential nature of the *Brahman* and leave it to the preceptor to complete the teaching. The path which begins with "light" and by which the departing soul travels to attain final release is described to Upakośala by his preceptor along with what leads up to it, namely, the worship of the *Brahman*. It is unreasonable to suppose that the preceptor has to teach about the path alone without teaching about the *Brahman*.

Another criticism is also answered by Rāmānuja. It is to the effect that the Fires teach Upakośala only *pratīkopāsanā*. That is, he is asked to regard as the *Brahman* worldly happiness and the ether of space, which are not the *Brahman*. According to Rāmānuja, this is inappropriate, because Upakośala is anxious to win

spiritual emancipation and not the transitory results that accrue from *pratīkopāsanā*.

When Upakosala says that he knows about the *prāṇa* being the *Brahman* and not about happiness or the ether of space being the *Brahman*, he is not asking for instruction in a new *pratīkopāsanā*. What he wants to know is whether the *Brahman* is to be regarded as the controller of happiness and the ether, or whether He is to be regarded as happiness which is unlimited and infinite (like the ether of space). In reply the Fires actually declare : "Whatever indeed is happiness, that same is the ether of space. What indeed is the ether of space, that same is happiness."

The teaching that the worship of the Person within the eye leads to the well known path beginning with light re-enforces the conclusion that He is the *Brahman*. This is irrefutably established by the fact that other suggestions about the Person are untenable. Neither the reflected image, nor the sun-god, nor the individual self has any permanent position in the eye ; and the qualities attributed to the Person can never apply to any of them. (Pages 31-44).

In the course of the discussion about the true identity of the Person within the eye, reference has been made to the Internal Ruler who dwells within the eye. It has been assumed that this Internal Ruler is the *Brahman*. Possible arguments against this assumption are now examined and refuted. Incidentally, it may be noted that while the first three *adhikaraṇas* of the second part have been concerned with the *Brahman* as located in infinitesimal homes like the interior of the heart or the eye, hereafter the theme diverts to the *Brahman* in some kind of relation with the universe as a whole.

In the three aphorisms (19-21) of the *Antaryāmyadhikaraṇa*, a well known passage from the *Bṛih. Up.* (III. 7) is

discussed. Here the *Brahman* is described as the Internal Ruler or Controller in the deities like those of the earth, water, fire, mid-air, air, the sun, space, the moon, stars, sky, darkness and light, in all beings, in the individual self, and in the things relating to the individual self such as life, speech, etc. He is pointed out as dwelling unknown in each of them, controlling each of them and having each of them as His 'body'. A comparison between the two versions of the text, those of the Kāṇvas and the Mādhyandinas, makes it clear that the Internal Ruler controls the individual self also, who is mentioned expressly in one recension and by a synonym in the other.

The identity of the Internal Ruler with the *Brahman* is questioned because towards the end of the passage He is described as the seer without being seen, the hearer without being heard and so on ; it is also added that there is no other seer or hearer etc. The *Brahman's* knowledge is not dependent on senses like eyes and ears. It is obvious that some individual self or the individual self in some sense is the seer, hearer, etc. The *Brahman* is excluded by the denial of any other seer, hearer etc.

This broad position taken by the critic is not without its own difficulties. Subtle arguments have to be provided to explain how any individual self can be the Internal Ruler of all things in the world and also of the person who is addressed. These are not explicitly stated. One of the various deities, or an individual self with special mystic powers, or some one else may be intended by the critic. Perhaps the best way of explaining this point of view is that the teaching that the Internal Ruler of the earth or fire or some other thing is also the Internal Ruler of the person addressed merely means that all the Internal Rulers belong to one class—the species of individual selves.

However, Rāmānuja disposes of this criticism with the help of several arguments. He quotes a parallel passage

from *Sub. Up.*, which identifies the Internal Ruler with Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Self. The immortality which is attributed to the Internal Ruler, is independently due to His own intrinsic nature, and this is the characteristic attribute of the *Brahman* only. He is said to be the seer, the hearer and so on, not because He is dependent on the senses for His knowledge. On the contrary, His perceptive realisation is due entirely and independently to His own intrinsic nature. The statement that there is no seer, hearer, etc. other than He, merely shows that there is no other controller to control Him. He possesses the power of being omniscient and of willing the truth.

Moreover, when the Internal Ruler is pointed as the Self of the person addressed, the individual self of the person is in the genitive case and its Self in the nominative case. The two therefore cannot be identical. Indeed, the individual self is as little worthy of being regarded as the Self or the Internal Ruler of all as non-intelligent matter. Thus, in both the recensions of the passage dealing with the Internal Ruler, it is made clear that He is the Supreme Self and that He is quite distinct from the individual self. (Pages 44-51).

The Internal Ruler has been described as one who sees without being seen. Because of His power to see, He may well be the Supreme Self. Can the same thing be said about the invisible *Akshara* mentioned in the *Mund. Up.* as the source from which the universe evolves? There is no reference here to such a quality as seeing which implies intelligence. This problem is dealt with in the next section, the *Adṛiṣyatvādiguṇakādhikaraṇa*, which consists of three aphorisms (22-24).

The *pūrvapaksha* relies particularly on a statement in the *Upanishad* that there is some one higher than the superior *akshara*. Obviously, '*akshara*' here cannot mean the *Brahman*; the context suggests that it refers to

the *prakṛiti* in its undifferentiated condition. In earlier passages also, the term should mean the same thing. When it is said to be invisible, it is denied to be gross matter, but affirmed to be something akin to it, namely, matter in a subtle, undifferentiated state. Thus, it would appear that the *prakṛiti* is here declared to be the cause of the universe, and not the *Brahman*. (The entity higher than the *akshara* may, in this view, be taken to be the individual self.)

The *Sūtras* reject this position by pointing out that the invisible *Akshara* is endowed with attributes which make Him out to be the *Brahman*. Rāmānuja explains that by knowing this *Akshara* everything is said to be known. He is the source of the universe. Omniscience is clearly attributed to Him, and His *tapas* consists of knowledge. In the circumstances, the word '*akshara*' must be used in a different sense in the later passage where it can denote only matter in its subtle state.

A study of the attributes of the *Akshara* and of the way in which He is distinguished from both matter and the individual self in the *Upanishad* fully supports this conclusion. Rāmānuja undertakes a fairly detailed survey of the *Upanishad* as a whole. A lower and a higher science dealing with the knowledge of *Brahman*, an indirect and a direct way of approach to Him are mentioned first. Then the invisible *Akshara* is described to be the source from which the universe of intelligent and non-intelligent things evolves. His omniscience is referred to, as also His unconditioned reality. Next, the performance of rituals by those desirous of worldly results and that by seekers of emancipation are differentiated. The *yogins*, it is pointed out, perceive the *Akshara* near at heart. He is higher than the individual self who is beyond the undifferentiated *prakṛiti*. His worship is the highest kind of loving devotion, and it results in the emancipation of the individual self, when it becomes like unto the *Brahman*.

Thus the invisible *Akshara* mentioned at the beginning of the *Upanishad* can only be the *Brahman*.

A final argument is that the *Akshara* is described as having a universal form. The celestial world of fire is His head, the sun and the moon are His eyes, the whole universe is His heart, and so on. This form can belong only to the Supreme Self who is the Internal Self of all. (Pages 51-65.)

The universal form attributed to the *Akshara* in *Muṇḍ. Up.* is associated in the *Chhānd. Up.* (V) with *Vaiśvānara*, and it is not clear that the word, '*Vaiśvānara*', means there the Supreme Self. For it is a common term which is known to have at least four meanings. It may stand for the sun-god, the element fire, the digestive 'heat' of the stomach and the Supreme Self. Any one of these meanings, it is urged, can apply in the context, and the meaning of '*Vaiśvānara*' cannot be determined there decisively to be only the Supreme Self. This question is answered in the nine aphorisms (25-33) of the *Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇa*, the last section of the second part of the first Chapter.

The first *Sūtra* of the *Adhikaraṇa* sets the doubt at rest. '*Vaiśvānara*' may be a common term having more than one meaning. But in this particular context in the *Chhānd. Up.* it is used in association with special attributes which make out what is indicated by the word to be the Supreme Self and none else. To demonstrate this, Rāmānuja surveys the teaching about *Vaiśvānara* in the *Upanishad*. Aupamanyava and four other sages meet together and start an enquiry, "Who is our Self, and what is the *Brahman*?" They seek the help of Uddālaka, a worshipper of the *Ātman* known as *Vaiśvānara*. Confessing to incomplete knowledge, he takes them to King Aśvapati as the most competent teacher for them all. Aśvapati questions them and instructs them. The subject of their investigation is, 'Who is our Self and what is the

Brahman?' He speaks to them about the Self known as *Vaiśvānara*. Thus the *Upanishad* here uses the word '*Vaiśvānara*' in the place of '*Brahman*'. Moreover, towards the close of the teaching, the worshipper is assured of the destruction of his sins and the experience of the *Brahman*. These results can accrue only if *Vaiśvānara* is the *Brahman* and not otherwise.

The form of *Vaiśvānara* is also recognised to be one associated with the *Brahman* in the *Śruti* and the *Smṛiti* alike. In the *Muṇḍ Up.* it is said of Him that the celestial world of fire is His head, the sun and the moon are His eyes, the air is His breath, the earth is His feet, and so on. The Supreme Self is similarly described in the *Mahabhārata* also. *Aśvapati* informs the six sages who have come to him that *Vaiśvānara* has for His head, eye, breath, trunk, bladder and feet the celestial world, the sun, air, the sky, water, and the earth respectively.

At this stage, a further objection is possible. *Aśvapati*'s teaching finds parallels in the *Bṛih. Up.* and *Śat. Br.* There *Vaiśvānara* is called 'Agni' or fire. *Aśvapati* himself teaches in connection with the worship of *Vaiśvānara* that the heart, the mind and the mouth are to be regarded as the three household fires. Here *Vaiśvānara*, existing within the heart, is made to assume the character of the three fires. He is also indicated to be the recipient of the offering of food made to the *prāṇa* (or the principal vital air) in the *prāṇāhuti* ceremony. In the *Śat. Br.*, *Vaiśvānara* is described as a fire placed within the worshipper. All these suggest that '*Vaiśvanara*' has the significance of 'gastric fire'. Therefore, its meaning cannot be determined to be the Supreme Self and nothing else.

The reply to this is that even while having the characteristics of the gastric fire, *Vaiśvānara* has other characteristics also. He has the three worlds for His body. This cannot apply to mere gastric fire. The proper

construction therefore is that Vaiśvānara is the Supreme Self having the gastric fire for His body. The worship of the Supreme Self so qualified is taught here. This is supported by Śrī Kṛishṇa's statement in the *B. G.* that He becomes the digestive fire in all beings and by the *S'at. Br.* calling Vaiśvānara as '*Purusha*' or 'the Person', a term referring particularly to the Supreme Self. The arguments disproving Vaiśvānara to be mere gastric fire also show that He cannot be the sun-god or the element fire.

Jaimini puts forward an alternative view about the equation of Vaiśvānara with Agni. Vaiśvānara is declared to be Agni, and 'Agni' has been taken to mean 'the Supreme Self having the digestive fire for His body'. Now, Jaimini points out that the word, '*Agni*', in its etymological significance, stands for 'one who leads all to the end of the goal'. This can mean only the Supreme Self, even as '*Vaiśvānara*', on a similar analysis, denotes Him only as the Leader of all.

To a possible criticism that Vaiśvānara, by reason of His having the three worlds for His body, need not necessarily be the Supreme Self, but may be the element fire or a god, the answer is given by Āśmarathya. The infinite *Brahman* is conceived to be measured by space to help easy comprehension on the part of the worshipper. But, the objector continues, Vaiśvānara has a material body: this makes it likely that he is a minor god. Bādari replies to this point. The *Brahman* is here associated with a material body for purposes of worship. In the very context where His body is described, it is also pointed out that He is really immeasurable. Evidently, therefore, a form of worship for the attainment of the *Brahman* is taught here.

Again, it is recalled that in the worship of Vaiśvānara, one is asked to look upon one's chest as the altar, the heart, mind and mouth as the three household fires and so

on. This is in harmony with the conception of Vaiśvānara as the gastric fire and not as the Supreme Self. Jaimini, again, comes forward to reply. Vaiśvānara is worshipped every day with offerings of food in the *prāṇāhuti* ceremony. The worshipper is asked to regard his chest etc. as the altar etc. in order to make the *prāṇāhuti* performed by him assume the character of the *agnihotra* sacrifice.

This is made clear by the parallel passage in the *Śat. Br.*, where the worshipper is asked to identify the different parts of his body with different parts of Vaiśvānara regarded as having the three worlds for his body. Then he looks upon his chest as the altar, his heart as the *gārhapatya* fire, and so on. Next, he performs the *prāṇāhuti*, looking upon it as the *agnihotra* sacrifice. Thus in the worship of the Supreme Self under the name of *Vaiśvānara*, the *prāṇāhuti* is an essential element. It is now clear that Vaiśvānara is the Supreme Self and none else. (Pages 65-81).

CHAPTER I, PART 3

After dealing, in the second part of Chapter I, with all the important scriptural passages suggesting, through indistinct characteristics, either the individual self or the *prakṛiti* as the cause of the world, the *Vedānta-Sūtras* proceed in the third part to take up other passages where the indications for the individual self or the *prakṛiti* are clear and distinct.

This part consists of ten *adhikaraṇas* and forty-four aphorisms. The *Sūtras* in this part are given below :

1. The abode of the heaven, the earth etc. (is the Supreme Self), because there is an expression (in the context here particularly significant) of Himself.

2. Because also that (Being) is taught to be that which is to be approached (in worship) by the released (souls)—(He who is the abode of the heaven, the earth etc. is the Supreme Self).

3. Neither the *ānumāna* (or what is capable of being established by the logical process of inference), nor (the *jīva* who is) the possessor of life (is the abode of the heaven, the earth etc.), because there are (in the context) no expressions signifying either.

4. Because (His) differentiation (from the individual self) is taught (in the context).

5. From the context (here, it comes out that the abode of the heaven, the earth etc. is the *Brahman*).

6. On account of the (mere) existence and (also) on account of the eating (of the fruits of *karma*, which are both predicated in the context here, the abode of the heaven, the earth etc. is the *Brahman*).

7. What is denoted by the word, '*Bhūman*' (which means 'the Great One', is the *Brahman*), because He is taught (in the context) to be greater than the *samprasāda* (or the individual self).

8. Because also the attributes (given in the context) are appropriate (only in relation to Him).

9. '*Akshara*' (means here the Supreme *Brahman*), because it is declared (in the context) to be the support of what is beyond the *ambara* (or *ākāśa*, i.e., the *prakṛiti*).

10. And that (power of supporting what is beyond the *ākāśa*) is due to (His) supreme power.

11. Because also otherness is negated (in relation to the *Akshara*).

12. The object of the action of seeing is He (i.e., the Supreme Self), on account of (its) being taught (to be the Supreme Self).

13. The 'little ether' (within the heart denotes the *Brahman*) because (the reasons found in) the subsequent statements (in the context refer to Him).

14. On account of (the individual selves) going to (and returning from) it, and on account (also) of (its being indicated by) the word ('*Brahma-loka*'), (the *daharākāśa* is the *Brahman*); accordingly, it is so seen declared in the scriptures, and there are also grounds of inference (in this behalf).

15. Because also His (i.e., the *Brahman*'s) greatness as the support (of the world) is found (mentioned) in relation to this (*daharākāśa*).

16. And because also it is well known (that the word, '*Ākāśa*', means the *Brahman*).

17. If it be said that, owing to there being a reference to another (than the *Brahman*), it is he (i.e., that other, namely, the individual self, who is the *daharākāśa*), it is replied that it is not so; because of the inappropriateness (of the qualities of the *daharākāśa* being attributed to the individual self).

18. If it be said that it (*viz.*, the idea of the *daharākāśa* being the individual self) results from a subsequent passage, it is replied that it is not so; for that (individual self which is mentioned later in the context) is, on the contrary, what has its essential nature made manifest (by the removal of the concealing veil of the effects of *karma*).

19. And the reference also (to the individual self) is made (in the context) with a different object in view.

20. If it be said that, owing to its (i.e., the *daharākāśa*'s) being declared in the scripture to be little, (it is not the *Brahman*, then it is replied thereunto that) this (objection) has been already answered.

21. Because also of its resemblance to Him (this individual self is not the *daharākāśa* or the *Brahman*).

22. The *Smṛiti* also declares (to the same effect).

23. He who is (spoken of as being) limited in size (to the size of a thumb is the *Brahman*), because the scripture itself declares (to that effect).

24. This (limitation in magnitude to the size of the thumb) is, however, in relation to the heart (of man), as man (alone) is qualified (to worship and meditate on Him).

25. Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that that (*viz.*, the act of worshipping the *Brahman*) obtains (among those who are) above (i.e., among the gods and others) also ; because such a thing is appropriate.

26. If it be said that it (*viz.*, the corporeality of the gods, etc.) gives rise to an inconsistency in relation to (religious) works, it is replied that it is not right to say so ; because manifold adoption (of bodies) is seen to be possible (in the case of certain beings).

27. If it be said that it is in relation to the scripture that that (inconsistency) arises, it is replied that it is not so, because (the gods and) all (other things) are born by means of that (*viz.*, the scripture), as may be made out directly and indirectly.

28. And it is for this reason that it (i.e., the *Veda*) is eternal.

29. Because also there is a continued identity in respect of the names and forms (of things), there is nothing which is inconsistent with a revolution (of creation), because it is so seen revealed in the *Śrutis* and is also declared in the *Smṛitis*.

30. In regard to the forms of worship in which the object of worship is conceived to be the honey etc., Jaimini speaks of the absence of fitness of the gods etc. (to be worshippers), because such a thing is impossible.

31. Because also it is in relation to the Light (that such worship by the *Vasus* etc., is taught to be performed).

32. Bādarāyaṇa, however, says that there is such a fitness (on the part of the gods etc., to adopt the form of the worship of the *Brahman* known as the *Madhuvidyā*): for so it is.

33. Because it is shown (in *Chhānd. Up.* IV. 1-2) that, owing to his having heard their disrespectful remarks (i.e., of the swans) and owing also to his having then gone (to Raikva the teacher), grief arose in him (i.e., Jānaśruti, who is hence called "Śūdra" and not because he is a Śūdra by birth).

34. Because also it may be made out (from the context) that he (Jānaśruti) is a Kshattriya.

35. Because also there are in the later portion (of the context) bases of inference arising from Chaitraratha (being a Kshattriya).

36. Because certain religious ceremonies are mentioned (as needed for the study and adoption of the science of the *Brahman*) and because the absence of these (ceremonies) is mentioned (in relation to the Śūdra).

37. Because also of the undertaking (of the teaching in the case of Jābāla) after making sure of its absence (i.e., of the absence of his belonging to the Śūdra caste).

38. Because (in the case of the Śūdra) there is prohibition in relation to the listening to, learning to recite and understanding (the *Vedas*).

39. Because also it is so declared in the *Smṛitis*.

40. (He who is of the size of the thumb is the *Brahman*) on account of trembling (at Him being predicated in relation to the whole world).

41. Because the splendour (of the *Brahman*) is seen (mentioned in the context, He who is of the size of the thumb is the *Brahman*).

42. What is denoted by the word 'Ākāśa' (is the *Brahman*) because it is taught (in the context) that it is, among other things, a different thing (from the individual self).

43. Because of the teaching of difference (between the individual self and the Supreme Self) in the states of deep sleep and death (the individual self is different from the Supreme Self).

44. On account of the words, "Lord" etc. (being found in the context, the Supreme Self is distinct from the individual self).

The first section of the third part goes by the name of *Dyubvādyadhikaraṇa*, and consists of six aphorisms. It is connected with the last two *adhikaraṇas* of the first part. In the second of these, Vaiśvānara, who has the heaven for His head and the earth for His feet, is shown to be the Supreme Self. Now the enquiry is about some one else, who appears to be the individual self, and who is at the same time described to be the support of the heaven and the earth. The reference is to the *Muṇḍ. Up.*, extensively discussed in the previous section, the *Adṛīṣyatvādiguṇakādhikaraṇa*. There the invisible *Akshara* has been identified with the Supreme Self for a variety of reasons. He too has been declared to have the heaven for His head and the earth for His feet.

The doubt now put forward can arise after the acceptance of the *Akshara* as the *Brahman*. In a passage subsequent to the one describing the *Akshara* in His universal form, the *Upanishad* describes the heaven, the earth, the mind and the vital airs as inwoven in the *Ātman*. It then goes on to say that the blood-vessels are united in him in the same way in which the spokes are fitted into the nave of a wheel, that he moves within and that he is born in many ways. These are clear indications that the *Ātman* under reference is the individual self. A break in the

context can reconcile the reference earlier to the invisible *Akshara* as the Supreme Self and to the individual self as the *Ātman* here. But the acceptance of the individual self as the theme here may shake even the earlier determination of the invisible *Akshara* as the Supreme Self.

This *pūrvapaksha* position is not without weaknesses of its own. It has to resort to some special pleading to show the individual self as the support of the heaven and the earth. The *Sūtras*, however, put forward other independent and conclusive arguments. In the first aphorism, it is pointed out that in the very passage which refers to the supporter of the heaven and the earth, there is an expression which unmistakably points to the *Brahman*. He in whom the earth and the heaven are inwoven is also the *setu* of immortality. The word, '*setu*,' which usually means a dam, here stands for a bridge. This meaning may be obtained either by an etymological analysis which derives the word from the root, *śi*, to bind together, or from the fact that the bridge has some resemblance to a dam.

Once this is granted, then the association of the Supporter of heaven and earth with the blood-vessels, the mind and the vital air has to be understood in a different way. Elsewhere in the scriptures the Supreme Self is said to be seated within the heart where all the blood-vessels unite. Being the support of all, He is also the support of the instruments of the individual self such as the mind. He may also be said to be born in many ways, because of His numerous incarnations.

The next aphorism refers to another fact which shows the Support of the heaven and the earth to be the Supreme Self. This Person is described in the *Upanishad* as being worshipped by the released souls. Indeed, there is nothing to indicate that the Support of the heaven, the earth etc., can be the individual self any more than it can be the *prakṛiti*. Moreover, He is taught to be different from the

individual self in a later passage, where He as the Lord and the individual self as grief-stricken are described as sitting on the same tree. Thus, there is no break in the context to justify the *pūrvapaksha*. The argument is finally clinched by the simile of two birds on a tree, one eating the *pippala* fruit and the other shining in splendour without eating at all. Only the shining bird, which does not eat, can be the support of the heaven, the earth etc., and it is the *Brahman*.

The principle of interpretation thus upheld is that in a context dealing with the Supreme Self, so long as continuity is maintained, there is no scope for the intrusion of the individual self. But *Chhānd. Up.* (VII) is a context which seems to deal with the individual self in unbroken continuity. By the same token, the *bhūman* or the 'great one' mentioned there ought to be the individual self, and knowledge thereof accepted as redeeming. Thus, the next section, *Bhumādhikaraṇa*, comprising *Sūtras* 7 and 8, arises. It has two other links also with the *Muṇḍ. Up.* dealt with in the previous section. Association with *prāṇa* attributed in the earlier section to the Supreme Self, here has to be attributed to the individual self. He who is called *Satya* (or Truth) in *Muṇḍ. Up.* may be the Supreme Self; but the same word appears merely to refer to truthful speech here.

The *Sūtras* now show that the *Bhūman* is the *Brahman*, being pointed out to be greater than the *samprasāda* or the individual self. Rāmānuja briefly surveys the entire seventh *Prapāṭhaka* of the *Chhānd. Up.* in order to state the *pūrvapaksha* clearly and refute it. Nārada, discontented even after studying the scriptures and seeking instruction about the *Ātman*, is here taught by Sanatkumāra. He is asked to worship, one after another in the order of increasing importance, various *pratīkās* as the *Brahman*. The list begins with 'name' and ends with 'desire'. Greater than desire is the *prāṇa*. There is no direction to worship the *prāṇa* as the *Brahman*. It can be

made out that by '*prāṇa*' the individual self is meant here, even though the simile of the spokes and the nave used in the *Kaush. Up.* (III. 9) is used here. There it refers to the Supreme Self, here only the individual self is meant, as the *prāṇa* is presently identified with the embodied individual self, represented by a father, mother, sister etc.

The *pūrvapakṣa* contention is that the individual self is the central theme of this part of the *Upanishad*. There is no question asked about whether there is anything greater than the *prāṇa*. Nothing again is declared to be so. So the rest of the passage too deals with the individual self, who is later on described as the 'great one' and knowledge about whom is declared to lead to liberation.

Rāmānuja controverts this position by explaining that Sanatkumāra, without being asked any question, himself teaches Nārada about something greater than the *prāṇa*. He calls this Truth; and by Truth, the *Brahman* is meant. For it is this Truth which is later described as the *Brahman*. Moreover, in the next section of the *Upanishad*, *Satya* is differentiated from the individual self.

The *pūrvapakṣa* can be maintained only by explaining away the reference to *Satya* as having to do merely with speaking the truth as an element in the meditation on the *prāṇa*. But in the context, what is taught is the proclamation of *Satya* as transcendent. Moreover, *Satya* is shown to be different from the *prāṇa* by the disjunctive particle '*tu*' ('but' or 'however'). The person who declares the *prāṇa* to be transcendent is thus distinguished from the person who declares *Satya* to be so. The *Vṛttikāra* also upholds the view that the *Bhūman* is the *Brahman*, because He is mentioned later than the individual self in the series beginning with 'name'.

Sanatkumāra's later teaching fully bears this out. After stating that only the worshipper of *Satya* can truly proclaim the object of his worship to be transcendent, he

goes on to describe the various stages in the worship of *Satya*. Mental reflection, faith, devotion and volitional effort are taught. These are intended to be stimulated by the statement that His nature consists of bliss.

Then this blissful *Brahman* or *Satya* is defined as the Great One, “(on seeing whom) one sees nothing else, (on hearing whom) one hears nothing else, and (on knowing whom) one knows nothing else.” This means that, while experiencing the *Brahman*, who has the nature of unsurpassed bliss, nothing else is experienced. Indeed, nothing other than He exists, as there is none who is equal or similar to Him, or whose existence is not dependent on Him.

That men experience the world as full of pain and limited in happiness is due to their *karma* which makes them experience the world as distinct from the *Brahman*. When one is freed from the influence of *karma*, the same world is experienced as having the *Brahman* for its Self and becomes bliss. Biliousness makes milk disagreeable, while health enables one to appreciate its taste. The teaching is concluded by showing that the true worshipper attains emancipation.

The next *Sūtra* re-affirms the identity of the *Bhūman* by pointing out that the attributes given in the context are appropriate only in relation to the Supreme Self. Incidentally, the argument that the worship of the individual self is taught in the closing passage is refuted. The attributes mentioned include that of independent self-sustentation, of being the Self of all, and of being the producer of everything from the *prāṇa* downwards. This last attribute disproves the *prāṇa* mentioned earlier to be the *Ātman* whose worship is taught here and knowledge about whom enables one to cross the sea of *samsāra*.

Worship of the Supreme Self under the conception of the ego is taught, but not the worship of the individual

self. The worship of the Supreme Self in His essential nature and also as the Internal Ruler of the individual self is also indicated.

Thus the *Bhūman* is shown to be the Supreme Self. (Pages 90-107).

The *Satya* of the *Muṇḍ. Up.* has been shown to be the same as the *Bhūman* of the *Chhānd. Up.* Now, further doubts are raised about the significance of the word, 'Akshara', which occurs in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* in two different contexts. The invisible *Akshara* there has been held to be the *Brahman*, but in a later context it is also allowed to denote matter in its undifferentiated condition (Chapter I, Part 2, *Adhikaraṇa* 5). In *Bṛih. Up.* (III. 8), where Yājñavalkya answers some questions of Gārgī, the *Akshara* appears again to mean undifferentiated matter or the individual self, and there it is even described as the cause of the world. If this is accepted, even the identification of the invisible *Akshara* with the Supreme Self may require re-examination. *Satya*, mentioned later than the *prāṇa*, is held to be greater and different ; similarly, the *Akshara* in *Bṛih. Up.* (III. 8) mentioned as that in which what is said to be beyond the *ākāśa* (or subtle matter) is inwoven has to be shown to be the Supreme Self here.

Gārgī asks in what that which is beyond the heaven and below the earth, that which is between the two, that which is past, is present and is the future, are inwoven like warp and woof. The answer is that all things are inwoven in the *ākāśa*. This is taken by the *pūrvapakṣa* to be the ether of space, which is the first to evolve among the five great elements. The *akshara* in which it is in turn inwoven is matter in its primordial undifferentiated condition. Alternatively, the *ākāśa* may mean primordial matter, which may be conceived, even like the *Brahman* in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, to be established in itself. This view is further sought to be supported on the ground that the word, 'akshara', means the Supreme Self only in the

scriptures and that its sense as primordial matter is earlier apprehended.

The *Sûtra* replies to this argument by pointing out that the *Akshara* in the context is taught to be the support of *ambarānta*, of what is beyond the *ākāśa* or the ether of space. Now, that which is beyond the *ambara* is the undifferentiated *prakṛiti*, whose support must in reason be something different from itself. It must be noted that, when all things are said to be inwoven in the *ākāśa*, the latter means not the 'air-filled sky', but matter in its subtle condition. The *Akshara* as the support of this *ākāśa* can only be the Supreme Self. This meaning of *Akshara* is plainly derived from its etymology, which refers to what is indestructible. There is no need to go to the scriptures for this.

A further objection is now raised ; if the *ākāśa* is the undifferentiated matter, then the *Akshara* may well be the individual self, which is the basis of non-intelligent things, which has the attributes mentioned in the context, and which is known to be indicated by the word quite as well as undifferentiated matter or the Supreme Self. The answer to this is given in the next aphorism, where it is pointed out that the power of supporting what is beyond the *ākāśa* is due to the supreme power of the *Brahman*. All things are subject only to His command, and such authority does not belong to the individual self even in its state of emancipation. Yājñavalkya refers later to this supreme power of the Highest Self.

Moreover, this *Akshara* is said to see while remaining unseen, and to be indeed the only seer. Obviously the individual self cannot be described in these terms. Nothing else exists other than the *Brahman* in the sense that nothing else has independent existence. The further teaching that all religious acts proceed from the commands of the *Akshara* point out its identity with the Supreme Self. (Some of the attributes such as all-pervasiveness cannot

belong to the individual self, according to Rāmānuja). Thus the *Akshara* taught to Gārgī is the Supreme Self. (Pages 107-114).

The Unseen Seer has been taken to be the *Brahman* here and earlier. In a passage in the *Pr. Up.* it is stated that a certain type of meditation leads the worshipper to the *Brahma-loka*, where he 'sees' the Highest Person. How can the Highest Person referred to here be the *Brahman*, who is incapable of being seen? This question is debated in the next section which goes by the name of *Ikshatikarmādhikaraṇa*. It consists of only one aphorism, the 12th.

The context relates to the teaching given to Satyakāma by the preceptor, Pippalāda. More than one kind of meditation on the mystic syllable *Om* is taught here. He who meditates on the syllable of one *mātrā* attains the world of men, while the *antariksha* or the middle world is attained by the meditator of the syllable of two *mātrās*. Meditation on the syllable of three *mātrās* leads the worshipper to the *Brahmā*-world, where he sees the Highest Person, who is higher than the individual selves in their totality. These selves are themselves regarded as high or eminent on account of their superiority to the body, the senses etc. In the circumstances, the Highest Person can be none other than *Brahmā*, the four-faced creator.

How the creator acquires this character is not explained here by Rāmānuja. But from his other works it can be made out that during the dissolutions of the universe, known as *naimittika* or occasional, the individual selves in the dissolved world and their sense organs etc. are gathered in *Brahmā*. Now, after thus inferring *Brahmā* to be the Highest Person here, the attributes mentioned in relation to him are to be accordingly interpreted. He is said to be calm, free from old age, free from death and free from fear. He is the Highest. One who worships him is freed from sin. Though these attributes appear proper

only in relation to the Supreme Self, they are to be applied to the creator with necessary modifications or changes in emphasis. His extremely long life, for instance, may be taken to justify his being described as immortal.

There is nothing in the context, however, to justify all this forced interpretation. The scriptures elsewhere say that the Supreme Self can be seen and experienced by the released selves or the transcendental seers. What is said here about the Supreme Self being seen therefore does not contradict the teaching of the scripture. Hence the attributes of being free from death etc. have to be understood in their primary sense and as pointing to the Supreme Self. The description of the Highest Person here as higher than the superior individual selves has really to be taken as 'higher than him who is higher than the individual selves in their totality'. That is, He is higher than Brahmā the creator, who himself is only an individual self, subject to *karma*.

Thus three kinds of meditation are taught to Satyakāma. One leads to a mundane result, another leads to an other-worldly result. But meditation with the help of the syllable *Om* of three *mātrās*, which itself denotes the Highest *Brahman*, leads the worshipper to attain Him, to enter His world and to see Him. (Pages 115-120).

The Person lying in the city, that is, the cave of the heart, is thus shown to be the *Brahman*, and the expression, '*Brahma-loka*,' is taken to indicate His supreme abode. In the *Chhāṇḍ. Up.* (VIII), these expressions occur in a context suggestive of doubts about their significance. We are told of a lotus-like home in the city of the *Brahman*, and of a 'little ether' (or *dahara-ākāśa*) inside it. The seeking and attainment of what is inside the 'little ether' is enjoined. Here the doubt arises whether the little ether is the ether of space, the individual self or the Supreme Self. This is the problem tackled in the next section, the *Daharādhikaraṇa* consisting of ten aphorisms (13-22).

Since something is said to be inside the little ether, how can it be the *Brahman*? Hence the need for an attempt to see whether the *daharākāśa* is the ether of space. If the city of the *Brahman* is taken as the body, then the lotus-like home within it is the heart, and the *daharākāśa* is the ether of space as limited by the heart. The Supreme Self is inside the *daharākāśa*, and His quest may be taken to be enjoined.

Such a view, it may be urged, fits in with the well known meaning of *ākāśa* as the ether of space. Moreover, whatever is the magnitude of the elemental ether of space is declared to be the magnitude of the *daharākāśa*. Again, heaven and earth, fire and air, the sun and the moon, stars and lightnings are all said to be inside it. Here are indications linking the little ether inside the heart with the ether of space. The attributes of the upreme *Brahman* later on given may very well be taken to apply to Him as residing inside the *daharākāśa*.

The first *Sūtra* concludes that the Little Ether within the heart denotes the *Brahman*, because the reasons found in subsequent statements in the context refer to Him. The *Daharākāśa* Itself being the *Brahman*, what is inside It is taken to be the collection of auspicious qualities later enumerated. Rāmānuja explains this position first by criticising the *pūrvapakṣa* view and later by a survey of the entire passage enjoining the worship of the *Daharākāśa*.

The references to the ether of space, it is pointed out, are not intended to indicate its identity with the Little Ether inside the heart, nor even, strictly, to institute a comparison between the two, as the *Brahman*, denoted by the *Daharākāśa*, is obviously greater in magnitude than the ether of space. The purpose of the teaching here is merely to deny littleness to the so called 'Little Ether'.

The teacher first describes the *Daharākāśa* as being inside the lotus-like home (i.e., the heart) within the

Brahma-pura (i.e., the body conceived as the city of the *Brahman*). Meditation on the *Daharākāśa* and what exists within It are enjoined. In reply to a question about what is inside the Little Ether, he compares It to the ether of space and declares that It forms the support of the whole world. All things desired by the worshipper, whether available here or not, are found in It. Although existing within the heart which is a part of the body which is subject to decay and death, the *Daharākāśa*, being very subtle and the supreme cause of all things, does not undergo any modification whatever. It is for this reason called *Satya* or the Fundamental Reality.

Another name given to the *Daharākāśa* now is the '*Brahma-pura*'. Earlier, this expression has been taken to mean 'the city of the *Brahman*' and identified with the body. For His lotus-like home, the heart, is said to be within this *Brahma-pura*. But now the term is used in a different sense. Inside It are all desirable qualities. It is indeed the Self, devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, desiring the truth and willing the truth. The '*Brahma-pura*' here therefore means the *Brahman*, and has to be understood as 'the city which is the *Brahman*'.

Thus it is made out that the *Daharākāśa* is the *Brahman*, and His auspicious qualities are said to be inside It. The quest and meditation enjoined relate both to the *Daharākāśa* and the auspicious qualities. There is the authority of the *Vākyakāra* for the view that what exists within the *Daharākāśa* is the collection of desirable qualities.

The identification of the *Brahma-pura* with the *Brahman* points to similar expressions found elsewhere in the scriptures. In the *Chhānd. Up.* itself, we have a reference to the *Brahma-loka* seeming like a buried treasure. People walk over the treasure without knowing of its existence ; all beings, though moving in the direction of

the *Brahma-loka*, do not win it, as they are ridden upon by ignorance. The second aphorism of this section identifies the *Brahma-loka* also with the *Daharākāśa*, and thereby supports the original identification of the *Daharākāśa* with the *Brahman*.

The figure of ignorant men walking over a hidden treasure is interpreted by Rāmānuja in two ways, and each interpretation is supported by other scriptural passages. It is a well-known scriptural teaching that all individual selves rest in the *Brahman* during deep sleep. The *Chhānd. Up.* itself refers to this; and in the *Bṛih. Up.*, it is taught in a passage where the *Brahman* is called the *Brahma-loka*. The movement of the individual selves towards the *Brahman* in the simile of the hidden treasure has to be understood as movement towards the state of rest in the *Brahman* during deep sleep.

Alternatively, the hidden treasure is the Internal Ruler. All beings move unknowingly over Him at all times. The movement in regard to the individual selves is a movement in time, whereas the movement of the ignorant men is a movement in space. In both the cases, those who move are ignorant. The *Bṛih. Up.* deals at some length with the Internal Ruler and the ignorance about Him of those whom He rules.

Even without reference to other passages in the scriptures, the mere figure of the hidden treasure is by itself capable of showing that the *Daharākāśa* is the *Brahma-loka*, that is, the *Brahman* Himself.

Further proof of the identity of the *Daharākāśa* with the *Brahman* is furnished by a later passage in the *Chhānd. Up.*, which refers to It as the bridge, the support of all these worlds so that they may not get into confusion. This corresponds to a similar teaching given in the *Bṛih. Up.*, which also elsewhere speaks of the *Akshara* as the support of the sun and the moon. The *Daharākāśa* too

is said to be the support of the sun, the moon, the stars and the lightnings.

Again, it is not correct to say that the word, 'ākāśa,' is well known to stand only for the ether of space. Its use in the sense of the *Brahman* is equally well-known. The scriptures often refer to the *Brahman* as the *Ākāśa*, the Shining One; whenever indeed the *Ākāśa* is found associated with the characteristic qualities of the Supreme Self, it has to be understood as referring to Him.

Having thus shown in four aphorisms that the *Daharākāśa* cannot be the ether of space, the *Vedānta-Sūtras* now proceed to deal with the alternative view that it may be the individual self. The first argument is set out in the fifth aphorism of the section. It is to the effect that in a later passage in the *Chhānd. Up.*, there is a reference to the individual self in terms suggestive of an identification with the *Daharākāśa*.

Here the individual self is called *samprasāda*. He is described as rising up from the body, reaching the Highest Light, and then manifesting himself in his own true form. Then the passage goes on: "He is the self, said he (i.e., the teacher). He is immortality, he is the fearless, he is the *Brahman*." The qualities attributed to the *Daharākāśa* are here associated with the individual self. They may be inapplicable, so far as the ether of space is concerned, but not in regard to the individual self. The term 'ākāśa' can also stand for the individual self, which shines with knowledge, is untaintable in essence and so on.

Rāmānuja's answer is that the qualities attributed to the *Daharākāśa* cannot apply to the individual self. For instance, it cannot be said of the individual self that he is devoid of sin. It is implied that the fearlessness and the immortality mentioned in the passage above cited are those of the Highest Light and not of the individual self.

A further objection is now met. A later passage of the *Chhānd. Up.* is devoted to the teaching given by Prajāpati. Here the very same qualities attributed to the *Daharākāśa* earlier are associated with the individual self. Prajāpati teaches that the individual self “is devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires the truth and wills the truth”. Moreover, “he is to be sought after”; one “who understands and knows that self attains all worlds as well as all desires.”

Indra hears of this teaching and seeks further elucidation from Prajāpati. He is taught how to distinguish the self from the body and from the dream image and how the self persists in dreamless sleep. Complete dissociation from the body is then shown to be the essential nature of the individual self. Indra also learns about the pure state of the self in *moksha*. The conclusion of the teaching is thus set out: “He who understands and knows that self, attains all worlds as well as all desires; thus said Prajāpati indeed.” Thus the *daharākāśa* can very well be made out to be the individual self, who is shown in Prajāpati’s teaching to possess all the qualities attributed to it. It is the meditation on the individual self which is thus claimed to be taught in the *Dahara-vidyā*.

Rāmānuja refutes this contention primarily with the help of two arguments. There is a radical difference between the qualities attributed to the *Daharākāśa* and those attributed to the individual self in Prajāpati’s teaching. In the former case, the qualities are unconditioned. But the individual self has its essential nature concealed by ignorance. Only after release from the bondage of *karma* its essential nature becomes manifest, and it becomes distinctly characterised by these qualities. Moreover, there are some other qualities of the *Daharākāśa*, which can never belong to the individual self even in the state of emancipation. These include the attribute of being the bridge, that of being the support of all the worlds etc.

The question is now raised why there should be a reference at all to the individual self under the name of *samprasāda* in the earlier passage dealing with the *Daharākāśa*. If the latter were the *Brahman*, this is quite unnecessary, as there will be no injunction to meditate on the individual self. The seventh aphorism of this section gives the reply that the reference to the individual self has a different object in view. The *Daharākāśa* is the Supreme Light, and has the power to redeem the individual self. This is the purpose kept in view in the reference to the *samprasāda* in the passage dealing with the *Daharākāśa*. Meditation on the individual self is enjoined by Prajāpati, and its fruits are the same as those of the meditation on the *Daharākāśa* of which it forms a part.

The size of the *Daharākāśa* is said to be minute, not because it is the individual self, but because the Supreme Self is to be so realised. This has already been explained in the *Sarvatraprasiddhyadhikaraṇa*, the opening section of the second part of the first Chapter of the *Vedānta-Sūtras*. The littleness of the Little Ether is not natural and unconditioned, as may be seen by the other characteristics which unmistakably show It to be identical with the Supreme Self.

Again, the individual self is said, only after attaining the Supreme Light, to be characterised by the qualities attributed to the *Daharākāśa*. This means that it becomes similar to the Supreme Self in the state of *moksha*. Elsewhere in the scripture also, it is taught that the wise man, shaking off merit and demerit, attains the highest degree of equality with the Supreme Self. We have thus another proof that the Little Ether is not the individual self. Śrī Kṛishṇa also teaches in the *B.G.* that the released self attains sameness of nature with Himself. The two aphorisms dealing with the resemblance between the individual self and the Supreme Self, and with the corresponding teaching in the *Smṛiti*, are thus seen to be linked with the eight earlier aphorisms. They do not

constitute, as suggested by others, a new section, referring to a passage in the *Mund. Up.* to the effect that everything shines after the *Brahman* and that by His light all things are lighted up. (Pages 120-144).

Wherever the self is said to be of a small size, the *Sūtras* tend to hold that the Supreme Self is meant, so conceived for purposes of worship and meditation. But there are passages in *Kāth. Up.* which refer to a person of the size of the thumb. This person seems unmistakably to be the individual self. How is this to be reconciled with the method of interpretation hitherto followed? The sixth section, called the *Prāmitādhikaraṇa*, is concerned with this problem.

According to Rāmānuja, this section has four aphorisms, 23-24 and 40-41. In between, aphorisms 25-39 deal with three topics that arise by the way. Thus, the subject of this *Adhikaraṇa* is interrupted after aphorism 24 and resumed again in aphorism 40. It is disposed of in a way at first, certain incidental problems arising from it are discussed, it is raised again in a different form and finally settled once for all. (Other commentators like Śaṅkara follow a different division into *adhikaraṇas*.)

The *pūrvapakṣa* points out that the person who is of the size of the thumb is the lord of the past as well as of the future in the sense that his *karmas* have determined his past and will determine his future. He is also the lord of the body. In the *Śvet. Up.* it is definitely stated that the person who is of the size of the thumb is the lord of life, that he is associated with will and egoity, and that he wanders about through his *karmas*.

Rāmānuja's answer here is that the statement about the Person of the size of the thumb being the lord of to-day and tomorrow uses the term 'lord' in its unrestricted sense. Hence He is the Supreme Lord. Later in the *Upanishad*, His worship also is enjoined. Nor can the individual self

be deemed to rule over his past or future in any unrestricted sense. His control over his fate is subordinate to the control exercised over him by the Supreme Lord.

Why then is the size of the thumb mentioned? It is for the purpose of facilitating worship. The Supreme Self exists in the heart of the worshipper for this purpose, and since the heart of man is of the size of the thumb, the Lord also exists there as of that magnitude. Since men alone are qualified to worship the Lord, the varying sizes of the hearts of animals do not matter. Moreover, it is nowhere stated that the individual self is of the size of the thumb. It is really atomic, and in the very passage from the *S'vet. Up.* cited earlier, it is stated to be of the size of the point of a goad. (144-147).

An incidental problem is now taken up. If men are qualified for the worship of the Lord, on account of the fact that He exists in the heart limited to the magnitude of the thumb, are the gods disqualified from His worship? This question is discussed in the next section—which is really a sub-section. It goes by the name of *Devatādhikaraṇa*, and consists of five aphorisms, 25-29.

The first of these states that Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that it is proper to regard the gods as worshipping the *Brahman*. This refutes the view that they are not so qualified. The *pūrvapakṣa* is based on the argument that the gods possess neither bodies nor the state of the soliciting suppliant. Without these, they cannot become worshippers.

Underlying this view of the nature of the gods is the conviction held by some of the followers of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*. They take seriously only the injunctions in the scriptures enjoining rituals and duties. The other parts of the *Vedas* serve no purpose except being helpful to the performance of the injunctions. The injunctions merely connect the gods with the objects aimed at. There is no

need to assume gods with bodies in connection with them (any more than to assume their existence in regard to the performance of other religious activities like the practice of austerities or the giving of gifts in charity).

Rāmānuja explains the reply of Bādarāyaṇa to this view. The gods are definitely described in the *Upanishads*, the Vedic *mantras* and *arthavādas* to have bodies and organs of sense. Being subject to *karma*, they too suffer from misery. They also have some knowledge about the auspicious qualities of the Lord. Thus they are qualified to become soliciting suppliants.

To regard the *arthavāda* as a mere panegyric intended to stimulate the performance of *karma*, and to refuse to take it seriously is not right and proper. There is no point in describing a non-existent excellence. Moreover, rituals yield fruits only because gods are pleased with them, and award the fruits. To invent an *apūrva* to connect the ritual of the past with the result of the future is unnecessary and not sanctioned by the scriptures.

If the gods have bodies, what happens when many sacrificers invoke them at the same time? The next aphorism answers this question by saying that each god can adopt many bodies simultaneously. The further objection is then raised that gods with bodies have necessarily to be mortal. It is pointed out in reply that, though as individuals they are not eternal, they represent, each of them, an eternal species. The Vedic word, 'Indra', for instance does not refer merely to a particular individual like a proper noun describing a man. On the other hand, it is like the word, 'ox'. It refers to a species and not to an individual. When a particular Indra ceases to be, the Creator creates another Indra of the same kind with the help of the Vedic word, 'Indra'. By revolving it in his mind, he learns the generic nature of Indra. All this is made clear in the *Vedas* and also in *Smṛiti* works like the *Mahābhārata* and the *Vishṇu-purāṇa*.

The references to the bodies of the gods may be thus accounted for without violating the principle that their bodies denote mortality. But there are references in the *mantras* and the *arthavādas* to sages and seers described as the authors of the *mantras*. It will have to be accepted, if these references are taken seriously, that the *Vedas* came into existence in time. The answer to this is that, as in the case of the gods, the name of every sage also represents a species.

Now, the question is asked : if the final dissolution of the universe is accepted periodically, how can the *Vedas* survive it? *Sūtra* 29 gives the answer that there is a continued identity in names and forms. The Divine Lord remembers at the end of the process of universal dissolution the universe in its original configuration. Then He creates the universe as before, reveals the *Veda* which has been existent in a certain order of syllabic succession and teaches it to the four-faced Brahmā the creator, who creates the world consisting of gods, men etc. as before. The eternity of the *Veda* means that it is preserved in the same order of syllabic succession, and not that syllables or words are eternal. It is eternally kept in God's mind and taught to every Brahmā.

It is thus proved that gods and others like them possess the fitness to worship the *Brahman* as they have the character of being a soliciting suppliant and the capability needed for such worship. (Pages 147-162). Some kinds of worship prescribed in the *Vedas* have the gods themselves as the objects of worship. An enquiry is now started whether the gods can adopt such types of worship as those enjoined in the *Madhvidyā*. The eighth section consisting of three aphorisms deals with this and goes by the name of *Madhvadhikaraṇa*.

In the first of these, the opinion of Jaimini is given that such worship is impossible. The reference is to a passage in the *Chhānd. Up.* (III), in which the sun is

described as the honey of the gods. The region of mid-air is the honeycomb which rests on the horizontal bamboo of the heavens. After elaborating this metaphor, the *Upanishad* states that various kinds of oblations generate nectar which flows into various parts of the sun and affects it in different ways. One engaging in meditation about one of these kinds of nectar as a form of worship of the *Brahman* is said to become in due course one of the gods enjoying it. Ultimately, he attains the *Brahman*. Jaimini thinks that a god cannot be asked to meditate on himself as enjoying a particular kind of nectar for the purpose of being re-born in the same position.

The next aphorism gives another reason in support of Jaimini's position. It is that the gods are described elsewhere in the scriptures as worshipping the Supreme Self as the Light of lights. Obviously, therefore, it is only this kind of worship of the Supreme Self that is enjoined on the gods.

But Bādarāyaṇa thinks differently. He is convinced that the gods too are qualified for such types of worship as the *Madhvidyā*. A god can certainly worship the *Brahman* existing within himself as the Internal Ruler. He can also desire to attain the same position in another cycle of creation. Indeed, the *Madhvidyā* teaches two types of worship—that of the *Brahman* in the condition of effect and that of Himself in the condition of cause. Meditation on the sun-god etc. is the worship of the *Brahman* as produced effect. The worship of the Internal Ruler of the sun-god etc. is the worship of the *Brahman* as cause. This view of Bādarāyaṇa about the fitness of the gods for the *Madhvidyā* is also supported by the *Vṛttikāra*. (Pages 162-166).

The gods have been thus shown to be capable of worshipping the *Brahman* in the ways described in the scriptures, because they possess bodies and have the character of soliciting suppliants. Moreover, the

limitation in magnitude to the size of the thumb attributed to the Supreme Self in the scriptures is because the human heart is of this size, and He exists there for the purpose of being worshipped. Thus, all human beings without distinction of birth or rank seem to be entitled to the types of worship taught in the scriptures. Even those excluded from the study of the *Vedas* can learn about the Self and the ways of His worship in various other ways. The *Samvarga-vidyā* in the *Chhānd. Up.* (IV) is taught by Raikva to Jānaśruti, who is addressed as a *Śūdra*.

This view is rejected in the next section of seven aphorisms (33-39), where the traditional caste restrictions on the study and adoption of the various forms of worship are upheld. Only those entitled to study the *karma-kāṇḍa* of the *Vedas* and perform the rituals prescribed there can adopt the ways of worship in the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*.

As regards Jānaśruti, he is shown to be a Kshatriya in the first three aphorisms. He is addressed as a *Śūdra*, not because he belongs to that caste, but because he is full of grief about his ignorance in relation to the *Brahman*. Then it is pointed out that Vedic studies have to be preceded by a ceremony of initiation, well-known to be restricted to the first three castes only. Satyakāma Jābāla is taught about the *Brahman* only after his preceptor has made sure that he is entitled by birth to the ceremony of initiation. Caste restrictions have been placed on the study of the *Vedas*, and these have been declared in the *Smṛitis*.

Rāmānuja however points out that the *Advaitins* in reason cannot uphold such restrictions. They deny all connection between the performance of rituals and the rise of knowledge about the *Brahman*. Nor can they insist on such knowledge being impossible except through the teachings of the *Upanishads*. Thus this section is concluded (pages 166-184), and it also brings to a close the digressions in the *Pramitādhikaraṇa*.

The sixth section about the worship of the Person who is of the size of the thumb is continued. The identity of this Person with the Supreme Self has been established on the ground that He is described as *Iśāna*, the Lord. But if the term is understood as referring to lordship in relation to the body, then the individual self becomes indicated. This doubt is now dispelled by *Sūtras* 40 and 41.

The answer relies on the fact that between two references to the Person of the size of the thumb, there is mentioned *Prāṇa* before whom the world trembles. This *Prāṇa* is identical with the Person, and the great fear in which the whole world holds Him shows Him clearly to be the Supreme Self. Elsewhere, the scripture makes it clear that only the Supreme Self can possess this kind of sovereignty dreaded by all.

Another intervening passage between the references to this Person mentions One in whose presence the sun, the moon and the stars fail to shine and by whose light everything is lighted up. Such splendour can belong only to the *Brahman*. This very passage is given in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* in reference to the *Brahman*. Other *Vedāntic* texts also describe the *Brahman* as Supreme Light. (Pages 184-187).

It may be remembered that the *Pramitādhikaraṇa* arose because of the determination of the identity of the *Daharākāśa* with the Supreme *Brahman*. Towards the end of the portion dealing with the *Daharākāśa*, the *Chhānd. Up.* speaks of the *ākāśa* in a way suggestive of the released individual self. The question has to be settled whether this *ākāśa* is different from the *Daharākāśa*, and if not, whether the earlier conclusion about the *Daharākāśa* can continue to stand. In the tenth and last section (aphorisms 42 to 44) of this third part of the first Chapter, this discussion is taken up. This section is called *Ārthāntaratvādivyapadeśādhikaraṇa*.

The passage which is claimed to identify the *ākāśa* with the released individual self says that it is a

differentiator of names and forms and what is between these names and forms. Immediately before this, the well blessed individual self is said to shake off the body and all sin and attain the eternal world of the *Brahman*. The released individual self is the differentiator of name and form in the sense that he is the instrument of the *Brahman* in such differentiation. Or he is the bearer of names and forms in the condition of bondage. He is the *ākāśa* because he is associated with undiminished light. As Prajāpati's teaching about the individual self has come after the teaching about the *Daharākāśa*, the context has been broken, and there can be no objection to the released individual self being mentioned here.

Sūtra 42 gives the reply by stating that the *Ākāśa*, being taught in the context to be different from the individual self, is the Supreme *Brahman*. The differentiator of names and forms cannot be the individual self, either in the state of bondage or of final release. In the former state, he is subject to *karma*, while in the latter he is excluded from the activity of creation etc. Everywhere in the scriptures, the Supreme Self is described as the Differentiator. He is this, because He has the qualities of being free from sin and of willing the truth. The immediate context not merely mentions the released self, but also the *Brahman* whom he attains. Nor is there any break in the earlier context. Prajāpati's teaching deals with the worshipper of the *Daharākāśa*, and It is now pointed out in conclusion to be the object of attainment.

All this reasoning presupposes difference between the released individual self and the Supreme Self. But there are scriptural statements which deny such difference, and others actually declare the identity between the individual self and the Supreme Self. This is indeed the teaching of *Advaita*, against which Rāmānuja has argued at length under *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 1. 1). Now he takes *Sūtras* 43 and 44 as supporting the view that the individual self is different from the Supreme Self.

The first aphorism points out that this differentiation is taught in the descriptions of the states of deep sleep and death. The reference is to the *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 3) where the individual self in deep sleep and death is mentioned. In the former condition he is embraced by the Supreme Self and is not aware of anything. In relation to death, it is stated that he is ridden upon by the omniscient Supreme Self and goes away, giving up his body.

A little later, the same *Bṛih. Up.* speaks of the Supreme Self as the Lord of all, the ruler of all, the support of the world and so on. These attributes cannot belong to the individual self even in the state of final release. The teaching of oneness between the individual self and the negation of duality has to be understood in the way already indicated. They point to the fact that the Supreme Self is the Self of all. He is the cause of which all things are produced effects. Thus, the *Ākāśa*, which is the differentiator of name and form, is distinct from the individual self and identical with the *Brahman*. ((Pages 187-194).

CHAPTER I, PART 4

This brings us to the end of the third part of the first Chapter. In the fourth and last part, all important passages in the scriptures which seem to point directly to something other than the *Brahman* as the cause of the world are discussed. It consists of 29 aphorisms divided into eight sections, which fall into two groups, as we shall see presently. The *Sūtras* are given below :

1. If it be said that according to some the *ānumānika* (or the *pradhāna*) also is the cause of the world, it is replied that it is not so ; because what is understood in the context by the word, '*avyakta*', is not the *pradhāna* or material Nature, but it is that which is made metaphorically to represent the body ; and the scripture declares accordingly.

2. The subtle (*avyakta* or the unmanifest elementary matter) is the body; because it (i.e., the body) is fit to be of use.

3. It (viz., the *avyakta* here) is useful because it is subject to Him.

4. Because also that (viz., the *avyakta* here) is not stated to possess the character of that which has to be known (for the attainment of final release).

5. If it be held that it (viz., the scriptural context) speaks (of the *avyakta* having to be known for the attainment of final release), it is not right to say so; because, according to the context, it is the Omniscient One (that is referred to therein as such).

6. Accordingly, this exposition and question (in the context here) relate only to the three.

7. Also, as in the case (of the term) '*mahat*' (the term, '*avyakta*', has to be construed otherwise than in the system of Kapila).

8. (The word, '*ajā*', cannot mean the *pradhāna* in the context here) because there is no special characterisation (in the context so as to make it signify the *pradhāna*), as there is in the case of the word, '*chamasa*' or 'cup'.

9. Indeed, it (i.e., the *ajā*) has the Light for its source, because some declare it in their scriptures accordingly.

10. Because, however, the teaching (here) relates to the production (of the world), there is nothing contradictory (in it); as in regard to (the teaching relating to the worship of the sun-god under the symbol of) honey and other such things.

11. Even accepting the number (to be the same as that known to the Sāṅkhyas), still, they (i.e., the principles of the universe according to the Sāṅkhyas) are not (taught here); because they are different (from those that are given

in the context here), and because also these (latter) exceed (the former in number).

12. They (i.e., the *pañchajanāḥ*) are the *prāṇa* and the rest, as appears from the complementary passage (in the context).

13. According to some (the meaning of the word, '*pañchajanāḥ*,' is determined) by means of the word, 'light', although 'food' is not (mentioned in the passage here).

14. (The *Brahman*) is the only cause of the world, because He, as already taught, is indeed mentioned (in the context here) to be the cause of the ether etc.

15. (The *Brahman* is the cause of the world) because of (His) being drawn in (here in the context).

16. (The *Brahman* is the only cause of the world) because (the word '*karman*' in the context) denotes the world as an effect (produced by Him).

17. If it be said that the characteristics of the individual self and those (indicated by the mention) of the principal vital air are mentioned (here in the context)—that has been already dealt with.

18. Jaimini, however, thinks that they (i.e., the characteristics of the *jīva*) relate to the other (*viz.*, the *Brahman*); because of the question and answer (in the context relating to Him); and thus (i.e., of this opinion) are some others also.

19. (The person pointed out as the object of the spiritual sight etc. in the context is the *Brahman* Himself) because of the purport of (all) the passages (therein).

20. Āśmarathya is of opinion that it (i.e., the denoting, in the context, of the Supreme Self by the words denotative of the individual self) is a proof of the proposition (that by a knowledge of a certain one thing the knowledge of all things results).

21. Auḍulomi is of opinion (that the words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self); because he (i.e., the individual self), at the time of final departing (from the body), gets into the state (of identity with the *Brahman*).

22. Kāśakṛitsna is of opinion (that the words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self also), because of the abidance (of the Supreme Self as the Self of the individual self).

23. (The *Brahman* is) also the material cause (of the world) because (in the context) there can be no stultification of the proposition and the examples illustrative of it.

24. (The *Brahman* is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) because also of the teaching relating to His thinking and willing (to the effect that He will become manifold and be born).

25. (The *Brahman* is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) also because He is directly revealed in the scriptures to be both.

26. (The *Brahman* is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) because (also) of His making Himself into the world (being taught in the scripture).

27. (The *Brahman* is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) because of the evolution (relating to Him as taught in the scriptures being peculiar).

28. (The *Brahman* is also the material cause) because also He is declared (in the scriptures) to be the source (of the world).

29. By means of the foregoing (reasoning), all other (similar passages) have been explained, have been explained.

At the commencement of his commentary on the fourth part of Chapter I, Rāmānuja makes a few

introductory remarks, summing up what has been taught so far. The *Brahman* has been shown to be the cause of the creation etc., of the world. He is to be enquired into and realised as the means for the attainment of final release. He is free from the slightest trace of what is evil and is full of auspicious qualities. He is the Internal Self of all and possesses unlimited sovereignty.

Rāmānuja goes on to say that the fourth part is devoted generally to disproof of Sāṅkhya claims for support to their doctrines in the *Vedas*. Their interpretations of certain texts as teaching the *avyakta* to be the cause of the world are set aside. One such instance occurs in relation to the *Kaṭh. Up.*, and it is dealt with in the first section of the fourth part. It is known as the *Ānumānikādhikaraṇa*, and it consists of seven aphorisms, 1 to 7.

This discussion is linked up with the last section of the third part, where the individual self is shown to be different from the Supreme Self. Now, in the *Kaṭh. Up.*, there is a statement that the *purusha* (or the self) is superior to the *avyakta* and that there is nothing superior to the *purusha*. "That is the highest limit, that is the final goal." It is urged that pure Sāṅkhya doctrine is here propounded. There is recognition here only of two primary entities—the undifferentiated matter which evolves and produces the universe and the intelligent individual self. No other entity such as the Supreme Self is here recognised. The Sāṅkhya scheme is accorded further support from the earlier statement that the *avyakta* is superior to the 'great thing' or *mahat*.

The first *Sūtra* refutes this position by taking note of the purport of the whole passage. There is an elaborate metaphor here of a chariot with its horses, reins, charioteer, rider in the chariot and so on. Later, what are represented by the chariot and other things are mentioned again directly, stripped of metaphor, in a

particular order of increasing importance. Everything formerly referred to finds a place in the second list except only 'the body'. In the corresponding place, however, the term '*avyakta*' is found. Thus '*avyakta*' here can mean only the body. It is superior to the individual self which is great in its capacity as the agent ; for the self cannot act without the help of the body. The *Puruṣa* who is superior even to the body is the Supreme Self, because everything has its activities dependent on His will.

The context makes it clear that the rider in the chariot or the individual self is the worshipper who reaches the other end of the path, the highest abode of Viṣṇu. The metaphor of the chariot is intended to teach self-control for the purpose of reaching this objective. The second list is based upon the order of importance with reference to steps in self-control. The senses, their objects, the mind, the faculty of intellection, the individual self, the body and the Supreme Self are mentioned in order so that the mind may be detached from the objects which attract the senses, and impelled to do so by the self working through the determination of the faculty of intellection ; the body is to be subdued to the purposes of the self and refuge is to be sought with the Supreme Self. The actual steps of self-control are detailed immediately afterwards.

This order of importance cannot be harmonised with Sāṅkhya ideas. No cause-and-effect relationship on the lines of their evolutionary theory can be found here. It is only in the case of one link in the chain, the superiority of *buddhi* to *manas*, that this can even be plausibly suggested. Moreover, the Sāṅkhyas have to understand the phrase, '*mahān ātmā*', not as the great individual self, but as the material principle of *mahat*, regarded in some sense as the *ātman* or the pervader. This is a very unnatural rendering.

The Sāṅkhyas now raise the question : why is the body referred to as the '*avyakta*'? The next aphorism

answers this by pointing out that the body as a modification of the *avyakta*, useful for the purposes of the individual self, can be referred to under the name of its cause. The Sāṅkhyas thereupon claim to have gained a point: the *Vedānta*, too, seems to accept the *avyakta* as the source of the material universe! Yes, says *Sūtra* 3, but only as having the Supreme Self for its self. Rāmānuja proceeds to quote the scriptures, the *B.G.* and the *V.P.* in support of this.

The fourth aphorism further argues that the Sāṅkhyas are out of court because nowhere is it said in the *Kaṭh. Up.* that knowledge of the *avyakta* is essential for final release. This knowledge, as well as knowledge of its modifications and of the individual self is necessary according to Kapila and his followers. Such a statement about the *avyakta* from a later passage in the *Upanishad* is pointed out, where something to be known is described as devoid of form, sound etc. and as superior to the *mahat*. The next aphorism shows that this statement occurs in a context dealing with the Supreme Self. The term '*mahat*' here means only the individual self earlier described as 'great'.

Sūtra 6 goes on to explain that the entire context in the *Upanishad* deals not with the *avyakta*, but with three topics and three only. These are the Supreme Self as the object of attainment, loving devotion as the means of attainment and the aspiring worshipper as essentially immortal and potentially omniscient. Rāmānuja surveys the teachings of the god of death to Nachiketas in this light; they answer questions about what is different from other ends, what from other means and what from other agents. Finally, it is urged in *Sūtra* 7 that just as the expression '*mahat*' in '*mahān ātmā*' cannot mean the material principle, *mahat*, of the Sāṅkhyas, similarly the *avyakta* declared as superior to the individual self is different from the entity known under that name to the Sāṅkhyas. The *avyakta* can mean only the body in this context. (Pages 195-213).

Be it so, say the Sāṅkhyas, but what about the *ajā* mentioned in the *Śvet. Up.* as producing numerous offspring? It is evidently the *pradhāna* or the *avyakta*. It is described as unborn and independently engaged in creation. There is no word, like the 'body' in the *Kāth. Up.*, to give *ajā* here a different meaning. This question is answered in the second section, *Chamasādhikaraṇa*, consisting of aphorisms 8 to 10.

Sūtra 8 states that there is no special characterisation in the context to make the *ajā* signify the *pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhyas. A contrast is suggested with a passage in the *Bṛih. Up.* where the word, '*chamasa*' (or 'cup') is used to indicate the skull. This is done by representing the skull as an inverted cup.

Rāmānuja first quotes from the *Chūlikā* and *Garbha Upanishads* to demonstrate that the Supreme Person has the *avyakta* or *pradhāna* under His control, being its self. Then passages from the *Śvet. Up.* are also quoted to the same effect. Finally, the relevant passage about the *ajā* is taken up. It speaks of three unborn entities, two male and one female. She is red, white and black, and she produces numerous offspring like herself. One of the males continues to love her, while the other has stopped loving her after some time. Rāmānuja concludes that there is no topic, context or particularising attribute which makes out the *ajā* here to be the *pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhyas. It is not necessarily independent, and there is nothing to show how it is to be distinguished from the two other unborn entities.

Not only are there no reasons in favour of the Sāṅkhya interpretation ; there are reasons to the contrary justifying the view of the *Vedānta*. In the *M. Nār. Up.*, the same passage about the three unborn entities occurs with slight variations. Here the context is the creation of the universe by the Supreme Self. The unborn female is thus seen to be the *pradhāna* having the *Brahman* as its source and self.

The word, '*ajā*', has its meaning controlled by a similar sentence in another scriptural passage, just as the meaning of '*chamasa*' is determined with the help of a complementary passage. This is set out in the second aphorism, where the *Brahman* is referred to under the name of 'Light'.

The question is then raised : how can anything unborn have its source in 'Light' ? Sūtra 10 answers this objection. In the context of creation, the *pradhāna* can be described both as unborn and as having the Light for its source. At the time of universal dissolution, it exists in a subtle condition, becoming indistinguishable from the *Brahman*. Since even then it is not destroyed, it is unborn. When creation takes place, it gets differentiated, its quality of *sattva* and others become manifest ; having become modified into the elements known as *tejas*, water and heat, it exists as red, white and black in colour. In its causal condition, it is unborn ; but in its condition as effect it has Light or the *Brahman* for its source.

An analogy is suggested in the Sūtra. In the *Madhvidyā* the worship of the sun is taught in the condition of cause as well as that of effect. In the former state, he neither rises nor sets, but in the latter he does both. He is thus uncaused as well as caused. The same applies to the case of the *ajā*.

Rāmānuja then explains why he differs from Śaṅkara in the interpretation of the passage about the *ajā*. How can it refer to a single entity consisting of the elements of *tejas*, water and earth ? Obviously, the *ajā* cannot be a combination of the elements, nor the *Brahman* in the condition of effect, for then it cannot be one. Nor can it be the *Brahman* as the cause, as He cannot be characterised by the three colours. If it is something else, the *prakṛiti* regarded as His effect, then we have a near approach to Rāmānuja's position. He would prefer, however, to take the *ajā* to be the *prakṛiti* as the source of the three elements.

He is also unwilling to take the *ajā* as a she-goat and see an elaborate metaphor here. He feels that the *prakṛiti* cannot, with propriety, be represented figuratively by a she-goat, and institutes a contrast between the two to prove his point. They differ in regard to fertility, intelligence and a number of other important features.

Thus it is concluded that the passage about the *ajā* shows the *prakṛiti* to have the *Brahman* for its Self, and not as an independent entity, as claimed by the Sāṅkhyas. (Pages 231-228)

The Sāṅkhyas now cite a passage where the arguments of the previous section cannot apply in their view. In the *Bṛih. Up.* (IV. 4), it is stated that one who knows the self or *ātman* in whom the five *pañchajanas* and the element of ether are established, becomes immortal. The Sāṅkhyas contend that this passage teaches the twentyfive principles of the universe according to their system. A parallel passage has been used to suggest that the *ajā* is not the independent *prakṛiti*. But nothing of the kind is available, in their view, to explain away the specific reference to their twentyfive principles. This claim is dealt with in the next section, the *Sāṅkhyopasaṅgrahādhikaraṇa*, consisting of aphorisms 11 to 13.

A great deal here depends on the meaning of the expression, *pañchajanāḥ*. The Sāṅkhyas interpret it to mean 'groups of five'. They say that five groups of five are mentioned. Rāmānuja takes the word in the sense of 'members of a group of five'. Thus where the Sāṅkhyas see twentyfive entities, Rāmānuja sees only five.

Grammar does not justify the Sāṅkhyas position. '*Pañchajanāḥ*' as a collective word should be in the feminine gender, whereas it is in the masculine here. Only the irregularity of Vedic texts can be pleaded in excuse. Moreover, it is difficult to divide the Sāṅkhyas principles into five groups on any logical basis. Further, in addition to the twentyfive principles, the ether and the self are

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mentioned in the context. Thus the Sāṅkhya case fails, even if twentyfive things are assumed to be referred to.

The next aphorism explains what these five members of a group of five are. In a complementary passage in the same *Upanishad*, it is declared: "They understand Him (i.e., the *Brahman*) to be the *prāṇa* of the *prāṇa*, the eye of the eye, the food of the food, the mind of the mind." Thus there is a reference here to the five senses and the mind as depending on the *Brahman*. The *prāṇa* refers to the tactile sense, and the food to those of smell and taste, the eye and the ear, of course, pointing to sight and hearing.

The Sāṅkhyas object, saying that this complementary passage has two versions, those of the Kāṇvas and the Mādhyandinas. In the former, there is no mention of 'the *prāṇa* of the *prāṇa*'; thus, the five senses as explained above are not enumerated. *Sūtra* 13 answers this objection by referring to the immediately preceding passage. Here the gods are said to worship Him who is the Light of lights and who is immortal life as well. The *Brahman* is the Light on which some other lights are dependent. Clearly, these secondary lights are the senses, which bring external objects to the light of consciousness. The three senses that are later mentioned are illustrative, and their full tally has to be completed by the corresponding passage in the Mādhyandina version.

Thus the five *pañcājanas* are the senses. Even if they were to be taken to refer to the twentyfive principles of the Sāṅkhyas, these principles are clearly stated to under the control of the *Brahman*. (pages 228 to 235)

The Sāṅkhyas at this stage take up a more general question in reference to a passage in the *Bṛih. Up.* The point that is raised is that scriptural texts do not speak with one voice about the cause of the world, Both existence (*sat*) and non-existence (*aśat*) are said to have

been in the beginning. In view of the inconclusiveness of the scriptural texts, it is not possible to determine definitely from them that the *Brahman* is the sole cause of the world. But this is not the case with the *pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhyas, which may be established definitely as the cause of the world both from the scriptures and with the help of independent reasoning. The next section, the *Kāraṇavādhikaraṇa*, consisting of aphorisms 14 and 15, deals with this argument.

In the *Bṛih. Up.* (I.4.), the creation of the world is declared to proceed by means of the differentiation into names and forms of something which is originally undifferentiated (*avyākṛita*). The reference can only be to the evolution of the unevolved *pradhāna*. Once this is grasped, the *sat* and the *asat*, existence and non-existence, are seen to be the *pradhāna* in its evolved and unevolved conditions.

The objection that the cause of the world is sometimes called the *Brahman* and the *Ātman* is not serious. These terms mean respectively that which is big and that which pervades. Both these descriptions apply to the *pradhāna*. The activities of seeing etc., sometimes associated with the cause of the world, have to be understood in a figurative sense. They refer to the state of this cause when creation is imminent.

Sūtra 14 refutes the Sāṅkhya thesis by pointing out that earlier aphorisms have proved the *Brahman* to be the sole cause of the world by establishing Him as the cause of the ether etc. Rāmānuja quotes scriptural texts to show that they describe creation only after referring to the omniscience of the Creating Agent. The *pradhāna*, being inert and non-intelligent, cannot be such a cause of the world.

But what about the description of the cause of the world as *asat* and *avyākṛita*? In the next aphorism it is

pointed out that the *Brahman* is drawn in to the context there. The *Brahman* is clearly mentioned both before and after the statement in the *Taitt. Up.* that in the beginning there was non-existence. Earlier, He is stated to be the creator and the Self of all. Later, reference is made to His being the Ruler of the world and to His unsurpassable bliss. Similarly, the *Brahman* is involved also in the passage about the *avyakṛita* in the *Bṛih. Up.* It may be made out therefrom that the *Brahman*, prior to creation, is *avyākṛita*, having the undifferentiated material Nature for His body, and that in creation He differentiates Himself through names and forms. The words, “*Brahman*” and ‘*Ātman*,’ need not be interpreted in a secondary sense. It is of course implied that the essential nature of the *Brahman* remains unchanged always and that the creation and dissolution of the universe merely bring about modifications in His ‘body’. (Pages 236 to 241.)

Granted that the *Brahman* or the *Ātman* is not the *pradhāna*, but something else in association with which the *pradhāna* evolves ; what is there to show that it is not the individual self? The *Brahman* has been differentiated from inert matter, but not from the individual self. The *Kaush. Up.* (IV) is cited to show that creation is brought about by the individual self presiding over the *pradhāna* in virtue of his association with *karma*. The *Sūtras* (16-18) controvert this stand in the next section called the *Jagadvāchitvādhikaraṇa*.

The *Upanishad* tells the story of the discussion about the *Brahman* between the sage, Bālāki, and King Ajātaśatru of Kāśī. Bālāki offers to teach the King, and proceeds to suggest that the *Brahman* may be the *puruṣa* in the sun, or in the moon, or in lightning etc. Ajātaśatru disagreeing, the teacher becomes the pupil and asks for instruction. The King points out that the supreme object of knowledge is the creator of the *puruṣas* mentioned by the sage—“He whose *karma* indeed this is”.

The Sāṅkhya contention here is that the *Brahman* who is to be known and who is described as the creator is the individual self. The world is created on the basis of the various kinds of *karma* of different individual selves. They become objects of enjoyment to one another through their *karma*, and creation takes place to work out the *karma*. Knowledge of the real nature of the individual self, as distinct from the *pradhāna*, is needed for liberation, and this is taught here.

Sūtra 16 replies that the word '*karma*' in the phrase, "whose *karma* indeed this is", merely means 'produced effect'. It therefore denotes the world as an effect produced by the Supreme Self. Rāmānuja argues that 'this' in the above phrase can only stand for the visible universe. He also urges that there is no needless repetition of ideas in referring first to the creation of the *purushas* and then to the world. The whole world is taught to be the produced effect of the *Brahman*, who is the creator of the *purushas* mentioned by Bālāki. In being His produced effects, all things—the superior and the inferior intelligent things as well as the non-intelligent things—are equal.

The Sāṅkhyas however rely not merely on the usual meaning of the word, '*karma*', as the impress left by good and evil deeds. They also argue that later sentences in the passage prove that the individual self is the subject here. Bālāki and Ajātaśatru are said to strike a person who is fast asleep. The question is asked as to where the self is in a sleeping or dreaming person. The answer is to the effect that in deep sleep, when there is no dreaming, the self resides in certain veins near the heart; speech and other senses become one with the principal vital air, and all of them rest in the self. Still later, it is stated that, like a rich merchant amidst his friends and relatives, the individual self enjoys and is enjoyed by other selves. All this indicates that the *Brahman* who is the subject of discussion here can only be the individual self.

Rāmānuja deals with these arguments under the next two aphorisms. The reference to the individual self and the principal vital air are explained on the basis of the rule of interpretation used in regard to the teaching given to Prataṛḍana. This has already been dealt with in the *Ved. Sūta*. (I. 1. 32). When an intelligent individual self or a non-intelligent thing is mentioned in association with the distinctive attributes of the *Brahman* or in grammatical equation with Him, then His worship is intended to be taught as having that self or non-intelligent thing for His body.

Rāmānuja points out that the *Brahman* is admittedly the subject of discussion from the outset. In the middle of the passage, we have a reference to the Creator of the *purushas* in the sun, the moon etc., and of the world. At the conclusion, it is declared that one who knows this teaching gets rid of all sins and attains superiority and overlordship in regard to all things. The *Brahman* being thus determined to be the subject here, the characteristics of the individual self and of the principal vital air have also to be interpreted as relating to Him. Thus the union of the senses and the self with 'the principal vital air' can only be taken to be the resting of the individual self in the *Brahman* during deep sleep, when all the activities of the senses cease. The *Brahman* is meant by the word '*prāṇa*', which usually refers to the principal vital air.

Sūtra 18 refers to an opinion of Jaimini that the individual self is mentioned here, so that by means of questions and answers, the essential nature of the *Brahman* who is other than the individual self can be taught. Rāmānuja surveys the entire dialogue to bring this out. Bālāki's ideas about the *Brahman* are found inadequate by Ajātaśatru. So the *Brahman* is defined as the creator of the *purushas* in the sun, the moon, etc, and of the world. Then the *Brahman* is shown to be different from the individual self and the latter from the principal vital air.

Bālāki and Ajātaśatru fail to wake up a sleeping person by addressing him by the names of the vital air ; but he is awakened by being prodded with a stick. Then Ajātaśatru asks about the positions of the self during dreaming and deep sleep. He himself answers the question by pointing out that He in whom the individual self rests during deep sleep and from whom he emerges on waking is the *Prāṇa*.

It is made out from other scriptural passages that this *Prāṇa* can be none other than the Supreme Self. Indeed, another version of the dialogue between the King and the sage is available in the *Bṛih. Up.* (II. 1). Here the individual self is said to rest during deep dreamless sleep in the *Ākāśa* within the heart, who is well known to be the Supreme Self.

Thus, the Sāṅkhya interpretation of the passage describing the positions of the individual self during dreams and deep sleep is refuted. The self resides in the veins near the heart only before deep sleep, that is, during dreams. So the dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru does not in any way help the Sāṅkhyas to establish the cause of the world to be the *pradhāna* presided over by the individual self. (Pages 242 to 255)

It has been possible to interpret the teaching of Ajātaśatru as relating to the *Brahman* because the word, 'karma', has two meanings, one applicable to the individual self and the other to the *Brahman*. But the *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛih. Up.* (II & IV) refers to a self who has to be known, after associating him with husband, wife, son etc. He is also associated with birth and death. Obviously, this self can be none other than the individual self, say the Sāṅkhyas. This problem is debated in the *Vākyānvayādhikaraṇa*, consisting of four aphorisms (19 to 22).

The *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* deals with the teaching given by the sage, Yājñavalkya, to his wife, Maitreyī, on the eve of his renouncing the world and becoming a *sannyāsin*.

The *Upanishad* says that, when he seeks to partition his property between his two wives, one of them, Maitreyī, ascertains from him that there is no hope of attaining immortality through wealth. She then prays for knowledge of the means for the attainment of immortality.

He begins his teaching by the statement that the husband becomes dear to the wife, not on account of his desire, but in accordance with the desire of the self. After citing some more examples, he points out: "My darling, everything becomes dear, not indeed in accordance with the desire of everything, but in accordance with the desire of the self." He proceeds to teach that this self has to be meditated upon. When he is known, all the world becomes known.

There are other references apparently making him out to be the individual self in the context. Of the self who is taught, it is said that he is altogether a mass of knowledge, and that he rises up from external elements and perishes after them. After death, he has no (individualised) knowledge. At the end of the teaching, he is described as the knower.

It may be asked: by knowing the individual self, how can everything become known? The answer is that the essential nature of all the individual selves is uniform. The distinctions of gods, men, beasts etc. are due to their bodies which are modifications of matter. Thus from knowing the truth about one's own self, knowledge of all selves, that is, of the whole world, results. Such knowledge leads to emancipation; hence Maitreyī is taught thus to help her in her quest for immortality.

Sūtra 19 controverts this position. It is the *Brahman* who is taught to Maitreyī as the object of saving knowledge. Only thus can the mutual relationships among the component parts of the relevant passages become perfectly consistent. Only the Supreme Self can be the means of

attaining immortality, because it is so taught everywhere in the scriptures. The truth about the individual self has to be understood only as being helpful towards the knowledge of the *Brahman*. Even though all individual selves are similar, knowledge of the essential nature of one of them cannot lead to knowledge of all things ; for there is matter also in the world. Only the knowledge about the *Brahman* can lead to knowledge of all things.

The husband, wife etc. are said to become dear on account of the will of the Supreme Self, in accordance with His desire to reward His worshippers. To trace such love to the individual self is illogical, because the Self recommended to be known is to be known as dissociated from what is dear and after giving up all dear things. Even if it be supposed that the husband becomes dear not for fulfilling his desires but for the satisfaction of the individual self of his wife—even then the saving knowledge can only be that of the Supreme Self. He alone is unconditionally and unsurpassingly dear to the individual self. He alone has to be 'seen', and not the objects known as husband, wife, son etc., which are mixed up with miseries.

One thing, however, still remains to be explained. If the quest of the Supreme Self is the teaching given to Maitreyī, how can He be described, as He is, as rising up from the external elements and perishing after them? The reply is that the individual self is mentioned there but as denotative of the Supreme Self. The views of Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi and Kāśakṛitsna are set out in three aphorisms, 20-22, about the sense in which identity is indicated between the individual self and the *Brahman*.

Āśmarathya urges that since knowledge of the *Brahman* results in the knowledge of all things, all things are His produced effects. Hence all words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self also. This view is liable to be criticised on the ground that the individual self, being birthless and needing efforts to achieve emancipation,

cannot be a produced effect of the *Brahman*. So Auḡulomi points out that because the individual self, when finally departing from the body, attains unto the state of the Supreme Self, the latter is denoted by the words denoting the former.

This view has its own difficulties. It cannot account satisfactorily for the absence of the state of the *Brahman* in the individual self before its final departure from the body. This absence cannot arise from the nature of the individual self; were it so, the distinction has to persist so long as the essential nature of the individual self exists. Nor can the absence be explained as conditional in a real or unreal sense to the individual self. In the former case, the individual self is the *Brahman* Himself, even before the final departure from the body. If the conditional distinction is unreal, it is impossible to determine to whom the state of the *Brahman* belongs at the time of the final departure from the body.

We have therefore a third explanation. Kāṣakṛitsna holds that the words denoting the individual self are denotative up to and inclusive of the *Brahman* also, because He abides there as its self. This view is regarded by Rāmānuja as having the approval of the author of the *Sūtras*.

Rāmānuja now proceeds to show how the entire *Maitreyī Brahmaṇa* can be understood as dealing with the *Brahman* as the Self and cause of the world. Thus, first of all, the worship of the Supreme Self is taught as the means for the attainment of immortality. For this purpose, the mind and the senses which form the auxiliary instruments of worship have to be restrained. To encourage worship and self-control, the Supreme Self is taught to be the material and the instrumental cause of the world. The individual self has the nature of unlimited intelligence, though in the condition of *samsāra* this intelligence is contracted. In the state of final release, there is no such

contraction. This self has the *Brahman* for its self. Hence all things are seen by one with true vision as the *Brahman*, who however remains untouched by the evils of the world. It is only through worship of the Supreme Self and His grace that He may be known thus and immortality gained. Thus here too the *Brahman* is shown as the cause of the world. (Pages 255-275)

In the six sections of this *pāda*, replies have been given to objections raised to the *Vedānta* by those Sāṅkhyas who do not admit of the existence of God. The arguments in the first three sections were directed against the possibility of the *pradhāna* being reckoned as an additional cause. Later sections refute arguments about the *pradhāna* being the sole cause of the world.

Now another school of Sāṅkhyas come forward. They admit the *Brahman* to be the efficient or instrumental cause, but deny that He can be the material cause. In the next section, the *Prakṛityadhikaraṇa* (aphorisms 23-27), their arguments are dealt with.

The *pūrvapakṣa* cites some scriptural texts which are understood as indicating that the *pradhāna* is the material cause of the world, when presided over by the Lord. This is indeed the general trend of the teaching of the scripture, though it may not specifically describe the *pradhāna* as the material cause. Moreover, we always find the instrumental and material causes to be different, as is the case, for instance, with the potter and the clay which form the two causes of the pot.

Sūtra 23 relies on a well-known passage in the *Chhānd. Up.*, which sets out a proposition and gives examples in illustration. The proposition is to the effect that through the knowledge of a certain thing all things become known. The father of Svetaketu asks him whether during his studies he has learnt about the *Ādeśa* (i.e., the Ruler or Controlling Entity), by knowing whom whatever

is unknown becomes known. Three illustrations are given—lumps of clay, gold and iron. By knowing any one of these lumps, all things made of it become known. These examples prove the *Brahman* to be the material cause of the world. Since He is described as the Ruler or Controller, He is also the instrumental cause. References in the scriptures to the *prakṛiti* as the mother of modifications, its evolution and its involution merely show that in the state of *pralaya* the *Brahman* has the *prakṛiti* in a subtle condition for His mode, and that in the state of creation, He has the same *prakṛiti* in a gross condition for His mode.

That there are different material and instrumental causes for things like pots does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the world too should have its material cause different from its instrumental cause. Disabilities attaching to the clay and the potter are not present in the *Brahman*. The clay is not intelligent, and the potter lacks the capacity to undergo modifications and to will the truth. But the Supreme *Brahman* can be both the material and the instrumental cause of the world, as He is distinct from all other things, omniscient and omnipotent.

The next three aphorisms, 24 to 26, cite scriptural passages in support. The *Chhāndogya* and *Taittiriya Upanishads* speak of the *Brahman* willing to become manifold. The latter also says that He made Himself into the manifold world. In the *Taitt. Br.*, we read that the *Brahman* is the wood and that He is also the tree out of which He fashioned the world.

Here the doubt arises how the *Brahman* can become the manifold world consisting of intelligent and non-intelligent things and yet remain untouched by its evil. *Sūtra* 27 says that this is possible because of the *Brahman* having a peculiarly evolving nature. Rāmānuja explains that the *Brahman* is the Self of the world, consisting of intelligent souls and non-intelligent matter. Though there

is a periodical recurrence of creation and dissolution, of evolution and involution, all the substantial modifications appertain to matter and all the wrong aims of life to the individual selves.

The *Brahman* remains distinct from matter and the individual selves, even during the state of dissolution when they cannot be distinguished from Him. Whether during creation or dissolution, they merely form the auxiliary instruments of His play. Scriptural passages are cited in support of all this, and some later aphorisms of the *Ved. Sūt.* are also referred to. Thus, it is shown that the *Brahman* is unstained by the evils of the world, even though He is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world. (Pages 275 to 295).

The next section has only one aphorism. It claims that the *Brahman* has been shown to be the cause of the world by the arguments advanced so far and the explanations given of scriptural texts. What is meant is that the cause of the world has to be understood as the *Brahman*, even when the reference thereto in any scriptural text is made without mention of the distinguishing characteristics of the *Brahman*. (Pages 296-297).

The first Chapter of the *Ved. Sūt.* is thus concluded. So far, one hundred and thirtyseven aphorisms have been traversed, divided into thirtyfive *adhikaraṇas*. All these sections, with the exception of three, deal with one topic—the *Brahman* as the cause of the world. Scriptural texts dealing with the cause of the world are shown to apply to the *Brahman*. Some other texts which are concerned with what is worthy of worship are also shown to apply to the *Brahman* identified as the cause of the world.

The three exceptions consist of the sections dealing with I. 1. 1, I. 1. 4 and I. 3. 33-39. The first of these is introductory, and along with the next section mentioned, it takes the *Brahman* for granted. The other section treats

of the caste restrictions on the study of the scriptures. Thus thirtytwo sections in the first Chapter seek to establish the *Brahman* as the cause of the world.

CHAPTER II, PART 1.

In the first Chapter, the *Brahman* has been shown to be distinct from matter and from the individual self, both in the state of *moksha* and that of *samsāra*, full of auspicious qualities, devoid of even the slightest trace of evil or imperfection, the purport of the *Vedānta* and the cause of the world. This conclusion is demonstrated to be unassailable from every possible objection in the second Chapter. Particularly, it is now confirmed that the *Brahman* is the cause of the world, and not anything else.

The first part of the second Chapter consists of the following 36 aphorisms, divided into ten sections.

1. If it be said that (in case the *Vedānta* is accepted as teaching the *Brahman* to be the cause of the world) the *Smṛiti* (of Kapila) will have no scope (as supporting and supplementing the *Vedānta*, it is replied that) it is not right to say so ; because such (a view) will lead to the evil of other *Smṛitis* not finding scope.

2. Because, however, of there having been no perception (of the *pradhāna* as the cause) on the part of others (like Manu etc.)

3. By means of this (reasoning), the Yoga (system of Hiraṇyagarbha also) is contradicted.

4. (The causality of the *Brahman* in relation to the world) cannot be predicated, because of this (world) having an entirely distinct character (from Hīm) ; and (its having) such a character is made out from the scripture.

5. (Where non-intelligent things are mentioned as possessing consciousness) it is, however, the presiding deities that are taught, because it is made out to be so by means of the qualifying attribute and of the movement (of those deities) subsequent (to creation).

6. But it (i.e., the fact that the cause is distinct from the effect) is directly seen.

7. If it be said that (in case the distinction between cause and effect is accepted, then) the non-existence (of the effect in the cause will have to be accepted), that is not right. Because what is stated thereby is merely that there is no such invariable rule (that like gives birth to like).

8. The re-absorption (of the world into the *Brahman*), as in that case (i.e., of the gold and the ear-rings), will lead to the attribution (of modification etc. to the *Brahman*) and come to be therefore inconsistent (with the *Vedānta* teaching of the oneness of cause and effect).

9. There is, however, no (such inconsistency); because examples (illustrative of the position that the *Brahman* is untainted by evils in both the states of cause and effect) are available.

10. (The *Brahman* is the cause of the world) also because of the fallacies in his (objector's) own view.

11. (The view that material Nature is the cause of the world cannot prevail) also because (mere) syllogistic reasoning (in support of it) is devoid of solid ground.

12. If it be said that it (i.e., material Nature) has to be inferred (as the cause of the world) otherwise (than in the manner of other schools), in that manner also there occurs the possibility of getting no freedom (from the evil of instability of mere syllogistic reasoning).

13. By means of this (reasoning), the other unacceptable views are also explained.

14. If it be said that, because it (i.e., the possession of the body) makes Him get into the condition of the enjoyer (of pain and pleasure), there is non-distinction (of the *Brahman* from the individual soul), it (i.e., distinction) is possible as in the world.

15. The identity (of the world) with Him is made out from the passages beginning with the words, '*ārambhaṇa*' etc.

16. Because during the existence (of the effect) also, there is perception (of the causal substance).

17. Because also of the existence of the other thing (i.e., the effect in the condition of cause).

18. If it be said that there is no (identity of the cause with the effect) because of the description (of the effect) as non-existence, it is replied that it is not so, for the reason (that such non-existence is) by way of another attribute, as is seen from the remainder of the (scriptural) passage in question, from logical reasoning and from other words in the scripture.

19. As in the case of the cloth.

20. As in the case of the vital airs, etc.

21. It may indeed be said that, owing to the other (i.e., the individual self) being described (as identical with the *Brahman*), there will result (to Him) the evils of not doing what is good (to Himself) etc.

23. As in the case of stones etc., it (i.e., becoming the *Brahman*) is inappropriate (in relation to the individual self).

24. If it is denied (that He is the sole cause), because a collection of materials is seen (even with capable agents and not with the *Brahman*), it is not right to say so. For it (i.e., creation) resembles (the production of) milk.

25. He (in creating the universe) is like the gods etc. (who create by their mere will what they desire) in (their own) world.

26. It may be said that it (i.e., the above view) leads either to the whole (indivisible *Brahman* becoming the divisible world) or to the contradiction of the scriptural texts relating to the indivisibility (of the *Brahman*).

27. However (the causality of the *Brahman* does not lead to either of these conclusions), because of the scripture, as it (i.e., His being different from all things else) rests (solely) on the scripture.

28. Thus, even in regard to the individual self (there is no ascription of the attributes of non-intelligent things), because they (i.e., the powers possessed by things) are varied and wonderful.

29. Because also there are errors in his (i.e., the objector's) own view.

30. And because also He (i.e., the Supreme Deity) is revealed in the scriptures as associated with all (powers).

31. If it be denied (that the *Brahman* is the cause), owing to His having no organs (and body), this objection has already been answered.

32. (He is) not (the cause of the world), because it (i.e., creation) has a purpose.

33. Mere play (is all His purpose in the creation of the world etc.), as indeed is the case (in regard to a king etc.) in the world.

34. There is no partiality or mercilessness (in Him), because it (i.e., creation) is dependent (on *karma*). The scripture says accordingly.

35. If it be said that there is no *karma* (or results of works before creation) because (of the declaration in the scriptures) of the non-distinction (between the individual selves and the *Brahman* prior to creation), it is replied that it is not right to say so ; because they (i.e., both the selves and *karma*) are beginningless. It (i.e., the non-distinction) is appropriate, and it (i.e., the beginninglessness of souls) is also declared in the scriptures.

36. (The *Brahman* is the cause of the world) because of His having all the qualities (required for being such a cause).

The first section of the first *pāda* of the second Chapter goes by the name of *Smṛityadhikaraṇa*. It consists only of two aphorisms. The claims of the Sāṅkhya system of Kapila as an authoritative guide to the interpretation of scriptural texts, are here examined and

refuted. It may be remembered that the last section of the first Chapter points out that all scriptural texts bearing on the cause of the world have to be understood as establishing the *Brahman* to be such cause. The Sāṅkhya now comes forward and says that the principles of interpretation adopted so far have proceeded on the erroneous basis of ignoring the insight and authority of the great sage, Kapila. A *Smṛiti* which contradicts a clearly understood scriptural passage, has to be rejected, of course. But the *Smṛiti* of Kapila, which expounds the Sāṅkhya system, offers authoritative guidance in the interpretation of obscure and contradictory scriptural texts. As it is almost exclusively concerned with metaphysics, it has no scope elsewhere than in dealing with such matters as the cause of the world etc. Thus, the scriptural texts which seem to support the *Vedānta* view have to be understood in harmony with the Sāṅkhya thesis, and not the other way round. The support given by the *Smṛitis* of Manu and others to the *Vedānta* is of no avail, because those *Smṛitis* have scope elsewhere and are authoritative only in regard to ritual and conduct.

The reply is given that the philosophical portions of the *Smṛitis* of Manu and others are also authoritative. They deal with the Lord and His relations with the world in order to provide a basis for the duties and rituals which they enjoin as constituting His worship. If Kapila has some authority, Manu and others are even more authoritative. The supporters of the *Vedānta* are many, while Kapila is only one. Stray scriptural texts which seem to support Kapila have therefore to be harmonised with the many which reveal the *Brahman* to be the cause. Moreover, Manu and others have had no perception of the truth as seen by Kapila. So Kapila's perception is based on error. The established conclusions of the *Vedānta* cannot be disturbed by Kapila's speculations. (Pages 299-307).

The next aphorism, which constitutes a section by itself, similarly refutes the Yoga system, attributed to

Hiraṇyagarbha, even though a Supreme Lord is here admitted and the *yoga* of devotion accepted as the means for the attainment of final release. For the Lord is here merely the instrumental cause and not the material cause of the world, which is held to be the *pradhāna* as an independent entity not having the Lord for its self. The meditation of Yoga therefore has for its objects the individual self and the Lord not properly understood. (Pages 307-308).

The authority of the *Smṛitis* of Manu and others is then attacked on the ground that they defy reason in teaching the intelligent *Brahman* to be the cause of the non-intelligent world. For the characteristic quality of the cause which differentiates it from other entities, has to persist in its produced effect also. The *Brahman* is devoid of evil, omniscient and the sole seat of all auspicious qualities. How can He be the cause of the imperfect, impure and inanimate world, whose characteristics are the opposites of His? The scripture itself makes Him out to be so different from the world. And the interpretation of the scripture has to be in accordance with reason. This problem occupies the next section, known as the *Vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa*.

The argument that the *Brahman* can be accepted to be the material cause of even non-intelligent matter because consciousness may be regarded as latent there, fails. For whatever is never manifest at any time is not latent, but non-existent. The *Brahman* having a nature which consists of knowledge, bliss and sovereignty, its characteristic quality of intelligence does not persist in the produced effect of the world. Hence there is a fundamental dissimilarity between the *Brahman* and the world, which makes it impossible for the former to be the cause of the latter. The birth of the intelligent scorpion from the non-intelligent cowdung and the non-intelligent cobweb from the intelligent spider can be explained on the basis that the relation of cause and effect exists among the non-intelligent part of the source and what is derived from it.

Scriptural passages which describe non-intelligent things like the earth, the waters and the *prāṇas* as speaking, desiring, competing and so on, refer only to the deities presiding over those non-intelligent things. They do not disprove the radical difference between the intelligent *Brahman* and the non-intelligent world.

But what about well-known instances in our experience where the effect is dissimilar to the cause? The intelligent insect is produced from the non-intelligent honey, and similarly the scorpion from cowdung. The distinguishing attributes of the causes, honey and cowdung, are not seen to persist in their respective effects, insects and scorpions. Why should not then the non-intelligent world be produced from the intelligent *Brahman*?

That, says the Vaiśeṣhika, would be accepting the *asat-kārya-vāda*, the view that the effect is not existent in the cause. The birth of the world in that case will be from non-existence. Not so, replies *Sūtra* 7. What is claimed is only that there is no invariable rule, that like gives birth to like. Oneness of substance between the cause and the effect is by no means denied. Hence it is maintained that the *Brahman*, who is the cause, undergoes modifications in the form of the world, which is distinct from Himself.

But, if there is oneness of substance between the *Brahman* and the world, and if they become indistinguishable during *pralaya*, all the evils of the world have to be necessarily associated with the *Brahman*. Then the *Vedaānta* passages will become mutually inconsistent. It may of course be said that the world forms the body of the *Brahman* and that its evils do not taint Him. But the intelligent and non-intelligent things cannot form the body of the *Brahman* in any sense. The body is dependent on the vital breath, and is the substratum of sense-organs that form the means for the experience of pleasure and pain resulting from *karma*. But the *Brahman* is not associated with the vital breath or sense-organs, and is free from

subjection to *karma*. Nor is it helpful to define the body as the ground of experience ; for the definition is applicable to many other things like palaces. Moreover, the eternal and spontaneous experience of bliss by the *Brahman* is not dependent on any ground of experience.

Two other possible definitions of the body are also objected to. If the body is said to be something whose essential nature, existence and activity are dependent on its self, then it applies to puppets and not to diseased or dead bodies. Again, it may be said that what is controlled and sustained by and is solely subservient to the glory of another is the body of that other. But this definition is too wide in that it is applicable to the category of action and such others.

Hence it is argued that scriptural passages become mutually inconsistent, if the view is taken that the world is the body of the *Brahman*. Even if such a relation between the world and the *Brahman* were possible, the possibility of evil cannot avoided by the *Brahman*. *Sūtra* 9 denies this conclusion by pointing out that examples illustrative of the position that the *Brahman* is untainted by the evils of world both in the states of cause and effect are available. It is well known that childhood, youth, old age etc., which belong to bodies, are not associated with souls. Similarly, knowledge, happiness etc. belong to souls and are not associated with bodies. When the *Brahman* is spoken of as contracting and expanding during dissolution and creation respectively, it is His body which suffers these changes. His purity is not affected by its evils. There is no inconsistency in the scriptural passages proclaiming His auspicious qualities and at the same time describing the world as His body.

The definition of the body given by the *Vaiśeṣika* is imperfect in that it cannot apply to the earth as the body of the *Brahman*, to the bodies of released souls, to the

chosen bodies of the *Brahman*, to the bodies of immovable beings and to the bodies acquired by curses. A satisfactory definition would run: "That substance which, in regard to all things as can be accomplished by it, is completely and always capable of being controlled and supported by an intelligent soul, and which has its essential nature solely subservient unto the glory of that intelligent soul—that substance is the body of that intelligent soul." In a diseased body, something obstructs the power of control of the soul. The dead body is a body only nominally. It is called so on account of its having been once a body.

Moreover, the Sāṅkhya theory about the cause of the world is riddled with difficulties. The self is regarded as free of modifications and of the nature of pure intelligence. Creation is said to be due to the superimposition of the attributes of the *pradhāna* on the self owing to proximity. If mere proximity can bring this about, even the freed souls must become entangled. Nor can we have any modification of the *pradhāna* being responsible for creation, for modifications are said to be the effects and not the cause of creation. So the *pradhāna* cannot be proved to be the cause of the world.

Further, logical reasoning on which the Sāṅkhya relies is notoriously inconclusive. The speculations of Kapila, Patañjali, Gautama and Kaṇāda, as well as those of the Buddhists, are contradictory, one of another. If it is suggested that arguments of a different kind can be advanced to sustain the Sāṅkhya thesis, and that these will be free from the errors of those mentioned above, the answer is that even these may be disproved by some cleverer logician. The inconclusiveness of logical reasoning continues to be a major obstacle to the establishment of the conclusion that the *pradhāna* is the cause of the world. Thus the *Brahman*, even though different from the world, is still its cause and source. (Pages 309–330).

In the next section, which consists only of *Sūtra* 13, it is pointed out that other unacceptable views are also disposed of by the refutation of the Sāṅkhya. These include those of the Vaiśeṣikas, the Naiyāyikas, the Jains and the Buddhists. Even though all of them believe in the atoms as the cause of the world, their atomic theories are mutually contradictory. So mere logic cannot satisfactorily account for the world, nor can it be taken as disproving the *Brahman* to be the cause of the world. (Pages 330-332).

The objection that the *Brahman*, being different from the world, cannot be its cause, has been sought to be overcome by bringing in the relationship of body and soul between the two. Now, the Sāṅkhya asks the question : if the *Brahman* is the possessor of a body, He cannot avoid, any more than the individual self, experiencing the pleasures and pains arising from such possession. The reply to it is given in *Sūtra* 14, which constitutes a section by itself, the *Bhoktrāpattiyādhikaraṇa*.

The point now brought forward is to be distinguished from what has been already disposed of under *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 2. 8). There it has been shown that the *Brahman*, by reason of His being present in the heart as the object of worship, does not experience the pleasures and pains of the worshipper. The reasons for the *Brahman* and the individual self being present inside the body of the worshipper are different. Here it is argued that, if the *Brahman* is associated with a body as its lord, then, just as in the case of an embodied individual self, He cannot avoid experiencing pleasures and pains. Scripture is quoted to show that such experience is inevitable so long as there is possession of a body.

The *Sūtra* replies to this. The experience of pleasures and pains by the individual self is due to the harmony or disharmony of the humours of the body. This results, not from his possession of a body, but from his past *karmas*

in the form of merit and demerit. The quoted scriptural passage applies only to a body acquired under the influence of *karma*. Elsewhere, scripture refers to the bodies of the freed souls, and they do not experience pleasures and pains like bound souls. Is it then necessary to say that the Supreme Self, who is devoid of evil and has not the slightest trace of contact with *karma*, cannot be tainted by imperfection or misery, even though He has the whole universe for His body?

The *Sūtra* refers to the analogy of experience in the world. This may be taken to point out what happens when a king's orders are obeyed and transgressed. Rewards and punishments follow, but the pleasures and pains arising from these do not result to the king because he has a body. *Draṇiḍa* in his *Bhāṣya* says that the Lord is like a king who is protected from discomforts even in an uncomfortable place, who gets enjoyable things and who protects his subjects. Thus the Lord is not affected by the evils of the world. The essential nature of the Lord is not affected by the creation or the dissolution of the universe.

Sāṅkara, *Bhāṣkara* and *Yāḍavaprakāṣa* take the distinction mentioned in the *Sūtra* to be that between the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment. By examples like those of the ocean, the wave and the foam, this distinction is sought to be established. *Rāmānuja* points out that none of these schools can consistently make this objection and answer it. (Pages 332-337).

The two sections following the *Vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa* were either complementary or incidental. We have now to go back to it. There a reply has been given to the objection of the *Sāṅkhya* that the *Brahman* cannot be the cause of the world because it is different from Him. It has been pointed out that the world is in one sense identical with the *Brahman*. This is based on the assumption that the effect is only the cause transformed

and that therefore there is identity between cause and effect. Now this assumption is challenged by the followers of Kaṇāda. Their criticism is examined in the next section, the *Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa*, consisting of aphorisms 15 to 20.

While the main critic in this section is the Vaiśeṣika school of Kaṇāda, Rāmānuja allows the discussion to cover a wide range. The theories of Saṅkara, Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa about cause and effect are also considered. Even differences of opinion among the followers of Saṅkara are noticed. The grand debate starts with a statement of Kaṇāda's views about the fundamental difference between cause and effect. The *Advaitin* replies that there is nothing other than the cause, all effects being unreal. Certain difficulties in this position are sought to be explained by those followers of Saṅkara who locate ignorance in the individual self. They are in turn criticised by other followers of Saṅkara who locate ignorance in the *Brahman*. Kaṇāda replies to these, and re-affirms his position. Rāmānuja then proceeds to refute him with the aid of scripture and logic. Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa are also refuted as holding untenable views. We have thus a critical enquiry which recalls the *Jijñāṣādhikaraṇa* in Chapter I, proceeding sometimes on parallel lines and sometimes striking out new paths of reasoning.

The theory of the identity of cause and effect is attacked by Kaṇāda on eight grounds. He points out that the notions of cause and effect are different. So too are the words descriptive of them. Again, their shapes are not the same, and in number they vary. The form of the pot is not that of clay; and while threads are many, the cloth is one. Moreover, the effect exists at a time subsequent to the cause. They cannot both exist at the same time. The effect is produced by work done on the cause by an agent. This work will be unnecessary if the cause and the effect are identical. Cause and effect also serve different purposes. Clay cannot fetch water from a well, nor can a

wall be built with a pot. Finally, if the effect is existent in the cause, there will be no non-eternal things.

Some possible objections to this position are also disposed of in advance. The theory that the activity of the agent helps in the manifestation of an effect previously latent in the cause is shown to have logical difficulties. For instance, the world is a collection of manifest things or effects. Their causes must be other manifest things, and they too would require other manifest things, and so on *ad infinitum*. If the manifestation of the effect has an origin, it is tantamount to saying that the effect is non-existent in the cause. The activity of the agent becomes meaningful, only if it is regarded as bringing into existence a non-existent effect from a cause which has a fitness for producing that effect. (Pages 337-340).

The *Advaitin* here comes forward to attack the *Vaiśeṣika*. He declares that the effect is identical with the cause because nothing other than the cause really exists. Every effect and the way in which it is practically realised are founded on ignorance. For instance, pots, dishes etc., made from clay are unreal, because they are excluded from perception one after another. The clay alone is real, because it persists all through. Similarly, the *Brahman* who is pure existence devoid of attributes, is alone real. The universe which is His effect is unreal. Again, unreality being that which is liable to be stultified by knowledge, the world is neither a real entity like the *Brahman*, nor a non-entity like the horns of a hare.

Moreover, what is called the effect is incapable of logical definition. It is not possible to say that the effect is produced by the causal substance either in its unmodified condition or after the assumption of any particular condition. Nor is the logical difficulty overcome by suggesting that the unmodified cause, in association with a particular time, place or instrumental cause, produces the effect. All the differences between the cause and the effect

listed by the objector have an erroneous basis, as when silver is mistakenly perceived in the mother-of-pearl.

Hence, the effect, regarded as something other than the cause, is unreal. The whole world, being an effect other than the *Brahman*, its cause, is unreal. This conclusion is supported by the scripture, and hence would prevail against perception, were that necessary. But perception also has pure existence for its object. (Pages 340-347).

Granted that the world is unreal, how to account for the individual self? The *Brahman* Himself having assumed the condition of the individual self, the latter is not unreal. But then the pains and pleasures of all are not experienced by each individual self. Moreover, there are distinctions between the individual self and the Lord, between the bound and the released selves, and so on.

A school of *Advaitins*, who locate ignorance in the individual self, now come forward to explain the position. The distinctions among individual selves are determined by particular limiting adjuncts. A conditional impurity attaches to them, and they become the abodes of ignorance. The state of the individual self and the stream of illusion are beginningless. The analogy is given of one face being reflected in gems, swords, mirrors etc., which may be big or small, pure or impure, and so on. (Pages 347-349).

Another school of *Advaitins*, who locate ignorance in the *Brahman*, criticise this view as an attempt to seek the favour of dualists. Is ignorance to be located in the fictitious form of the individual self, or in the *Brahman* as having this form? It cannot be the former, because all things other than the *Brahman* are unreal and non-intelligent, and ignorance can be located only in something which is intelligent. Again, how can ignorance create the form of the *jīva*, and at the same time be located in the *Brahman* qualified by this form?

If a single ignorance is responsible for the existence of all individual selves, the rise of true knowledge in one individual self will bring about the emancipation of all. The assumption of varieties of ignorance corresponding to each individual self does not save the situation. The ignorance which produces the individual self cannot be in it, but must be elsewhere, that is, in the *Brahman*. To say that the ignorance in a prior individual self manufactures a posterior individual self leads to the momentariness of the individual self and other difficulties. Moreover, the rise of true knowledge will then mean the destruction of the essence of the individual self.

The analogy of the reflected face regards the mirror as the limiting adjunct. The appearance of smallness and other evils cannot result to the face or its reflection, because both these are non-intelligent. The appearance of manifoldness must result to the *Brahman*. As He is one indivisible uniform mass, He cannot see the individual selves without the help of ignorance.

These difficulties cannot be overcome by making a distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā*, and attributing *māyā*, the means of deceiving others, to the *Brahman*, and *avidyā*, the means of self-deception, to the *jīva*. There is no point in the *Brahman* having *māyā*, if He cannot see others, and He cannot see others except with the help of *avidyā*. Other attempts to distinguish *māyā* and *avidyā* also fail. Nothing is gained by saying that *māyā* shows unreal things to be unreal, while *avidyā* is the cause of false perception. Nor is there any point in the view that *avidyā* gives rise to the perception of things at once unreal and undesirable, while *māyā* does not lead to the perception of undesirable things by the *Brahman*. Moreover, an eternal and unreal *māyā* is of no use to the *Brahman*. Therefore, it must be concluded that the *Brahman* Himself, divided into various parts by the beginningless *avidyā* associated with Himself, perceives manifoldness as existent within Himself. The definite

distinctions of the bound and the free, the teacher and the pupil etc., arise from illusion as in the case of dream-perception. It is enough if there is one *avidyā* to account for all fictitiously assumed things.

This conclusion is set out in four syllogisms. All distinctions such as that between bondage and freedom or that between oneself and another, are manufactured by ignorance and are unreal like dreams. One's soul animates all bodies, which are all manufactured by ignorance. All intelligent things are one's own self.

After thus answering the *Advaitins* who locate ignorance in the individual self, the other school of *Advaitins* go on to attack Kaṇāda on two other grounds. If the individual selves are many, all of them should have been liberated; for the past periods of time known as *kalpas* are infinite. Being differentiated, the selves possess the quality of number, and like pots etc., they must be deemed to be non-intelligent. The second objection is that the existence of anything other than the *Brahman* affects His infinity, which is declared in the scriptures. Being limited as a thing implies origination and destruction, and these will have to be predicated of the *Brahman*.

Hence it is concluded that the *Brahman*, under the influence of beginningless ignorance, becomes the seat of the superimposition in the form of the world. Nothing other than the *Brahman* being real, the world is identical with Him. (Pages 349-362).

The school of Kaṇāda now proceeds to reply in detail to the second group of *Advaitins*. At the outset, attention is invited to one of the seven objections advanced by Rāmānuja against *Advaita* under the *Jijñāsādhikaraṇa*. It goes by the name of *Tirodhānānupapatti*, and points out that the *Brahman*, who is devoid of attributes and is mere self-luminousness, cannot have His luminosity concealed, without suffering the destruction of His essential nature.

It is wrong to argue that effects are unreal because they are excluded from consciousness, one after another. The logical exclusion of a thing seen at one place and time from another place and time does not stultify its reality. Nor is it right to maintain that effects, being perceived for a limited time between their birth and their destruction, are not describable either as entities or as non-entities, and are hence unreal. The unreality of a thing can be proved only by the stultification of its perception at the time and place it has been perceived and not at any other time and place. In the latter case, it is shown to be non-eternal, and not unreal.

How is the effect produced? An unmodified cause in association with time, place and such auxiliaries, produces the effect. This association with time, place etc. is dependent on other causes like God's will, *karma* etc., and not on the cause or its modification. In an effect like the mystic crass of gold, the cause or gold is certainly seen. But the effect is also established to be different by differences in ideas, words, etc. relating to cause and effect.

The syllogisms of the *Advaitin* are now attacked. One soul cannot animate all bodies, because the experiences of all are not found in one; and to attribute variety in experience to the non-intelligent internal organ of sense is improper. Bodies are not manufactured by ignorance, because they are unstultified and therefore real. From matter being uniformly non-intelligent, all intelligent selves cannot be said to be identical, because their experiences are different. One's own self cannot ensoul all bodies, because *Advaita* has no use for concepts like 'I', 'you' etc.

If all things other than pure intelligence are unreal, then all efforts to win release are futile. The knowledge prompting it is itself ignorance, or is located in a knower manufactured by ignorance, or is derived from a teacher

or a scriptural sentence similarly produced. The *Brahman* who is thus sought to be known cannot but be unreal.

To say that the pure attributeless *Brahman* is self-luminous does not prove the *Advaitin's* case. Consciousness is said to be self-luminous only because perception brings external objects to the light of consciousness. Nor can the *Brahman* be the witness of ignorance or the projector of ignorance ; it is only a particular knower who can witness or project.

The *Advaitin's* argument about real effects springing from unreal causes is undermined by his allowing only limited and empirical reality to them. The *Brahman*, even though known from knowledge relating to unreal things, cannot be said to be real because there is no subsequent stultification. For knowledge based on error cannot establish anything to be real. If the negation of the attributes of the *Brahman* is later than their affirmation, the negation of even the attributeless *Brahman* by the nihilist is later still.

The scripture has already been shown not to support *Advaita*. So, too, perception. Hence it is clear that knowledge is in a real knower and that it proves particular things. Part of this knowledge rests on an erroneous basis, and such error is real. Only thus can we distinguish the real from the unreal, or have any practical transactions. Taking the world to be an unreal superimposition, the *Advaitin* seeks a real basis for it in the *Brahman*. Errors, however, can arise even from an unreal basis as from unreal misleading causes etc. This particular argument therefore is not of much use.

The existence of many individual selves has been denied on the ground that they should all have been redeemed because there have been an infinite number of *kalpas* in the past. But then the selves are also infinite in number. They possess the quality of number only in

relation to the limiting adjuncts of space and time. Differentiation does not make them non-intelligent, because it cannot endow them with the attributes of a different class of things. Distinction among pots does not make them cloth.

The limitation of the *Brahman* as a definite thing does not detract from His infinity. Variations of things in regard to limitations of time and place are not connected with their limitations as things. Hence the existence of other things does not negative the association of the *Brahman* with all time and place, which is arrived at by other means. Moreover, the *Advaitin* himself has to accept the distinction of the *Brahman* from ignorance, and thereby concede that He is limited as a thing. To speak of the absence of limitation as a thing is indeed to speak of the horns of a hare.

So the *Vaiṣeṣika* concludes that the effect is real and different from the cause. The world, being an effect of the *Brahman*, is different from Him. (Pages 362-375). This is the *pūrvapakṣa*, which this section seeks to controvert. *Sūtra* 15 cites a well known passage from the *Chhānd. Up.* in refutation.

In the context, *Śvetaketu* is taught by his father about the *Brahman*. Asked whether he has learnt from his teacher about that Ruler by knowing whom everything becomes known, *Śvetaketu* feels nonplussed. He wonders how by knowing one thing everything can become known. The examples of clay and pots, of gold and ornaments, of iron and scissors etc. are brought to his notice. Here the knowledge of the material cause is seen to result in knowledge of all its effects. But *Śvetaketu* still remains unconvinced. He sees only the difference between clay and pots, and not their identity. So, he is further taught that pots are real as clay. For the sake of practical use, the clay is made to assume a certain shape, and in this condition it is given a name. Thus we have the pot. But

really the pot is only clay. It is not that the pot is unreal and the clay alone is real; but the pot is a state or condition of clay. This is taught to Svetaketu in the statement: "Modification, (as also) name, is attained (by clay) for the sake of speech (followed by action); it is all real only as clay." (*Chhând. Up.* VI. 1. 4). Other passages both before and after bear this out.

The Vaiṣeshika argument that the pot is realised as destroyed even while the clay is in existence is set aside on the ground that production and destruction are merely particular conditions of the causal substance. This accounts for differences of ideas and words between the cause and its effects. The activity of the agent is also seen to have scope, as on it depends the attainment of a particular condition by the causal substance. This view also explains how the effect is existent in the cause. The effect is accepted to be real, as against the *advaitin*, but it is non-different from the cause.

The example of the clay and the pot is applied to the *Brahman* and the world. The Supreme *Brahman*, during *pralaya*, has for His body the intelligent and non-intelligent things in a state so subtle that they cannot be distinguished from Him. Then, there is creation, when He has for His body the intelligent and non-intelligent things in a gross condition and differentiated by names and forms.

Differentiation by means of names and forms takes place by the entry into the non-intelligent thing of the individual self which has the *Brahman* for its self. The *Brahman* also remains as the self of the non-intelligent thing associated with the intelligent self. Thus all the modifications and the erroneous aims of life are in association with the intelligent and non-intelligent things which form His body; and the *Brahman* remains devoid of evil and a mine of auspicious qualities. It is in this sense that non-identity is negated and identity taught as between the world which is the effect and the Supreme *Brahman* who is the cause. (Pages 375-384).

Rāmānuja then proceeds to deal with the views of Saṅkara, Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa about the scriptural statement of identity between the world and the *Brahman*. Saṅkara holds that such identity results through the effect being unreal. The cause alone is real, and it endures as the basis of the unreal effect. Rāmānuja says that this view does not accept identity in the strict sense.

Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa admit the effect to be real and identical with the cause. The former believes that the identity between the individual self and the *Brahman* is natural, while the distinction between them is due to limiting adjuncts. As between the *Brahman* and the non-intelligent things, both identity and distinction are natural. This amounts to saying that no entities exist other than the *Brahman* and the limiting adjuncts. Hence the *Brahman* Himself must be regarded as undergoing modifications in the form of evil, and this is against the scriptures which maintain distinctions between Him, the intelligent self and the non-intelligent thing.

Yādavaprakāśa thinks that Pure Existence is the causal *Brahman*. In creation a part of Him changes into the intelligent selves, non-intelligent matter and the controlling Lord. All these are made up of Pure Existence; and so there is identity between the *Brahman* who is the cause and the world which is the effect. Rāmānuja declares that this view is against both reason and scripture. He quotes from the *Upanishads*, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Manu Smṛiti* and the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa* to show that Pure Existence can be none other than Nārāyaṇa, who is full of auspicious qualities. Moreover, existence has to be regarded as an attribute of things: it cannot be either a substance or a cause.

Thus identity is established between the *Brahman* who is the cause and the world which is the effect, in the manner set out by Rāmānuja, and in no other way is it possible. (Pages 375-391). The Vaiśeṣika now raises a

fresh objection. Differences in words and ideas occur both when a single substance undergoes changes of state and when we deal with different substances. In *Sūtra* 16, it is pointed out by way of reply that differences of state alone can be indicated when the effect is recognised in the causal substance. Nor can the cause and the effect be said to be two entities of the same class because two entities are not seen at one time. If they are two substances, the recognition of the cause in the effect is not possible. In the scorpion produced from cowdung, though the cause is not seen, the substance of earth which forms the first cause of cowdung is seen. In smoke, fire is not seen because fire is not its cause, but only wet fuel: and the odour of fuel is perceived in the smoke.

Moreover, the effect is also recognised in the cause both in the world and in the scriptures. Looking at pots, we say that they were clay earlier in the day. The scripture says that all this world was only *Sat* in the beginning. From these, the non-existence of the effect at an earlier time may be made out. The scripture also declares that Non-existence was in the beginning. But non-existence is only an attribute. The pots were non-existent earlier in the sense that the clay was then in a different condition. The Non-existence from which the scripture derives the world is only the *Brahman* with His body in a subtle, undifferentiated condition. *Sūtras* 19 and 20 further make the point clear by citing two examples. Just as the threads become the cloth having a different name and form, and just as the element of air becomes the fivefold vital air in the body, so too the *Brahman* becomes the world.

The identity between the *Brahman* and the world thus established is questioned further by the Vaiśeṣika in the next section, the *Itaravayapadeśādhikaraṇa* comprising aphorisms 21 to 23. If the *Brahman* is identical with the individual self, why does He create a world in which that self suffers misery? Understanding identity in the *advaitic*

sense, he argues that the difficulty above-mentioned applies to the views of Bhāskara, of those who believe the individual self to be associated with ignorance and of those who believe the *Brahman* to be so associated. The next two *Sūtras* give the reply.

The *Brahman* is taught also to be different from the individual self in the scriptures. It is the latter who is liable to be afflicted by miseries. Even as the inanimate stone cannot be regarded as having the same nature as the *Brahman*, the individual self also cannot be said to be so. But, as already established in the aphorism referring to Kāsakṛtsna's views about the abidance of the Supreme Self in the individual self (I. 4. 22), there is a grammatical equation between two distinct entities on account of the one being the self of the other. Thus the world possesses the character of the effect of the *Brahman* and also the character of being identical with Him.

Rāmānuja then proceeds to reply to the *advaitins'* interpretation of this *adhikaraṇa*. They too grant that the *Brahman* is here spoken of as different from the embodied self. The question then arises whether the *Brahman* who is different is associated with or dissociated from ignorance. Rāmānuja argues that neither alternative can be satisfactorily established. Indeed, the purport of the whole section is to establish the relationship of cause and effect between two entirely distinct things. (Pages 398-405).

Granted that the *Brahman* is the cause of the world ; how can He create without having a collection of materials and instruments to help Him in the work? Even a skilful potter or weaver cannot make a pot or a piece of cloth without having the potter's wheel, the loom etc. The only difference between a capable agent and others is that he can produce things with the help of instruments and materials, while others cannot do so even when provided with them. This doubt is disposed of in the ensuing

section, known as the *Upasamhāradarśanādhikaraṇa* (aphorisms 24-25).

The answer shortly is that creation resembles the production of curds from milk. Milk is transformed into curds without the help of any instruments or materials. Similarly, the gods in their worlds create what they want merely by their will. Even so the Supreme Person creates the whole universe by His will. (Pages 406-408).

The example of the transformation of milk into curds suggests another objection to the Sāṅkhya. When curds are produced from a given quantity of milk, the whole of the milk undergoes the change. So, when the world is created by the *Brahman*, the whole of the *Brahman* must be used up in the world. If it is said that only a part of the *Brahman* is so used up, it goes against the scriptural texts which make out the *Brahman* to be indivisible. It may be said that the *Brahman* having the intelligent selves and the non-intelligent matter in a subtle condition as His body becomes the *Brahman* with the intelligent and non-intelligent things in a gross condition as His body. Even here, it cannot be denied that part of the embodied *Brahman* forms the effect and has undergone changes. This question is the subject of the ninth section, *Kṛitsnaprasaktyādhikaraṇa* (aphorisms 26-31).

The answer to this is that the *Brahman* is stated to be both indivisible and the cause of the world in the scriptures. What is stated there has to be understood exactly according to the statements made. In a matter where the sole means of knowledge is the scripture, and which is outside the range of worldly experience, logical objections arising from such experience are irrelevant. Non-intelligent things are different from one another; and they are all different from the intelligent selves. Just as varied qualities are seen in these, even so the *Brahman* who is different from all things else has peculiar qualities of His own. They are above all logical contradictions, and they account

for His producing the world, and yet remaining indivisible and unchangeable.

But the objections raised by the Sāṅkhya against the *Vedānta* affect him. How can the indivisible *pradhāna* produce the world? It consists of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, or is produced by them. In the former case, the indivisible *sattva* etc. cannot produce gross effects. If they are said to produce the *pradhāna*, then the latter ceases to be the ultimate cause. Moreover, the analysis of the world into 24 principles will also be set aside, and additional principles admitted.

Thus the *Brahman* alone can be the cause of the world. All the wonderful powers needed for this are specifically declared by the scriptures as associated with Him. Even without organs of sense, He can act. (Pages 408-414). But why should He act? He has obtained all desires; and none does anything except to realise some purpose for himself or others. The *Brahman* has no purpose to serve, so far as He is concerned; and by creating a world full of misery, He is not serving any purposes of others. This problem is discussed in the tenth and last section of this *pāda* of Chapter II in aphorisms 32 to 36, constituting the *Prayojanavattvādhikaraṇa*.

Sūtra 33 declares that creation etc. are mere sport for the *Brahman*. A great king can almost be described as one who has all his desires satisfied; still he plays with balls and such other things. In a similar way the *Brahman* indulges in play. Even if this be granted, the objector goes on, the *Brahman*, viewed as the cause of the world, ceases to be perfect on other grounds. Inequalities in creation indicate either partiality or cruelty on His part. That would be true, *Sūtra* 34 answers, if creation were the result of caprice. But the *Brahman* creates having in view the *karmas* of individual souls.

Now the further objection is raised that there can be no individual souls nor *karma* during *pralaya*. The

Brahman alone then exists. No, says *Sūtra* 35. In *pralaya* there is no differentiation by name and form. But both the souls and the streams of *karma* are beginningless. This is declared in the scriptures.

So, it is concluded that the *Brahman* possesses all the qualities needed for being the cause of the world, and is the cause. (Pages 416-420).

The *Brahman* having been established as the cause of the world in the first Chapter of the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, the first part of the second Chapter deals with criticisms of this conclusion. In the first two sections, the views of two respected authorities, Kapila and Hiraṇyagarbha, which are at variance with the *Vedānta*, are canvassed and set aside. In the other eight sections, different arguments against the *Brahman* being the cause, mostly based on independent reasoning and logic, are examined and refuted. The *Sūtras* are now ready to take the offensive in the philosophical debate.

॥ श्री : ॥

SRI-BHASHYA

—O—

CHAPTER I

PART II

ADHIKARANA I.

SARVATRAPRASIDDHYADHIKARANA.

It has been stated in the first part (of the first chapter in the first *adhyakaraṇa*) that in order to enter successfully upon (the study of) the Science (of the *Brahman*), a person who has learnt the *Vedas* and obtained that knowledge of the true nature of (ritualistic) works, which results from the study of the *Karma-Mīmāṃsā*, has to realize (first) the finite and impermanent character of the results of mere works (performed without knowledge of the *Brahman*); then he has to feel the desire for final release which has the characteristics of the highest object of human pursuit, and is called into existence by (the knowledge of) the true nature of the *Brahman* and His worship, both of which are, at first sight, made out from *Vedāntic* passages to be capable of yielding infinite and eternal results; and then he has to understand well that the power of words is to denote such things as are naturally and of themselves understood,⁴¹⁴ and (thence) to conclude definitely that *Vedāntic* passages certainly form the means of knowing the Highest *Brahman*: and then he may begin the study of that *Mīmāṃsā* of the Embodied, (i.e., of the *Brahman*), which

414. See Vol. I, pp. 215-229, wherein the Prabhākaras who object to this view are refuted

treats of the proper ways and means to be adopted in arriving at such (a conclusion).

It has also been declared (therein in the second *adhikaraṇa*) that the scriptural passage beginning with—“From whom, indeed, all these beings are born” (*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.)—teaches (us) to know the Highest *Brahman* to be the only cause of the great bliss of salvation and also (the only cause) of the origin, preservation and destruction of the whole world, which is made up of countless and varied moveable and immoveable things that may be classified as the enjoyer, the instrument of enjoyment and the home of enjoyment.

We have maintained (in the third *adhikaraṇa*) that the Highest *Brahman*, who is the only cause of the world, is capable of being known solely by means of the Scripture, for the reason that He cannot be known by all the other means of knowledge. We have further stated (in) the fourth *adhikaraṇa*) that, even though *Vedāntic* passages (describing the *Brahman*) are not connected with any activity or cessation from activity (on our part), the position, that the Scripture (which, according to the *Mīmāṃsakas*, is solely concerned with enjoining particular forms of activity or cessation from activity) forms the means of proving the *Brahman*, is satisfactorily established by the accordant interpretation (of those same *Vedāntic* passages as referring to the Highest *Brahman*, who constitutes, by His very nature, the highest object of human pursuit.

We have also explained (in the fourth *adhikaraṇa*) that the *Brahman*, who is to be known by means of the *Vedānta* as forming the sole cause of the whole world, is, on account of the association (with Him) of ‘seeing’ (i.e., thinking, or willing) and other such attributes (mentioned in the later aphorisms of the *adhikaraṇa*), undoubtedly a particular intelligent Being who is a distinct entity from the *Pradhāna* (i.e., material Nature) which may be made out by the logical process of inference (to be the cause of the

world, when so considered). Again, we have also established (in the sixth *adhikaraṇa*) that He (*viz.*, that particular intelligent Being) is an entity distinct from that other entity which is denoted by the word '*jīva*', (i.e., the individual soul) and which is subject (as such) to the two conditions of bondage and release ; because, among other things, He possesses, of His own nature, (that) bliss and (that) omniscience which are unsurpassed in excellence, and is the cause of fear and of freedom from fear to all individual souls, and He wills the truth, and constitutes the Internal Self of all intelligent and non-intelligent beings.

We have also explained (therein in the seventh *adhikaraṇa*) that He possesses a divine form which is peculiar to Him, is non-material and is not caused by *karma*⁴¹⁵ (as the result of past actions). We have upheld (in the eighth and ninth *adhikaraṇas*) that it is He alone who is, as if well-known, pointed out to be the cause of the world by means of '*Ākāśa*', '*Prāṇa*', and other such words (denoting particular non-intelligent things) and who is possessed (thus) of characteristics different from those that belong to all other intelligent and non-intelligent things.

We have maintained (also in the tenth *adhikaraṇa*) that what is denoted by the word *Light*, and is (said to be) possessed of that unsurpassable splendour which is peculiar to the Highest Reality, is none other than Himself ; because that (Light) is recognised to be in association with the highest heaven. We have further declared (in the eleventh and last *adhikaraṇa*) that the Highest Person, who forms the means of attaining that immortality which is peculiar to Him who is the Final Cause (of all things by reason of His being able to give it to others), is Himself denoted by '*Indra*' and other words, in accordance with the import of the Scriptures.

415. The idea is that the individual self gets materially embodied for the purpose of enjoying the good, and suffering from the bad

results of activities gone through in previous births, while the divine form of the Lord is not at all due to any such cause.

Therefore, it has been, in this manner, pointed out (in the first part of the first chapter) that He who is taught in the *Vedānta* is none other than Nārāyaṇa, who is beyond the sphere within which all other means of knowledge (than the scripture) operate, and who is quite distinct from all things other than Himself by reason of His being an ocean of infinite noble qualities, such as the quality of willing the truth, etc., etc.

Hereafter, in the second, third and fourth parts, (first of all) a doubt is raised to the effect that, although what is taught in the *Vedānta* is none other than the *Brahman*, nevertheless, a few *Vedāntic* passages certainly (seem to) relate to the exposition of the true nature of certain things which may be brought under the heads of the *Pradhāna* (i.e., material Nature) and the *kshetrajña* (i.e., the individual soul); and then by way of removing that (doubt), it is pointed out that the *Brahman* (Himself) is (alone) the mine of all those auspicious qualities which are mentioned in each of such passages. Among such passages, those that refer with indistinct characteristics to the soul and such other things are discussed in the second part; those that refer with distinct characteristics to (such) things, in the third part; and those that seem to deal directly with those various things (are discussed) in the fourth part.

सर्वप्रसिद्धोपदेशात्

Sūtra 1.

Sarvatraprasiddhopedeśāt. (33)

In all this, (it is the *Brahman* Himself that is meant to be declared), because (it is He alone that is) prominently taught.

It is declared in the *Chhāndogya*:—"Now, indeed, (this) person is characterised by worship. Just as a person's

worship is in this world, so also after death will he be in the next. Let him perform worship. He is *manomaya* (i.e., mind-made); He has life (*prāṇa*) for His body, light for His form &c., &c." (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1 & 2. *et. seq.*)⁴¹⁶ Here it is understood that the object of the worship enjoined in the statement—"Let him perform worship"—is indicated in the sentence—"He is) *manomaya*; He has life (*prāṇa*) for His body."

It being so, the doubt arises whether He, who possesses the qualities of being *manomaya* (mind-made) etc., is the individual self or the Supreme Self. It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the individual self.⁴¹⁷ Why? Because mind and life (*prāṇa*) form the implements of the individual self; and because also they are negated in relation to the Supreme Self in the passage—"Indeed, He is without life, without mind." (*Muṇḍ Up.* II. 1. 2.). Moreover, the *Brahman* indicated in the earlier part (of the passage under reference) by the statement—"All this, indeed, is the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1) cannot be connected here as forming the object of worship; because that

416. The context here is *Chhānd. Up.* (III. 14. 1 to 4): "All this, indeed, is the *Brahman*, because all this is born out of Him, is absorbed into Him, and lives by Him; let him perform worship being tranquilised. Now, indeed, (this) person is made of worship. Just as a person's worship is in this world, so also after death will he be in the next. Let him perform worship. He is mind-made, has life for His body, light for His form, wills the truth, is like the *ākāśa*, is all-action, is all desires, all sweet odours, all tastes, has appropriated all this (set of qualities) and is speechless and unanxious. He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice or barley, or than a mustard seed, or than a

canary seed; He is my Self within the heart who is greater than the earth, greater than the regions of space, greater than Heaven, greater than all these worlds. He is all-action, is all desires, all odours, all tastes, has appropriated all this (set of qualities) and is speechless and unanxious; He is my Self within the heart, He is the *Brahman*. After departing from this world, I attain unto Him. He who has this conviction, to him there is no doubt. So said Śaṇḍilya, (so said) Śaṇḍilya."

417. This *pūrvapakṣin* here and later may be a follower of Nīlīśvara Śāṅkhya. He may be regarded as putting forward a hypothetical objection without himself accepting the interpretation of the text suggested by him.

(statement) is made with the object of giving the teaching of the *Brahman* being the Self (of all)—(the teaching) which is the means of acquiring that tranquillity which is helpful in the performance of the worship enjoined in the statement—"Let a man meditate, after being tranquillised." (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1.)

And again, it is not right to say that, for the reason that the worship enjoined in the statement—"Let him perform worship"—requires an object of worship, the *Brahman*, though mentioned in a different (portion of the) passage, has to be taken as being referred to (here), because there is (really) no such desideratum, inasmuch as He who possesses the quality of being *manomaya*, etc., is mentioned in the self-same passage (as forming the object of worship); and because also both the desiderata⁴¹⁸ are capable of being well-supplied by a mere change in the grammatical case in reference to that which is pointed out in the statement—"He is *manomaya* ; he has life (*prāṇa*) for his body"—to be nothing other (than what is referred to in the passage itself, *viz.*, the individual self).

It having been thus determined that it is (merely) the individual self which (is referred to here), it is finally arrived at that the word '*Brahman*' also, mentioned in the concluding part (of the passage) to the effect—"This is the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 4)—is used as a term of respect to denote the individual self itself.

If it be so held, we reply—"In all this (it is the *Brahman* Himself that is meant to be declared), because (it is He alone that is) prominently taught" (*Ved. Sūt.* 1. 2. 1). That which possesses the attribute of being

418. The two desiderata are (i) in the scriptural injunction, and the need for a worshipper for (ii) the need of an object of worship for an injunction to worship.

mind-made' and other such attributes is the Highest Self Why? 'In all this', that is, in the *Vedānta*, it is only in relation to the Highest *Brahman* that the well-known attributes of being 'mind-made' etc., are taught.

Indeed, the attribute of being 'mind-made' and other such attributes are (all) well-known as belonging to the *Brahman*, as, for instance, in the following passages:—"He who is mind-made is the Lord who has life for His body" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 2. 7); "It is *ākāśa* (or ether) that is within the heart. In that (*ākāśa*) there is that Person who is mind-made, who is immortal and brilliant as gold" (*Taitt. Up.* I. 6. 1): "He (the Lord) is apprehended by the heart, by steady wisdom, and by the mind. Those who know Him become immortal" (*Kaṭh. Up.* VI. 9); "He (i.e., the Lord,) is not apprehended by the eye nor even by speech." (*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 1. 8); "But He (the Lord) is apprehended by the pure mind".(?)

Similarly, (they are made out to be His) in the following and other passages—"He is the Life of life" (*Ken. Up.* 1. 2.); "Now indeed the omniscient Self who is *Prāṇa* Himself firmly takes hold of this body and makes it rise up" (*Kaush. Up.* III. I.); "All these beings certainly enter into the *Prāṇa* (to be absorbed into it), they are evolved out of the *Prāṇa*" (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 11. 5.). To be 'mind-made' is to be capable of being apprehended by the purified mind. To have life for the body is to be the support of life as well as to be its controller. And this being the case, the word '*Brahman*', also occurring in the passage—"This Self exists within my heart.....He is the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 3 & 4.)—is undoubtedly used in its primary and natural significance. The passage—"Indeed, He has no life, no mind" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 1. 2)—denies, in relation to the *Brahman*, that He has such knowledge as is dependent upon the mind, or has such existence as is dependent upon life.

Or (the *sūtra* may be interpreted thus) :—⁴¹⁹ In this very context, by means of the passage—“ All this, indeed, is the *Brahman*, because it is born out of Him, is absorbed into Him : and lives by Him : tet a man meditate, being tranquilised,” (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1)—meditation is enjoined to the effect that, after acquiring tranquillity, one should meditate on the *Brahman* as the Self of all. The sentence—“ Let Him perform worship ” (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1)—is a re-statement, made with the object of authoritatively declaring the qualities of that same (*Brahman*). And the qualities that have to be so authoritatively declared are the quality of being ‘ mind-made ’ and other such qualities. Therefore, the meaning of the whole passage (under reference) is to the effect that one should worship the *Brahman*, who is the Self of all as the possessor of the attribute of being ‘ mind-made ’ and of other such attributes.

Here the doubt arises whether it is the individual self or the Supreme Self that is pointed out in this passage by the word ‘ *Brahman*. ’ It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the individual self. Why? Because it is only that (self) which can be appropriately denoted by means of the grammatical equation with the word ‘ all ’. Indeed, what is pointed out by the word ‘ all ’ is the whole world beginning with (the four-faced) *Brahmā* (and going) downwards to a clump of grass. And the individual self may certainly acquire the character of the four-faced *Brahmā* and other objects, consequent upon the (operation of the) limiting conditions due to such special *karmas*

⁴¹⁹ Rāmānuja now gives an alternative commentary on the *sūtra*. Till now he has been putting forward in his own words the point of view adopted by Śaṅkara in his commentary on this aphorism. Now he offers an explanation which has the support of *Bodhāyana*, the *Vṛttikāra*. Here the entire section, *Chhāndogya*

Upanishad (I.1. 14) is taken as the context, where as to Śaṅkara the opening sentence deals with a different topic. It may be added that Rāmānuja gives only the second explanation in *Vedānta-sāra* and *Vedāntadīpa*, his two other commentaries on the *Vedānta-sūtras*.

as are caused by the beginninglessly old ignorance (or *avidyā*). But, in relation to the Highest *Brahman* who is omniscient and omnipotent, who is devoid of sin and free from even the smallest taint of all that is evil, such as ignorance, etc., it is not appropriate to predicate the characteristic of (His) being all things, which (necessarily) implies (His being) the abode of all that is evil.

Occasionally, the word '*Brahman*' is found to be used to denote the individual self also. It is for this reason alone that the Highest Lord is here and there specially mentioned with a qualification, as in the instances of *Paramātmān* (the Highest Self) and *Param Brahman* (the Supreme *Brahman*). Moreover, the individual self, when freed from all limiting conditions, acquires greatness (*bṛihattva*, so as to make him become fit to be denoted by the word '*brahman*'), because the Scripture says :—"He (i.e., the freed individual self) also becomes fit for infinity (i.e., immortality)." (*Śvet. Up. V. 9*). As the origin, preservation and destruction of the world are due to his (i.e., that self's) own *karma*, when he is subject to ignorance (or *avidyā*), it is appropriate to describe him as the cause (of the world), in accordance with the (scriptural) statement—"All this is born out of him, is absorbed into him, and lives by him." (*Chhānd. Up. III. 14. 1*.) Hence the meaning (of the passage under discussion) is this :—This individual self is, of his own nature, the *brahman*, when his essential nature comes to be unconditioned ; and owing to the beginninglessly old ignorance (or *avidyā*), he is found to exist in the form of gods, animals, men and immovable things.

To this it is replied—"In all this (it is the *Brahman* Himself that is meant to be declared), because (it is He alone that is) prominently taught." (*Ved. Sū. I. 2. 1*). "In all this," that is, in the whole world pointed out by the statement—"All this (is the *Brahman*) indeed"—what is declared by the word '*Brahman*', as forming the Self of that (world), is the Highest *Brahman* Himself, but not the

individual self. Why? "Because (it is He alone that is) prominently taught"—because, by reason of the statement that '(all this is) born in Him, is absorbed into Him and lives by Him', it is taught, as if well-known, that 'all this, indeed, is the *Brahman*'. It is said that the whole of this world, which has the *Brahman* for its Self, is indeed the *Brahman*, for the reason that it is born out of the *Brahman*, is absorbed into the *Brahman*, and is dependent upon the *Brahman* for its existence; it is understood here that that (Being) is the *Brahman* who is prominently taught in the *Vedānta* to be the source of the creation, preservation and destruction of the world. And that Being is the Highest *Brahman* Himself.

Accordingly, in connection with the passage which begins with—" (He) from whom indeed all these beings are born, by whom, when born, they are all preserved, and to whom they go when they perish, do you desire to know that (Being) well; that is the *Brahman*" (*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.)—it has been shown by means of the statement beginning with—"Let him know the *Ānanda* (or Bliss) to be the *Brahman*; indeed it is only from the *Ānanda* that all these beings are born" (*Taitt. Up.* III. 6. 1.)—that the origin, preservation and destruction of the world proceed from the omniscient Highest *Brahman*, who is associated with that unsurpassably excellent bliss which is mentioned in the former *anuvāka* (or chapter of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* known as the 'Ānandavallī').

Similarly, in the (scriptural) passage—"He is the cause. He is the Lord of what is the lord of the senses (*i.e.*, of the *jīva* or the individual soul); He has no progenitor and no superior" (*S'vet. Up.* VI. 9.)—the Highest *Brahman* Himself who is the lord of the individual self, which (in its turn) is the lord of the senses, is taught to be the cause (of the world).

Thus, everywhere, it comes out prominently that the Highest *Brahman* Himself is the cause (of all things). Hence the identification (of the world with the

Brahman) becomes appropriate, inasmuch as it is born out of the *Brahman*, is absorbed into Him, and lives by Him, and has Him, in consequence, for its Self. Therefore, the Scripture itself enjoins that, after acquiring tranquillity, one should worship the Highest *Brahman*, who has all things for His modes (of manifestation), who has the All for His body, and who is the Self of all; and so it (first of all) declares that the Highest *Brahman* forms the Self of all things, and then it teaches His worship. As a matter of fact, the Highest *Brahman*, who exists in the condition of cause as well as in the condition of effect, has the intelligent and the non-intelligent things existing in their subtle and gross states for His body, and is, accordingly, the Self of all (those things) at all times. That the Highest *Brahman* is the opposite of all evil and the home of all auspicious qualities, is not contradicted in establishing an identity of this kind; because the evils inherent in the body, which is a (mere) mode (of His manifestation), cannot be said to affect the Self to whom that mode belongs. On the contrary, it has been already pointed out that this (two-fold characterisation of the *Brahman* as above given) certainly adds to His excellence by attributing (to Him thereby) an unsurpassable sovereignty.

What has been stated above (by the *pūrvapakshin*) to the effect that it is appropriate for the individual self to be identical with all things—that is not right; because individual selves which are different in each body cannot possibly be identical with one another. It will be established in connection with the aphorism—"Except in the matter of the activity relating to (the creation etc., of) the world etc.," (*Ved. Sūta*. IV. 4. 17)—that, in the case of him also who is released (from material bondage), even though his essential nature has become unconditioned, that identity with the world which is dependent upon his being the cause of the origin, preservation and destruction of the world, cannot be possible. It is not also correct to say that, because the origin, preservation and destruction of the

world are determined by the *karma* of the individual self, therefore he alone is the cause thereof; for, even though his *karma* may affect (the details of creation etc.,) the Lord alone is the (sole) cause of the (whole) world. Therefore, it is the Highest Self Himself who is here denoted by the word *Brahman*. Wise and learned men highly value this same interpretation of this aphorism. For example, the *Vṛittikāra* (Bodhāyana) says thus:—"The passage, beginning with 'All this, indeed' (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1) means that the *Brahman* who is the Self of all is the Lord (i.e., the Highest Ruler)."

विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेश्च

Sūtra 2.

Vivakshitaguṇopapattēśca. (34)

Because also the attributes intentionally mentioned (immediately in the context) are appropriate (only in relation to the Highest Self).

Moreover, the attributes mentioned in the passage—"He is mind-made, has life for His body, has light for His form, wills the truth, is the essence of *ākāśa*, is all actions, is all desires, all sweet odours, all tastes, has appropriated (to Himself) all this (set of attributes), is speechless and unanxious" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 2)—are appropriate only in relation to the Highest Self. 'He is mind-made' means that He is capable of being apprehended solely by the purified mind. Indeed, He is apprehended only by that mind which is purified by means of such worship of the Highest Self as is accomplished with the help of the seven⁴²⁰ means, such as discrimination, freedom, etc. By this it is brought out that, owing to His being the

opposite of evil and being also the only abode of auspicious qualities, (the *Brahman*) possesses such an essential nature as is quite distinct from that of all other things; for it is only tainted things that are capable of being apprehended by tainted minds.

‘He has life for His body’ means that He is the supporter of the lives of all beings in the world. He who has life for His body, that is, He in whom life is contained, to whom it (*i.e.*, life) is obedient and subordinate—He is life-bodied. It will be established later on that the connotation of the term ‘body’ (*śarīra*) lies in its signifying the quality of being contained, obedience and subordination. ‘He has light for His form’ means that He has a resplendent form. The meaning is that He is associated with unsurpassable splendour, because He possesses such a divine form as is non-material and peculiar to Himself, and possesses (also) unexcelled auspiciousness. ‘He wills the truth’ means that His will is never frustrated. ‘He is the essence of *ākāśa*’ means that His true nature is subtle and pure like that of *ākāśa* (or ether); or He is the essence of *ākāśa* for the reason that He is the Self of that *ākāśa* also which is the source of all other things.⁴¹ Or again He is like *ākāśa*, for the reason that He shines of Himself and illuminates other things also. ‘He is all actions’: an action is that which is performed: ‘He is all actions’ means that the whole world is His handiwork. Or ‘He is all actions’ means that He is One to whom all actions (religious as well as secular) belong. ‘He is all sweet desires’: ‘desires’ means all those things that are desired, and they are the things to be enjoyed and also the auxiliaries of enjoyment, etc. The meaning is that He possesses all kinds of them in perfect purity. ‘He is all odours, all tastes.’ The meaning here is this:—Since material sweet odours, tastes, etc., are negated in relation to Him, in the

421. The *ākāśa* is the source of all other things in the sense that in the evolution of the materi-

al world, it comes earlier than the four physical elements.

passage which begins with—"He is characterised neither by sound, nor by touch" (*Kāth. Up.* III. 15)⁴²²—He possesses such odours and tastes as are non-material, peculiar to Himself, taintless, unsurpassed in excellence, auspicious, and to be enjoyed by none other than Himself, and are of all kinds.

'He has appropriated all this' means that He has appropriated to Himself (*abhyātta*) the aforesaid collection of (all) auspicious attributes up to and inclusive of tastes. In regard to the expression *abhyātta* (which means 'has appropriated'), it has to be understood that the affix *kta* (which usually forms the passive participle) is used in the agential sense in the manner in which it is so used in the example *bhuktā brāhmaṇāḥ*—'the Brāhmaṇas have eaten.'⁴²³ In the word *avākī* (speechless) *vāka* means talk; and He who has it not is *avākī* (speechless). In answer to the question why He is so, it is replied that 'He is unanxious.' As He has acquired all objects of desire, He is without any thing to be anxious about; therefore He is without anxiety. For this very reason, He is *avākī* (or speechless), that is, He does not speak. The meaning is that, being supreme in sovereignty, He does not care a straw for the whole world, consisting (of all things) from the four-faced Brahmā down to a clump of grass, and is (thus) silent through self-satisfaction. These aforesaid attributes mentioned (immediately in the context here) are (therefore) appropriate only in relation to the Highest Self.

422. *Kāth. Up.* (III. 15) runs thus: "That eternally indestructible One which is characterised neither by sound nor by touch, nor by form and colour, nor similarly by taste, nor by smell; which has no beginning and no end; which is higher than the *maḥat* (or the individual self)—realising that One, one is freed from death."

423. This is justified on the ground of usage, or because *bhuktam* (what is eaten, food) with the affix *ach*, will give us *bhukta* in the sense of 'one who has eaten' on the analogy of *arsasa*. (Vide Pāṇini, V. 2 127)

अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शारीरः

Sūtra 3. *Anupapattestu na śāriraḥ* (35)

The individual self is not, however, (meant to be declared herein) ; because it is inappropriate (to apply these attributes to him).

The meaning is that to those who reflect well on Him, who is such an ocean of auspicious qualities, there cannot arise the doubt that, in the context (under discussion), the individual self is treated of ; because even the slightest trace of the smallest modicum of the attributes under reference cannot appropriately be predicated in relation to the individual self, who is almost like unto a glowworm, who has the potentiality to be associated with the infinite misery which is necessarily consequent upon his being associated with the body, and who is found to exist in (both) the conditions of bondage and emancipation.⁴²⁴

कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशाच्च

Sūtra 4. *Karmakartṛivypadeśāccha*. (36)

Because also the agent and the object of (worship) are (separately) mentioned (in the context).

In the passage—"After departing from this (world), I attain unto Him" (*Chhānd. Up.* III, 14. 4.)—the Highest *Brahman* is declared to be the object of attainment, and the individual self to be the attainer (thereof).⁴²⁵ Hence the attaining individual self is the worshipper, and the Highest *Brahman* who is to be attained is the object of worship. Accordingly, it is clearly made out that this (*Brahman*) is surely different from the attainer (thereof).

424. The purport here is to show that the attributes in question apply as little to the emancipated self as to the bound self.

425. The objector interprets

this text as referring to two states of the soul. In the state of bondage, it is the agent, and its object of attainment is the state of freedom.

शब्दविशेषात्

Sūtra 5.

Śabdaviśeṣāt. (37)

Because (also) there is (in the context) a difference (in declension) between the words (which respectively denote the *Brahman* and the individual self).

In the scriptural statement—"He (*eshah*) is my (*me*) Self within the heart" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 3 & 4)—the individual self is pointed out by the genitive (*me*), whereas the object of worship (is pointed out) by the nominative (*eshah*). Thus again, in a similar context,⁴²⁶ in relation to the individual self and the Supreme Self, there occurs in the scriptures (i.e., the *Agni-rahasya*) of the Vājasaneyins a difference (in the declension) of the words used to denote them; as, for instance, in the passage—"He who is within the individual self (*antarātmā*) and is (minute) like a grain of rice or barley or like a canary-seed or the kernel of a canary-seed, He is the Person (*Puruṣa*) that is brilliant like gold (*hiraṇmaya*) and is also like smokeless light". (*Śat. Br.* X. 6. 3. 2.) Here the individual self is pointed out by the word '*antarātmā*' (which must be regarded as) having the locative case-ending; and the object of worship (is pointed out) by the words '*Puruṣa*' and '*hiraṇmaya*' having the nominative case-ending. Therefore the Highest (*Brahman*) Himself is the object of worship.

स्मृते च

Sūtra 6.

Smṛitescha. (38)

Because also the *Smṛiti* (says the same thing).

He (i.e., the *Brahman*) is different from the individual self for this reason also. The *Smṛiti* declares in the

426. Here too Śaṅḍilya's teaching is given.

following passages⁴²⁷ the individual self as the worshipper and the Supreme Self as the object of worship :—" And I am seated in the heart of all beings. Memory and knowledge and (their) removal⁴²⁸ proceed from Me." (B. G. XV. 15); "That wise man who knows Me thus to be the Highest Person" (B. G. XV. 19); "The Lord is established, O Arjuna, in the region of the heart of all beings; and (from there) by means of His wonderful powers, He causes the revolving of all the beings that are mounted within the mechanism (of the body). Seek refuge with Him alone." (B. G. XVIII 61. & 62).

अर्भकौकस्त्वात्तद्व्यपदेशाच्च नेति
चेन्न निवार्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च

Sūtra 7. *Arbhakaukastvāt tadvyapadesāchcha*

netichenna nichāyyatvādevam vyomavachcha⁽³⁹⁾

If it be said that, because He has a very small abode and is declared to be (small in accordance with) that, (the Being referred to in the context is) not (the Supreme Self), it is not right to say so; because He is to be so realised, and (because again) He is like the ether also.

'To have a very small abode' means 'to be in a very small place.' 'To declare (to be small in accordance with) that' is to attribute smallness (to him). On account of his existing within the small space of the heart in accordance with the passage—"He is my self within the heart" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 3. & 4.); and on account also of the declaration of minuteness as his essential characteristic in accordance with the passage which begins with "(he is)

⁴²⁷. in B.G. Also see Vol I, Note 21.

⁴²⁸. The word *apohana*, which is here translated as 'removal',

also means sometimes 'the process or faculty of reasoning'. See Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Gītā*,

smaller than a grain of rice or barley" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 3)—(the being referred to in the context here) is not the Highest Self, but is merely the individual self. Accordingly, since in the passage—"The wise perceive him to be all-pervading, very subtle and to be the source of all beings" (*Mund. Up.* I. 1. 6), and in other (such) passages, the unconditioned nature of the Highest Self is brought to light, the individual self is (hence) declared to be merely of the size of the point of a goad.

If it be so held, it is replied that it is not so. In fact, it is only the Highest Self that is minute like an atom, inasmuch as He is taught (here) to be so realised ; ' to be so realised ' is to be so understood, or rather to be so worshipped ; but not on the other hand to be understood to mean that atomic minuteness does, in fact, belong to His essential nature. He is taught to be ' like the ether also '. That is, His natural greatness is also described in this very context in the passage—"He is greater than the earth, greater than the regions of space, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds." (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 3.) Hence the attribution of minuteness (to Him) is intended only to serve as a help for worship.

Accordingly, (in the context here), by means of the passage—"All this, indeed, is the *Brahman*, because all this is born out of Him, is absorbed into Him, and lives by Him : being tranquil, let him worship." (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1)—worship is enjoined to the effect that one should worship the *Brahman* who, owing to His being the cause of the creation and destruction of all beings, and owing also to His quickening them with life by entering into them as the Self of all things, is the Self of all. Then, by means of the passage—"Now, indeed, (this) person is made up of worship. Just as a person's worship is in this world, so also after death will he be in the next." (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1)—it is declared that the attainment of an object (of worship) is in accordance with the worship (itself).

Afterwards, by means of the statement—"Let him perform worship (*kratu*)" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1), (the injunction about) worship is reiterated with the object of authoritatively declaring the attributes (of the Being that is to be worshipped). Thereafter, by means of the passage—"He is mind-made, has life for His body, light for His form, wills the truth, is the essence of *ākāśa*, is all actions, is all desires, all sweet odours, all tastes, has appropriated all this (set of qualities), and is speechless and unanxious" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 2.)—all such attributes of His essential nature as are authoritatively said by the scripture to belong to Him, who is characterised by the sovereignty of the (whole) world, are also mentioned.

Then (again) by means of the passage—"He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice or barley, or than a mustard seed, or than a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 3.)—it is stated that, for purposes of worship, the abode of the Highest Person, who is the object of worship, as constituting the Self of that (worshipper himself) and as possessing the minuteness of an atom, is to be found within the heart of the worshipper. Then by means of the passage—"He is my Self within the heart, (who is) greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds: He is all actions, is all desires, all odours, all tastes, has appropriated all this (set of qualities), and is speechless and unanxious" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 3 & 4.) the finally realisable form of the Being, who is to be worshipped within the heart, is pointed out. Then by means of the passage—"He is my Self within the heart, He is the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 4)—continued meditation is enjoined to this effect, *viz.*, that the *Brahman*, who has the above-stated characteristics, has, out of His highest mercy and with the intention of saving us, condescended to be near unto us within our heart.

Then there is affirmed, by means of the passage—
'After departing from this world, I attain unto Him'

(*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 4) the realisation of the certain conviction that the attainment (through worship of any object desired) is in accordance with the worship (itself). And then (finally) by means of the statement—"He who has this conviction, to him there is no doubt" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 4)—it is concluded that he, who has such a settled conviction regarding the attainment of the thing to be attained, need entertain no doubt as to his attaining (the object sought after). Hence it is for purposes of worship that He is declared to exist in a very small abode and to possess the minuteness of an atom.

सम्भोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात्

Sūtra 8. *Sambhogaprāptiritichenna vaiśeṣhyāt* (40)

If it be said that (owing to His association with the heart which is a part of the body) there results (to Him) the experience (of pleasure and pain), it is replied that it cannot be so; because that (which gives rise to such an association) is different (from mere corporeal association).

It may be said that, when it is admitted that the Highest *Brahman* also may exist within a body, in the same way in which the individual self does, there befalls (to Him) experience of pleasure and pain as a consequence of (His) association with the body. But this is not right: for the cause (which gives rise to such an association) is different. In fact it is not the mere existence within the interior of a body that gives rise to the experience of pleasure and pain. On the contrary, it is the subjection to the influence of *karma* in the form of merit and demerit (that constitutes the cause thereof). But this (subjection) is not possible in relation to the Supreme Self who is free from all sins,

Accordingly, the scripture declares thus :—" One of them eats the sweet *pippala* fruit, while the other shines in splendour without eating at all." (*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 1. 1. & *Śvet. Up.* IV. 6)

ADHIKARANA II.

ATTRADHIKARANA.

If the Supreme Self is no enjoyer, then, in that case' the being who is taught to be the enjoyer must, in all places, be the individual self himself. Under such a supposition, he (the *Sūtrakāra*, however,) says (thus) :—

अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात्

Sūtra 9. Attā charācharagrahaṇāt. (41)

The eater (of the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Kshatriya* is the Supreme Self), because (the whole of) the movable (world) is implied (by the expression ' *Brāhmaṇa* and *Kshatriya*).

In the *Kaṭha-vallī* it is declared to the following effect :—" He to whom the *Brāhmaṇa* (i.e., the movable things) and the *Kshatriya* (i.e., the immovable things), both constitute the food, and to whom *mṛityu* (or Death) happens to be the condiment—who can definitely know how He is ?" (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 25.) Here the doubt arises whether the 'eater' suggested by the terms 'food' and 'condiment' is the individual self himself, or is the Supreme Self.⁴²⁹ It is perhaps thought proper to hold that

429. Śaṅkara refers to another view that the 'eater' is Agni. Those who argue that the individual self is referred to here take *odanaḥ* and *upasechanam* to mean respectively 'an enjoyable object' and 'something which is subordinate'. They look upon the souls embodied in the two sexes as objects of enjoyment to

each other. And as the souls are immortal, death is subordinate to them even as the condiment is subordinate to food; indeed death cannot stand in the way of their enjoyment. The *Vedāntin* interprets the 'eater' here as the 'destroyer', and not as the 'enjoyer'.

it is the individual self. Because, to be an enjoyer (of pleasure and pain) is due to the influence of *karma*, and because also it is appropriate only for the individual self to be under such (an influence).

(In answer) to this, it is stated that “the eater (of the Brāhmaṇa and the Kshatriya) is the Supreme Self, because (the whole of) the movable and immovable (world) is implied (by the expression, ‘Brāhmaṇa and Kshatriya’). The ‘eater’ (here) is the Supreme Self Himself. Why? Because (that whole) of the movable and immovable (world) is implied (by the expression ‘Brāhmaṇa and Kshatriya’). Indeed, to be the ‘eater’ of the whole movable and immovable (world) is possible only to Him. And this state of being the enjoyer (possessed by the Supreme Self) is not caused by *karma*; but on the contrary it means that character of the destroyer which belongs to Viṣṇu, who is the Highest *Brahman* and is the cause of the creation, preservation and destruction of the world; because, in this very context, it is declared that “he (i.e., the individual self) reaches the other end of the path, and that is the highest seat of Viṣṇu”. (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 9)

Similarly, by the statement—“to whom *mṛityu* (or Death) happens to be the condiment,” the whole of the movable world, as suggested by the expression ‘Brāhmaṇa and Kshatriya’ is to be understood here as constituting the food that is fit to be eaten. Indeed, a condiment is that, which, while it is itself being eaten, helps the eating of other things. Hence, as forming a condiment, Death also is eaten up; and so it seems clear that what is intended to be mentioned (here) is the eating up of the whole of the movable and immovable world that is flavoured with that (condiment) and is indicated by the expression, ‘Brāhmaṇa and Kshatriya’. And this sort of eating is nothing less than (the world’s) destruction. Therefore this kind of being the enjoyer, which is the same as being the destroyer (of the world), belongs only to the Supreme Self,

प्रकरणाच्च

Sūtra 10.

Prakaraṇāchcha. (42)

Because of the context (here relating to the *Braṇ man*) and also (of what has been stated earlier).

Moreover, the context here relates only to the Highest *Brahman*. Indeed, it opens the subject-matter thus :— ‘Knowing Him to be the Self which is great and omni-present, the wise man does not grieve. This Self is not reached either by reflection (*pravachana*, which here means *manana*) or by steady meditation (*medhā* or *nīdīdhyāsa*), or by largely ‘hearing’ the scriptures. Whomsoever He chooses, by him alone is He reached. To him, this Self reveals His own form.” (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 22 & 23). In fact, also by (the interrogation)—‘Who can definitely know how He is?’ (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 25)—we are again reminded only of what was stated before, namely, that without His grace He is not easily knowable.

It may, however, be said again thus :—This person (*i.e.*, the eater above-mentioned), as suggested by the ‘food’ consisting of the *Brāhmaṇa* and *Kshatriya*, is not the Supreme Self, who is free from all sins; because immediately afterwards (in the context) it is only the enjoyer of the fruits of *karma*, who is associated with a second something, that is mentioned in the passage—“Those who know the *Brahman*, having worshipped the five fires and performed also the *trīnāchiketa* rite,⁴³⁰ declare that there are the two that ‘drink in’ (*i.e.*, enjoy) the reward of works in the world of good deeds, that have entered into the cave (of the

430. According to Śaṅkara, this is thrice kindling the fire called ‘*Nāchiketa*’, Raṅgarājanuja makes it out to be the recital of three particular sections (or *anuvāks*) of the *Yajur-veda*. See also Kullūka on Manu, III. 105.

heart), in the transcendently excellent ether of which they reside, and that are as shadow and sunlight". (*Kāth. Up.* III. 1) And that second something may be either the *prāṇa* (i.e. the principal vital air) or the *buddhi*. (i.e., the intellect).

Indeed, the 'drinking in' of the *rita* is nothing other than the enjoyment of the fruits of *karma*; and this is not possible and appropriate in relation to the Supreme Self. But the principal vital air and the intellect, which are the instruments of the individual self, who is the enjoyer, are somehow or other (as instruments) capable of being associated with this act of 'drinking in'. Hence it is the individual self himself who is associated with either of them as the second thing that is dealt with (here). Therefore, the context (in which these passages occur) being one and the same, the 'eater' mentioned in the previous passage ought also to be that individual self himself. To such (a supposition), it is said (in reply):

गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि तदर्शनात्

431 **Sūtra 11.**

Guhām pravishṭāvātmānau hi taddarśanāt. (43)

Indeed, the beings that have entered into the cave are the two selves, (*viz*, the individual self and the Supreme Self); because it is seen (to be so in that context).

It is not stated (in the context) that the two, who have entered the 'cave' and are 'drinking in' the fruits of *karma*, are either the individual self and the principal vital air, or the individual self and the intellect. But, on the contrary, it is unquestionably the individual self and the Supreme Self that are declared to be those (two beings). Why? "Because it is seen (to be so in that context)". In

431. *Ś* ṅkara and some others begin a new *adhikaraṇa* here

the context, it is seen that it is only the individual self and the Supreme Self that are declared to have entered the 'cave'.

In regard to the Supreme Self, it is in fact (taught) thus:—"By means of that self-knowledge, which is derived from *yogic* self-concentration, the wise man comes to know that God, who is difficult to be seen and is hidden, who has entered into all beings and is placed within the 'cave' (of the heart), and who exists in the inmost recesses (of all beings as the Internal Controller of their souls) and is ancient; and then he gives up pleasure and pain". (*Kāth. Up. II. 12*).

In regard to the individual self also (it is) thus (taught in the context):—"That is *aditi*, which is with the *prāṇa* (or the principal vital air) and is full of the 'deities' (or the senses), and which, having entered the 'cave', abides therein, and which, in association with the elements, is again born in various ways". (*Kāth. Up. IV. 7*.) '*Aditi*' means 'that which eats the fruits of *karma*', and that is the individual self. 'Is with the *prāṇa*' means 'exists in association with the *prāṇa*'. 'And is full of the deities' means 'has all its enjoyment dependent upon the senses'. 'Having entered the cave, abides therein' means 'exists within the interior of the lotus of the heart'. 'In association with the elements, (he) is born in various ways' means that in association with the gross elements such as the earth, etc., he (*i.e.*, the individual self) is born in various ways in the form of gods, etc. This being the case, the teaching that 'the two drink in the *rita* (or the fruits of *karma*)' has to be understood (figuratively), as in the instance—"Those with the umbrellas are moving on."⁴³²

432. This illustration is intended to show that a whole collection of men may be pointed out by means of a prominent attribute belonging only to some few of the members thereof. In a collection of men, only some may carry umbrellas; and to a man at a distance that collection of men may be pointed

out as a collection of men with umbrellas. Similarly, both the individual self and the Supreme Self forming a group are said to drink in, that is, to enjoy the fruits of *karma*, although the character of drinking in the fruits of *karma* belongs only to the individual self.

Or the agency in the act of drinking in is appropriate in relation to both the individual self and the Supreme Self, as (respectively) constituting the thing that is controlled and the controller thereof (in relation to that act).⁴³³

विशेषणाच्च

Sūtra 12.

Viśeṣaṇāchcha. (44)

Because also of the characteristic attributes (of both the individual self and the Supreme Self being mentioned in the context).

In the context (under reference), everywhere it is only the individual self and the Supreme Self that are (respectively) stated to be associated with the characteristic of the worshipper and of the object worshipped, of the attainer and of the thing attained. In the passage—"After knowing the *brahmajajña* (or the individual self) to be divine and venerable, and after (also) realising (his true nature), then he attains this everlasting peace" (*Kāth. Up.* I. 17)—the word '*brahmajajña*' (lit the *Brahman*-born knower) means the individual self, because he is born out of the *Brahman* and is also intelligent. Here, 'after knowing him to be divine and venerable' means 'after knowing the individual self, who is the worshipper, to possess the *Brahman* for his self'. In the passage—"May we be enabled to worship that Highest *Brahman*, who is a bank for sacrificers (to pass over),⁴³⁴ who is indestructible, who is the fearless other shore to those who desire to cross (the ocean of *samsāra*), and who is (capable of being attained through the fire-sacrifice known as) the *nāchiketa*" (*Kāth. Up.*

433. This explanation of the individual self being 'caused to drink' the fruits of *karma* by the Supreme Self as the ordainer of *karma-phala*, seems to be pre-

ferred by Rāmānuja

434. Raṅgarāmānuja interprets 'bank' as 'support', adding that God supports the sacrificers by giving them the fruits of sacrifices.

III. 2)—‘*nāchiketa*’ means ‘that which is attainable by means of the rite known as the *nāchiketa*’.

In the passage beginning with—“Know the individual self to be the rider in the chariot, and the body itself to be the chariot” (*Kaṭh Up.* III. 3)—the individual self, who is the worshipper, is mentioned. Similarly in the passage—“But that person who has understanding for his charioteer and the mind (or the internal organ of attention) for the reins, he reaches the other end of the path; and that is the highest seat of Vishṇu” (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 9)—the individual self and the Supreme Self are (respectively) mentioned to be the attainer and the object of attainment. (In the passage) also (under discussion) here—(*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 1)—by means of the expression ‘shadow and sunlight’ only those two things (*viz.*, the individual self and the Supreme Self) are declared to be (respectively) characterised by the attributes of ignorance and omniscience.

It may, however, be said here that the passage—“After a man departs from this world, there is this doubt: some say that he is, while others say that he is not” (*Kaṭh. Up.* I. 20)—opens with a question regarding the real nature of the individual self, and that in consequence the whole of this context has to be made out to refer to the individual self. But it is not right to say so. Indeed, this question here is not due to any doubt regarding the existence or non-existence of the individual soul who is different from the body; for, if it were so, the asking of the two previous boons would be impossible and inappropriate.

Accordingly, at the time when the father’s sacrifice at which the whole of his wealth was to be given away in gifts was approaching its completion, the son Nachiketas, who was the greatest among the faithful, thought that the sacrifice would lose its merit, in consequence of a deficiency in the gifts that had to be given away, and desired that the father’s sacrifice should become perfect even by the giving

away of himself. He then asked his father more than once—"To whom will you give me away?" (*Kaṭh Up.* I. 4); and afterwards entered the abode of the god of death, in obedience to the words of his father, who was angered at the restraint put upon him by the son (to the effect of compelling him to give away even his own son as a gift).

The god of death had previously left his house, and so could not be seen (at home); and therefore he (i.e., Nachiketas) waited there (at the door) fasting for three days. (The god of death) was frightened at his (i.e., at Nachiketas's) fasting (thus); and by way of remedying (the undesirable consequences arising to himself out of) that (fasting), offered three boons (to Nachiketas) to choose.

Being exceedingly faithful, he chose as the first (of these boons) the kindly reconciliation of his father towards himself. Indeed, all this is impossible and inappropriate in relation to any one, who does not know the individual self to be distinct from the body (wherein it is). Then, as the second boon, he chose that worship of Agni, which forms the means of acquiring such fruits as are enjoyable by the individual self that has risen above the body. This also is not possible in relation to him who has not understood the self to be distinct from the body.

Therefore, here, in this the third boon, which is chosen to the effect—"After a man departs from this world, there is this doubt: some say that he is, while others say that he is not: as taught by you, let me know this: among the boons, this is the third boon" (*Kaṭh. Up.* I. 20), this question is raised with the desire to know the nature of the Higher Self as well as of the lower self and (the nature) also of the worship of the Supreme Self, so that through this (knowledge), which forms the means (for the attainment of final release), the true nature of *moksha* (or final release), which consists in such an attainment of the *Brahman*

as constitutes the highest object of human pursuit, may well be understood.

Consequently (the question raised in) "after a man departs, etc.," is not intended to refer merely to the dissociation of the body (from the soul), but is on the contrary intended to refer to (its) complete release from all bondage, as in (this other scriptural passage which says)—
 "After departing (to final liberation), there is no (individually limited) knowledge any more". (*Bṛih. Up. II. 4. 12*).

This is the meaning :—When a man, who is eligible to attain *moksha*, becomes completely free from all bondage, there arises that doubt as to (his) being existent or non-existent—(a doubt) which relates to his essential nature and is the cause of (much) difference of opinion among philosophical controversialists ; for the removal of that (doubt), let me, as taught by you, know, that is, learn, the true character of his essential nature.

Thus indeed do they (the philosophers) hold different opinions in many ways (in regard to the nature of final release). Some (i.e., the Buddhists) say that final release consists in the destruction of the essential nature of the soul, which is constituted purely of consciousness. Others (i.e., the *Advaitins*, say that it is) the disappearance of *avidyā* (or ignorance) from an (enduring) entity which consists purely of consciousness. Others (i.e., the *Naiyāyikas*) hold that it is the state of (the soul's) complete self-isolation, consisting in the removal of all such (imposed) specific characteristics as knowledge etc., from the soul which is (in itself non-sentient) like a stone. Others (again, i.e., the followers of Bhāskara), who acknowledge (the existence of) a Supreme Self that is devoid of all evil, maintain that final release consists in that same (Self), which has become an individual soul in consequence of its association with limiting conditions, becoming Itself (again) through the disappearance of those limiting conditions,

But those, who are well versed in the *Vedānta*, say that final release is indeed the natural experiential realisation of the Supreme Self by the individual soul on the removal of its ignorance—(by that soul) the essential nature of which is concealed in the *avidyā* (or ignorance) made up of the beginningless *karma*, (the soul) the sole delight of which consists in the experiential realisation of the Supreme Self, and the essential nature of which is unlimited knowledge accordant (with such realisation), and which is, as constituting His body, a mode of the Supreme *Brahman* who is the Self of all, is distinct from all (things) other (than Himself), is a mine of numerous auspicious qualities characterised by natural and unbounded excellence, who is altogether of the essential nature of endless bliss and knowledge which are antagonistic to all evil, and who (again) is the only cause of the whole world.

There (in the context in the *Kāṭhopanishad*) the god of death (Yama) was asked by Nachiketas (to this effect)—“Let me, through your favour, know the essential nature of final release and the means of attaining it.” Then (the god of death) tested him by (first) pointing out (to him) that it was very difficult to understand (those things) and by (next) tempting him with the offer of various kinds of enjoyments. And after thus making out his fitness (to receive the instruction sought by him, Yama) taught him the discerning knowledge regarding the reality of the Higher Self as well as of the lower self, the worship of the Supreme Self, and (the nature of) final release, which (last) consists in reaching His abode, (imparting the instruction) by means of these (scriptural passages) which begin with (*Kāṭh. Up. II. 12*)—“Him, whom it is difficult to see, who is hidden within and has entered into (all things),” and end with “He reaches the other end of the road, and that (other end) is the supreme abode of Vishṇu”. (*Kāṭh. Up. II. 9*) He thereafter taught him (further) such (other) particular things (like *Praṇavāḡgnividyā* etc.) as were desired by him. Thus every thing here is quite appropriate. It is therefore

conclusively established that the 'eater' is no other than the Supreme Self.

ADHIKARANA III.

ANTARĀDHIKARANA

अन्तर उपपत्तेः

Sūtra 13. *Antara upapatteḥ.* (45)

He, who is (declared to be) within (the eye, is the *Brahma*), because of (all the attributes mentioned in the context)¹³⁵ being appropriate (only in relation to Him).

The *Chhandogas* declare in the scriptures, to the following effect:—"He said that that Person who is seen within the eye—He is the Self, That is immortal, That is fearless, That is the *Brahman*". (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 15. 1). Here there is the doubt whether the person pointed out as abiding in the eye is the same as the image reflected (in the

435: The context here is the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* (IV. 10-15), where the instruction of Upakosala in *Brahma-vidyā* is described. For 12 years he lived with the teacher, Satyakāma Jāla, as a student. While his fellow-students were sent away as having completed their education, Upakosala was kept on as a student; but he was not taught the saving knowledge about the *Brahman*. Then the teacher went on a journey, disregarding the request of his wife to complete the teaching to Upakosala. In great distress of mind, the boy now began to fast. Thereupon, the three Fires of the preceptor came forward to console him having been greatly

pleased with his devoted services to them. They taught him, together and individually, about the *Brahman* and their relations to the persons seen within the sun, the moon and lightning. They added that his teacher would complete the instruction. Jāla, on his return, found the boy with a face shining with divine knowledge. He completed the teaching begun by the Fires. His teaching commenced with a reference to the Person within the eye, identified Him with the *Brahman*, and culminated in a description of the path leading emancipated souls to the *Brahman*.

eye), or whether that (person) is that particular deity which presides over the sense of sight, or whether that (person) is the individual self, or whether that (person) is the Supreme Self.⁴³⁶

It is perhaps thought right to hold that he is the image reflected (in the eye); because he is pointed out (in the passage under discussion) as though he were already well-known, and because also, by means of the word 'seen', he is mentioned (therein) to be directly perceivable. Or that (person) may be the individual self; because in relation to that (individual self) also, on account of his presence (in the body being seen) specially in the eye, the prevalent notion (that he is within eye) is quite appropriate. For, it is by looking well at the open eye, that they ascertain the stay and departure of the individual self within (and from) the body. Or, he who is established within the eye may be a particular deity (*viz.*, the sun-god), as he is well-known (to be within the eye) in accordance with the scriptural passage—"He (i.e., the person in the sun) is, through his rays, established in him (i.e., in the person within the eye)". (*Bṛih. Up.* V. 5. 2). Since it is appropriate to point out only these as if they were already well-known, (he who is within the eye) is (obviously) any one of them.

If it be so arrived at, we reply: "He who is (declared to be) within (the eye, is the *Brahman*), because of (all the attributes mentioned in the context) being appropriate (only in relation to Him)." Why? Because (it is thus taught) in the scriptural passage—"He said—He is the Self. That is immortal, That is fearless, That is the *Brahman*. Him they call *samyadvāma* (or One in whom all desirable things gather together), for all blessed things go to meet in Him: He alone is, indeed, *Vāmani* (or the Giver of good things),

⁴³⁶, The first three theories about the person in the eye are said to arise respectively from popular notions, scriptural texts and inference,

for He leads all beings to attain all good things : He alone is, indeed, *Bhāmani* (or the Shining One), for He shines throughout all the worlds". (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 15. 1 to 5). And all those attributes (which are mentioned herein) are appropriate only in relation to the Supreme Self.

स्थानादिव्यपदेशाच्च

Sūtra 14. *Sthānādivyapadeśāchcha.* (46)

Because also existence etc. (within the eye)⁴³⁷ are taught (only in relation to the Supreme Self).

Existence and (the power of) control etc., (as within the eye) are taught only in relation to the Supreme Self in the (scriptural) passage which begins with—"He who, dwelling within the eye, etc.," (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 18). For the same reason, it is He alone who is meant in the passage—"That Person (who is seen) within the eye" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 15. 1). Therefore, to be pointed out also as a being, who is well-known, is appropriate in relation to the Supreme Self. It is solely in accordance with this (view), that the mentioning of direct perception in relation to Him to the effect that He is 'seen' is also appropriate, inasmuch as He is directly perceivable by *yogins*.

सुखविशिष्टाभिधानादेव च

Sūtra 15. *Sukhaviśiṣṭābhidhānādeva cha.* (47)

On account also of the declaration, by itself, of His association with (supreme) happiness (that Person within the eye is the Supreme Self).

437. *Sthāna* (abode) is taken as taken to refer to 'control and *sthiti* (existence) because of sustenance'.
anavasthiteḥ in *Sūtra* 18. *Adi* is

He who abides in the eye is the Highest Person for this reason also, namely, because the passage—"That Person who is (seen) within the eye" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 15. 1)—is given in order definitely to fix, for the purpose of worshipping the *Brahman*, a place of abode for Him, who is associated with (supreme) happiness as mentioned in the context which is to the effect, "The *Brahman* is (supreme) happiness, the *Brahman* is ether" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 10. 5); and also in order to declare the attribute of being *samyadvāma* (One in whom all desirable things gather together) and other such attributes (in relation to that same *Brahman*). The expression 'by itself' indicates the independence of (this) argument⁴³⁸.

It may, however, be said here that, since the form of worship taught by the (three) Fires⁴³⁹ is interposed in the middle (of the context here), the *Brahman* mentioned in the (beginning of the) context, to the effect that "the *Brahman* is (supreme) happiness" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 10. 5), cannot fall within the scope here. Accordingly, the Fires, after teaching the worship of the *Brahman* by means of the passage—"The *Brahman* is life, the *Brahman* is (supreme) happiness, the *Brahman* is ether" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 10. 5.), taught thereafter the worship of the Fires, by means of the passage beginning with—"Then, indeed, the *Gārhapatya* Fire taught him" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 11. 1). Moreover, it is not possible to say that the worship taught by the Fires forms an associated part of the worship of the *Brahman*; because (in relation to this fire-worship) it is

438. The arguments set forth in the two previous *Sūtras* (13 and 14) require to be completed by their negative correlates in *Sūtra* 18. The argument here stands by itself, identifying the Person in the eye described to Upakosala by his teacher with the *Brahman* described earlier to him by the Fires as 'happiness' and 'the ether of space'.

439. These are (i) the *Gārhapatya* or household fire, which is

perpetually maintained by the householder and transmitted from father to son, and from which fires for sacrificial purposes are lighted; (ii) the *Anvāhārya* or the fire on the right altar used in the ceremony performed in honour of the ancestral manes every newmoon, and (iii) the *Āhavanīya* or the fire to the east of the sacrificial ground, taken from the householder's perpetual fire for any sacrificial purpose.

taught in the Scripture that the results arising therefrom consist in the attainment of full life, an uninterrupted familial succession, etc., which are all not included among the results produced by the worship of the *Brahman* and are (further) antagonistic thereunto.

(To this), it is stated in reply (as follows):—In both the places (*viz.*, in the commencement as well as in the conclusion of the context here), the word '*Brahman*' is expressly mentioned as in the passage—"The *Brahman* is life" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 10. 5) and (also) in the passage—"That is immortal, That is fearless, That is the *Brahman*'" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 15. 1). Moreover, in accordance with the statement made by the Fires to this effect—"Your venerable preceptor shall, however, teach you the path (commencing with 'light' and leading to final release)" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 14. 1)—the teaching regarding the worship of the *Brahman* is considered to be incomplete before the teaching of the path (of final release is given). Therefore, this worship which is taught by the Fires, and which occurs in the middle of (the teaching regarding) that (worship of the *Brahman*) is determined to be (itself) an associated part of the worship of the *Brahman*.

(It is so determined) also for the reason that in the passage—"Then indeed the *Gārhapatya* Fire taught the aforementioned⁴⁴⁰ (Upakosala)" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 11. 1),—fire-worship is taught only to him who had qualified himself to (receive the teaching regarding) the worship of the *Brahman*. Again, in the passage—"Dear friend, this our worship, and the worship of the Self, (both have been taught) to you" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 14. 1)—(both these kinds of worship) are together taught to Upakosala; and

440. The pronominal form *enam* (him) in the accusative case is used to refer to Upakosala here. According to *Pāṇini* (1, 4. 34), the substitution of this form for *imām* or *etam* takes place only when the pronoun is re-employed. Thus

enam here refers to one already mentioned earlier. The Upakosala who is taught the worship of the Fires is the Upakosala to whom the *Brahman* has been taught, and who has thus qualified himself for instruction in fire-worship.

he, as mentioned in the passage—"I am full of diseases" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 10. 3), was tormented, after having been hit by the hurtful action of various kinds of desires adverse to the attainment of the *Brahman*, by the (various) fears of *samsāra*, such as conception in the womb, old age, death, etc. Accordingly, it is made out that this fire-worship forms an associated part of that worship of the Supreme Self, which (alone) yields the only result known as final release.

It having been thus learnt that it (*viz.*, fire-worship) constitutes an associated part (of the worship of the *Brahman*), the statement that it yields results (other than final release) is obviously an eulogistic *arthavāda*⁴¹¹.

Moreover, there is not mentioned here even a single result which is opposed to final release;⁴⁴² because, all those results which are mentioned in the passage—"When sinful deeds are destroyed, he attains the (higher) world, he attains to full life, he lives brightly; all those who are in friendly relation with him do not come to nothing: we hold communion with him in this world as well as in the other" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 11. 2., IV. 12. 2 and IV. 13. 2)—may appropriately befall him who is qualified for the attainment of final release.

'When sinful deeds are destroyed' means 'when he destroys such sinful acts (and influences) as are opposed to the attainment of the *Brahman*'; (and) 'he attains to the (higher) world' means 'he attains the world of the *Brahman* on the removal of the sin which is opposed to that (attainment of the *Brahman*)'; (then) 'he attains to full life' means 'he attains such a full life as is needed for the completion of the worship of the *Brahman*'; 'he lives brightly' means 'he lives unattacked by diseases until the

441. Vide Vol 1, Note 282.

preferred by Rāmānuja.

442. This view seems to be

attainment of the *Brahman*': (and) 'all those who are in friendly relation with him do not come to nothing' means 'his disciples and disciples' disciples, etc., his sons and grandsons, etc., also surely become the knowers of the *Brahman*'. That such is the result of knowing the *Brahman* is declared elsewhere also in the scripture thus:— "None who is born within his family is without the knowledge of the *Brahman*" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 9, and *Māṇḍ. Up.* III. 3.).

Upavayantam bhuñjāmo'smimścha loke'mushmimścha. (Here) *vayam* means 'we', that is, the Fires; *tam* means 'him' (i.e., the worshipper Upakosala); *upabhuñjāmaḥ* means 'we protect him from all trouble'.

Thus fire-worship forms an associated part of the worship of the *Brahman*, and so there is nothing wrong in its being mentioned alongside of that other (worship, viz., that of the *Brahman*): consequently the *Brahman* dealt with in the very beginning of the context (under reference), as being associated with (supreme) happiness, is (Himself) mentioned (here, as existing within the eye), for the purpose of defining a place of abode (for Him) for worshipping (Him), and also for the purpose of describing (His) attributes.

It may here be again objected that what is made out by means of the statement—"Your venerable preceptor shall, however, teach you the path (commencing with 'light' and leading to final release)" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 14. 1)—is that it is only the path (commencing with 'light' and leading to final release) which has to be taught by the venerable preceptor, inasmuch as (that) path alone (still) remained (to be taught by the preceptor); and that, consequently, it cannot be said that what is intended (to be taught here) is the idea of assigning an abode and attributes (to the *Brahman* for the purpose of worshipping Him),

This (objection) is replied to thus. The meaning of the passage—"Your venerable preceptor shall, however, teach you the path (commencing with 'light' and leading to final release)" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 14. 1)—is this. Without teaching the worship of the *Brahman* (to Upakosala), his venerable preceptor (Satyakāma Jābāla) went away; not having obtained that (teaching), Upakosala became highly grieved; in order to console him and save him, his venerable preceptor's Fires, which were pleased with the service rendered to them (by Upakosala), taught him merely the essential nature of the *Brahman* and also the fire-worship which forms an associated part of that (other worship, viz., that of the *Brahman*).

Then, after carefully considering the meaning of the scriptural passage—"Indeed, that form of worship alone, which is learnt from a venerable preceptor, becomes perfect" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 9. 3.)—(they, i.e., the Fires) thought within themselves that, in order to (enable him) to attain perfection (in worship), the venerable preceptor alone should teach him the *Brahman* as having the attribute of being *samyadvāma* (One in whom all desirable things gather together) and other such qualities, and (should teach him) also a place of (His) abode for worshipping Him in it, as also the path commencing with 'light' (and leading to final release). Accordingly, they (i.e., the Fires) said—"Your venerable preceptor shall, however, teach you the path (commencing with 'light' and leading to final release)". The mention of the 'path' (here) is to show that a part of the worship (of the *Brahman*) still remained to be taught.

It is for this very reason that the venerable preceptor also began (his teaching) with the passage—"I will teach you that, just as water does not cling to the lotus leaf, so also sinful deeds do not cling to (i.e., taint) him who knows this" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 14. 3); and then he

taught that the *Brahman* is characterised by the auspicious attribute of being *samyadvāma* (or One in whom all desirable things gather together) and other such auspicious attributes; and that He is to be worshipped within the space of the eye; and (at last he described) the path commencing with 'light' (and leading to final release). Accordingly, the *Brahman* Himself who is, in the commencement of the context, described to be associated with supreme happiness in the passage—"The *Brahman* is supreme happiness, the *Brahman* is ether" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 10. 5). is mentioned here. Hence the Being abiding within the eye is the Supreme Self.

Again, it may be asked: How do you know that what is referred to in the passage—"The *Brahman* is (supreme) happiness, the *Brahman* is ether" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 10. 5)—is the Highest *Brahman* whom you describe here as abiding within the eye? On the contrary, it appears from the passage, which says that 'the *Brahman* is (supreme) happiness, and that the *Brahman* is ether', that what is enjoined (therein) is simply to look upon the well known element of ether and upon worldly pleasure as the *Brahman*; because this (passage) is similar in character to the (scriptural) statements—"Name is the *Brahman*". (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 1. 5.) and 'Mind is the *Brahman*', (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 3. 2).⁴⁴³

(In reply) to such a supposition he (the *Sūtrakāra*) says:—

443. The objection here is that the identification of happiness and the ether of space with the *Brahman* is merely intended to teach *pratīkopāsānā*, where a thing which is not known to be the *Brahman* is meditated on as the *Brahman*. This view is supposed to derive some support from there being no mention of

the *Brahman* at the conclusion of the teaching of the Fires to 'Upakosala' in *Chhānd. Up.* IV. 10. 5. *Sūtra* 16 now seeks to establish that Upakosala is taught the *upāsānā* of the *Brahman*, which alone can lead to *mokṣha*, and not *pratīkopāsānā* whose results are temporary.

अत एव च स ब्रह्म

414 **Sūtra** 16.*Ata eva cha sa brahma.* (48)

For that same reason also, that (*ākāśa* or ether of space which is denoted by *kha*) is the *Brahman*.

For whatever reason in the passage there, (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 10. 5)—where it is declared that what indeed is the *ka* (or supreme happiness) that itself is the *kha* (or the ether of space)—the ether (or *ākāśa*) is declared to be characterised by supreme happiness, for that same reason that (very) ether which is denoted by the word *kha* is the Highest *Brahman*.

What is said (in the *Upanishadic* context here) is this. When the Fires said—"The *prāṇa* (i.e., the principal vital air or life) is the *Brahman*, the *ka* (or supreme happiness) is the *Brahman* and the *kha* (or the ether of space) is the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 10. 5)—Upakosala stated in reply: "I know that *Brahman* which is life (or *prāṇa*), but I do not know that (*Brahman*) which is denoted by *ka* as well as by *kha*" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 10. 5).

This is the meaning thereof:—It is certainly not the worship (of the *Brahman*) under such symbols as the principal vital air, etc., that is taught by the Fires (here); because their attempt is to teach me (Upakosala), who am afraid of the terrors of *samsāra*, which consists of birth, old age, death etc., and am (also) desirous of winning final release. Thus what is taught is the *Brahman* Himself, who (in reality) forms the (only) object of worship.

444. This *Sūtra* is commented on by Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, but not by Śaṅkara and Madhva. 'That same reason' is characterisation by supreme happiness. But the text for consideration here is "Whatever indeed is the *ka*, that itself is the *kha*," and not,

as in the previous *Sūtra*, "The *Brahman* is *ka*, the *Brahman* is *kha*." The word *saḥ* (that) in the *Sūtra* indicates, by its masculine gender *ākāśa* in *tadākāśam*, according to the *Śrutaprakāśikā*, and *prāṇu* in *prāṇo Brahma* according to Rāṇ, arāmānuja.

It being so, the *Brahman* has been mentioned here in the same grammatical equation⁴⁴⁵ with the well known *prāṇa* (or life) and other things. And among these it is appropriate for the *Brahman* to be mentioned as *prāṇa* (or life) either because He supports the whole world, or because He is the controller of *prāṇa* (or life) by reason of His owning the principal vital air (or life) as His 'body'. Accordingly, he (i.e., Upakosala) said—"I know that *Brahman* which is *prāṇa* (or life)" (*Chhānd. Up. IV. 10. 5*).

Similarly (supreme) happiness (or *ka*) and the ether of space (or *kha*) also constitute the attributes of the *Brahman*, because they (also) form His body and hence are subject to His control. Or (they) form His attributes, as, in consequence of their being determinative of each other's significance, they (i.e., *ka* and *kha*) are intended to describe that essential nature of the *Brahman* which consists of the bliss that is unsurpassed in excellence. It being so, in case they (i.e., *ka* and *kha*) are taken independently to form His attributes through constituting His body, then the *Brahman* will have to possess the character of being the controller of the pleasures of the senses and of the element of ether; and consequently there will be no apprehension of His essential nature (but only of His glory). But in case they (i.e., *ka* and *kha*) are taken as being determinative of each other's significance, then the *Brahman* (as denoted by them) will possess such an essential nature as consists altogether of infinite and indescribable bliss.

Accordingly, with the intention of definitely finding out which of these (two) alternative views (is right), he (Upakosala) said—"But I do not know the *ka* and the *kha*." Knowing this intention of Upakosala, the Fires said—"Whatever indeed is the *ka*, that same is the *kha*. What indeed is the *kha*, that same is the *ka*". (*Chhānd. Up. IV. 10. 5*). The meaning is that the nature of the *Brahman* as

⁴⁴⁵. For particulars about the grammatical equation, vide Vol. 1, Notes 75 and 223.

bliss is in itself infinite and indescribable. Consequently, that *Brahman* who, having life for His body, is characterised by *prāṇa* (or life) as an attribute, He Himself is conclusively shown in the scripture to possess the character of infinite and indescribable bliss, in the passage—"And they, verily, taught him (i.e., Upakosala) the *prāṇa* (or life to be the *Brahman*), and the *ākāśa* (or the ether of space) to be the same (as supreme happiness)." (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 10. 5).

Hence it is the *Brahman*, who is of the nature of infinite and indescribable bliss, that is mentioned in this very passage—"The *Brahman* is (supreme) happiness, the *Brahman* is the ether". Consequently, it is the Highest *Brahman* alone that is therein dealt with in the context under reference; and it is He Himself who is declared here to have the eye for His abode. Therefore, the Being within the eye is the Supreme Self.

श्रुतोपनिषत्कगत्यभिधनाच्च

Sūtra 17. *Śrutopanishatkagatyabhidhānāchcha.* (19)

(The Being within the eye is the *Brahman*), because also the path (which commences with 'light' and leads to final release and) which is allotted to him who has studied the *Upanishads*, is described (here in the context).

That path commencing with 'light' (and leading to final release), which is taught in other scriptural contexts⁴⁴⁶ as having to be meditated on by him who has understood the essential nature of the Highest Person, that is, by him who has studied the *Upanishads*, that (path) which, giving rise to the attainment of the *Brahman*, possesses the characteristic attribute of allowing no return journey (again

446. These include *Chhānd. Up.* in which 'light' is dealt with in V. 10. 1, *Bṛih. Up.* VI. 2. 15 and *Vedānta Sūtras*, IV. 3, *Kaush. Up.* I. 3. The 'path beginn-

to this world of *samsāra*)—(that) is taught to Upakosala, who has (already) learnt about the Person within the eye, (in the context) beginning with the passage—“They go to light, indeed, from light to day, from day to the bright half of the moon”, and ending with—“(They go) from the moon to the lightning. There is that superhuman person, and he leads them to the *Brahman*. This is the path of the gods, this is the path to the *Brahman*. Those who proceed on this path do not return to this human cycle (of *samsāra*)”. (*Chhānd. Up. IV. 15.5 and 6.*)

Therefore also that Person who is within the eye is the Supreme Self.

अनवस्थितेरसम्भवाच्च नेतरः

Sūtra 18. *Anavasthiterasambhavāchcha netarah.* (50)

Other things (than the *Brahman*) cannot be (the Person within the eye), because they do not (always) exist (therein) and because also it is impossible (for them to possess the qualities attributed to Him in the context).

Things like the image reflected (within the eye) do not always exist within the eye; and unconditioned attributes like immortality are not appropriate in relation to them. Therefore, things other than the Supreme Self, such as the reflected image (within the eye) do not deserve to be the Person within the eye.

Surely, the image reflected (within the eye) is dependent upon the proximity of another person, and therefore it cannot possibly be invariably (within the eye). In order to co-operate harmoniously with the activity of all the senses, the individual self has to be in a particular position (i. e., the heart) which is at the root of all the senses. Accordingly, he does not exist within the eye. The deity (sun)

also does not abide within the eye ; because, in the passage —“ He (*i.e.*, the person within the sun) is through his rays established in Him (*i.e.*, in the Person within the eye) ” (*Bṛih. Up.* V. 5. 2)—he is said to exist (within the eye) by means of his rays, and because also it is possible for him, who is situated in another place (than within them), to preside over the senses.

It is (also) altogether impossible for all these things (other than the Supreme Self) to possess unconditioned immortality and other such attributes. Therefore the Person within the eye is the Supreme Self.

ADHIKARANA IV.

ANTARYĀMYADHIKARANA

Under the aphorism—“Because also existence, etc., (within the eye) are taught (only in relation to the Supreme Self)” (*Ved. Sūtr.* I. 2.14.)—it was assumed that existence and (the power of) control, etc., as within the eye, which are mentioned in the passage beginning with—“He who dwelling within the eye, etc.,” (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7.18) belong only to the Supreme Self. And (on that assumption), it was established that the Person abiding within the eye is the Supreme Self. Now he (the *Sūtrakāra*) proves that same (assumption to be true).

अन्तर्याम्यधिदेवाधिलोकादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात्

Sūtra 19. *Antaryāmyadhidaivādhilokādishu
taddharmavyapadeśāt, (51)*

The Internal Ruler, (spoken of) in the passages (severally) named *adhidaiva*, *adhiloka*, etc.,⁴⁴⁷ (is the *Brahman*), because His attributes are declared (t herein).

(Both) the divisions of the Vājasaneyins, (namely), the Kāṇvas and the Mādhyandinas, declare in their scripture thus :—“He who, dwelling in the earth, is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who controls the earth from within—He is your Internal Ruler and Immortal Self.” (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7.3.) Similarly—in all the deities such as (those of) water, fire, mid-air, air, sun, space, moon, stars, sky, darkness and light ; and in all beings ; and also in the individual self, and in the things relating to the individual self, such as life, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge, seed—a particular Being is pointed out as dwelling in each of them, as existing within each of them, as incapable of being known by each of them, as having each of them for His body, and as controlling each of them. And then it is declared—“He (i.e., that Being) is your Internal Ruler and Immortal Self”.

However, in the recension of the Mādhyandinas, there are the following (additional) readings—“He who dwelling in all the worlds etc.,” “He who (dwelling) in all the *Vedas*, etc.,” “He who (dwelling) in all the sacrifices etc.”

⁴⁴⁷ The context is *Bṛih. Up.* III. 7, known as the *Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa*, where in answer to Uddālaka's questions Yājñavalkya explains that the *Brahman* is the Internal Controller of everything in the universe including the individual soul. The *Upaniṣad* has two versions, that of the Kāṇvas and that of the Mādhyandinas. In *Kāṇ. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 14, the listing of the deities in whom the Internal Controller is present, is concluded after mentioning those presiding over the earth, the waters, fire, mid-air, air, the sun,

space, the quarters, the moon, stars, sky, darkness and light. The conclusion of the topic is announced thus : *Ityadhidaivatam* (I thus far the subject relating to the deities). The *Mādhy. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7, has additionally sentences about the presence of the Internal Controller in all the worlds and concluding with the statement, *Ityadhilokam* (I thus far the subject relating to the worlds). Śaṅkara's reading of the *Sūtra*, which omits *adhiloka*, does not clearly introduce the Mādhyandina version into the context,

Moreover, in place of the reading—"He, who dwelling within the *viññāna*, etc.," (*Kāṇ. Br̥ih. Up.* III. 7.22), there is the alternative reading—"He, who dwelling within the self etc.," (*Mādh. Br̥ih. Up.* III. 7.22) And there is this peculiarity also, that (in place of the reading *esha te'ntaryāmyamṛitaḥ*) there is (the reading) *sa te'ntaryām-yamṛitaḥ*.

Here the doubt arises whether that 'internal ruler' is the individual self or the Supreme Self. It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the individual self. Why? Because in the remaining part of the (context wherein this) passage (occurs), namely, in "He is the seer, the hearer, etc.," (*Br̥ih. Up.* III. 7.23.), it is mentioned that that being's knowledge is dependent upon the senses and because also he who 'sees' thus (*i.e.*, through the senses) is himself taught to be the internal ruler, and again because other seers (than such an individual self) are declared to be non-existent in the statement.—"There is no seer other than he." (*Br̥ih. Up.* III. 7.23).

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply:—"The Internal Ruler (spoken of) in the passages (severally) named *adhidaiva*, *adhiloka*, etc., (is the *Brahman*), because His attributes are declared (therein)". (*Ved. Sūt* I. 2.19). He who is declared to be the Internal Ruler in the scriptural passages named *adhidaiva*, *adhiloka*, etc., is that *Nārāyaṇa* who is free from all sins and is the Supreme Self. Both the expressions, *adhidaiva* and *adhiloka*, are mentioned (in this *sūtra*), with the object of drawing attention to the fact that, in the recension of *Mādhyandinas*, the passages named *adhiloka* etc., are to be found in addition to the passages named *adhidaiva*, etc., which (latter alone) are found in the recension of the *Kāṇvas*.

Accordingly, the meaning is this, that the Internal Ruler mentioned in both the sets of passages is the Supreme Self. Why? "Because His attributes are declared (therein)." Indeed, this is the attribute of the Supreme Self, that, being

one only, He controls all worlds, all beings, all gods, etc. Thus, the question of Uddālaka begins with the passage—"He who controls this world and the next world and all these beings from within", and ends with the passage—"Tell me about that Internal Ruler." (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7.1. and 2.) And the answer thereunto is given (in the context) beginning with the passage—"He, who dwelling within the earth, etc." (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7.3). Consequently, to enter into all worlds, all beings, all gods, all *Vedas* and all sacrifices, and then to control them in all the various ways, and to form the Self of all, through having all things for His body—all this is not possible to any one other than the Highest Person who is omniscient and wills the truth.

Accordingly, the following *Upanishadic* passages—"He, who has entered within, is the ruler of all things that are born, and is the Self of all" (*Taitt. Ār.* III. 21.); "Having created it, He entered into that world; having entered into that (world), He became the *sat* and *tyat*"⁴⁴⁸ (*Taitt. Up.* II. 6.1)—and others like them declare that the character of being the Ruler of all and of being the Self of all, etc., belongs only to the Supreme Self.

Similarly, in the *Subāla Upanishad* there is (the section beginning with) the passage—"In the beginning (*i.e.*, before creation) nothing (*i.e.*, no created thing) was existent; all these created beings were born from no (previously created) source and from no (previously created) basis."⁴⁴⁹ Only the Divine Lord Nārāyaṇa (was). The sense of sight and the object of sight are Nārāyaṇa, the sense of hearing and the object of hearing are Nārāyaṇa". (*Sub. Up.* VI.). There is that which, (*i.e.*, another section following it which) begins with the passage—"The one eternal Being who is unborn is placed in the 'cave' within the body", and

⁴⁴⁸ Vide Vol. I. Note 183.

⁴⁴⁹ This sentence can also be rendered thus. "In the beginning (*i.e.*, before creation), nothing

(*i.e.* no created thing) was existent—nothing which lacked a source or which was without a basis; (then) all these created beings were born."

therein it is said—“(He) whose body is *mṛityu*, ⁴⁵⁰ who is moving within *mṛityu*, whom *mṛityu* does not know, He is the Internal Self of all beings, He is free from all sins, He is the Divine Lord, the only Nārāyaṇa”. (*Sub. Up.* VII). Here the characteristic qualities of being the Self of all, of having all things for His body, and of being the controller of all, are attributed only to the Highest *Brahman*. Moreover, such immortality as is independently due to one's own intrinsic nature forms the characteristic attribute of the Supreme Self alone.

Again, the quality of being the seer and other such (qualities) possessed by the *Brahman* are not dependent upon the senses, but are on the contrary independently due to His own intrinsic nature itself: they are due to the fact that He, in Himself, possesses the power of being omniscient and of willing the truth. Moreover, the scripture declares the same thus: “He sees without eyes, hears without ears, without hands and feet He grasps things and moves quickly”. (*S'vet. Up.* III. 19.). Further, the expressions ‘seeing’, ‘hearing’, and such others do not denote the knowledge born out of the senses like the sense of sight, but on the contrary (denote) the direct perception of colour (or form) and such other things. And this direct perception of colour (or form) and such other things is—in the case of the individual self, the intelligence constituting whose intrinsic nature is enveloped by *karma*—born out of the senses like the sense of sight. But in the case of the Supreme Self, that (perceptive realisation) is entirely and independently due to His own intrinsic nature.

Moreover, the passage—“There is no other seer than Him”—(*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 23)—says that there is no seer other than (i.e., equal or superior to) that seer, who is the

⁴⁵⁰. This word means *prakṛiti* or matter here.

Controller mentioned in the previous passages. In a previous part (of the context) by means of the passages "whom the earth does not know"—(*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 3) "whom the self does not know"—(*Mādh. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 22.) and by means of other similar passages, it has been declared that He (*i.e.*, the Controller referred to already) controls the earth, the self and such other controlled objects, (Himself being) altogether unperceived by them. That same idea is summed up in the statement—"He sees without being seen, and hears without being heard" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 23); and then by means of the statement, beginning with—"There is no seer other than Him" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 23), it is declared that there is no other controller to control Him who is the (only) Controller.

In the sentences *esha te ātmā* ('This is your Self') and *sa te ātmā* ('He is your Self'), the individual self is pointed out by the word *te* ('your') which stands in a different grammatical case (from that of the words *eshaḥ* and *saḥ* which denote the *Brahman*), and (hence) the Internal Ruler who is taught to be the Self (of the individual self) cannot possibly be (such) an individual self.

न च स्मार्तमतद्वर्माभिलाषाच्छारीरश्च

⁴⁵¹**Sūtra 20.** *Na cha smārtam ataddharmābhilāpāch-
chhārīraścha.* (52)

That which is dealt with in the *Smṛiti* (of Kapila) and also that which is the embodied being do not form (the Internal Ruler); because attributes other than those which belong to them are mentioned (in the context).

451. Śaṅkara reads this *Sūtra* without the last two words, *Śārīraścha*, which are transferred to the beginning of the next *Sūtra*. Rāmānuja's version has the advantage of clearly showing that the *pradhāna* is brought in only by way of illustration to indicate

that the attributes in question can apply as little to the individual self as to insentient matter. Moreover, the tautology arising from the presence of both *śārīraḥ* and *enam* in *Sūtra* 21 is avoided.

“That which is dealt with in the *Smṛiti* (of Kapila)” is the *pradhāna* (or material Nature). “That which is the embodied being” is the individual self. That which is dealt with in the *Smṛiti* (of Kapila, viz., the *pradhāna*) and that which is the embodied being (viz., the individual self) do not form the Internal Ruler; “because attributes other than those which belong to them are mentioned (in the context)”; that is, because attributes which cannot appropriately belong to them are mentioned (in the context).

To possess, independently and by one’s own intrinsic nature, the character of being the seer of all, of being the controller of all, of being the Self of all and also to possess an altogether independent immortality, cannot in the least be the characteristic attributes of those two things (viz., the *pradhāna* and the *purusha*). What is said is this. Just as the non-intelligent thing, *pradhāna*, that is, that which is dealt with in the *Smṛiti* (of Kapila), does not deserve to be omniscient, to be the controller of all, to be the Self of all, and to have other such attributes—so also the individual self (does not deserve to possess these attributes), because its characteristic attributes are other (than these).

The appropriateness of the attribution of these attributes to the Supreme Self as well as the appropriateness of the non-attribution (of them) to the individual self was demonstrated by means of the two (preceding) aphorisms. Here he (the *Sūtrakāra*) gives another independent reason (to prove that the Internal Ruler is different from the individual self).

उभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैवमधीयते

Sūtra 21. *Ubhaye’pi hi bhedenainamadhīyate.* (53)

Indeed both (the *Kāṇva*s and the *Mādhyandina*s) declare in their scriptures that this (i.e., the individual self) is different (from the Internal Ruler).

Both, that is, the Mādhyandinas and the Kāṇvas, differentiate and classify *this*, that is, the individual self, along with such non-intelligent things as speech, etc., for the reason that it is (like them) subject to the control of the Internal Ruler ; and (they) declare it accordingly in their scriptures.

The Mādhyandinas say—"He who, dwelling in the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, who controls the self within—He is your Internal Ruler and Immortal Self". (*Mādh. Brīh. Up.* III. 7. 22). And the Kāṇvas say—"He who dwelling in the *viñāna*, etc." (*Kāṇva. Brīh. Up.* III. 7. 22). The meaning is that they declare in their scriptures this (the individual self) to be quite distinct from Him, for the reason that it is controlled by (Him) the Supreme Self.

Therefore, it is conclusively proved that the Internal Ruler (dealt with here) is the Supreme Self, Nārāyaṇa, who is quite distinct from the individual self and is free from all sins.

ADHIKARANA V

ADṚṢYATVĀDIGUṆAKĀDHIKARANA.

अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः

Sūtra 22. *Adṛṣyatvādiguṇako dharmokteḥ.* (34)

That Being who is characterised by invisibility and other such attributes (is the Supreme Self), because His attributes are mentioned (in the context)."⁴⁵²

452. The context is in *Munḍ Up*

The Ātharvaṇikas read in their scriptures thus :—“ And that is the higher knowledge (*vidyā*) by which that *Akshara* (or Indestructible Being) is known—that (Being) which is invisible, which cannot be seized, which has no family (or which has no name), which has no colour, no eyes, no ears : That which has no hands and no feet, and That which the wise see as the source of all beings, is the eternal, the omnipresent, the all-pervading, the extremely subtle, and the imperishable One ”. (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 6.). Similarly, (they read) further on :—“ He is higher than what is beyond the *akshara* (*aksharāt parataḥ paraḥ*) ”. (*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 1. 2.)

Here the doubt is raised whether the *akshara*, possessing invisibility and other such attributes, and the Being, which is higher than what is beyond the *akshara*, are (respectively) the *prakṛiti* (i.e., material Nature,) and the *puruṣa* (i.e., the individual self), or whether it is the Supreme Self Himself (who is so mentioned) in both (the contexts). It is perhaps held to be right that they are the *prakṛiti* and the *puruṣa*.

Why? Because in regard to this *akshara* here, there is no predication of any of those special attributes of an intelligent being, such as the character of being the seer, etc., as there is in passages like—“ He sees without being seen ”. (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 23). And in the statement—“ He is higher than the superior *akshara* (*aksharāt parataḥ paraḥ*) ” (*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 1. 2), the individual soul, who is higher than the undifferentiated *prakṛiti* (or material Nature) which is above all modifications, is referred to as the *samashī-puruṣa* (or the aggregate of individual selves).

What is said is this. The negation of visibility and the other qualities inherent in the non-intelligent earth and the other elements, which possess form (or colour) etc., in their gross condition, posits certainly that (other) non-intelligent thing which is in the subtle condition and is

of the same kind as the earth and the other elements.⁴⁵³ And that (non-intelligent thing) is nothing other than the *pradhāna* (or material Nature). Moreover, it is very well known that the quality of being higher than that (*pradhāna*) belongs only to the *samashī-purusha* (or the aggregate of individual selves). And the *pradhāna*, abided in (or governed) by that (*purusha*) evolves all the modifications beginning with the 'great principle' and ending with the 'particular principles'.⁴⁵⁴ Accordingly, here in this context, the following illustrative examples are given—"Just as the spider sends out and draws in its thread, just as medicinal herbs grow out of the earth, just as hairs on the head and on the body spring forth from a living person, similarly this whole universe is born out of the *akshara*".⁴⁵⁵ (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 7.). Therefore, in this context, it is only the *pradhāna* (or material Nature) and the *purusha* (or the individual self) that are taught about.

453. The *pūrvapakṣa* here is based on the fact that *akshara* in *Muṇḍ. Up.* 1. 1. 2 undoubtedly means the *prakṛiti* (or matter) in its undifferentiated condition. It is therefore argued that the word is used in the same sense in I. 1. 6 also. Rāmānuja demonstrates that *akshara* is used to mean the *Brahman* in I. 1. 6 and the *prakṛiti* in I. 1. 2. The qualities negated of or attributed to the *Akshara* in I. 1. 6 show Him to be the *Brahman*: The objector, however, points out that, by the negation of visibility and other qualities in I. 1. 6, the *akshara* is denied to be gross matter, but affirmed to be something similar or akin to it; and this something is matter in its subtle or undifferentiated condition. The argument is something like saying that when a man says, "This is not a dog," he means a cat or a wolf or some creature resembling a dog, and not a man or a mountain or something far dissimilar.

454. Vide Vol. I, Notes 91, 169 and 170.

455. The illustrations are intended to show that by knowing a material cause its effects are known. The spider, the soil and the living person indicate respectively that the *prakṛiti* can evolve when governed by individual souls, or when not so governed, or when they are merely present. As applied to the *Brahman*, they help us to understand how one and the same thing can be both the material and the efficient cause, and how the material cause need not be destroyed or concealed during the production of the effect. The spider suggests how the *Brahman* creates the universe out of Himself and draws it within Himself during the process, of dissolution. From the example of the earth we see that the material cause can remain undestroyed and unconcealed even after producing the effect. The growth of hair and nails points out the possibility of the non-living springing from the living.

If it be so held, we state in reply :—"That Being who is characterised by invisibility and other such attributes (is the Supreme Self), because His attributes are mentioned (in the context)". (*Ved. Sūta*. I. 2. 22). He who possesses invisibility and other such attributes, as well as He who is higher than what is beyond the *akshara* (*aksharāt paratah parah*) is the Highest Person Himself. Why? "Because His attributes are mentioned (in the context)".

In the passage beginning with—"He who understands all and who knows all, etc.," (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 9), omniscience and other attributes, which belong only to Him, are mentioned. Thus in the passage, beginning with—"By which (*vidyā* or knowledge) that *Akshara* is known", (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 6), the *Akshara* possessing invisibility and other such attributes is mentioned; then in the statement—"The whole universe is born out of the *Akshara*" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 7)—it is further mentioned that the universe is evolved out of that (*Akshara*) and then, in the passage—"He who understands all, and who knows all and whose *tāpas*⁴⁵⁶ consists of knowledge, from Him proceeds the undifferentiated creation, as also the world of matter and soul characterised by the differentiations of name and form" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 9)—the quality of omniscience and other similar attributes are attributed to that *Akshara* which is (thus) the source of all beings; afterwards, by means of the passage—"He is higher (*parah*) than what is beyond the *akshara*" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 1. 2), that same *Akshara*, which is the source of all beings and is omniscient and which is dealt with in the context here as possessing the attribute of invisibility, that alone is called the Highest (*parah*).

Hence in the statement, *aksharāt paratah parah*, the word *akshara* in the ablative case does not denote that (other) *Akshara* (or Supreme Self) which is mentioned in the context as being possessed of invisibility and other such

attributes ; because, owing to that Omniscient Being being the cause of the universe, and being (also) the Highest of all, none other than Him can possess the quality of being the Highest (*paratva*).

Therefore, the word *akshara* here denotes the non-intelligent thing (matter) in its subtle elementary condition.

विशेषणभेदव्यपदेशाभ्यां च नेतरौ

Sūtra 23. *Viśeṣaṇabheda-vyapadeśābhyāñcha netarau.*⁽⁵⁵⁾

Because also the context mentions the characteristic attributes of, and the distinction (between, the *pradhāna* or matter and the *purusha* or the individual soul on one hand and the Supreme Self on the other), that (*Akshara* who is the source of all things) is not those other two things (*viz.*, matter and soul).

For this reason also, that (*Akshara* which is the source of all beings) is not the *pradhāna* (material Nature) and the *purusha* (the individual self). Indeed, the context distinctively qualifies (that *Akshara* by means of special characterising attributes). The meaning is that it distinguishes that *Akshara*, which is the source of all beings, from the *pradhāna* and also from the *purusha*, by enunciating and proving the proposition that, by knowing a certain One Thing (*viz.*, this *Akshara*), all things become known, and (also) by other similar means. Similarly, the distinction of the *Akshara* from both of them (i.e., from the *pradhāna* and the *purusha*), is mentioned in the passage—“He is higher than what is beyond the *akshara*”, and in others following it.

Accordingly, in the passage—“He taught his eldest son, Atharva, that science of the *Brahman* which is the foundation of all other sciences” (*Mund. Up.* I. 1. 1.)—

the science of the *Brahman*, which forms the foundation of of all other sciences,⁴⁵⁷ is dealt with in the context ; undoubtedly the higher science of the Highest *Brahman* (referred to in the context) forms the foundation of all other sciences. With the desire of knowing this above-mentioned science, which forms the foundation of all (other kinds of) sciences, and which had been learnt by Aṅgiras in due order of succession from the line of teachers consisting of the four-faced Brahmā (the creator), Atharva etc., the famous Śaunaka, known as *Mahāśāla* (i.e., the owner of a great mansion), approached Aṅgiras in accordance with the rules of discipline laid down therefor, and questioned him thus—“ Reverend sir, by knowing which indeed does all this (universe) become known ?” (*Mund. Up.* I. 1. 3).

Bearing in mind that the science of the *Brahman* forms the foundation of all (other kinds of) science, and that in consequence, by knowing the *Brahman* all things become known, he (i.e., Śaunaka) made his question relate to the essential nature of the *Brahman*. “ He (i.e., the preceptor) said to him (i.e., Śaunaka): (It is) that (for attaining) which those who know the *Brahman* say that there are, in fact, two sciences to be known, namely, the undeniably higher one, and similarly, the lower (one)” (*Mund. Up.* I. 1. 4).

“ Two sciences have to be known ” by him who is desirous of attaining the *Brahman*. The meaning is that there are two accepted kinds of knowledge which relate to the *Brahman*, and may respectively be characterised as direct and indirect. Of these, the indirect form (of knowledge) is obtained by means of the scriptures ; the direct form (of knowledge) is obtained by means of (the process of mental concentration known as) *yoga*.

Of these two (forms of knowledge), that which constitutes the means of (directly) attaining the *Brahman* is the

⁴⁵⁷. The implied argument here is that, as all things are included in the *Brahman*, all sciences are included in the science of the *Brahman*.

direct form of knowledge ; and this must assume the character of loving devotion, because it is particularly stated so in this same (context) in the passage—" Whomsoever He chooses, by him alone is He reached ". (*Munḍ. Up.* III. 2. 3.).⁴⁵⁸ And what is required for the acquisition of that (loving devotion) is knowledge born of the scriptures and functioning along with the seven means known as discrimination, etc.,⁴⁵⁹ for it is declared (elsewhere) in the scripture to the effect that " Brāhmaṇas desire to know Him by reciting the *Vedas*, by sacrifices, by giving gifts, by religious austerities associated with fasting ". (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22) Moreover, the venerable Parāśara says (the same things) thus :—" The means of acquiring it (*viz.*, loving devotion), O great sage, are knowledge and religious works. And this knowledge is said to be of two kinds, namely, that which is born out of the scriptures and that which is produced by discrimination also ". (*V. P.* VI. 5. 60—61.)

In the passage, beginning with—" Of these, the lower (knowledge) is the *Rig-veda*, the *Yajur-veda* ", and ending with—" the *Dharma-śāstras* "⁴⁶⁰ (*Munḍ. Up.* I. 1. 5.) that indirect form of knowledge is mentioned which is produced by means of the *śāstras* and forms the means of realising the *Brahman* ; because the *Vedas* together with their auxiliary sciences,⁴⁶¹ with the *Itihāsas* and the *Purāṇas*, with the

458. This point is made clear in Vol. I, p. 18 : " For it is indeed the dearest one that becomes worthy to be chosen. To whomsoever He is unsurpassingly dear, he alone is the dearest to him."

459. These seven means are given in a quotation from the *Vākya-kāra* and explained in Vol. I, pp. 20-21. " Functioning along with " is the rendering for *anugrihitam*, which literally means ' helped on by '. As the *Śrutaprakāśikā* points out and the quotation immediately following

from the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* makes clear, the seven means are an independent cause for producing loving devotion to God.

460. *Munḍ. Up.* (I. I. 5) in Śaṅkara's version describes the lower science or knowledge as consisting of the four *Vedas* and the six *Vedāṅgas*. It refers also additionally to the *Itihāsas*, the *Purāṇas* and the *Dharma-Śāstras* in Rāmānuja's version.

461. The auxiliary sciences are the *Vedāṅgas*, about which please see Vol. I, Note 7.

Dharma-sāstras, and also with the *Mīmāṃsās*, are the means of producing the knowledge relating to the *Brahman*. (What is taught) in the passage—"And that is the higher (*vidyā* or knowledge) by which that *Akshara* is known" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 5).—is the 'knowledge' which is called worship, and has acquired the character of loving devotion and is peculiarly capable of giving rise to the realisation of the *Brahman*.

In the passage, beginning with—"That which is invisible, which cannot be seized" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 6), what is declared is the essential nature of the Highest *Brahman*, who is the object of both these kinds of knowledge, named indirect and direct. By means of the passage, beginning with—"Just as the spider sends forth and draws in its thread" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 7), what is stated is the evolution of the whole universe, made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things, out of that *Akshara*, which is the Highest *Brahman* having the above-mentioned nature.

From the mention of the whole universe (*viśva*)⁴⁶² (here in the context), it is not merely (the world of) non-intelligent things (that is said to have been evolved out of It). In the passage—"The *Brahman* grows by means of *tapas*; *anna* is born out of Him; from *anna* are born life (or the principal vital air), mind, *satya* (i.e., the collection of all embodied souls), the various kinds of worlds, and immortality as a result of (ritualistic) works." (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 8)—the manner in which the whole universe is born out of the *Brahman* (as cause) is described. 'By means of *tapas*' means 'by means of knowledge'; because it is stated further on thus—"His *tapas* consists of knowledge." (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 9). 'Grows' means 'increases'. The meaning is that the *Brahman* becomes desirous of creating (the world), in consequence of possessing the mental state which is of the

⁴⁶². *Viśva* is taken by the world of non-intelligent things. *pūrvapakṣin* to mean only the This is refuted here.

nature of a resolution to the effect—'May I become manifold'. (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3).

"*Anna* is born out of Him." *Anna* (here) is that which is eaten (or enjoyed). The meaning is that the undifferentiated subtle elements, forming the objects of enjoyment to the whole world of enjoyers (*i.e.*, souls) are born out of the Highest *Brahman*. And the whole totality of modified products like life (or the principal vital air), *manas* (or the internal organ of attention), etc., up to and inclusive of the ritualistic works, that form the means of attaining results in the form of *svarga* and of final release, is produced out of that same (*anna*).

In the passage,⁴⁶³ beginning with—"He who knows all and understands all" (*Mund. Up.* I. 1. 9.), the quality of omniscience, the quality of willing the truth, and other such qualities, which together form the auxiliary helps in the work of creation, are all mentioned. Out of the *Brahman* (in the condition of a cause), who is omniscient, wills the truth and is the *Akshara*, this (*etat*) is born, namely, the *Brahman*, who is in the condition of effect, and is differentiated by name and form and consists of the enjoyers and things to be enjoyed. ॥॥

The statement—"This Being mentioned above is eternally existent" (*Mund. Up.* I. 2. 1.)—declares the

463. This *mantra*, which has been translated on p. 54 may be thus paraphrased: "He who knows all things and understands all things thoroughly in all their modes and their full connotation, and whose inner mental effort of thinking and willing is of the form of knowledge—from Him who is the

Brahman in the condition of cause and who is characterised by the will to create, proceeds this undifferentiated creation which is the *Brahman* in the condition of effect, as also, evolving therefrom, the *anna* or the world of matter and soul characterised by differentiations of name and form".

unconditioned reality of the *Brahman*. There is the passage—"Whatever ritualistic works the seers saw in the *mantras*, those (works) became manifold in the *tretā* (or the three Fires). Desiring the Truth (or the Real), do you adopt those (works)." (*Mund. Up.* I. 2. 1).⁴⁶⁴ The meaning is—you, who desire the indestructible (*akshara*) Person, who is the home of auspicious qualities, such as omniscience and the quality of willing the truth, and who is Himself the Truth, do (you), for the purpose of attaining Him, desist from (works yielding) other fruits, and perform all those (ritualistic) works which have been taught by seers in the *Rig*, the *Yajus*, the *Sāman* and the *Atharvan*, and which are appropriate to the various conditions and stages of life, and have (further) become manifold in relation to the *tretā* fires.

In the passage, beginning with—"This is your path", and ending with—"This is your world of *Brahmā*, (the

464. Hereafter *Mund. Up.* I. 2 is taken up. The first *mantra*, except for the last sentence, is understood as describing the performance of rituals by one who is desirous of attaining the *Brahman*: "This Being mentioned above is eternally existent. Whatever ritualistic works the seers saw in the *mantras*, those (works) became manifold in the *tretā* (i.e., the three sacrificial fires). Desiring the Truth, do you adopt those (works)." The last sentence refers to those who desire other things than *moksha*: "This is your world of *Brahmā*, (the world) due to your merit and good works." This theme is continued in I. 2. 2-10. Of these, the conclusion of I. 2. 6 is quoted, and then I. 2. 7 is quoted in full. Then the teaching reverts to those who aspire after salvation: "Those wise men indeed who live in the forest, following the way of the (religious)

mendicant, who are tranquil and who are devoted to the *Brahman* and to faith in Him—they, passing through the doorway of the sun and free of all taint, reach the place where is the immortal *Purusha* whose nature (or divine body), is changeless (11). Having examined the worlds obtained by works, let a *Brāhmaṇa* acquire freedom from all desires. The changeless is not gained by the changeable; to know that, let him approach, with fuel in hand, a preceptor who is learned in the *Vedas* and has a sure footing in the *Brahman*. To him (i.e., to such a pupil), who, with restrained senses and fully tranquil mind, has thus approached him (i.e., the preceptor), that wise man (the *guru*) should speak of (i.e., teach) that knowledge of the *Brahman* by which the ever existent and indestructible Person is known. (12-13)"

world) due to your merit and good works" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 2. 1 to 6), the manner in which ritualistic works are to be performed is mentioned; (it is also mentioned therein) that, by omitting to perform any one of the ritualistic works enjoined either by the *śrutis* or the *smṛitis*, other similar works (connected therewith), though well performed, fail to produce their results, and that the wrong performance (of ritualistic works) is equal to no performance at all. Then, by means of the passage, beginning with—"Frail indeed are these floats in the form of sacrifices. To those who perform them, this knowledge of works, which is associated with the eighteen,⁴⁶⁵ is (really) inferior (in value). Those fools, who rejoice in the belief that this sacrificial work is itself the final good, again and again do they pass through old age and death." (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 2. 7), it is declared that those, who, being previously attached in mind to the results (of ritualistic works), and being also destitute of knowledge, perform ritualistic works which are lower (in their nature) have frequently to return to this world.

Then (again) by means of the passage, beginning with—"Those indeed who adopt *tapas* (i.e., the *Brahman*) and faith" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 2. 11.), it is eulogistically declared that ritualistic works, performed without attachment to their results by one who possesses knowledge, are capable of leading one to the attainment of the *Brahman*. Then by means of the passage, beginning with—"After examining the worlds" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 2. 12), it is enjoined that he, who is not attached to the results of mere works, and is desirous of arriving at that knowledge which is helped on by works, as already stated, and forms the means of attaining the *Brahman*, should necessarily approach a preceptor.

⁴⁶⁵. These eighteen are probably the sacrificer, his wife and the sixteen *ṛitviks* or priests required for certain elaborate sacrifices.

Then⁴⁶⁶ by means of the passage, beginning with—"Now this is the Eternal Reality. Just as from a well lighted fire, etc.," and ending with—"My dear friend, he loosens here the knot of ignorance (or *avidyā*)" (*Mund. Up.* II. 1. 1 to 10.), it is clearly declared that the *Akshara* mentioned above, who (as mentioned above) is the source of all beings, the Highest *Brahman* and the Highest Person, forms, along with all the unexpressed (but implied)⁴⁶⁷ attributes appertaining to His own nature, the Internal Self of all beings, and is thus in the form of the universe, inasmuch as He has the universe for His body: (and it is also clearly declared therein) that the creation of the universe proceeds from Him.

Then, by means of the passage,⁴⁶⁸ beginning with—"(*The Akshara* that is perceived by the *yogins* as) the near

466. Here *Mund. Up.* II. 1 is taken up. "Now this is the Eternal Reality. Just as from a well-lighted fire sparks similar to it come out in thousands, even so, dear friend, from the *Akshara* proceed various kinds of beings, and they get dissolved in Him alone. (1). That Person is certainly divine, is unembodied, exists within and without, and is indeed unborn. He does not breathe, has no mind, is pure and is undoubtedly higher than what is beyond the *akshara*. (2). The celestial world of fire is His head, His two eyes are the sun and the moon, His two ears the quarters, the *Vedas* are His uttered speech, His breath is all the moving air, His heart is the whole universe, His two feet are the earth. Indeed He is the Internal Self of all beings. (4)...(He as) the Self is indeed all the universe. (His) work (of creation) is thought. He is the nectar to the (freed) soul transcending matter (*brahman*). My dear friend, he who realises Him as located in the cavity of the

heart--he loosens here the knot of ignorance. (10)"

467. The attributes described as 'unexpressed' really seem to be expressed here.

468. Rāmānuja now sums up the rest of the *Upanishad*, starting with II. 2. The following *mantras* may help to illustrate the several points in his outline: (*That Akshara*) is near (being realised by the *yogins* as present) in the cavity (of the heart) and is indeed the great object of attainment (for all). This (is to be known), that whatever vibrates (in wakefulness), whatever breathes and whatever sleeps rest on Him. Know this. He is the support of whatever is gross and whatever is subtle. He is more to be honoured than the individual self. He is the most sought after by the people. (II. 2. 1). The *pranava* (or the syllable *Om*) is said to be the bow, the individual self the arrow and the Supreme *Brahman* the target. With unswerving concentration should it be shot. Let him (i.e., the individual self) become one with

(at heart)" (*Mund. Up.* II. 2. 1.), it is taught that that same Highest *Brahman*, who is the *Akshara*, is higher than even the *purusha* (i.e., the individual self) that is beyond the undifferentiated *prakṛiti* (or material Nature), who is seated in the highest heaven, whose essential nature is bliss unsurpassed in excellence, is to be worshipped in the cavity of the heart in a particular way; (it is also taught here) that worship is, in nature, the same as the highest kind of loving devotion, and that (in consequence) the worshipper obtains, after the removal of ignorance (or *avidyā*), as the fruit (of his worship), the experience of the *Brahman* which (experience) is the same as becoming like unto the *Brahman*. Thus it (*viz.*, the context here) is concluded.

Accordingly, there being the above-mentioned characterisation, and there being also the declaration of the difference (between matter, soul and God), the *pradhāna* (material Nature) and the *purusha* (individual self) are not taught in this context. Indeed, the declaration also of the distinction of the Highest *Brahman* from them (i.e., from the *pradhāna* and the *purusha*), is found here in the following and other passages:—"That Person is certainly

Him like the arrow (with the target). (II. 2. 4). He who knows all (things) and understands all (things thoroughly in their full connotation), and to whom belongs this sovereign glory on earth—this *Ātman* is established in the city of the *Brahman* in the Highest Heaven. (II. 2. 7). He is to be apprehended (only) by the (pure) mind, He is the Lord of life (which is His body), He is established in the *anna* (i.e., the body). Placing (on Him) the heart (i.e., the mind), the wise see by concentrated meditation (which is the highest kind of devotion) that Immortal (*Brahman*) who shines as (pure) bliss. (II. 2. 8). When He who is (the soul of) the highest and the lowest is seen, the knot of the heart is broken, doubts are all shattered, and his *karmas* perish.

II.2.9) When the wise seer sees that Person, who is bright like gold and is the creating Lord, and who is the source of the material universe, then that wise man, shaking off merit and demerit and being untainted, attains the highest degree of equality (with the *Brahman*). (III. 1. 3). Just as flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and form, so also the wise man, freed from name and form, reaches that Divine Person who is higher than the highest. (III. 2. 8) He who knows the *Brahman* becomes (like unto) the *Brahman*. In his family there will be none without knowledge of the *Brahman*. He crosses beyond sorrow, beyond sin. Freed from the knots of the cave (of the heart), he becomes immortal. (III. 2. 9).

divine, unembodied, exists within and without, and is indeed unborn. He does not breathe, has no mind, is pure, and is undoubtedly higher than what is beyond the *akshara*". (*Mund. Up.* II. 1. 2). The meaning is, that he, who is beyond the *akshara*, that is, beyond undifferentiated matter, is the collectively named *purusha* (or individual self), and He who is higher than even that (collective *purusha*), and possesses invisibility and other such attributes, and is (also) denoted by the word *Akshara*, is the Supreme Self.

The word *Akshara* may be derived from the root *aś*—to pervade—(and may be understood) as that which pervades; or (derived) from the root *kshar*—to flow out or to come out from—(and may be understood) as that which has not come out of anything else as its modification. Therefore it is somehow or other possible⁴⁶⁹ even for undifferentiated matter to be denoted by the word *akshara*, either because it is pervasively present (in a subtle state) in all its own modifications, or because, unlike *mahat* etc., it does not flow out of any other things, so as to deserve to be called by a separate name (from that of that other thing).

रूपोपन्यासाच्च

Sūtra 24. *Rūpōpanyāsāchcha.* (56)

Because also (His universal) form is described (in the context under reference, that Being who is characterised by invisibility and other such attributes is the Supreme Self).

469. Since *akshara* cannot here mean the *Brahman*, it is shown etymologically to be capable of referring to *prakṛiti* in two ways. In one case, the reference is to the pervasion of the gross, evolved matter that we see around us everywhere by the still unevolved

portion of subtle, primordial undifferentiated matter. Alternatively, the reference is to the fact that primordial matter is not evolved from anything else like each of its evolutes, beginning with *mahat*. For these evolutes, please see Vol. I, Note 169)

There is this passage (in the context under reference)—
“The celestial world of fire (*agni*) is His head, His two eyes are the sun and the moon, His two ears are the quarters, the *Vedas* are His uttered speech, His breath is all the moving air, His heart is the whole universe, His two feet are the earth. Indeed, He is the Internal Self of all beings” (*Mund. Up.* II. 1. 4). Such a (universal) form as this belongs only to the Supreme Self who is the Internal Self of all beings. Therefore, that (Being who is characterised by invisibility and other such attributes) is the Supreme Self.

ADHIKARANA VI

VAIŚVĀNARĀDHIKARANA

वैश्वानरस्साधारणशब्दविशेषात्

Sūtra 25. *Vaiśvānarassādhāraṇaśabdaviśeṣāt.* (57)

***Vaiśvānara* (means the Supreme Self) because that common term has (in the context here) a special qualification.**

Beginning the context with the passage—“You now worship this *Vaiśvānara* who is the same as the Self. Teach that same Being to us.....” (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 11. 6.)—the *Chhāndogas* declare therein as follows: “And he who worships this *Vaiśvānara*, who is such and is measured only by the regions of space (such as heaven), and who is (really) immeasurable...” (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 18. 1).

Here the doubt arises whether the *Ātman*, known as ‘*Vaiśvānara*’, may possibly be determined to be the

Supreme Self or not.⁴⁷⁰ It is perhaps held that it is not possible so to determine it. Why? Because the word *vaiśvānara* is seen to be used in four (different) significations.

For example, it is used to denote the digestive heat of the stomach in this passage—"This 'vaiśvānara' fire...is that by which the food that is eaten is digested. That which one hears, when one has the ears closed, is the noise thereof. When one is departing from this life, then one does not hear this noise". (*Bṛih. Up.* V. 9. 1.). It is used to denote also the third of the (five) great elements in the following passage—"For the sake of the whole world, the gods made the 'vaiśvānara' fire (or the element of light and heat) into the sun, who distinguishes the day (from the night)". (*R. V.* X. 88. 12). And that (word *vaiśvānara*) denotes a god in this passage—"May we be in the good graces of Vaiśvānara. Indeed, he is the king who has a halo of glory (all around)". (*R. V.* I. 98. 1).

It is also used to denote the Supreme Self, as in the following passages—"Therefore, he threw himself into the *Ātman*, the Fire within the heart, named 'Vaiśvānara.' (?) "This same Vaiśvānara, known also as 'Life' and 'Fire' rises, having the whole universe for His body." (*Pr. Up.* I. 7). Moreover, the characterising attributes, occurring in the opening passages of the context and elsewhere, are (all) capable of being understood in harmony with all these (significations).

If it be so held, it is stated in reply—" *Vaiśvānara* (means the Supreme Self), because that common term has (in the context here) a special qualification". (*Ved. Sūt.* I. II. 25.). *Vaiśvānara* (means) the Supreme Self. Why?

470. The objection here is to the effect that the true meaning of 'Vaiśvānara' in this context cannot be determined. It may have any one of its four meanings. The *Upanishad* has certainly used the word in some definite sense, but we are unable to determine it.

“Because that common term has (in the context here) a special qualification”. That which specially qualifies is “a special qualification” (*viśeṣha*); and (so) the meaning is—because the common term *vaiśvānara* is specially characterised by the particular attributes belonging to the Supreme Self.

Accordingly (in the context here), the five well-known sages, Aupamanyava and others, met together and started an enquiry—“Who is our Self, and what is the *Brahman*?”—(*Chhānd. Up. V. 11. 1.*); and then, as stated in the passage—“Indeed, reverend sirs, Uddālaka, son of Aruṇa, now worships this *Ātman* known as ‘Vaiśvānara’; well let us go to him” (*Chhānd. Up. V. 11. 2.*); they came to know that Uddālaka had the knowledge of the *Ātman* known as ‘Vaiśvānara’, and went to him (to learn). And that Uddālaka learnt that they were desirous of knowing the *Ātman* known as ‘Vaiśvānara’ and felt that he himself did not fully know that (Vaiśvānara); and he thereupon told them—“Indeed, reverend sirs, that celebrated Aśvapati, the king of the Kekayas, now worships the *Ātman* known as ‘Vaiśvānara’. Let us all go to him (to learn).” (*Chhānd. Up. V. 11. 4.*).

And they, with Uddālaka as the sixth, went to that Aśvapati. And he respectfully received each of those great sages in accordance with his worthiness; and then by means of the passage beginning with—“There is no thief in my (kingdom)”—and ending with—“Reverend sirs, I am verily performing a sacrifice” (*Chhānd. Up. V. 11. 5.*)—he drew their attention to the fact that they were entitled to receive gifts (at his hands) inasmuch as he was carrying out a sacrificial ceremony; (he) then made them understand that even those who know the *Brahman* have to avoid what is forbidden by law and do the deeds prescribed by law.⁴⁷¹

471. Aśvapati pointed out that the taxes he had received from the good people over whom he was ruling were not tainted money.

Even the godly could receive gifts from him. Moreover, as seekers of the *Brahman*, they had a duty to receive such gifts.

He then said—"I shall give as much wealth to each of you as I give to each of my *ṛitvij* priests. Please therefore stay here, reverend sirs." (*Chhānd. Up.* 11. 5.) And they, being desirous of attaining final release and being (also) anxious to know the *Ātman* known as 'Vaiśvānara', said—"Teach us that same *Ātman*".

Therefore, it is made out that the *Ātman* (or Self) known as 'Vaiśvānara' is the Supreme Self—the *Ātman* who, after (their) approaching one who knew the *Ātman* known as 'Vaiśvānara', was questioned about by such as were anxious to know the *Brahman* forming the Self of all individual selves, as may be made out from (the subject stated at the commencement of their investigation)—"Who is our Self, and what is the *Brahman*?" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 11. 1). The words, *Ātman* and *Brahman*, occur in the commencement of the context here; and then everywhere (in the context) the words, *Ātman* and *Vaiśvānara*, are used (in their place); therefore also it is made out that the word, *Vaiśvānara*, which is specifically used in the place of the word, *Brahman*, denotes none else than the *Brahman*.

Moreover, there is the passage—"He eats the 'food' (i.e., enjoys bliss) in all worlds, in all beings, in all selves" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 18. 1.), and also the passage—"Therefore just as the fibre in the *ishika* reed, thrown into the fire, is burnt up, so also all his sins are burnt up." (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 24. 3). This result, as (it is) mentioned here, of the knowledge of the *Ātman* known as 'Vaiśvānara', (also) enables us to understand that the *Ātman* known as 'Vaiśvānara' is the Highest *Brahman*.

The *Vaiśvānara* (mentioned above) is the Supreme Self for the following reason also :

स्मर्यमाणमनुमानं स्यादिति

Sūtra 26. *Smāryamāṇamanumānam syāditi* (58)

What is thus recognised ⁴⁷² (in the context here as constituting the body of Vaiṣvānara) gives rise to an inference (that *Vaiṣvānara* means the Supreme Self).

Beginning with the sky and ending with the earth, the (corporeal) form of Vaiṣvānara is taught here, there being a reference to each member thereof in detail. And that form is, in the *S'rutis* and *Smṛitis*, well-known to constitute the body of the Highest Person. That same form is here recalled to mind to the effect that that form is indeed the same as this form; that is, what is so recognised helps an inference, or, in other words, forms the basis of a logical inference. The word *thus*⁴⁷³ denotes the manner (in which the above-said body of Vaiṣvānara is here recognised). The body, which is of this nature and is (here) recognised, forms the basis of the logical inference that Vaiṣvānara is the Supreme Self.

Indeed, in the *S'rutis* and *Smṛitis*, that body, which is of this nature, is well-known to belong to the Highest Person. It is declared thus in the *Atharvapaṇa*—"Agni (or the celestial world of fire) is His head, His two eyes are the moon and the sun, His two ears are the quarters, the *Vedas* are His uttered speech, all the moving air is His breath, His heart is the whole universe, His two feet are the earth. Indeed, He is the Internal Self of all beings." (*Mund. Up.* II. 1. 4). Here *agni* means the celestial world of fire, because it is mentioned in the scriptures—"That world, indeed, is *agni*." (*Bṛih. Up.* VI. 2. 9).

472. Śaṅkara takes *smārya-mānam* in the sense of 'mentioned in the *Smṛitis*.' Rānānuja renders it as 'remembered' or 'recognised'. Compare *Sūtra* 31 where *smṛiti* has the meaning of 'continued remembrance constituting worship.'

473. *Iti* is sometimes used to indicate a cause or reason. Hence the explanation given here to the effect that the word is used in a different sense here.

The sages also declare thus :—"The seers say that His head is heaven, the sky is indeed His navel, His two eyes are the moon and the sun, His two ears are the regions of space ; know that the earth is His two feet, and that He is in Himself unthinkable and is the leader of all beings." (?) (They) also (say)—"He whose mouth is the fire, whose head is heaven, whose navel is the sky, whose two feet are the earth, whose eye is the sun, whose ear is the quarters,—to Him, who is the Self of the universe, (we) bow." (M. B. XII. 46. 70).

Here also, (*i.e.*, in the context under reference) heaven and such other things are mentioned as forming the head and the other limbs of Vaiśvānara. Accordingly, by those great sages, Aupamanyava and the others, the king of the Kekayas was asked—"You now worship none other than the *Ātman* known as Vaiśvānara ; teach us that same Being." (*Chhānd Up.* V. 11. 6.) : and he became desirous of teaching to them the *Ātman* known as Vaiśvānara. From the fact that their specific question (relating to Vaiśvānara) would otherwise be inappropriate, he made out that they did know something, but did not also know something (else), about the *Ātman* known as Vaiśvānara ; and then, with the object of learning what part they knew and what they knew not, he put questions to them one after another.

Then, on his asking—"Aupamanyava, who is the *Ātman* you worship ?" (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 12. 1) he received the answer—"Revered king, (I worship) nothing else than heaven." (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 12. 1). Thereafter, while trying to remove from him his idea that heaven constitutes the whole of the *Ātman* known as Vaiśvānara, he (*i.e.*, the king Aśvapati) taught him that heaven forms only the head of Vaiśvānara, and told him that heaven, which forms a part of Vaiśvānara, has the name *sutejāh*, (or the beautifully brilliant one) which is significant of its quality (of beautiful brilliancy).

Similarly, on Satyayajña and the others mentioning that they severally had, for their objects of worship, the sun, the air, the sky, the water, the earth, one for each, they were one after another taught that these (objects of worship) have the names, *viśvarūpa*, *prīthagvartman*, *bahula*, *rayi*, and *pratishṭhā*, which (names) are significant of the attributes ⁴⁷⁴ (respectively possessed by those objects of worship), and that the sun and the other objects of worship respectively form the eye, the breath, the trunk (*sandeha*), the bladder and the feet, so as to constitute the limbs of the *Ātman* known as Vaiśvānara. The word *sandeha* means the middle part of the body.

Accordingly, that form, which is characterised by having the heaven etc., for the head, etc., in the manner stated above, belongs only to the Highest Person. Therefore Vaiśvānara is undoubtedly the Highest Person Himself.

Again, he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) takes up for consideration the doubt that it may not be possible to establish conclusively (that *Vaiśvānara* means the Supreme Self), and removes it thus :

शब्दादिभ्योऽन्तःप्रतिष्ठानाच्च नेति चेन्न तथा
दृष्ट्युपदेशादसंभवात्पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते

*Sūtra 27. Śabdādibhyo'ntaḥ pratishṭhānācchcha
neti chenna tathādrishṭyupadeśādasambhavāt
puruṣamapi chainamadhīyate. (59)*

474. *Viśvarūpa* means that which makes the whole universe manifest: *prīthagvartman* is that which has many different kinds of motion: *bahula* is that which possesses greatness (of size); *rayi* literally means wealth, but here in relation to water it may mean the 'wealth' of health resulting from the food produced with the help of water: *pratishṭhā* is that which serves as a support. Vide *Chhānd. Up. V.*

13 to 18. Note that the forms worshipped are primarily differentiated by the different attributes associated with them. In *Sat. Br. X*, the same attributes are referred to under different names associated with different parts of the head of Vaiśvānara. Here the head is *atiṣṭhā*, the eye is *prīthagvartman*, the ether is *bahula*, the water in the face *rayi* and the chin *pratishṭhā*.

If it be urged that (Vaiṣvānara) is not (the Supreme Self), for the reason, among others, (that there is the use) of the word (*agni* or 'fire' in grammatical equation therewith), and also for the reason that he (Agni) is firmly seated within the body, it is replied that it cannot be so; because it is the worship of the Supreme Self so qualified that is taught (here), and because (also) it is impossible (for the digestive heat of the stomach to possess the qualities attributed here to Vaiṣvānara); moreover, some read of Him in their scriptures as the Person (*Puruṣa*).

What has been already stated to the effect that it is conclusively established that Vaiṣvānara is the Supreme Self—that is not right; because the gastric fire also is meant to be referred to here, "for the reason, among others, (that there is the use) of the word (*agni* in grammatical equation therewith), and also for the reason that he (Agni) is firmly seated within the body." Indeed, that word (so used here) is learnt from the scripture to be *agni*, inasmuch as it is in grammatical equation with *Vaiṣvānara* in the passage—"This same *agni* (or fire) is *Vaiṣvānara*"⁴⁷⁵ occurring in that scriptural context of the Vājins which relates to the worship of Vaiṣvānara.

In this context also (which is now under reference), there is the passage—"The heart is the *gārhapatyā* fire, the mind is the *anvāhāryā* fire, and the mouth is the *āhavanīyā* fire"⁴⁷⁶ (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 18. 2); and in it, the Vaiṣvānara, existing in the heart, etc., is made to assume the character of the three fires. Then there is the passage beginning thus—"Therefore, that food which is first served, that is to be offered as in a sacrifice. He who offers in sacrifice that first offering, let him sacrifice it by

^{475.} Vide *Śat. Br.* X. 6. 1. 11. ^{476.} Vide Note 439.
Compare also *Pr. Up.* 1. 7.

saying *prāṇāya svāhā*," ⁴⁷⁷ (*Chhānd. Up. V. 19. 1*). From this, it is made out that Vaiśvānara forms also the recipient of the offering of food given to the *prāṇa* (or the principal vital air). Similarly the Vājasaneyins declare in their scriptures that Vaiśvānara exists within the person, as in this passage—"Indeed, he who knows this fire, Vaiśvānara, in this manner to have the nature of a person and to be placed within the person etc." (*S'at. Br. X. 6. 1. 11*).

Accordingly, that (Vaiśvānara) is in grammatical equation with the word *agni* (fire) and has assumed the character of the three fires; he forms the recipient of the offerings of food given to the *prāṇa* (or the principal vital air), and he is also firmly seated within the body. For all these reasons, 'Vaiśvānara' is also made out to be 'that (fire) which belongs to the stomach'. Therefore, this (*Vaiśvānara*) cannot absolutely mean the Supreme Self.

If it be so held, it is replied that it is not so; "because it is the worship of the Supreme Self so qualified ⁴⁷⁸ that is taught (here)"; because the Vaiśvānara who has been mentioned above as having the three worlds for His body, and who is the Highest *Brahman*, is taught (here) for purposes of worship as having the gastric fire for His body and to be thus in association with that (gastric fire). In fact, it is not the mere gastric fire that is (here) understood by the use of the word *agni* and by means of the other reasons (given above); but, on the contrary, it is the Supreme Self who is associated with the gastric fire (as His body, that is so understood).

If it be asked how this is arrived at, it is replied that (it is so arrived at) because it is impossible for

477. This means: "May the food I offer become a sacrificial offering unto the deity presiding over the principal vital air." (Vide *Taitt. Ār. VI. 33*)

478. The *Sūtra* uses the word *dyishti*, which usually refers only to *pratīka* worship. Here however the worship of the *Brahman* is meant.

the digestive heat of the stomach to have the qualities attributed here to Vaiśvānara. The meaning is that the mere digestive heat of the stomach cannot possibly have the three worlds for its body, and that in consequence the word, *agni* (fire), which is (here) made out to denote the digestive heat of the stomach, and is in grammatical equation with the Vaiśvānara known to have the three worlds for His body, denotes the Supreme Self Himself as having (that) gastric fire for His body and as having thus come to be associated therewith.

To the same effect it has been declared by the Lord thus :—“Becoming the Vaiśvānara ⁴⁷⁹ I dwell in the bodies of all living beings ; and in conjunction with the *prāṇa* and the *apāna*, I digest the four ⁴⁸⁰ kinds of food ”. (B.G. XV. 14.). The meaning is “(I do so) having the gastric fire for (My) body.” Hence it is the worship of that Being who is associated with that (gastric fire as the body) that is taught here.

Moreover, “some”, that is, the Vâjasaneyins, “read of Him in their scriptures as the Person (*Purusha*)” in the passage—“He who is that Person is this same Agni known as Vaiśvānara”. (*S’at. Br.* X. 6. 1. 11.). Indeed, the mere gastric fire cannot be the Person (referred to here). Surely, it is possible only to the Supreme Self to be the unconditioned Person, such as is mentioned in the following and other passages :—“The Person (or *Purusha*) has a thousand heads...All this indeed is the Person.” (*R. V.* X. 90. 1 & 2.)

अत एव न देवताभूतञ्च

Sūtra 28. *Ata eva na devatā bhūtañcha.* (60)

For these very reasons, (Vaiśvānara) is not the deity (sun) nor the element (*tejas*).

479. Vide Vol. I, Note 409.

480. The four kinds of food *choshya*, *lehya* and *peya*, that is, eatable, suckable, lickable and are what are known as *khādya*, drinkable.

For the same reasons as have been given above, ⁴⁸¹ there is no room to hold that either the deity (known as the sun-god) or even the third of the (five) great elements is Vaiśvānara.

साक्षादप्यविरोधश्चेमिनिः

Sūtra 29. *Sākshādapyavirodham Jaiminiḥ.* (61)

Jaimini holds that there is nothing wrong even in (holding) that (the word *agni*) denotes directly and of itself (the Supreme Self).

It has been stated above that the word, *agni*, in grammatical equation with *Vaiśvānara*, denotes the Supreme Self, inasmuch as He has the gastric fire for His body and is in that way qualified by that (association with the gastric fire as His body) ; and (also) that, only as so qualified, the Supreme Self is to be worshipped. And the (venerable) teacher, Jaimini, is of opinion that the word *agni* also denotes, like the word *Vaiśvānara*,⁴⁸¹ the Supreme Self Himself, directly and of itself, that is, without any intermediate process of reasoning, and that in consequence there is nothing wrong (in that view).

What is said is this :—This general term, *Vaiśvānara*, also, which is qualified in a particular manner by the association of the special attributes of the Supreme Self, is determined to denote the Supreme Self Himself, inasmuch

481. These reasons are that *Vaiśvānara* is described by the words, *Ātman*, *Brahman* and *Puruṣa*, that His worship destroys all sins etc.

482. *Śaṅkara* under this *Sūtra* shows how the words, *Agni* and *Vaiśvānara*, can by themselves mean the *Brahman*. *Rāṇuṣa* thinks that only the word *Agni* is referred to here. His point is that both in *Sūtras* 27 and 29 *Vaiśvānara* is equated with *Agni*

and through that equation identified with the Supreme *Brahman*. Thus the etymological interpretation of *Vaiśvānara* serves only as an example for a similar interpretation of *Agni*. It also follows from this that the attributes needed for the worship of *Vaiśvānara* as the Supreme Self have already been laid down in *Sūtra* 29. Now only the meaning of the word is given.

as He is, among other things, ⁴⁸³ associated with the quality of being the leader of all beings. Similarly, the word *agni* also (etymologically) denotes the fire, on account of its being associated with certain particular qualities such as the quality of leading (all) to the end of the goal. Those very same qualities, as unconditioned and in their highest excellence, are properly found to belong to the Supreme Self. Therefore, in this context, it (*viz.*, the word *agni*), being that which is qualified by (certain) particular qualities of the Supreme Self, denotes none other than the Supreme Self.

It may be asked how, as stated in the passage—(“He who worships) this (aforementioned Vaiśvānara), who is such and is measured only by the regions of space and is (yet really) immeasurable” (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 18. 1)—the Highest *Brahman*, who is infinite and unlimited, becomes measurable by means of the measure relating to the space which contains all the things between heaven and earth. (In reply) to this, he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) says :

अभिव्यक्तेरित्याश्मरथ्यः

Sūtra 30. *Abhivyakteryāśmarathyah.* (62)

Āśmarathya holds that it is for the purpose of easy comprehension (that the infinite and unlimited *Brahman* is looked upon as measured by space).

The (venerable) teacher *Āśmarathya* is of opinion that the Supreme Self is conceived to be measured by

483. The 'other things' include His being the object of attainment of all. Similarly, in regard to Agni also, the quality of being pre-eminently the object of attainment of all is primarily meant among other qualities not expressly mentioned, but implied by 'such as'.

space to help easy comprehension on the part of the worshipper. ⁴⁸⁴ The heaven is His head, the sun is His eye, the air is His breath, the sky is His trunk, the waters are His bladder, and the earth is His feet. Thus He is measured by the space which includes all things between heaven and earth. (To become so measured) can, indeed, appertain to Him—who pervades the whole universe and is Himself immeasurable—only to serve the purpose of easy comprehension (on the part of the worshipper).

It may be asked why it is that the Highest *Brahman* is described to be a person with a head and the other various limbs. If it be so asked, he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) says (in answer):

अनुस्मृतेर्बादरिः

Sūtra 31. *Anusmṛiterbādariḥ* (63)

Bādari holds that it is for the purpose of worshipping (Him that the *Brahman* is so described).

The (venerable) teacher, Bādari, is of opinion that it is for the purpose of so worshipping (Him that the *Brahman* is thus described). ⁴⁸⁵ There is this passage—"And he who worships this (aforementioned) Vaiśvānara, who is such and is (yet really) immeasurable, he eats the 'food' (*i.e.*, enjoys bliss) in all worlds, in all beings, in all selves".

⁴⁸⁴. The opinion of Āsmara-thya is cited with approval by the *Sūtrakāra* in reply to a possible objection that the Vaiśvānara stated to be measured by the regions of space may denote not merely the Supreme Self but also the element, fire, or a god. Hence, the objector goes on, there can be no definitive determination of the meaning of *Vaiśvānara* in the context as the Supreme Self.

⁴⁸⁵. Bādari's opinion is here cited with approval to refute a possible argument that the Vaiśvānara who has a *prākṛita* (or material) body may be a god. The description of Vaiśvānara as a person is not for easy comprehension, but for purposes of meditation.

(*Chhānd. Up.* V. 18. 1). Evidently a form of worship for the attainment of the *Brahman* is taught here. 'This Vaiśvānara who is such'—means He who has the form of a person as mentioned before. 'In all worlds, in all beings, in all selves,'—'whatever food,' that is, whatever object of enjoyment exists—that, he (the worshipper) eats : that is, he enjoys that *Brahman* who exists everywhere and is in Himself the bliss which is unsurpassed in excellence. But that food which is 'eaten' by all those individual selves who are subject to the influence of *karma* and which is peculiar to each of them—that (kind of 'food') is to be avoided by those who are desirous of attaining final release. Therefore, it is not that which is meant to be referred to (in the context) here.

If Vaiśvānara is the Supreme Self, it may then be asked why the chest, etc., (of the worshipper) are (respectively) taught to be the altar, etc. On the contrary, such teaching becomes appropriate only when it is taken to refer to the gastric fire. (In answer) to this, he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) says :

सम्पत्तेरिति जैमिनिस्तथाहि दर्शयति

Sūtra 32. *Sampatteriti Jaiministathā hi darśayati.* (54)

Jaimini holds that it is intended to make (the *prāṇāhuti*⁴⁸⁶ assume the character (of the *agnihotra* sacrifice; for the scripture reveals it to be such.

The *prāṇāhuti* ceremonial is a form of worshipping that Vaiśvānara, who is Himself the Supreme Self, who has all things between heaven and earth for his body; and it has to be performed by the worshipper every day. The venerable teacher, Jaimini, holds that it is to make it assume

486. This word means a sacrificial offering made to the five *prāṇas*, as to which see Vol. I, Note 383.

the character of the *agnihotra* sacrifice that the chest, etc., (of the worshipper) are (respectively) taught to constitute the altar, etc.

The following scriptural passage—"If, without knowing this, (i.e., that the chest is the altar etc.) one offers the *agnihotra* sacrifice, it would be as if a man were to remove the live coals and pour the libation on the dead ashes. He, however, who offers this *agnihotra* sacrifice with a full knowledge of its true purport—he offers it in all worlds, in all beings, in all selves. Therefore, just as the fibre in the *ishikā* reed, thrown into the fire, is burnt up, so also all his sins are burnt up," (*Chhānd Up.* V. 24. 1 to 3) "reveals it to be such"; that is, it points out a result which is appropriate only in relation to the worship of the Supreme Self, and also (points out thus) that the *prāṇāhuti* assumes the character of the *agnihotra* sacrifice.

आमनन्ति चैनमस्मिन्

Sūtra 33. *Āmananti chainamasmin.* (65)

They (i.e., the Chhandogas) also declare Him (to be) in it.

"Him", that is, the Highest Person Vaiśvānara, who is characterised as having heaven, etc., for His head, etc. "In it"—that is, in the body of the worshipper. "They also declare Him to be (therein)", to serve as the recipient of the *prāṇāhuti*, in the passage beginning with—"Indeed, the head itself of this *Ātman* known as Vaiśvānara mentioned above is *Sutejas* (or the beautifully brilliant heaven)." (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 18. 2.)

The meaning (of the scriptural context) here is this :—In the passage—"And he who worships this (afore-mentioned) Vaiśvānara who is such and is measured by the regions of space and is (yet really) immeasurable" (*Chhānd.*

Up. V. 18. 1) the worship of the Vaiśvānara who has three worlds for His body is enjoined ; then in the passage beginning with—" In all worlds " (*Chhānd. Up. V. 18. 1*), the result (of such worship) is taught to be the attainment of the *Brahman* ; then in the passage beginning with—" Indeed, the head itself of this " (*Chhānd. Up. V. 18. 2*), that *prāṇāhuti* is taught which is considered to be equivalent to the *agnihotra* sacrifice and thus forms an element in the worship of that same (Vaiśvānara).

Further, the fire, the sun, etc., form the limbs of that Vaiśvānara who has been taught already to be the object of worship ; and they are respectively known by the names, *Sutejas*, *Viśvarūpa*, etc. ; and the context (here) identifies them with the body of the worshipper from head to foot.⁴⁸⁷ "The head itself (of this meditating self) is (Vaiśvānara's) *Sutejas*." (*Chhānd. Up. V. 18. 2*). The meaning is that the head of the worshipper himself is the celestial world forming the head of the Supreme Self. "The eye (of this meditating self) is (Vaiśvānara's) *Viśvarūpa*." (*Chhānd. Up. V. 18. 2*). The meaning is that it is the sun. "The breath (of this meditating self) is (Vaiśvānara's) *Prithagvartman*". (*Chhānd. Up. V. 18. 2*). The meaning is that it is the air. "The trunk (of this meditating self) is (Vaiśvānara's) *Bahula*". (*Chhānd. Up. V. 18. 2*). The meaning is that the trunk of the worshipper himself is the sky (or *ākāśa*) forming the trunk of the Supreme Self. "The bladder itself (of this meditating self) is (Vaiśvānara's)

47. The *prāṇāhuti* ceremonial is here conceived of as an element in the worship of Vaiśvānara. The worshipper's body is therein regarded as Vaiśvānara's body. Hence *Chhānd. Up. (V. 18. 2)* has to be construed as follows: "Indeed, the head of this (meditating) self is Vaiśvānara's *Sutejas*; the eye (of this meditating self) is (Vaiśvānara's) *viśvarūpa*; the breath (of this meditating self) is (Vaiśvānara's) *prithagvart*

man: the trunk (of this meditating self) is (Vaiśvānara's) *bahula*; the bladder itself (of this meditating self) is Vaiśvānara's *rayi*; the feet themselves (of this meditating self) are the earth (in reference to Vaiśvānara) the chest itself (of this meditating self) is the altar, (his) hair are the *barhis*, his heart is the *gāṛhapatya* (fire), (his) mind is the *anvāhārya* fire, and (his) mouth is the *āhavanīya* fire."

Rayi”. (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 18. 2). The meaning is that his bladder itself constitutes the waters forming a part of His body. “The feet themselves (of this meditating self) are the earth (in reference to Vaiśvānara).” (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 18. 2). The meaning is that his feet themselves are the earth which forms His feet.

Accordingly, the worshipper worships in his own body the Supreme Self Vaiśvānara, who has the three worlds for His body and is near (at heart) ; then he looks upon his own chest, hair, heart, mind and mouth, as the altar, the sacred bed of *kuśa* grass thereon, the *gārhapatya* fire, the *anvāhārya* fire and the *āhavanīya* fire (respectively), which together form the auxiliary aids to the *agnihotra* sacrifice intended to propitiate the Supreme Self Vaiśvānara, who is the recipient of the *prāṇāhuti* ; and then he regards the *prāṇāhuti* itself to be an *agnihotra* sacrifice ; and then here (at last) the scriptural passage beginning with—“The chest itself is the altar, [the hair are the sacred bed of *kuśa* grass, the heart is the *gārhapatya* fire” (*Chhānd. Up.* V. 18. 2).—teaches that he should worship the Supreme Self known as Vaiśvānara by means of such a *prāṇāhuti* as has in this manner attained the character of the *agnihotra* sacrifice.

Therefore it is a demonstrated conclusion that Vaiśvānara is none other than the Supreme Self who is the Highest Person.

CHAPTER I

PART III

ADHIKARAṆA I

DYUBHĪVĀDYADHIKARAṆA

द्युभवाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात्

Sūtra 1. *Dyubhṛvādyāyatanam svaśabdāt.* (66)

The abode of the heaven, the earth, etc.; (is the Supreme Self), because there is an expression (in the context here particularly significant) of Himself.

The Ātharvaṇikas read in their scripture thus : “He in whom the heaven, the earth, and the interspaces are inwoven, as also is (inwoven) the mind along with all the vital airs—know Him alone to be the *Ātman*. Give up all other talk. He is the bridge (*setu*) leading to immortality.” (*Mund. Up.* II. 2. 5). Here the doubt arises whether the being thus declared to be the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is the individual self or the Supreme Self.

It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the individual self. Why? That which forms the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is dealt with in a previous passage (in the context here); and that same being is again referred to by means of the word *yatra* (meaning ‘in whom’) having the significance of the locative case, in the subsequent passage which runs thus :—“In whom (*yatra*) the blood-vessels are united in the same way in which the spokes are fitted into the nave of a wheel—that same being moves within, and is born in many ways” (*Mund. Up.* II. 2. 6.) It is that being who is (here) mentioned to be the support of the blood-vessels.

Then again, in the statement—"that same being moves within and is born in various ways"—it is further mentioned that he takes birth in many ways. This relation to the blood-vessels and this liability to be born in many ways in the form of gods, etc., are both the characteristics of the individual self only. In this very same passage (under discussion), there is the statement—"the mind also is inwoven along with all the vital airs." That character of being the abode of the fivefold vital air⁴⁸⁸ and of the mind (which is mentioned herein) is itself an attribute belonging only to the individual self.

It having been thus determined that that (being) has the characteristics of the individual self, the attribute of constituting the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., and other such attributes have, somehow or other, to be harmonised (with the individual self so determined).⁴⁸⁹

If it be so arrived at, we state in reply—"The abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., (is the Supreme Self), because there is an expression (in the context here particularly significant) of Himself." (*Ved. Sūta. I. 3. 1.*) The abode of things like the heaven, the earth, etc., is the Highest *Brahman*. Why? 'Because there is an expression (in the context here particularly significant) of Himself': because there are (in it) expressions peculiarly significant of the Highest *Brahman*. The statement—"He is the bridge (*setu*) leading to immortality"—is an expression peculiarly significant of the Highest *Brahman*. (Again) "He who thus knows Him becomes immortal here; there is no other path for the attainment of final release". (*Taitt. Ār. III. 12. 7.*) To this effect, it is He Himself that is declared everywhere in all the *Upanishads* to be the means for the attainment of immortality.

488. Vide Vol. I, Note 388.

489. The *Śrutaprasaṅgikā* explains that the individual self, according to the *Pūrvapakṣin*, may be the abode of heaven, earth,

etc., by virtue of its own nature, by the force of *karma*, or by reason of its omniscience in the state of *mokṣa*.

Further, the word *setu* (may be taken to mean 'bridge', as it) is derived from the root *si*, which means to bind together. The meaning is that He is the bestower of immortality. Or, what is like a bridge is itself a bridge.⁴⁹⁰ Indeed, it is the bridge that enables us to reach the other shore of rivers, etc. The meaning is that He enables us to reach that immortality which is found on the other shore of the ocean of *samsāra*. The word *Ātman* (or Self) also, when it is unconditioned by limiting adjuncts, has its primary and natural significance so as to denote the Highest *Brahman*. *Ātman* is, indeed, that which pervades. It is possible only for Himself to pervade all things other than Himself through being their controller. Hence that word (*Ātman*) is also an expression which signifies Him alone.

"He who knows all and understands all" (*Muṇḍ. Up. II. 2. 7.*)—and other such statements occurring further on (in the same context) are also significant of the Highest *Brahman*. It is also possible for Him to be the support of the blood-vessels; because, beginning with the passage—"It is always hanging down from the blood-vessels joined on to it, and is like the partially opened bud of a lotus"—it is (finally) declared: "The Supreme Self is seated in the middle of that frame."⁴⁹¹ (*M. Nār. XI. 8 to 12.*)

The statement—"He is born in many ways"—is also appropriate in relation to the Highest *Brahman*; because, in the passage—"Although He is unborn, He is born in various ways; only wise men know His source" (*Taitt. Ār. III. 13. 1.*)—it is declared that, in order to be capable of being approached (in worship) by gods and other

490. The word *setu* usually means a dam which hinders the flow of a river. Etymologically, it is derived from the root, *si*, to bind together. (*Uṇādi Sūtra*, I. 70). The etymological meaning is not supported by usage, while the meaning given by usage has to be modified to suit the context.

491. The idea conveyed by the passage referred to here is that the heart, wherein all the blood-vessels unite, is their support, and that within it there is a minute flame of fire, wherein the Supreme Self is seated, so that He also becomes thereby the support of the blood-vessels.

beings, the Highest Person gets into association with the form, configuration, qualities and actions suited to each particular class of beings ; and without in the least giving up His own nature, He is, of His own accord, born in many ways. The *Smṛiti* also says—"Although I am unborn and inexhaustible in My own nature, and although I am the Lord of all beings, still, taking up My own *prakṛiti*, I am born again and again by means of My own *māyā*." (B. G. IV. 6) ⁴⁹². Moreover, it is possible only for the Supreme Self, who is the support of all, to be the support also of all the instruments of the individual self, such as the mind.

(The abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is) the Highest Person for the following reason also :

मुक्तोपसृष्टव्यपदेशाच्च

Sūtra 2. *Muktopasṛṣṭavyapadeśāchcha.* (67)

Because also that (Being) is taught to be that which is to be approached (in worship) by the released (souls)—(He who is the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is the Supreme Self).

This Person, who forms the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is declared to be the object of attainment even to those who are released from the bonds of *samsāra* ; as for instance in the following passages :—"When the wise seer sees that Person who is bright like gold and is the creating Lord, and who is the source of the material universe, then that wise man, shaking off merit and demerit and being untainted, attains the highest degree of equality (with the *Brahman*)". (*Mund. Up.* III. 1. 3) : "Just as flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and

⁴⁹². For the explanation of passage, *vide* Vol. I, pages the word, *māyā*, as used in this 362-363.

form, so also the wise man, freed from name and form, reaches that Divine Person who is higher than the highest". (*Mund. Up.* III. 2. 8).

Indeed, it is only those, who are entirely freed from the bonds of *samsāra*, that have shaken off merit and demerit and are taintless and are also without name and form. In reality, *samsāra* is nothing else than the assumption of name and form, under the influence of that association with non-intelligent matter, which arises from the merit and demerit (of works). Therefore that Person, who is pointed out as the object of attainment to those, who have shaken off merit and demerit, who are without any taint, that is, who are devoid of any contact with *prakṛiti* (or material Nature), and who have attained the state of the highest equality with the Highest *Brahman*—(that Person) is the Highest *Brahman* Himself forming the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc.

Having thus established, by means of certain expressions (in the context) peculiarly significant of the Highest *Brahman*, and by other means, that (the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc.,) is the Highest *Brahman* Himself, he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) says that He (who is the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc.) is the Highest *Brahman* Himself for this reason also, namely, that there are no expressions (in the context) peculiarly significant of the individual self.

नानुमानमतच्छाब्दात्प्राणभृच्च

Sūtra 3. *Nānumānamatachchhabdāt prāṇabhṛichcha.* (63) ४९३

493. This *Sūtra* is given as two by Śhikarācārya thus. (i) *Nānumānamatachchhabdāt* and (ii) *Prāṇabhṛichcha*. The reason given in *atachchhabdāt* estab-

lishes the conclusions arrived at in both the statements. There is thus propriety in linking them together in one *Sūtra*.

Neither the *ānumāna* (or what is capable of being established by the logical process of inference), nor (the *jīva* who is) the possessor of life (is the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc.): because there are (in the context) no expressions signifying either.

The meaning is that just as, in this context (under reference), the thing that is taught is not the *pradhāna* (or material Nature), for the reason that there is no expression signifying it, similarly the (*jīva* or) possessor of life (is not) also (the thing that is taught here).

Anumāna is derived from a root which means to measure, and is that which is measured ; that is, it denotes the *pradhāna* mentioned by others (to be the cause of the world). Or *Anumāna* is that which is arrived at by the inferential process of logical reasoning.⁴⁹⁴

“Because there are (in the context) no expressions signifying either.” The meaning is that there are no expressions denoting either of them (i.e., either the *pradhāna* or the individual self). *Atachchhabdāt* means “because there are no expressions signifying it”. As the indeclinable-compound-form (known as the *avyayībhāva*) is used (among other things) to denote the absence of a thing (*Pāṇini*; II. 1. 6), (this compound word) is *avyayībhāva* in form.⁴⁹⁵

(The abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is) not the individual self for the following reason also :

494. In splitting this *Sūtra* into its component words, the portion *nānumānam* may be split up either as *na + anumānam* or *na + anumānam*. Both *anumāna* and *ānumāna* mean the *prakṛiti*, as explained in the text.

495. The *avyayībhāva* is the indeclinable compound form and

is generally used as an adverb. It is also used whenever the absence of a thing is to be denoted as here. The *Śrutaprakāśikā* explains how the meaning required in the context cannot be obtained, if *atachchhabdāt* is taken to be any other type of compound word like the *tatpuruṣa* or *bahuvrīhi*.

भेदव्यपदेशात्

Sūtra 4. *Bhedavyapadeśāt.* (69)

Because (His) differentiation (from the individual self) is taught (in the context).

There is (in the context) this passage :—" On the same tree, the *purusha* (i.e., the individual self), sits immersed (in grief) : deluded by (*prakṛiti* which is) the object of enjoyment, he grieves. When he sees another, the Lord, to be gracious and well pleased, then he (also), relieved from grief, attains His (*asya*) greatness". (*Mund. Up.* III. 1. 2 & *S'vet. Up.* IV. 7.) By means of this passage and by means of other similar passages, this (Being, who is the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc.,) is taught to be quite distinct from the individual self.

Aniśaya,⁴⁹⁵ that is (in other words), under the influence of *prakṛiti* which forms the material world of enjoyments, the individual self, thus deluded, grieves. When he sees another, who is different from himself, who is the Lord of all and is gracious, and (sees) also the glory of this Being (*asya*)—the glory which consists in controlling the whole universe—then he becomes free from misery.

प्रकरणात्

Sūtra 5. *Prakaraṇāt.* (70)

From the context (here, it comes out that the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is the *Brahman*).

495. *Aniśaya* is the instrumental singular of *aniśā*, which is here taken by Rāṇaṇuja to mean *prakṛiti*. The word literally means a person or thing under

the control of another. *Prakṛiti* is not sovereign or independent, as it is regarded as being ruled by the individual self and ultimately by the *Brahman*.

It has already been well shown under the aphorism—“That Being who is characterised by invisibility and other such attributes (is the Supreme Self), because His attributes are mentioned (in the context)” (*Ved. Sūt. I. 2. 22*)—that the context under the reference here relates to the Highest *Brahman*. Here, however, we have undertaken to remove (only) that doubt, which may possibly arise to the effect that there is a break in the context, for the reason that the subject-matter of the context (here) relates to the blood vessels and to the fact that He (the *Brahman*) takes birth in various ways and is also the support of the mind and the vital airs.

स्थित्यदानाभ्याञ्च

Sutra 6. *Sthityadanābhyañcha.* (71)

On account of the (mere) existence and (also) on account of the eating (of the fruits of *karma*, which are both predicated in the context here, the abode of the heaven, of the earth, etc., is the *Brahman*).

There is the passage—“Two birds, which possess similar attributes and are inseparable friends, cling to the same tree; one of them eats the sweet *pippala* fruit, while the other shines in splendour without eating at all.” (*Mund. Up. III. 1. 1*). Here it is taught that one being eats the fruits of his *karma*, and that the other, without at all eating the fruits of *karma*, merely dwells shining with splendour within the body. Of these, that Being alone, who, without eating the fruits of *karma*, shines with splendour, who is omniscient and forms the bridge of immortality, and who is the Self of all—He alone deserves to be the abode of the heaven, of the earth, etc., but not that individual self who is eating the fruits of his *karma*, and feels miserable.

Accordingly, it has been conclusively established that the abode of the heaven, the earth, etc., is the Supreme Self.

ADHIKARANA 11

BHŪMĀDHIKARANA.

भूमा सम्प्रसादादध्युपदेशः त्

Sūtra 7. *Bhūmā samprasādādadyupadeśāt.* (72)

What is denoted by the word *Bhūman* (which means the Great One, is the *Brahman*), because He is taught (in the context) to be greater than the *samprasāda* (or the individual self).

The *Chhandogas* declare to the following effect—"That is the *bhūman* (the Great One), (experiencing) whom one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else. Again, that is the small one (*alpa*), (experiencing) whom one sees something else, hears something else, knows something else." (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 24. 1).

Now the word *bhūman* is built up so as to have an affix possessing the sense of an abstract noun. Accordingly, the word *bahu* is seen to be included in the group of words beginning with *prithu*. Therefore, the affix *imanich* is attached (to *bahu*) in accordance with the (grammatical) rule—"The affix *imanich* also is attached to the words belonging to the group of words beginning with *prithu*." (*Pāṇini* V. 1. 122). And then, in accordance with the (grammatical) rule—" (The first vowel in the affix *imanich*), when it comes after (i.e., is attached to) the word *bahu*, disappears, and *bhū* is substituted in place of *bahu* ". (*Pāṇini*. VI. 4. 158)—the basal stem (*bahu*) and the affix (*imanich*) are combined into a new form, and the word

bhūman is obtained. *Bhūman* means greatness. And here the word *bahu* (meaning 'great') signifies magnitude, but not number ; because it is mentioned to be a correlative of the word *alpa* (small), which occurs in the statement—" (Seeing) whom, one sees something else, . . . that is *alpa* (the small one) ". Moreover that (word *bahu*) is ascertained to denote not the mere attribute (of greatness), but an entity qualified by that attribute, because that (word) has to denote a qualified entity, which is a correlative of that (other) qualified entity which is denoted by the word *alpa*.

It is thus that this *Bhūman* occurs. Hence it means " the Great One. " And the being who is here found to be characterised by greatness is the *Ātman* ; because the context ⁴⁹⁷ here begins with the statement—" He who knows the Self crosses the ocean of misery. " (*Chhānd. Up. VII. 1. 3*) ; then it teaches the knowledge relating to the *Bhūman* (the Great One), and then, in the statement—" The *Ātman* indeed is all this " (*Chhānd. Up. VII. 25. 2.*), it comes to an end with that same (word *Ātman*).

⁴⁹⁷. The context here is *Chhānd. Up. VII.* The sage Nārada, after studying the *Vedas* and their auxiliaries, continues to feel spiritually discontented. He therefore seeks instruction in the 'Science of the Self' from his elder brother, Sanatkumāra. The latter teaches first that what Nārada has studied is *Nāman*, and he is asked to worship *Nāman* as the *Brahman*. *Nāman* is here to be taken as a *pratīkā* for the *Brahman*. Then other objects are prescribed for worship as the *Brahman* in the order of increasing importance, till the *prāṇa* or the individual self is reached. There is no direction to worship the *prāṇa* as the *Brahman*. Nor is here any auspicious result declared for the worship of the *prāṇa*. But one who knows the truth about the *prāṇa* is said to become an

ativādin, a person who regards it as transcendent. Then Sanatkumāra teaches, without any query from Nārada: "But he who, by holding on to Truth as the highest, declares that his object of worship is transcendent, he in fact truly declares that his object of worship is transcendent," (*16. 1*). Here 'Truth' means the *Brahman*; and later this Truth itself is described as *Bhūman* or the Great One. The *pūrvapakṣa* here is that nothing higher is taught than the *prāṇa*, and that this *prāṇa* itself is later called *bhūman*: Moreover, there is no reference to the worship of the *Brahman* under the name of Truth. Sanatkumāra is said merely to enjoin that speaking the truth is an element in the worship of the *prāṇa*.

Here the doubt is raised whether the being, who is characterised by the attribute of greatness, is the individual self or the Supreme Self. It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the individual self. Why? For the following reason. It is made out from the statement—"I have indeed learnt the *śāstras* thus. He who knows the self crosses the ocean of misery with the help of venerable teachers like yourself" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 1. 3)—that, Nārada approached (the teacher Sanatkumāra) with the desire to know the *ātman*. To him, various things commencing with *nāman* (name) and concluding with *prāṇa* (life-breath), were taught as objects of worship. Among these, in regard to all those things that are mentioned prior to *prāṇa*, there are seen the following and other questions—"Reverend sir, is there anything greater than name?" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 1. 5.); and 'Is there, reverend sir, anything greater than speech?' (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 2. 2): and (there are also seen) the following and other answers, 'Speech, indeed, is greater than name' (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 2. 1); and 'Mind, indeed, is greater than speech' (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 3. 1). But concerning *prāṇā*, we do not see (any such question or answer). Hence it is made out that the teaching regarding the *ātman* extends only so far as to include *prāṇa*. Therefore, what is here pointed out by the word *prāṇa* is undeniably the individual self, which is always associated with the *prāṇa*, but is not merely a particular kind of vital air.

The following and other statements—"Prāṇa is, indeed, the father, *prāṇa* is, indeed, the mother" (*Chhānd. UP.* VII. 15. 1) enable us to know that the *prāṇa* (mentioned here) is an intelligent entity. Further, there are to be found here words of reproach applied to any one who hurts his father and others when alive, on account of his proving a source of injury to them, as in the statement beginning with—" (He is) a patricide, a matricide, etc." (*Chhānd. UP.* VII. 15. 2). And there are no words of reproach given here, so as to be applied to him who severely

hurts those very persons when they are without *prāṇa*. Hence what is pointed out by the word, *prāṇa*, is certainly an intelligent being capable of feeling an injury. Even in the case of such individual selves, as have (through their sins) become immovable things devoid of the (fivefold) vital air (*prāṇa*)⁴⁹⁸, it is seen that according as they have or have not the power of injuring, there is (in them the power to feel) an injury or the absence thereof. Hence it is definitely determined that he who is (here) pointed out to be capable of feeling an injury is surely the individual self.

Moreover, for this very reason, one should not be led away to believe that he, who is, with the help of the illustrative example of the spokes and the nave and other such (explanatory suggestions),⁴⁹⁹ indicated by the word, *prāṇa*, is the Highest *Brahman*; because there is no logical scope to say that the Highest *Brahman* is capable of feeling pain, and because also the illustrative example of the spokes and the nave is appropriate only in respect of the individual self, for the reason that all the non-intelligent things, which are different from the individual self and constitute his objects of enjoyment and means of enjoyment, are dependent upon the individual self for their existing (in the condition in which they are). And it is this same (individual self), denoted by the word *prāṇa*, that happens to be the great one (*bhūman*); because there is no breach in the context before the expression, *bhūman*, occurs (therein), owing to the non-existence in the context of the question—'Is there, reverend sir, anything greater than the *prāṇa*?' and of an answer (thereto), to the effect, 'This is, indeed, greater than the *prāṇa*'.

498. Plants are said to have *prāṇa*, but not in its fivefold form. Vide the commentary under *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 1. 9). Sinful souls are believed, in consequence of their transgressions in life, to be born in the form of plants, trees and other immovable objects.

499. The illustrative example referred to occurs in *Kaush. Up.* (III. 9), which is quoted and discussed under *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 1. 30). The real point is that while *prāṇa* means the *Brahman* there, the same word means only the individual self here.

Moreover, it has been stated that he, who knows the *prāṇa* thus, may say that his object of worship transcends all others. Then, in the statement—"Indeed, he speaks of the object of his worship as transcendent" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 16. 1)—that very person (who thus knows the *prāṇa* as transcendent) is again referred to. Then, by means of the statement—"He who, by holding on to truth says that this is transcendent", (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 16. 1), it is taught that to speak the truth⁵⁰⁰ forms an element in worship of *prāṇa*. Then, in the statement—"When, indeed, he understands, then he speaks the truth" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 17. 1)—it is taught that that speaking the truth, which is obligatory (on all) is subordinate to the knowledge of the true nature of *prāṇa*, which (knowledge) has been already pointed out to be the principal thing.

Then, for the attainment of that (knowledge of the true nature of the *prāṇa*), reflection, faith, devotion and effort are taught (as the necessary means). And then, for the purpose of inducing their practice, it is taught that the essential nature of the individual self pointed out (here) by the word *prāṇā*, as forming the object of attainment, is an experience of the nature of happiness. And then (finally), it is taught in the statement—"Indeed, the great one itself has to be specially desired and known" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 23. 1)—that that happiness is characterised by greatness (or immensity). Accordingly, that nature of the individual self himself, which is free from ignorance (*avidyā*), is taught (here) to be immense happiness. Thus there is also no contradiction of the commencement of the context, which begins with—"He who knows the *ātman* crosses (the ocean of) misery." (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 1. 3.) Therefore, he who is associated with the quality of greatness, is the individual self.

⁵⁰⁰ In VII. 16. 1, the verb is *ativadati*, that is, 'declares as transcendent', but in VII. 17. 1, it is *vadati*, 'speaks'. The meaning of the latter is given to

the former by the *pūrvapakṣin*, while Rāmānuja would understand the latter in the sense of the former.

For whatever reason the individual self is thus associated with the quality of greatness, for that same reason, in reference to the thing 'I', which is the individual self, the peculiar excellence of (that same) individual self is taught in the passage beginning with—"I am myself indeed below, I am above," and ending with—"I am indeed all this." (*Chhānd. Up. VII. 25. 1*). When it is thus definitely determined that it (*i.e.*, the 'great one') is the individual self, the other parts of the context have to be interpreted so as to agree with it.

If it be so held, it is stated in reply—"What is denoted by the word *Bhūman* (which means the Great One, is the *Brahman*), because He is taught (in the context) to be greater than the *samprasāda* (or the individual self)." (*Ved. Sūt. I. 3. 7*). He who is characterised by the quality of greatness is not the individual self, but is the Supreme Self. Why? "Because He is taught (in the context) to be greater than the *samprasāda*." *Samprasāda*⁵⁰¹ is the individual self; because such *Upanishadic* usage (of the word, *samprasāda*) is well known, as for instance, in the following passage :—"Now this same *samprasāda* (or the individual self), rising up from this body, attains the Supreme Light, and becomes manifest in its true nature." (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 3. 4 & 12. 3*). The meaning is that He who is characterised by the quality of greatness and is denoted by the word *Satya* (or Truth), is taught (here) to be greater than the *samprasāda* or the individual self. And that which is denoted by the word 'Truth' is the Highest *Brahman*.

501. The word literally means whatever is pure and serene and is primarily used to refer to the state of *sushupti* or dreamless sleep, because it is free from the disturbances felt during wakefulness or dreaming. Sometimes it may refer to the dreaming state as less disturbed than the wakeful one. *Vide Chhānd. Up.*

(*VIII. 6. 3*) and *Bṛih. Up. (IV. 3. 15)*. Thence it has come to denote the essential nature of the individual self in its unfettered condition. It is noteworthy that in *VIII. 3. 4*, which closely follows the seventh *prapāṭhaka* where the *Brahman* is called *Satya*, *samprasāda* is specifically distinguished from the *Brahman* whose name is *Satya*,

What is said is this :—Just as, among those things (in the context), which, beginning with Name, end with the *prāṇā*, every one of them that comes later is stated to be greater than that which precedes it ; even so those which (thus) come later have to be different entities from those that are mentioned earlier. Accordingly, that which is pointed out to be greater than the individual self referred to by the word *prāṇā*, and is denoted by the word *Satya* (Truth), is certainly a different entity from that (individual self itself). That which is pointed out by the word, ‘Truth’, is itself the Great One ; and so it is the Highest *Brahman* Himself that is called the Truth (here) declared to be the Great One. The *Vṛittikāra* (Bodhāyana) says the same thing thus :—“In the passage beginning with—‘But the Great One (or *Bhūman*) itself, indeed etc.’ (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 23. 1)—the Great One is the *Brahman*, because (that Great One) is itself mentioned later than the individual self in the series commencing with Name.”

It may be asked how it is made out that Truth is (here) taught to be greater than what is pointed out by the word *prāṇā* (i.e., to be greater than the individual self). And it is stated in reply thus. In the passage—“This same person mentioned above, seeing thus, reflecting thus, knowing thus, declares that his object of worship is transcendent”⁵⁰² (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 15. 4)—it is stated that he, who knows the *prāṇā*, deserves to give out that his object of worship is transcendent. Then the passage—“But he who, by holding on to Truth as the highest, declares that his object of worship is transcendent, he in fact truly declares that his object of worship is transcendent” (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 16. 1)—distinguishes, by means of the word ‘But’, that person, who, after knowing the Truth, declares that his object of worship is transcendent, from the previously mentioned person, who has also declared that his object of

⁵⁰². ‘Seeing’, ‘reflecting’ and ‘knowing’ are explained respectively as *śāksātākāra*, *manana*

and *upāsana* (or direct realisation, reflection and worship through meditation).

worship (*viz.*, the *prāṇa*) is transcendent. For this same reason, in the statement—"But . . . he in fact truly declares that his object of worship is transcendent"—he, who declares the *prāṇa* to be transcendent as an object of worship, is not again referred to (at all, as accepted by the *pūrvapakshin*). Therefore, it is made out that that *Satya*, which is the cause of this (person's) declaration to the effect that his object of worship is transcendent, is greater than the *prāṇa*, which (likewise) is the cause of the previously mentioned person's declaration that his (own) object of worship transcends all others going before it.

Again, what has been already stated (by the *pūrvapakshin*) to the effect that only to him, who knows the *prāṇa*, the speaking of truth has been taught, so as to constitute an element (in the worship) contemplated in the context, and that hence there is no break in the continuity of the context as relating to the *prāṇa*—that is not right. Indeed, by means of the word, 'But', another person who (being other than the worshipper of the *prāṇa*) declares his object of worship to be transcendent, is certainly suggested (here). But that (suggestion) is not merely to the effect that the same person, who (holding on to the *prāṇā*) declares his object of worship to be transcendent, has himself to possess as an element (in respect of his worship of the *prāṇā*) the attribute of having to speak the truth (also).

In the passage—"But he indeed is the performer of the *agnihotra* sacrifice, who speaks the truth" (?) and in other like passages, no other person than the performer of the *agnihotra* sacrifice is suggested; hence a forced interpretation is (here) adopted to the effect that speaking the truth is enjoined as an essential element (in the performance of his sacrifice), on the performer of the *agnihotra* sacrifice, who happens to be the only person mentioned. But (in the passage under discussion) here the Supreme *Brahman* who is denoted by the word Truth (or Existence), is mentioned as prompting a different person (from the worshipper of the

prāṇa) to proclaim (Him) to be transcendent as an object of worship. And the word, *Satya* (which means Truth or Existence), is (often) used to denote the Highest *Brahman*, as in the following and other instances—"The *Brahman* is Existence (or Truth), Knowledge, Infinity." (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1). Thus he, who is firmly devoted to Him and declares Him to be transcendent as an object of worship, appropriately happens to be greater than the previously mentioned person who holds a (different) thing (*i.e.*, the *prāṇa*) to be transcendent. Therefore the 'otherness' (of the worshipper of Truth from the worshipper of the *prāṇa*) is established by the natural and appropriate interpretation of the passage (in question) and should not be set at naught.'

Indeed, to be an *ativādin* is to hold that one's own object of worship is superior as an object of human pursuit to every other (object of worship). He who knows the *prāṇa* is (thus) an *ativādin*, because he holds and declares that the individual self, which is denoted by the word *prāṇa* and forms his own object of worship, is superior to all the other (specified) objects of worship, which begin with 'Name' and end with 'Desire'. Even he (who thus declares the *prāṇa* to be his transcendent object of worship) pursues (only) such an object as (really) has a higher than itself. Therefore he who declares the Supreme *Brahman* to be the highest as an object of worship, higher than which there is none to aim at,—he alone is the true *ativādin*.

Accordingly, it is stated (in the context under reference) thus:—"But, he, who, by holding on to Truth (*Satyena*), declares that his object of worship is transcendent,—he indeed truly declares that his object of worship is transcendent." (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 16. 1). The instrumental case ⁵⁰³

503. This word literally means by or with '*Satya*', but the instrumental case has here the power to denote a distinguishing characteristic, as in the case of the word *Śvetachehbatreṇa* in

the sentence, *Śvetachehbatreṇa rājānam adrākṣīt*. The meaning here is that a person was made out to be a king with the aid of the white umbrella as a royal distinguishing mark,

of the word, *Satyena* is used (here) “to denote a particular distinguishing characteristic”. (*Pāṇini*. II. 3. 21). The meaning is that he, whose object of worship is transcendent, and who is himself (as a worshipper) specially characterised through *Satya*, that is, through the Supreme *Brahman* as (his) object of worship—he declares rightly his object of worship to be the highest). It is for this very reason that the pupil (Nārada) makes (here) the request—“Reverend sir, I, that same person, may I also become an *ativādin* through the characteristic of *Satya*”; and the teacher (Sanatkumāra) says—“Indeed, *Satya* itself has to be specially desired and known.” (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 16. 1).

By means of the statement—“Out of the *Ātman* comes the *prāṇa*” (*Chhānd Up.* VII. 26. 3)—it is pointed out that what is denoted by the word, *prāṇa*, is born out of the *Ātman*. Therefore it is made out that the *Ātman* dealt with in the beginning of the context (under reference here) in the passage—“He who knows the *Ātman* crosses (the ocean of) misery” (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 1. 3)—is different from what is denoted by the word *prāṇa*.

What has been already stated to the effect that, because the question—“Is there, reverend sir, anything greater than the *prāṇa*?”—and the answer (thereunto)—“This is greater than the *prāṇa*”—are both seen to be absent (here), it has to be understood that the *ātman*, with which the context here is made to begin, is finally disposed of with the teaching regarding the *prāṇa*,—that is not right. In fact, it is not solely by question and answer that (one) thing is made out to be different from another, inasmuch as it is possible to make this out by other means of knowledge also; and such other means⁵⁰⁴ of knowledge have been already given.

504. The other means of knowledge are explained in the *Śruti-prakāśikā* to be (i) the word *tu* (but) in *esha tu ativadati*

(*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 16. 1) and (ii) the expression *Prāṇa ātmataḥ* (in VII. 26. 1).

The idea of the pupil, who did not put the question—“Is there, reverend sir, anything greater than the *prāṇa*?”—is this. The non-intelligent things, beginning with Name and ending with Desire, have been taught (here) in the order in which every preceding thing is surpassed by every (immediately) succeeding thing, in consequence of its being greater (in value) as an object of human pursuit : moreover, in regard to (all) those things (so taught), it has not been mentioned by the teacher that the knower of each of the (succeeding) things (among them) is an *ativādin* : he (the teacher) has, however, considered that, in the case of him who has come to realise the essential nature of the (intelligent) individual self as pointed out by the word *prāṇa*, the greatness of the object of his pursuit is transcendent ; and in consequence, he (the teacher) has taught that he (who worships the *prāṇa*) may (well) declare the object of his worship to be transcendent, as mentioned in the passage—“He indeed it is, who, seeing thus, thinking thus, knowing thus, may declare that the object of his worship is transcendent.” (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 15. 4).

Hence the pupil (obviously) thought that the teaching regarding the *Ātman* was (actually) concluded at this very point, and did not again put any further question. But the teacher, knowing that this (*prāṇa*) also has a higher than itself, taught of his own accord that the Highest *Brahman* denoted by the word ‘Truth’ (*Satya*) constitutes the (altogether) unsurpassed object of human pursuit, by means of the passage—“But he, who, by holding on to Truth as the highest, declares that his object of worship is transcendent,—he indeed truly declares his object of worship to be transcendent.” (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 16. 1).

After the Highest *Brahman*, who is in Himself the highest object of human pursuit, was (so) suggested, the pupil, too, with the object of knowing the truth regarding His essential nature and His worship, made a request to the effect—“May I also, reverend sir, become an *ativādin* by

means of *Satya*." (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 16. 1). Then, in order to attain that condition of an *ativādin* which is due to the direct realisation of the *Brahman*, the worship of the *Brahman*, which forms the means for the direct realisation of the *Brahman*, was taught in the statement—"But *Satya* indeed has to be specially enquired into (or worshipped)." (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 16. 1).

Then mental reflection in relation to the *Brahman*, as forming the means of carrying out that (worship) was taught in the statement—"But reflection, indeed, has to be specially enquired into." (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 18. 1). Then, since reflection serves the purpose of fixing in the mind what has been already 'heard', it is understood that this teaching regarding reflection necessarily implies 'hearing'. Accordingly, faith in the *Brahman*, which forms the means of 'hearing' (the scriptures), has been taught in the passage—"But faith (or ardour) indeed has to be specially enquired into." (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 19. 1). Then that kind of devotion to Him, which forms the means of attaining such (a faith), is taught in the passage—"But devotion indeed has to be specially enquired into." (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 20. 1). Then in the passage—"But volition (or *kṛiti*)⁵⁰⁵ has indeed to be specially enquired into" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 21. 1)—that kind of volitional effort, which forms the means of practising that (devotion) and is of the nature of an internal stimulus giving rise to the activity connected with that (devotion) is also taught. Then, for the purpose of realising (this) volition by way of the commencement of 'hearing' etc., it is taught in the passage—"But bliss (or happiness) indeed has to be

505. Rāṅgarāṇānāja interprets *kṛiti* as a determination of the mind in a particular direction. This may be taken to be the same as giving direction to the will. Rāmānuja himself explains *kṛiti* here as *udyogaprayatna*. The *Śrūtaṭprakāśikā* seems to take both

udyoga and *prayatna* as synonymous. The *prayatna* here has necessarily to be internal; otherwise it cannot be *kṛiti*. Therefore we have taken *udyogaprayatna* as an internal stimulus giving rise to an external activity.

specially enquired into" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 22. 1.)--that the *Brahman*, who is the (highest) object of attainment and is denoted by the word 'Truth', is to be known as having the nature that consists of bliss. Then, considering that that bliss alone, which is unsurpassed in greatness, constitutes the highest object of human pursuit, it is taught in the passage—"But the Great One (*Bhūman*) indeed has to be specially enquired into" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 23. 1)—that that same *Brahman*, who has the nature of bliss, is (also) to be known as being of an unsurpassable greatness.

Then (finally) the definition of that *Brahman*, who has the nature of the bliss which is unsurpassed in greatness, is given thus—"That is the Great One, (on seeing whom) one sees nothing else, (on hearing whom) one hears nothing else, (on knowing whom) one knows nothing else." (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 24. 1).

The meaning is this : that while the *Brahman*, who has the nature of the bliss (or happiness), which is unlimited in excellence, is being experienced by (any) one, the enjoyer (of such an experience) sees nothing other than Him ; because the whole of the totality of all things is included in the essential nature of the *Brahman* and in His greatness. Therefore it is that—while experiencing the *Brahman*, who has the nature of unsurpassed bliss (or happiness), and is associated with the attribute of greatness, which is another name for Lordship,—(therefore it is that then) one sees nothing other than Him, simply for the reason that nothing other than Him is in existence.⁵⁰⁵ And then, as all that is capable of being experienced (by him who has thus realised the greatness of the *Brahman*) has wholly a blissful nature, he "knows" no pain. Indeed, that alone is bliss (or happiness) which, while it is being experienced, is agreeable to the man (who experiences it).

506. That nothing other than the *Brahman* is in existence may be understood in two ways. (i) None equal or similar to Him is

in existence. (ii) Nothing is existent whose existence is not dependent on Him.

Again, it may, however, be asked, how that same world, which, while it is being experienced as a (thing) distinct from the *Brahman*, is seen to consist of pain and to be made up of limited happiness, can acquire the nature of happiness altogether, in case it is experienced as having the *Brahman* for its Self in consequence of its forming (the manifestation of) His glory. The reply (to this) is given thus :—To those individual souls, who are under the influence of *karma*, the whole world, experienced as (a thing) distinct from the *Brahman*, happens to be full of pain and limited in happiness, so as to accord with the (respective) nature of the *karma* of every one of those (souls). Hence the experience of the world, as (a thing) distinct from the *Brahman*, as being limited in happiness, and as consisting of pain, is due to *karma*. Consequently, to him who is freed from the ignorance (*avidyā*), which is (ultimately) of the nature of *karma*, that same world, falling within the experience of the *Brahman* as characterised by glorious greatness, becomes bliss (or happiness) altogether.

For instance, the milk, that a person affected by biliousness drinks, gives him, in proportion to the degree of his biliousness, either very little pleasure or even the contrary of it. That same milk, however, invariably gives rise to pleasure in the case of him who is not (in any way) affected by biliousness. Again, just as an instrument used for the purposes of a pastime by the father (the king) is not capable of giving rise to any pleasure in the prince (who is the son), when he does not (himself) look upon it as such, but becomes very pleasing to him when he looks upon it as such ; so also, the world certainly gives rise to unsurpassed bliss (or happiness) when viewed as an instrument of sport in the hands of the *Brahman*, who is by nature bliss unsurpassed in excellence and is the abode of innumerable auspicious qualities (also) unsurpassed in excellence, and (when viewed) as having Him for its

Self.⁵⁰⁷ Consequently, while experiencing the *Brahman*, who is associated with the sovereignty of the world and is by nature bliss unsurpassed in excellence, one sees nothing other than Him, nor does one 'see' any misery.

The remaining portion of the context (here) explains only this. There is the passage—"He, indeed, who, seeing thus, thinking thus, knowing thus, has the Self for his satisfaction, has the Self for his sport, has the Self for his enjoyment, and has the Self for his rapture—he is his own ruler, he is free to move as he likes in all the worlds.⁵⁰⁸ But those who know otherwise than thus, they have other rulers to rule over them, they come by perishable worlds and are not free to move as they like in all the worlds." (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 25. 2). 'To be one's own ruler' means 'to be independent of *karma*'; 'to have other rulers to rule over them' means 'to be subject to *karma*'. Accordingly, there is this passage also—"He, who sees (that One), does not see death, nor disease, nor the quality of miserableness (in the world). Indeed, the seer sees all and attains all in all places." (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 26. 2.) Moreover, (the idea) that the *Brahman* has the nature of the bliss which is unsurpassed in excellence, has been dealt with in detail under the aphorism—"That which is denoted by the word *Ānandamaya* (is the *Brahman*); because there is (in the context) the repetition (of various grades of bliss which culminate in the *Ānandamaya* which forms the Highest)". (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 13).

507. Two kinds of association, leading to unpleasant and pleasant experiences respectively, are here illustrated. Sweet milk becomes hateful to one associated with biliousness. The association of the plaything with the king makes it delightful to the prince.

508. The reference is to one who has worshipped the *Bhūman* and by means of *manana* and *upāsana* has obtained direct

realisation. To him all kinds of joy are included in the bliss of the experience of the *Ātman*. *Rati*, *krīdā*, *mīlana* and *ānanda* are explained respectively as the satisfaction derived from the use of garlands, sandal paste etc., the joy from gardens, the delight from dalliance with women and the rapture from power and sovereignty.

Thus, that *Brahman*, who is denoted by the word 'Truth' (or Existence) and is a different entity from the individual self pointed out by the word *prāṇa*, is (here) taught to be the Great One. Therefore the Great One is the Highest *Brahman*.

धर्मोपपत्तेश्च

Sūtra 8. *Dharmopapatteṣha* (73)

Because also the attributes (given in the context) are appropriate (only in relation to Him).

Whatever attributes are declared in the scriptures in relation to this Great One, they are all appropriate only in relation to the Highest *Brahman*.⁵⁰⁹ Natural and intrinsic immortality, as given in the statement—"This is immortal"⁵¹⁰ (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 24. 1); the attribute of independent self-sustentation, as given in the statement—"He is (established) in His own glory" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 24. 1); the attribute of being the Self of all, as given in the passage beginning with—"He indeed is below", and ending with—"He alone is all this" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 25. 1); the attribute of being the producer of everything from the *prāṇa* downwards, as stated in the passage

509. The reference here is to *Chhānd. Up.* (VII. 24-26): "Whatever is the *Bhūman*, that is immortal. Whatever is *alpa*, that is mortal." He (the disciple, asked): "Reverend sir, wherein is it (i.e., the *Bhūman*) established?" "In its own glory, or not (even) in the glory...He is below, He is above, He is behind, He is in front, He is to the south, He is to the north, He indeed is all this. Then therefore the teaching under the ego assumption. I am indeed below, I am above...I am indeed

all this. Then therefore the teaching regarding (the *Bhūman*) as the Self. The Self indeed is below. The Self is indeed all this...To that same person, indeed, who certainly sees thus, thinks thus, knows thus, the *prāṇa* comes out of the Self...the *ākāśa* comes out of the Self, all this indeed comes out of the Self alone."

510. The *Upaṇiṣad* has *tadamṛitam*, but the *Śrībhāṣya* quotes as *etadamṛitam*, which phrase, however, occurs in VII. 3. 4.

beginning with—"Out of the *Ātman* comes the *prāṇa*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 26. 1); these and other similar attributes certainly belong to none other than the Supreme Self.

Moreover, that teaching of (the *Brahman*'s) being the Self of all, which is given in the passage beginning with—"I am indeed below" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 25. 1)—therein is (also) declared the worship of that *Brahman*, who is characterised by the attribute of greatness, under the conception of the ego; because the teaching (regarding the *Brahman*) under the conception of the ego is begun immediately afterwards (in the context) with the passage—"Then therefore the teaching under the ego-assumption". (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 25. 1). It is declared in the *Antaryami-Brāhmaṇa* (i.e., *Bṛih. Up.* III. 7) and elsewhere that the Self also of the thing 'I', which is the same as the individual self, is the Supreme Self Himself. Accordingly, the internal entity (of the individual self) includes the Supreme Self in its import, and so the word 'I' also has its significance extended so as to include the Supreme Self in its meaning.⁵¹¹ Therefore the teaching regarding the worship (of the *Brahman*) under the conception of the ego relates to the worship of the Supreme Self as having the individual self for His body.

The Supreme Self has all things for His body, and hence forms the Self of all; thus He is the Self of the individual self also. This same thing is mentioned in the passage beginning with—"Then therefore the teaching

511. The point here is not that the ego is the *Brahman*, but that the *Brahman* is taught under the conception of the ego. It is pointed out that the expression used is not *ahamādeśaḥ*, which may be taken to be teaching about the identity of the ego and the *Brahman*, but *ahankārādeśaḥ*. This can only mean teaching under the concep-

tion of the ego. That is, the individual self is to be regarded as the body of the Supreme Self. The word, the mental conception about what is signified by it and its ultimate meaning—all reach to the Supreme Self. According to the *pūrvapakṣa*, of course, it is the individual self which is taught in VII. 25. 1.

regarding the Self", and ending with—"The Self alone is all this". (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 25. 2). To explain this same point, it is stated, in the passage beginning with—"To that same person, indeed, who certainly sees thus, thinks thus, knows thus, the *prāṇa* comes out of the Self, ...the *ākāśa* comes out of that Self" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 26. 1.)—that everything is produced out of the Supreme Self, who forms the Self of even the individual self. The meaning is that everything is born out of the Supreme Self, who is established as the internal ruler of the worshipper. Thus, for the purpose of firmly establishing the idea, that the Supreme Self has the individual self for His body, the worship (of the Supreme Self) under the conception of the ego has necessarily to be conducted.

Therefore it is a demonstrated conclusion that He who is (here) characterised by the attribute of greatness is the Supreme Self.

ADHIKARANA III

AKSHĀRĀDHĪKARANA

अक्षरमन्वरान्तधृतेः

Sūtra 9. *Aksharamambarāntadhṛiteḥ.* (74)

Akshara (means here the Supreme Brahman) because it is (declared in the context⁵⁰⁷ to be) the support of what is beyond the *ambara* (or *ākāśa*, i.e., the *prakṛiti*).

In the context dealing with the questions put by Gārgī, the *Vājasaneyins* declare to the following effect in their

512. The context here is *Bṛih. Up.* III. 8, where Gārgī āchā-
knavī challenges Yājñavalkya
with questions about the support
of the heaven, the earth and all
things in the past, the present and
the future.

scriptures—"And he spoke in reply thus: This, verily, O Gārgī, is that *Akshara* which Brāhmaṇas say is neither gross nor atomic, neither short nor long, nor red, nor viscid, nor lustrous," and so on. (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 8.) Here the doubt arises whether this *Akshara* is the *pradhāna* (i.e., material Nature) or the individual self, or whether it is the Supreme Self (Himself).⁵³

It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the *pradhāna*. Why? Because, in the passage, "It is higher than what is beyond the *ākshara*", (*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 1. 2), and in other such passages, the word, *akshara*, is seen used so as to denote the *pradhāna*, and because also the attributes of not being gross, etc. may all be appropriately predicated in relation to that *pradhāna*.

It may, however, be contended⁵¹⁴ that in the passage—" (That is the higher knowledge) by which that *Akshara* is known." (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 5)—and in others like it, the word, *Akshara*, is seen to denote the Supreme Self also. But that is not the case here; because, between two things, one of which (*viz.*, the *pradhāna*) is arrived at by another means of knowledge (than the scripture), and the other (*viz.*, the *Brahman*) arrived at by the scripture (itself), that

513. According to Śaṅkara, the question at issue here is whether the *Akshara* is the Supreme Lord or the *varṇa* (i.e., the *oṃkāra*). In Rāmānuja's view it is difficult to maintain such a *pūrvapaksha* in view of *Bṛih. Up.* I. 1. 8. 8, which he quotes at the beginning of this *adhikāṣa*. He therefore proceeds to deal with some other views about the *Akshara* to the effect that it is the *pradhāna* or the *jīva*. These *pūrvapakshas* take the *ākāśa* in III. 8. 4, wherein the heaven, the earth etc. are described as being woven like warp and woof, to be the ether of space. The *akshara*, which is later, said in II. 8. 8 to

have *ākāśa* woven into it, is *pradhāna* or primordial matter. Alternatively, *ākāśa* may mean primordial matter, which may be regarded as being supported by itself or by the individual self. Both these latter can be called *akshara*.

514. Here an objector comes forward to the objector. He may be the *Vedāntin* or some one else who does not necessarily accept fully the *Vedāntin's* position here. The point here is that the word *akshara* is known to signify other things besides *pradhāna*. It may stand for the Supreme Self and also the individual self.

which is arrived at by that other (non-scriptural) means of knowledge is first apprehended ; and there is therefore nothing wrong in (our) accepting what is so apprehended (to be the thing denoted by the word *akshara*).

Moreover, (in the context here) in the passage, which begins with -- " That which is above the heavens, O Gārgī, and that which is below the earth " (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 6)—it is first of all declared that, in regard to all the things existing in the three (*viz.*, the present, past and future) times, the *Akshara*, which forms their cause, is their support ; then in the passage—" In what, indeed, O Gārgī, is the *ākāśa* woven, like warp and woof " ? (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 7), the question is asked as to what it is which, while forming the cause of (that) *ākāśa*, constitutes its support. And the *Akshara* which is then declared in the answer (thereto) as being the cause of all modified existences and as forming their support, and which is also arrived at by a means of knowledge other (than the scripture)—that is made out to be the *pradhāna*. Therefore (this) *akshara* denotes the *pradhāna*.

If it be so inferred, it is stated in reply thus :— " *Akshara* (means here the Supreme *Brahman*) ; because it is (declared in the context to be) the support of what is beyond the *ambara* (or *ākāśa*, *i.e.*, the *prakṛiti*)". (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 3. 9). *Akshara* means the Supreme *Brahman*. Why? " Because it is (declared in the context to be) the support of what is beyond the *ambara*." The word, *ambara*, means *ākāśa*, and what is beyond it is what constitutes its other shore (or source) ; it is the undifferentiated *prakṛiti* which is beyond the *ākāśa*, because that is the (thing) supported ; it is as much as to teach that this *Akshara* is the basis of that (undifferentiated *pradhāna* which is the source of the *ākāśa*). The meaning is this, that in this passage, namely,— " In what, indeed, is this *ākāśa* woven like warp and woof " --- what is denoted by

ākāśa is not the air-filled *ākāśa* (or the sky) ; on the other hand, it means the undifferentiated *prakṛiti*, which lies beyond it (and forms its source) ; therefore that *Akshara*, which is mentioned here as being the support of even the undifferentiated *prakṛiti*, cannot rightly be the undifferentiated *prakṛiti* itself. 515

It may, however, be asked how it is made out that what is denoted by the word *ākāśa*, is not the air-filled (sky). This is answered thus. In the following statement, namely,—“That which is above the heavens, O Gārgī, and that which is below the earth, and that which is between heaven and earth, and all these things which they call past, present, and future,” (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 3, 4, 6, 7.)—that *ākāśa*, which is pointed out to be the basis of all modifications existing in the three (*viz.*, past, present and future) times cannot rightly be the air-filled *ākāśa* (or the sky) ; 516 because that also has to be included among the modifications (referred to here). Therefore, it is made out that what is here denoted by the word, *ākāśa*, is the subtle element (the *pradhāna* in its causal condition). Then in the question—“In what, indeed, is the *ākāśa* woven like warp and woof?”—it is asked what it is that forms the basis of even such a subtle element. Consequently, the *Akshara*, which is pointed out to be the support of that (subtle element), cannot appropriately be the *pradhāna*.

Again, what has been stated above to the effect that the thing which is arrived at by another means of knowledge (than the scripture) is apprehended earlier than the other thing, which is arrived at by the scripture (itself)—that is not right ; because the word *Akshara* imports its meaning through the power of its own etymology, and does not

515. This is precisely the view of the *pūrvapakshin*—that the primordial matter called the *akshara* is its own support.

516. The air-filled sky is

moreover destroyed in the *pralaya* and cannot therefore be between all things, present, past and future, as stated in the context.

therefore stand in need of any other authority (in support thereof). While endeavouring to apprehend the relation (between a word and its meaning), by whatever criterion the essential nature of that meaning is made out, that same (criterion) is not (felt to be) needed at the time of the use thereof (in current speech).⁵¹⁷

If that be so, it may perhaps be said that what is denoted by the word, *akshara*, may be taken to be the individual self; because it is appropriate for it to be the basis of all the non-intelligent things, including the subtle element (*pradhāna* in its undifferentiated causal condition); and because also the given attributes of not being gross, etc.,⁵¹⁸ are applicable to it; and because, again, the word, *akshara*, is seen used to denote the individual self also in the following and other passages—⁵¹⁹ “The undifferentiated thing (*avyakta*) is absorbed into the *akshara*” (*Sub. Up.* II.); “He whose body is the *avyakta*, whose body is the *akshara*” (*Sub. Up.* VII.); “The destructible are all the beings; the unchangeable is called the *akshara*” (*B. G.* XV. 16).

517. The argument here is that the word, *Akshara*, of itself denotes through its etymology, the Supreme *Brahman*, inasmuch as it means etymologically that which is indestructible. In a case like this, no special criterion of any kind is needed to determine the meaning, as there is no question here of the word meaning anything apart from its etymology, or being used in any unusual sense. Moreover, every time a word is used, its etymology need not be enquired into. When we refer to a man with a stick, he need not be actually present before us. Only that meaning of a word is first apprehended which is best known, whether from etymology, usage, inference or perception. A word like *dharma* or *īśvara* first suggests to us the scriptural sense

only. The *pradhāna* again is imperceptible, and inference about its existence dubious. No inference further can stand which conflicts with scripture. Finally, there is the absurdity that the *pradhāna* has to be regarded; as supporting itself.

518. One of the attributes of the individual self here referred to is that it is not atomic. (*Bṛh'Up.* III. 8. 8). The Naiyāyikas and the Sāṅkhyas hold it to be so, though according to the Vedāntin it is atomic.

519. Vide Note 185 of Vol. 1. *Akshara* here means the individual self according to the *pūrvāDakshin*. It means the individual self and subtle matter mixed together indistinguishably, according to the Vedāntin.

To this (objection), the reply is :

सा च प्रशासनात्

Sūtra 10. *Sā cha praśāsanāt* (75)

And that (power of supporting what is beyond the *ākāśa*) is due to (His) supreme power.

In the passage beginning with—"Indeed, under the supreme command of this *Akshara*, the sun and the moon, O Gārgī, stand well supported ; indeed, under the supreme command of this *Akshara*, heaven and earth, O Gārgī, stand well supported ; under the supreme command, indeed, of this *Akshara*, O Gārgī, the twinkling of the eye, the *muhūrta*,⁵²⁰ the day and the night, the fortnight, the month, the season, the year,—all these stand well supported." ; (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 9)—it is taught that that power of supporting even what is beyond the *ākāśa* results solely from the supreme power of that *Akshara*. 'Supreme power' means pre-eminent exercise of authority. And that above-mentioned power of supporting all things as subject to one's command, cannot belong to the individual self in both of its conditions of bondage and release. Therefore,⁵²¹ it is the Highest Person Himself who is the *Akshara* that forms the Supreme Self.

520. Vide Note 85, Vol. I.

521. Though in *Bṛih. Up.* (III. 8. 9), which is the subject matter of this *sūtra*, there is no reference to *ambarānta* or what is beyond the *ākāśa*, the unimpeded sovereign power of the *Akshara* is described and illustrated. This means that the *Akshara* rules over everything including the *ambarānta*. The

ākāśa mentioned earlier, the sun, the moon, the divisions of time, etc. are illustrative of the totality of things. Other texts in the *Upanishad* like IV. 4. 22. and V 6. 1 may also be alluded to here by implication. This sovereign authority over all is located in the Highest Person in B.G. (XV.18) and other well known texts.

अन्यभावव्यावृत्तेश्च

Sūtra 11. Anyabhāvavyāvṛtitescha. (76)

Because also otherness is negated (in relation to the *Akshara*).

'Otherness' means the character of being other (than the *Brahman*) ; it is the character of being the *pradhāna*, etc. That this *Akshara* is other than the Highest Person is negated in the remaining (*i.e.*, the concluding) portion of the passage (under reference) thus—"That above-mentioned *Akshara*, O Gārgī, being Itself unseen sees, being Itself unheard hears, being Itself unthought thinks, being Itself unknown knows ; there is no other seer than He, there is no knower other than He ; in this *Akshara* indeed, O Gārgī, is the *ākāśa* woven like warp and woof." (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 11). Here, since the quality of being the seer, the quality of being the hearer, etc., are taught (as belonging to the *Akshara*), the character of being the non-intelligent thing *pradhāna* is negated in relation to that (same) *Akshara*. Moreover, from the teaching that He possesses the character of being the seer of all things, being Himself unseen by all, the character of being the individual self is negated (in relation to the *Akshara*). Consequently, this negation of 'otherness' (in relation to the *Akshara*) confirms the conclusion that this *Akshara* is the Highest Person. 522

522. The *Brahman*, called *Akshara* here, is differentiated from the *pradhāna* because It is the seer, and from the individual self because It sees, while remaining unseen. This explanation generally agrees with that of Śāṅkara here. But *Bṛih. Up.*

III. 8. 11, which denies the existence of any other seer etc. than the *Akshara*, need not be taken to deny the existence of individual selves. Rāmānuja develops another view also about the negation of 'otherness'.

'The negation of otherness' may also be explained thus :—The 'negation of otherness' means the negation of the (independent) existence of other things. Just as this *Akshara*, being unseen by other things and being (Himself) the seer of other things, forms the support of all things other than Himself—similarly, there is nothing else (here) which, while being unseen by this (*Akshara*) and being also the seer thereof, forms the support thereof.⁵²³ So says this remaining portion of the passage (in the context) beginning with—"There is no seer other than He"; and it thus negates the (independent) existence of other things (in relation to the *Akshara*) and negatives in relation to that (same) *Akshara* the character of being the *pradhāna* and also the character of being the individual self.

Again, ⁵²⁴ from the the following passage—"Under the supreme command of this *Akshara*, O Gārgī, men, obeying, praise the givers of gifts ; the gods, obeying, praise the sacrificer, and the *pitṛis*, (i.e., the manes of the dead) obeying, praise the *darvi* ⁵²⁵ offering" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 9)—it is made out that that *Akshara*, in accordance with whose commands proceed all the religious acts consisting of sacrifices, gifts, offerings of oblations, etc., which are prescribed in the *Vedas* and in the *Smṛitis*, is the Highest *Brahman* who is the Highest Person Himself. And again, it is declared thus :—"He, indeed, O Gārgī, who, not knowing this *Akshara*, offers oblations in this world, performs sacrifices, and practises *tapas* (or penance, religious austerities, etc.) for many thousands of years—to him all that has an end ; he, indeed, O Gārgī, who, not knowing this *Akshara*, departs this life—he comes to misery ; but he, O Gārgī

523. The first *thereof* evidently refers to the *Akshara* the second may refer to the same, or to 'all things' mentioned earlier.

524. *Cha* (also) in the *Sūtra* may imply either a reason connected with supporting the *amba-*

rānta, or something new. The latter view is set out in this paragraph.

525. This refers to an oblation made with a wooden spoon or ladle.

who, knowing this *Akshara*, departs this life—he, indeed, becomes a *Brāhmaṇa* (i.e., attains the *Brahman*).” (*Bṛih Uṣ. III. 8. 10*).

From this, it is conclusively established that that *Akshara*, the ignorance relating to which leads to *samsāra* and the knowledge relating to which leads to the attainment of immortality, is the Highest *Brahman* Himself.

ADHIKARANA IV

IKSHATIKARMĀDHIKARANA

ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्सः

Sūtra 12. *Ikshatikarmavyapadeśāt saḥ. (77)*

The object of the action of seeing is He (i.e., the Supreme Self) on account of (its) being taught (to be the Supreme Self).

In the context dealing with the questions put by Satyakāma, 5-6 the Ātharvaṇikas declare in their scriptures to the following effect :—“ But he, who, on the other hand, meditates on the Highest Person with the help of the syllable *Om* of three *mātrās*, attains unto the light of the sun ; and as a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed indeed from sin ; he is led up into the *Brahmaloka* (i.e., the world of the *Brahman*) accompanied with the singing of the *sāman* ; he sees the Highest Person, who is seated in the ‘ cave ’ of the heart and is higher than the free self, who in his turn is higher than the embodied individual self”. (*Pr. Uṣ. V. 5*).

526. The context is *Pr. Uṣ. (V)*, where Satyakāma, the son of Śibi,

asks the preceptor, Pippalāda, some questions about the *oṃkāra*.

Here, the two words denoting the acts of meditating and of seeing have a common object ; inasmuch as such an act of seeing is the result of meditation, and inasmuch as the object of attainment has to be the same as the object of meditation in accordance with the rule—"As is a man's work (of worship) in this world, (so will his attainment be after he has departed this life ")—(*Chhānd. Up.* III.14. 1), and inasmuch again as the thing which forms the object of both (the words denoting the acts of meditating and seeing) is recognisably referred to (here) by means of the (same) expression, 'Highest Person'.

Here the doubt arises whether the Being referred to in this passage by the expression *Highest Person* is the four-faced Brahmā (the creator), who is the lord of the egg-shaped universe and is of the form of the totality of the individual selves, or whether it is the Lord of All, who is the Supreme Person.⁵²⁷

It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is (Brahmā who is) the individual selves in totality. Why? The context (here) begins with the passage—"Now, reverend sir, he among men, who meditates, till he departs this life, on the syllable *Om*, what is the world he will surely win thereby?" (*Pr. Up.* V. 1.) ; then it teaches that he who meditates on the syllable *Om* of one *mātrā* attains the world of men ; thereafter, it states that he who meditates on the syllable (*Om*) of two *mātrās* attains the middle world (*antariksha*) ; and lastly, the *brahma-loka*, which is mentioned to be the

527. The *pūrvapaksha* for Śaṅkara here is that the *Āpara-Brahman* is to be meditated on and the *Para-Brahman* to be seen, while that of Yādavaprakāśa is that the object of *dhyāna* is the bound soul and that of vision is the released soul. Pointing out the unreasonableness of having two different objects for the two actions,

Rāmānuja deals with another view that Brahmā the creator is to be both meditated on and seen. Here Brahmā is described as the *jīvas* in their totality, because during *naimittika-prāyāsa*, the *jīvas* in the dissolved worlds and their sense organs etc are gathered in him. See Rāmānuja's commentary on B.G. (VIII. 17-19),

object of attainment for him who meditates on the syllable *Om* of three *mātrās*, is made out to be that world which is beyond the middle world (*antariksha*) and belongs to the four-faced Brahmā, who is all the individual selves in their totality. And the lord of that (*brahma-loka*), who is seen by whoever goes into that (*loka* or world), is none other than that four-faced Brahmā (the creator).

Moreover, the expression—528“ who is higher than the higher individual selves in their totality ”—(*Pr. Up.* V. 5)—is (thus) appropriate, inasmuch as the four-faced Brahmā, —who dwells in the *brahmaloka* and is all the individual selves in their totality—is higher than the individual self in its separateness, who becomes concrete (or embodied) with the body, the senses, etc., and is (only) higher than the body, the senses, etc. Therefore, the ‘Highest Person’, who is pointed out here, is the four-faced Brahmā himself, who is all the individual selves in their totality. It having been thus definitely determined that it is the four-faced Brahmā (who is the ‘Highest Person’), the attributes of being free from old age, etc. (given in the context here) have somehow or other 529 to be interpreted (in relation to him).

If it be so arrived at, the reply is—“ The object of the action of seeing (in the context) is He (*i.e.*, the Supreme Self) on account of (its) being taught (to be the Supreme Self).” (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 3. 12). The object of the act of seeing is He, that is, the Supreme Self. Why? Because it is so taught. Indeed, the object of the act of seeing is taught

528. The original runs thus ; *etasmāt jīvaḥ parāt param*. The objector here takes *parāt* as qualifying *jīvaḥ* : and the meaning is as given above. The Vedāntin however takes *parāt* as a qualified word equivalent to a substantive : and the resulting meaning is : ‘who is higher than him who is higher than the indivi-

dual souls in their totality’.

529. The qualities enumerated in *Pr. Up.* (V. 7) are freedom from old age, from death and from fear. The astoundingly long life of Brahmā may justify his being regarded as ever young and deathless. Compared with other souls in *samsāra*, he is fearless.

(here) to be the Supreme Self. Accordingly, in the *śloka* quoted in relation to the object of the act of seeing, there is this :—“Solely by way of the syllable *Om*, the wise man goes to Him who is calm, free from old age, free from death, free from fear, and is the Highest”. (*Pr. Up.* V. 7). The characteristics mentioned here, namely, to be the Highest, to be calm, free from old age, free from fear and free from death, certainly belong to the Supreme Self alone, as (it can be made out) from scriptural passages such as the following:—“He (*i.e.*, the Lord) is free from death. He is free from fear, He is the *Brahman*”. (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 15. 1.)⁵³⁰ The statement—“He is higher than him who is higher than this embodied individual self.” (*Pr. Up.* V. 5)—is also given to denote the Supreme Self, but not the four-faced *Brahmā*, because he also comes within the meaning of the word *jīvaghana* (*i.e.*, the embodied individual self). Indeed, he is called *jīvaghana*, who, in consequence of his *karma*, is an embodied being. In relation to the four-faced *Brahmā* also, this (condition) of being embodied is taught in the scriptures in passages such as the following :—“He (*i.e.*, the Lord) creates the four-faced *Brahmā* at first.”⁵³¹ (*S'vet. Up.* VI. 18.)

This again has been stated above, namely, that the *brahma-loka* pointed out to be beyond the middle world (*antariksha-loka*), is seen to be the world of the four-faced *Brahmā*, and that, therefore, he who resides therein (as its lord) is this four-faced creator. This is not right. In the passage which says—“He is calm, free from old age, free from death, free from fear” (*Pr. Up.* V. 7)—the object of the act of seeing is definitely determined to be the Supreme Self: therefore, the *brahma-loka* which is pointed out to be the (final) abode of (such a) seer does not deserve to be the perishable world of the four-faced *Brahmā*.

530. The reference may be to the characteristics mentioned in the sentence, or to those in the quotation from *Chhānd. Up.* here.

531. The *Upanishad* text goes

on: “and then communicates the *Vedas* to him.” This shows the limited range of the knowledge of the creator, and his being subject to *karma* and embodied.

Further, in accordance with the statement beginning with—"As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed, indeed, from sin; he is led up into the *Brahma-loka* (or the world of the *Brahman*), accompanied with the singing of the *sāman*" (*Pr. Up.* V. 5.)—what is mentioned as the goal to be attained by him, who is freed from all sin, cannot be the abode of the four-faced *Brahmā* (the creator). It is for this very reason that, in the (scriptural) *śloka* quoted (here), the following declaration is made concerning this same *Brahma-loka*—"That which the transcendental seers know is this". (*Pr. Up.* V. 7). The 'transcendental seers' (here) are the transcendental knowers. And that which is worthy to be seen by the transcendental knowers is the abode of *Vishṇu*, since it is stated to be so in the following among other passages⁵³²—"The transcendental seers always see that highest home of *Vishṇu*" (*Pr. Up.* V. 10 and *Taitt. Samh.* IV. 2. 9. 4).

Again, the world of the four-faced *Brahmā* is not (immediately) above the middle world (*antariksha*); because there are, in the interval (between), many (other worlds), such as the world known as *Svarga*, etc. Therefore, in the reply given (to *Satyakāma*) to the effect—"This syllable *Om* is, indeed, O *Satyakāma*, that *Brahman*, which is the highest and the lowest; therefore, the wise man attains either of them by this means alone" (*Pr. Up.* V. 2)—that *Brahman*, who is pointed out to be the lower in His condition as effect, is divided into two kinds, one as belonging to this world and the other to the next; then it is stated that those who meditate on the syllable *Om* of one *mātrā* will obtain thereby the mundane result, which is the attainment of the world of men; then, again, it is stated that those who meditate on the syllable *Om* of two *mātrās* will obtain the other-worldly result, which is indicated by the word *antariksha*; lastly, there is the teaching that the

⁵³². Vide *Chhānd Up.* VIII. and *Nṛ̥s. Up.* 8, 3.4., 7.4; 8.3; 10.1; *Maitrī. Up.* II.2;

Highest *Brahman* Himself is to be attained by those, who (constantly) meditate on the Highest Person with the help of the syllable *Om* of three *mātrās*, which (itself) denotes the Highest *Brahman*. Thus the whole (of our argument) is consistent.

Therefore the object of the action of seeing is the Supreme Self Himself.

ADHIKARAṆA V

DAHARĀDHIKARAṆA

दहर उत्तरेभ्यः

Sūtra 13. *Dahara uttarebhyah.* (78)

The 'little ether' (within the heart denotes the *Brahman*), because (the reasons found in) the subsequent statements (in the context refer to Him).

The Chhandogas declare to the following effect in their scripture (*i.e.*, *Chhāndogya-Upanishad*):—"Now, in that small lotus-like home (*i.e.*, the heart) which is in this city of the *Brahman* (*viz.*, the body), inside of it, there is the little ether (or *dahara-ākāśa*); and what exists within that, that has to be sought after, that has, indeed, to be specially desired and known". (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 1). Here the doubt arises whether this *dahara-ākāśa* (or 'little ether') is one of the great material elements (*viz.*, the spatial ether), or whether it is the individual self, or whether it is the Supreme Self (Itself) ⁵³³.

533. The grounds for the doubt are: (i) as something is inside the *dahara-ākāśa*, it cannot

be the *Brahman*; and (ii) as it is compared to the elemental ether, it cannot be the ether.

Which, indeed, is it that is appropriate (here)? It is one of the great material elements (*viz.*, the spatial ether). Why? Because the word, *ākāśa*, is largely understood to denote the material element of ether, and because also from the statement—"What exists within that, that has to be sought after"—it (*viz.*, the *ākāśa*) is made out to be the support of something else which has to be sought after.

If it be so held, it is stated in reply—"The 'little ether' (within the heart) denotes (the *Brahman*), because (the reasons found in) the subsequent statements (in the context, refer to Him)." (*Ved. Sūt. I. 3. 13*). The *dahara-ākāśa* (or the 'little ether') here is the Highest *Brahman*. Why? "Because the subsequent statements", that is, the reasons found stated in the passages coming afterwards ("in the context, refer to Him)."

In the following passage—"This Self⁵³⁴ is devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, and free from thirst, desires the truth and wills the truth" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 1. 5*)—the following qualities, namely, the quality of being the unconditioned Self, the quality of being devoid of sin, etc., the quality of desiring the truth and the quality of willing the truth are all declared to belong to the *daharākāśa*; and these give rise to the knowledge that the *daharākāśa* is the Highest *Brahman*.⁵³⁴ In the passage beginning with—"Now, to those who depart from here, after having known the Self and also His eternal auspicious qualities, to them there is free movement in all the worlds", and ending with—"Whatever desires he (*i.e.*, the released self) may indulge in, that will befall him (merely) through his will and will be

534. 'This Self' here means 'the unconditioned Self'. But the *pūrvapakṣa* wrongly takes the word, *Ātman*, (literally, the pervader) as the *ākāśa*, which pervades the other four elements, or as the

individual self which 'pervades' by its knowledge. The unconditioned Self is here distinctly shown to have no evil qualities and to be full of auspicious qualities.

fulfilled through that (will); and (thus) obtaining it, he becomes blessed" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 6 to 2. 10)—it is stated that he who knows the *daharākāśa* attains the power of willing the truth: and this also gives rise to the knowledge that the *daharākāśa* is the Supreme *Brahman*.

Moreover, in the passage—"Whatever is the magnitude of this (elemental) ether, that is the magnitude of this *daharākāśa* within the heart" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 3.)—there is given (between the *daharākāśa* and the elemental ether) the relation of a subject of comparison to the thing with which it is compared; and this cannot be appropriate, if the *daharākāśa* is taken to be the elemental ether.

It may, however, be said that this relation of a subject of comparison to the thing with which it is compared is founded upon the limitation due to the heart (as an enclosing organ). In such a case, it cannot be appropriate for the *ākāśa* limited by the heart to be the abode of all things including heaven and earth. It may be further objected (here) that even in the case where the *daharākāśa* is understood to be the Supreme Self, it is not (at all) possible for that *ākāśa* to be the subject of a comparison with the external elemental ether, because in the passage beginning with—"It is greater than the earth, it is greater than mid-heaven" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 3.), it (*viz.*, the *daharākāśa*) is declared to be greater than all things.⁵³⁵

But this is not right; because the passage (under notice) here is intended to negate, in relation to the *daharākāśa*, that littleness which would result to it from its being contained within the interior of the lotus-like heart;

535. The elemental ether is not really intended to be compared with the *dahara-ākāśa* as the former is not greater in magnitude than the *Brahman*. The purported comparison only negates the littleness of the *dahara-ākāśa*.

as, for instance, the statement that the sun goes like an arrow is intended to deny slowness of motion in relation to the sun who really moves much more quickly (than the arrow).

It may again be said thus. In the passage beginning with—"This Self is devoid of sin" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5)—it is not the *daharākāśa* that is referred to; because in the statement—"Inside of it, there is the little ether (or *daharāśa*) ; what exists within that, that has to be sought after" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 1)—what exists within the *daharākāśa*, and is different from it, is spoken of as the object fit to be sought after ; therefore (in connection with the passage) here, it is proper to point out that what is described therein as 'This Self which is devoid of sin' constitutes that very object which is fit to be sought after.

This would be so, provided the scripture itself did not differentiate the *daharākāśa* from what exists within it. But it (*viz.*, the scripture) has differentiated (these). Accordingly, in the passage ⁵³⁶—"Now (there is) that small lotuslike home which is in this city of the *Brahman*, (*Brahmapura*); that subtle ether (*daharākāśa*) which is inside of it and what exists within that (subtle ether), that (i.e., the subtle ether and what is inside it) has to be sought after" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 1.)—the Supreme *Brahman*, as an object of worship, being conceived to be quite close (to the worshipper), the body of the worshipper is (first) pointed out by the word *Brahmapura*, then the heart, which is within that (body) and forms a member thereof, having the shape of a lotus and possessing a small size, is stated to be the home of the Supreme *Brahman* ; then, for the

⁵³⁶. In this key sentence Śaṅkara understands 'what exists within that' as the *dahara-ākāśa* existing within the lotuslike home. Rāmānuja, referring to the nearest possible antecedent of 'that', makes it clear that the quest and

the *upānā* refer to both the 'subtle ether' and its host of qualities. *Tat* in the sentence can be regarded as a *dvandva* compound of *sah* and *tat*, reduced to the form of a single word in the singular number.

purpose of graciously assisting the worshipper, He who is omniscient and omnipotent and is the one ocean of tender love to all those who seek refuge (with Him), is referred to by the word, *daharākāśa*, as existing quite within that home and as being worthy to be meditated upon in a condition that is wholly fine; then the whole collection of qualities which are contained in Him, namely, the quality of being naturally free from all evil, that is, being devoid of sin, etc., the auspicious quality of being naturally unsurpassed in excellence, that is, willing the truth, etc., is pointed out in the statement—‘That has to be sought after’—to constitute the object which has to be meditated upon.

Here in the statement—‘That has to be sought after’—the *daharākāśa* and the collection of qualities existing within it are both contemplated by the use of the word, ‘that’; and it is taught that both of them have to be sought after. The meaning is this, that after the explanatory statement—‘Now (there is) that small lotus-like home which is in this city of the *Brahman*’—it is enjoined that the *daharākāśa* within that small lotus-like home and the collection of qualities within that *daharākāśa* have both to be sought after.

It may (now) be asked how it is made out that what is denoted by the word, *daharākāśa*, is the Highest *Brahman*, that what is referred to in the expression, ‘what exists within that’, relates to His qualities, and that there is a commandment given, which, contemplating both these by the use of the word, ‘that,’ enjoins that both of them have to be sought after. Then listen with an attentive mind⁵³⁷.

537. Rāmānuja now makes a survey of the whole of VIII. 1, showing the continuity of thought and paying special attention to pronouns and their antecedents. After meditation on the *daharākāśa* and what is inside it is taught (1), the disciples ask for

particulars about what is inside the ‘little ether’ (2). The teacher points out that the *daharākāśa* is not little and that all things are contained in it. This he does by suggesting a comparison with the elemental ether: at the same time the attractiveness of the

In the statement—"Whatever is the magnitude of the elemental ether, that is the magnitude of this ether (*daharākāśa*) within the heart' (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 3)—it is declared that the *daharākāśa* is very great in magnitude; then, in the statement—"In this (*asmin*), which is wholly inside of it, are contained both heaven and earth, both fire and air, both the sun and the moon, lightnings and stars" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 3.)—the *daharākāśa* which is itself the subject under consideration is referred to by the word, '*asmin*' ('in this'), and it is declared that it (*viz.*, the *daharākāśa*) forms the support of the whole world; then in the statement—"Whatever there is here as belonging to him (i.e., to the worshipper), and whatever is not, all that is contained in this (*asmin*)" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 3)—that very *daharākāśa* is thought of again by means of the word, '*asmin*' ('in this'); and it is therein declared (further) that the *daharākāśa* possesses an unsurpassably enjoyable character by mentioning that whatever there is here in this world in relation to the worshipper in the way of a collection of enjoyable things, and whatever such enjoyable things there are not here, but are merely (included) within the range of his desires,—the whole of that totality of enjoyable things is contained within this above-mentioned *daharākāśa*; then it is said that, although this *daharākāśa* exists within the heart which forms a member of the body, and although the body is subject to old age, death, etc., it (*viz.*, the *daharākāśa*) does not undergo any modification whatsoever, for the reason that it (*viz.*, the *daharākāśa*) is very fine and

former is also made clear (3). Before he can say more about the *dahara-ākāśa*, the pupils interrupt him hastily with a question about the effects on it of the decay and death of the body (4). In 5, the immortality of the *dahara-ākāśa* is first taught, and then the thread of the teaching, interrupted by the hasty question in 4, is resumed from where it was left at the end of 3. The desirable

qualities of the *dahara-ākāśa* are now enumerated. All *kāmas* are included in it like ponds in the sea, because it has the qualities given here. (*Satya kāma* in 5 may mean that the means for the enjoyment of the Lord's desires are eternal, or it may refer to His highest heaven.) Then the fruits of the meditation taught are described. (4-6).

minute owing to its being the Supreme Cause of all things⁵³⁸; then in the statement—"It is for this very reason, indeed, that this real entity is the *Brahma-pura*" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 1. 5*)—it is taught that that same *dāharākāśa* is what constitutes the real entity and forms the city known as the *Brahman*, which is the abode of the whole world; then in the statement—"In this (*asmin*) are contained all the desires (*kāmāḥ*)" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 1. 5*)—the *daharākāśa* is referred to by the word, *asmin*, and the qualities which are worthy of being desired (are referred to) by the word, *kāmāḥ*, and it is pointed out (further) that those (qualities) exist within the *daharākāśa*; then this same idea of the *daharākāśa* being characterised by all such auspicious qualities as are worthy to be desired, as well as of its being the Self, is made clear by the passage which begins with—"This Self is devoid of sin", and concludes with—"He wills the truth" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 1. 5*); then in the passage beginning with—"Just as people here on earth follow", and ending with—"For them, there is no free movement in all the worlds" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 1. 6*).—it is declared that those who do not know the eight qualities which are given here in the context, and do not also know the Self characterised by them and denoted by the word, *daharākāśa*, as well as those who perform religious rituals for the attainment of such enjoyable objects as are different from that (Self)—both these (kinds of persons) attain impermanent results and cannot possess the power of willing the truth; and then in the passage beginning with—"Now those who depart from here, after having known the Self and also His eternal and auspicious qualities, for them there is free movement in all the worlds" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 1. 6*).—it is said that those, who know the Self denoted by the word, *daharākāśa*, and the

⁵³⁸ The cause is always subtler than the effect and is not involved in the modifications of the effect. The Supreme Cause is subtler than all other causes,

being the Internal Controller of each of them. It is therefore described as *Satyam*, the Reality or Real Entity which does not undergo any modification.

desirable qualities which exist therein and which consist of the quality of being devoid of sin, etc., obtain, solely through the grace of that Highest Person who is the 'ocean' of all noble qualities, the fulfilment of all desires and the power of willing the truth.

Therefore, it is definitely determined that what is taught here is that the *daharākāśa* is the Highest *Brahman*, that the collection of desirable qualities, beginning with the quality of being free from sin, exists within it (i.e., the *daharākāśa*), and that both these things (viz., the *Brahman* and the qualities inherent in Him) have to be sought after and specially desired to be known. Accordingly, the *Vākyakāra* also makes this point clear in the passage beginning with— "The scriptural expression, 'what exists within that' (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 1. 1*), refers to qualities that are worthy of being desired".

In this very manner, for the foregoing reasons, the *daharākāśa* denotes the Supreme *Brahman* Himself.

गतिशब्दाभ्यान्तथाहि दृष्टं लिङ्गञ्च

Sūtra 14. *Gatishabdābhyām tathāhi dṛishṭam* (79)
liṅgam cha.

On account of (the individual selves) going to (and returning from) it and on account (also) of (its being indicated by) the word (*Brahma-loka*), (the *daharākāśa* is the *Brahman*); accordingly, it is so seen declared in the scriptures, and there are also grounds of inference (in this behalf).

The *daharākāśa* is the Highest *Brahman* for the following reason also.⁵³⁹ In the passage—"Just as those who,

539. The question of sleep is discussed at greater length in *Ved. Sūt. III. 2*. The argument here is that the *daharākāśa*, described as *Brahmapura* and

Satyā here, is called *Brāhmaloka* in *Chhānd. Up. VII. 3. 2* and *Bṛh. Up. IV. 3. 33* and *IV. 4. 23*. In these latter passages, the individual soul is said to rest in the

not knowing the land (well), walk over it again and again and do not come upon the golden treasure hidden therein ; so also these beings, in spite of their moving in that direction day after day, do not yet win this (*etam*) *Brahma-loka*, for they are ridden upon by ignorance" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 3. 2)—the *daharākāśa*, which is the subject under consideration here, is pointed out by the word, 'this'. The fact that all beings are therein said to move in that direction day after day, and the fact that that *daharākāśa* towards which they move is referred to by the word, *Brahma-loka*—both go to show that the *daharākāśa* is the Highest *Brahman*.

It may be asked how these two things are capable of establishing that this (*daharākāśa*) is the Highest *Brahman*. To this the reply is given that "accordingly, it is so seen declared in the scriptures." Elsewhere in the scriptures it is seen declared that, during deep sleep, all the individual selves go to the Highest *Brahman* day after day, as (for instance) in the following passage—"In this very manner, indeed, my dear child, all these beings reach the *Sat*, and do not still know that they are going to reach the *Sat* ; and having returned from the *Sat*, they do not know that they have returned from the *Sat*." (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 9. 2 and VI. 10. 2). Similarly, the word, '*Brahma-loka*', also is (elsewhere) seen used to denote the Highest *Brahman*, as in the passage—"Thus said he (*i.e.*, Yājñavalkya) : 'Thou, supreme sovereign (Janaka), this (upholder of the individual

Brahmaloka during deep sleep. This is taken as proving that the *daharākāśa* is the Supreme *Brahman*. Rāmānuja interprets *Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 3. 2. in another way also, taking the *Brahma-loka* to be the Internal Controller. In the analogy of ignorant men walking over the hidden golden treasure, we have a movement in space above the treasure. The movement of the individual soul cannot be in space, but only

towards a state or condition where the *Brahman*, and the individual soul cannot be easily distinguished. Alternately the movement of the soul can be in time : that is, it exists at all times. It may also be noted that Rāmānuja quotes the analogy about the hidden treasure in full, in order to refute a possible objection that the soul rests in the space inside the heart and not in the *Brahman*.

selves during deep sleep) is the *Brahma-loka*" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 33 and IV. 4. 23). The movement (of the individual souls) to the *Brahman* is not seen in other texts (dealing with other things than the *Brahman*). But this very thing is (actually) declared in the scriptures, that all the individual selves remain in the *daharākāśa*, free from sorrow, during deep sleep, as at the time of universal dissolution. And this is a sufficient basis for the inference that this (*daharākāśa*) is the Highest *Brahman*.

Similarly, the word '*Brahma-loka*' (in the context) being used with the significance of a grammatical equation (between) its component parts (*Brahman* and *loka*), so as to denote this *daharākāśa* (in the sense of the *Brahman* who is Himself the world to be attained), may, independently of any other authoritative employment (thereof), be taken to be sufficient basis for the inference that this (*daharākāśa*) is the Highest *Brahman*. To this effect says he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*)—"There are also grounds of inference (in this behalf)." According to the rule applicable to the compound word *nishāda-sthapati* (or the lord who is a *nishāda* or non-Aryan), it is more reasonable to adopt the *karmadhāraya* word-composition here than the *shashī. tatpurusha*. (*Vide Pūr. Mīm.* VI. 1. 51 & 52.)⁵⁴⁰

Or, the passage—"They move (in that direction) day after day" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 3. 2)—does not speak of the movement (of the individual selves towards the *Sat*) during the time of deep sleep; on the other hand, (it says that)

⁵⁴⁰ Jaimini discusses and settles the question who is the *nishāda-sthapati* (the *nishāda*-lord) entitled to perform the Vedic sacrifice called the *Raudra*. He is not a lord of the *nishādas*; himself not being a *nishāda*, but belonging to one of the classes entitled to study the *Vedas*; but he is a lord who is himself a *nishāda*. The compound word has to be taken to be *karmadhāraya* (or

appositional) and not *tat-purusha* (or determinative). Wherever possible, compound words should be regarded as positional, as the full force of the component terms is only then brought out. In the instance here, *Brahmaloka* has to be understood as 'the *Brahman* who is Himself the world to be attained', and not as 'a world belonging to or related to the *Brahman*'.

they move day after day over the *dahrākāśa*, which is always existent as the Internal Self (of all beings) and which forms the highest object of human pursuit : that is, themselves existing at all times and not knowing Him, they do not obtain Him, that is, do not attain Him. Just as those, who do not know the hidden golden treasure and the place wherein it is (hidden), although they may be always moving thereon, do not yet come by it, just so (is it the case here). Such is the meaning (here).

This very same constant movement (of the individual selves) over the (hidden) *daharākāśa*, which is existent as the Internal Self (of all beings), (the movement) which belongs to all beings who are controlled by that (*daharākāśa*) and are ignorant thereof—goes to show that that *daharākāśa* is the Highest *Brahman*. Accordingly, elsewhere (in the scriptures) it is seen declared that the Highest *Brahman* who exists as the Internal Self (of all beings) is not realised by the beings who are controlled by Him and abide in Him. For instance, (it is declared) in the *Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa* (i.e., *Bṛih. Up.* III. 7) thus :—“He, who, dwelling in the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, and who internally rules the self—(He is thy Internal Ruler and immortal Self)” (*Mādh. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 22) ; “He sees unseen, hears unheard” (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 23). It is needless to see this declared elsewhere (also in the scriptures).

This constant movement of all beings over Him who exists in the heart and is made out, from the illustrative example of the (hidden golden) treasure, to be the highest object of human pursuit—(the movement) which, having Him as its basis, belongs at all times to all the beings who are ignorant (thereof)—is itself a sufficient ground for the inference that this (*daharākāśa*) is the Highest *Brahman*.⁵⁴¹

⁵⁴¹. The point here is that the *daharākāśa* is identical with the *Antaryāmin*, and that what is true of the latter is also true of the former.

For the following reason also, the *daharākāśa* is the Highest *Brahman*.

धृतेश्च महिमोऽस्यास्मिन्नपलब्धेः

Sūtra 15. *Dhṛiteścha mahimno'syāsminnupalabdheḥ.* (80)

Because also His (i.e., the *Brahman's*) greatness as the support (of the world) is found (mentioned) in relation to this (*daharākāśa*).

In the passage beginning with—"He, the Self, (is the bridge)" (*Chhānd Up.* VIII. 4. 1)—the *daharākāśa*, which is the subject under consideration (here), is referred to. Then in the passage—"He is the bridge, the support of all these worlds, so that they may not get into confusion" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 4. 1)—(the state of) being the support of the world is declared (in relation to the *daharākāśa*). And this goes to show that the *daharākāśa* is the Highest *Brahman*. Indeed, to be the support of the world constitutes the greatness of the Highest *Brahman*, as it may be made out from the following and other passages :—"He is the Lord of all, He is the master of all beings, He is the protector of all beings, He is the bridge and the support of all the worlds so that they may not get into confusion." (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22) : "Under the supreme command of this *Akshara* (or the Imperishable *Brahman*), O Gārgī, the sun and the moon stand well supported". (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 9). And this above-mentioned greatness which is known as the support (of all) and belongs to Him who is the Supreme *Brahman* is found to exist in relation to this *daharākāśa*. Therefore the *daharākāśa* is the Highest *Brahman*.

प्रसिद्धे च

Sūtra 16. *Prasiddheścha.* (81)

And because also it is well known (that the word *Ākāśa* means the *Brahman*).

Moreover, the word '*Ākāśa*' is well known to denote the Highest *Brahman*, as in the following and other passages—"If this *Ākāśa* (i.e., the *Brahman*) be not Bliss, who indeed is there that can live and who that can enjoy?"⁵⁴² (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1); "All those beings are indeed born out of the *Ākāśa* above". (*Chhānd. Up.* I. 9. 1). The idea here is this, that the well known use (of the word (*Ākāśa*) when characterised by the qualities of being devoid of sin etc., (in the sense of the *Brahman*) is of stronger authority than its (other) well known use to denote the material element of ether.

Thus indeed has the view that the *daharākāśa* is the material element of ether been refuted (in the preceding four *Sūtras*). Now, however, after raising the doubt that the *daharākāśa* is the internal individual self, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) proceeds to disprove it thus :

इतरपरामर्शसि इति चेन्नासंभवात्

Sūtra 17. *Itaraparāmarśāt sa itichenṇāsambhā vādāt.* (B²)

If it be said that, owing to there being a reference to another (than the *Brahman*), it is he (viz., that other, namely, the individual self, who is the *daharākāśa*), it is replied that it is not so; because of the inappr opriateness (of the qualities of the *daharākāśa* being attributed to the individual self).

542. The verbs, *anyāt* and *prānyāt*, (being the potential third person singular respectively of *an* and *prāṇ*) refer to breathing. Raṅgarāmanuja interprets them as expressive of enjoyment of

happiness in this world and of bliss in *moksha*. Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Taitt. Up.* takes them as referring to the activities of the *apāna* and the *prāṇa*.

What has been stated above to the effect that, in accordance with the other parts of the context, the *daharākāśa* is the Highest *Brahman*—that is not right; because in the other parts of the context, it is that which is other than the Highest *Brahman*, that is, it is the individual self, which is directly referred to; as in the following passage—"Now this *jīva* rises up from this body, and, having reached the Highest Light, he (*i.e.*, the released individual self) manifests himself in his own true form. He is the self, said he (*i.e.*, the teacher). He is immortality, he is the fearless, he is the *Brahman*". (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 3. 4).

No doubt, it is not possible for the *ākāśa*, which, in the statement,—“Inside of it, there is the little ether (or *daharākāśa*)”—(*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 1.)—is taught to be within the lotus-like heart (of man), to possess the character of the material element of ether, inasmuch as (between these two *ākāśas*) there cannot be, among other things, the relation of the subject of comparison to the thing with which it is compared; nevertheless, it is proper to accept (in relation to the *daharākāśa*) that, in accordance with the other parts of the context, it has the character of the individual self. Moreover, the word, *ākāśa*, owing to its (import) being in association with luminousness and other such (qualities), is applicable only to the individual self. 543

If it be so held, the reply to it is this: “it is not so because of the inappropriateness.” This (*daharākāśa*) is not the individual self; because the qualities of being devoid of sin, etc., cannot exist in relation to the individual self.

543. The *pūrvapakṣa* seeks to identify the *samprasāda* in VII. 3. 4. (which can only be the individual self) with the *daharākāśa*. It is argued that this *samprasāda* is described as the *Ātman* and the *Brahman*, as immortality and as

the fearless. But it is the Highest Light who is thus described—not the *samprasāda*. The qualities of the *daharākāśa* are unconditioned; those of the released soul are made manifest on its being emancipated.

उत्तराच्चेदाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्तु

Sūtra 18. *Uttarāchchedāvīrbhūtasvarūpastu.* 83)

If it be said that it (*viz.*, the idea of the *daharākāśa* being the individual self) results from a subsequent passage (it is replied that it is not so); for that (individual self which is mentioned later in the context) is, on the contrary, what has its essential nature made manifest (by the removal of the concealing veil of the effects of *karma*.)

It may, however, be said that from a subsequent passage (in the context), that is, from the passage uttered by Prajāpati, it is definitely determined that it is the individual self which is associated with the qualities of being devoid of sin, etc.

What is (here) said is this :—The passage⁵⁴⁴ attributed to Prajāpati (in the context) relates certainly to the individual self. Accordingly, Indra heard (from somebody) in the form of a tradition the utterance of Prajāpati to the effect: “He who is the *ātman* (or the self) is devoid of sin, is free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires the truth and wills the truth; he has to be sought after, he has to be

544. Rāmānuja here sums up *Chhând. Up.* VIII. 7 to 12, where Prajāpati teaches Indra the nature of the individual self. Indra learns to distinguish the self from the body which can be seen reflected in a mirror and from one's own form as seen in dreams. In dreamless sleep the self seems to him to be almost extinct. Then Prajāpati shows

how the self is different from the senses and what its pure state in *moksha* is. The teaching of Prajāpati is regarded as an *aṅga*, a subsidiary part, of the *daharāvidyā*, the teaching relating to the worship of the *Brahman* as the *daharākāśa*. The fruits of the latter are prescribed for the former also.

specially desired to be known ; he who understands and knows⁵⁴⁵ that self attains all worlds as well as all desires" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 7. 1*) : he then approached Prajāpati with the object of knowing the essential nature of the self (or *ātman*) that has to be sought after ; then with the intention of finding out the capacity of his pupil, Prajāpati gradually taught him (*i. e.*, the pupil, Indra) the embodied individual self as he is found in the conditions of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep ; then, on noticing that Indra did not find anything (in the self) worthy of acceptance in each of those (conditions), and that he was thus fit to receive the teaching regarding the essential nature of the pure self, he (*i. e.*, Prajāpati) said to him (Indra) thus—"This body, O Indra, is indeed liable to decay ; it is subject to death ; it is (simply) the abode of this incorporeal and immortal self" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 12. 1*) ; and it was explained to him (therein) that the body serves as an abode (for the self), that the self presides therein, and that this (self) which is unembodied is characterised by immortality as its nature ; then in the passage—"To him who remains with a body, there is no destruction of the pleasing and the unpleasing ; the pleasing and the unpleasing touch not him who remains without a body" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 12. 1*)—it is taught that he, who is associated with a body evolved in response to *karma*, has thereby to undergo miseries consisting of the experience of pleasures and pains, and that, when he is finally freed from the body, those miseries also come to an end ; then in the passage—"In this very manner, this same *samprasāda* (or the individual self), rising up from this body, attains the Supreme Light, and becomes manifest in his true nature" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 12. 2*).—(Prajāpati) taught complete dissociation from the body to be the essential nature of the individual self.

545. "Understands" (which is how *anuvidya* has been rendered) signifies "has knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences about"; "knows"

(or *vi-jānāti*) means "meditates on, performs *dhyāna* about". See Vol. I, p. 16, where this explanation is given;

Then, in the passage—"He (*i.e.*, the Lord) is the Highest Person ; he (*i.e.*, the released self) moves about there (in the Highest Heaven), eating, playing and enjoying either in the company of women, or with vehicles, or in the company of relatives ; he (in His presence) does not mind this body which has had birth" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 3.)—it is stated that the Supreme Light which is the object to be attained is the Highest Person, that the individual self, whose veil of ignorance has been removed, and who has attained unto the Supreme Light, obtains, in the world of the *Brahman*, all the objects of enjoyment desired by him, and that all the wrong aims of life, such as (the love of) the body which are due to *karma* and are inseparably associated with pleasure and pain, are not even thought of (there) ; then in the passage—"Just as the draught animal is yoked to the cart, similarly, *prāṇa* (or the self characterised by life) is yoked to this body" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 3)—by means of the illustrative example of the yoking together of the draught animal and the cart it is explained that it is to that very thing (*i.e.*, the individual self) which has the essential nature mentioned above, that there results, in the state of *samsāra*, such an association with the body as is dependent upon *karma*.

Then in the passage—"Now where the eye is fixed upon visible form, there is the person of the eye (*i.e.*, the self) ;⁵⁴⁶ the eye itself is the instrument of vision ; and he who knows, 'I smell this', he is the self ; the nose is the organ of smelling ; and he who knows 'I utter this,' he is the self ; the tongue is the organ of speech ; and he who knows "I hear this", he is the self ; the ear is the organ of the hearing ; and he who knows 'I know this,' he is the self ; the mind is his divine eye" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 4 and 5)—it is clearly shown that the eye and the other

546. "The person of the eye" here stands for the individual self to whom the eye is an instr. ment of knowledge. But the same

expression in *Chhānd. Up.* VI. 15. 1 stands for the Supreme Person. See *Antarādhikaraṇa*, pp. 31-44 above.

(sensory organs) are the instruments of sensation, that visibility, etc., are the objects of knowledge, and that he (*i.e.*, the self) is the knower (thereof); thus it is explained that, for these very reasons, he (*i.e.*, the individual self) is distinct from the body, the senses, etc.

Then by means of the passage—"This above-mentioned person, indeed, perceiving with this mind, namely, his divine eye, enjoys all those desires which are found in the world of the *Brahman* (or the *Brahma-loka*)" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 5)—it is taught that that same (self), when he has shaken of the body and the senses, which are dependent upon *karma*, enjoys all desires through the divine, *i.e.*, the spiritually natural knowledge denoted by the word, *mind*;⁵⁴⁷ then in the passage—"Indeed, the gods worship this above-mentioned self; from it, all the worlds have been obtained by them as well as all desires" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 6)—it is given that those, who have knowledge, realise the self to be possessed of the nature mentioned above; then it (*viz.*, the context here) is concluded with the passage—"He who understands and knows that self, attains all worlds, as well as all desires: thus said Prajāpati indeed" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 6.)—wherein it is taught that he, who knows the self to be possessed of the nature mentioned above, obtains in the result that experience of the *Brahman* which is characterised by the complete attainment of all worlds and all desires.

Therefore, from this passage (which is attributed to Prajāpati) it is made out that that which possesses the qualities of being free from sin, etc., and is mentioned in the very beginning (of the context) as the object to be known, is certainly the individual self. Thus it is possible for the individual self to possess the qualities of being free from sin, etc. Consequently, it being possible for the

547. The mind as the divine eye is mentioned twice in VIII. 12, 5—first in association with the self in the state of *samsāra*, and then in association with the

released self. In the latter case the reference is to the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* of the self, its attribute of knowledge, expanded to fullest proportions.

individual self mentioned in the later portion of the passage relating to the *daharākāśa* to possess the qualities of being free from sin, etc., that (individual self) alone is definitely determined to be the *daharākāśa* (here).

In reply to this (position), he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) says : “ For that (individual self mentioned later in the context) is, on the contrary, what has its essential nature made manifest (by the removal of the concealing veil of the effects of *karma*) ”. (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 3. 18). In this passage which is attributed to Prajāpati (here in the context), that individual self is mentioned which is of this nature, namely, that it possesses an essential nature characterised by the qualities of being free from sin, etc., (all) originally concealed by ignorance ; which afterwards, becoming free from the bondage of *karma* and rising up from the body, attains unto the Highest Light ; and which then, having its truly essential nature revealed, becomes distinctly characterised by the qualities of being free from sin, etc. On the other hand, in the passage relating to the *daharākāśa*, it is the *daharākāśa*, whose essential nature is (ever) unconcealed and is associated with the qualities of being free from sin, etc., that has to be truly understood.

548 The attribute of being the “ bridge ”, of being the support of all the worlds, and other such attributes can, under no circumstances, belong to the individual self, even when it stands revealed in its essential nature ; these (attributes) and the attribute of being the controller of the intelligent and non-intelligent things, as learnt from the

548. This paragraph brings out the force of *tu* (rendered as ‘on the contrary’) in the *Sūtra*. The *Sūtrakāra* in effect says : “What is referred to is only the individual self whose essential nature has been made manifest, not the *daharākāśa*. Even the

released individual self cannot be the *daharākāśa* whose qualities are unconditioned.” In his commentary on *Ved. Sūt.* IV. 4. 1, Rāmānuja explains what is meant by the individual self having its essential nature made manifest on attaining the Supreme Light.

etymological significance of the word *satya* ⁵⁴⁹—truth or existence—go to prove that the *daharākāśa* is the Highest *Brahman*. Under the aphorism beginning with—“Except in the matter of the activity relating to the creation, etc. of the world” (*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 4. 17) ⁵⁵⁰—we shall establish that the attribute of being the “bridge”, of being the support, and other such attributes cannot at all belong to (the self) even when it has its essential nature revealed.

If so, the question may be asked why it is that, in the passage relating to the *daharākāśa*, the individual self is mentioned at all in the statement beginning with—“Now this same *samprasāda* (attains the Supreme Light)” (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 2). To this objection, ⁵⁵¹ he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer as follows :—

अन्यार्थश्च परामर्शः

Sūtra 19. *Anyārthaścha Parāmarśaḥ.* (84)

And the reference also (to the individual self) is made (in the context) with a different object in view.

549. The etymology of *Satyam* is given in *Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 3. 5, where the word is analysed into *sat*, *ti* and *yam*. *Sat* is explained as standing for intelligent souls and *ti* for non-intelligent matter. *Yam* signifies a controller. Thus *Satyam* means the Controller of the intelligent and non-intelligent things. Earlier, in VIII. 3. 4, the *daharākāśa* is named *Satyam*.

550. This is *Ved. Sūt.* (IV. 4. 17), and it runs as follows: “Except in the matter of the activity relating to (the creation etc. of) the world, (the released souls possess all the powers

belonging to the Supreme *Brahman*) because of (the Supreme *Brahman* Himself forming) the topic of the context (here wherein the above-mentioned activity is referred to); and also of the non-mention (of the released souls therein).

551. The *pūrvapakṣa* argues that the reference to the *samprasāda* here can only be with a view to teach that it should be the object of meditation: hence it must be identical with the *daharākāśa*. The reference is not called for either by way of answer to any question or by way of a subsidiary meditation.

(In the passage relating to the *daharākāśa* in the context here) it is stated that, in the same way in which the *daharākāśa* possesses the qualities of being free from sin, of supporting the world, etc., the released individual self, on attaining unto that (*daharākāśa*), attains its own natural condition characterised by the auspicious qualities of being free from sin etc. Through this (statement) it is intended to teach that peculiar qualification of the Highest Person which constitutes the cause of such (attainment by the individual self); therefore it is that the individual self mentioned in the passage attributed to Prajāpati is referred to herein.

Moreover,⁵⁵² in the passage attributed to Prajāpati, the knowledge relating to the reality of the essential nature of the released individual self has been mentioned so as to be helpful to the worship and meditation relating to the *daharākāśa*; for the individual self who is desirous of attaining the *Brahman*, has necessarily to know his own essential nature; because, owing to the fact that a person who is himself possessed of auspicious qualities, obtains the experience relating to the Highest *Brahman*, who is possessed of an incalculable series of auspicious qualities unsurpassed in excellence, the knowledge relating to the reality of one's own essential nature is included among the results flowing from the worship of and meditation on the *Brahman*. "He attains all worlds, as well as all desires" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 7. 1*): "He moves about there, eating, playing" (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 12. 3.*)—these and other such results to be attained, which are all mentioned in the passage attributed to Prajāpati, are also the same as the results that arise out of the meditation and worship relating to the *daharākāśa*.

⁵⁵² This replies to a possible objection that no purpose is served in the context by the description

of the nature of the individual self, which cannot be an object of worship.

अल्पश्चेति चेत्तदुक्तम्

Sūtra 20. *Alpaśruteriti chettaduktam.* (85)

If it be said that, owing to its (*i.e.*, the *daharākāśa's*) being declared in the scripture to be "little", (it is not the *Brahman*, then it is replied thereunto that) this (objection) has been already answered.

It may again be said that in the scriptural statement—"Inside of it there is the 'little' ether (*daharākāśa*)"—(*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 1.)—the scriptural declaration of a small magnitude appropriately belongs only to the individual self, who is compared to the point of a goad,⁵⁵³ but is not applicable to the *Brahman* who is greater than all. Whatever answer has to be given to this objection has indeed been already given by the aphorism containing the expression, "because He is to be so realised". (*Ved. Sū. I.* 2. 8).

⁵⁵⁴ Therefore, the *daharākāśa* is none other than the Highest Person, who is free from even the smallest taint of ignorance and all other evil, and who is an ocean of innumerable noble qualities such as knowledge, strength, sovereignty, heroism, power and valour, which are all natural to Him and are unsurpassed in excellence. But he who is pointed out in the passage attributed to Prajāpati has the body due to *karma*, as made out from the following passage among others, "It is as if they struck him (the dream image), as if they chased him" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII.

⁵⁵³. Vide *Śvet. Up.* (V. 8).

⁵⁵⁴. Completely refuted objections cannot be raised for a second time in a work like the *Ved. Sū.* Hence *Sū. 20* must be deemed to have in view doubts additional to those dealt with under I. 2. 7. Rāmānuja here indicates that these centre round the question whether

the 'littleness' of the *daharākāśa*, as described in the rest of the context, may not be natural. The question is decided on the strength of the unmistakable characteristics of the *Brahman* attributed to the *daharākāśa*. The *lāga* is of more force than the *prakaraṇa*.

10. 2) : and who, owing to the subsequent attainment of the Supreme Light, has his essential nature revealed, marked by the qualities of being free from sin, etc.: thus this (individual self existing in the condition of final release) cannot be the *daharākāśa*.

For the following reason also, this (*daharākāśa*) is in this manner (different from the individual self).

अनुकृतेस्तस्य च

Sūtra 21. *Anukṛitestasya cha.* 86)

Because also of its resemblance to Him (this individual self is not the *daharākāśa* or the *Brahman*).

This internal individual self which is freed of bondage, and which, owing to its resembling that *daharākāśa* which is the Supreme *Brahman*, obtains the qualities of being free from sin, etc., cannot be the *daharākāśa*. To resemble Him (*tadanukāraḥ*) is to become similar to Him.⁵⁵⁵ Thus the finally released individual self is declared in the following passage to become similar to the Supreme *Brahman*: "When the wise seer sees that Person, who is bright like gold and is the creating Lord, and who is the source of the material universe, then that wise man, shaking off merit and demerit and being untainted, attains the highest degree of equality (*i.e.*, similarity with the *Brahman*)". (*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. I. 3).

Therefore, that which is mentioned in the passage attributed to Prajāpati is the being that is similar, and that to which it has to be similar is the *daharākāśa* which is the *Brahman*.

555. In the *Vedāntasāra*, Rāmānuja has explained *anukṛiti* as *svachchhandavṛitti*, moving or functioning according to desire. This is one of the distinguishing

characteristics of the Supreme *Brahman*, and its acquisition by the individual self is included in its becoming similar to Him.

अपि स्मर्यते

Sūtra 22. *Api smaryate.* (87)

The *Smṛiti* also declares (to the same effect.

⁵⁵⁶ Even he who is involved in *samsāra* is declared in the *Smṛitis* to possess, when in the condition of final, release, such a resemblance to the Highest *Brahman* as is characterised by the highest degree of similarity (to Him), as in the following passage :—"Depending upon this knowledge, those who attain sameness of nature with Myself are not born at the time of creation and are not hurt at the time of dissolution" (B. G. XIV. 2).

⁵⁵⁷ Some are of opinion that the two aphorisms namely, "Because also of its resemblance to Him (this individual self is not the *daharākāśa* or the *Brahman*)" (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 3. 21) and "The *Smṛiti* also declares (to the same effect)" (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 3. 22)—constitute a different *adhikaraṇa* (or section) by themselves, and have been given (by the *Sūtrakāra*) for the purpose of establishing that the scriptural passage—"He shining, all this shines after Him, and by His light is all this lighted up." (*Kaṭh. Up.* V. 15 and *Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 2. 13)—relates to the Highest *Brahman*. But by means of two *adhikaraṇas*, namely, the *adhikaraṇa* beginning with the aphorism, *Adṛiṣyatvādiguṇako dharmokteḥ* (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 2. 22 to 24), and the *adhikaraṇa* beginning with the aphorism, *Dyubhṛvādyāyatanam svaśabdāt.* (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 3. 1 to 6), that context has been

⁵⁵⁶ In the *Vedāntadīpa* Rāmānuja takes *api* in the *Sūtra* in the sense of 'cha' ('and'). But here the meaning suggested is 'even'.

⁵⁵⁷ Śaṅkara has a new *adhikaraṇa* for *Sūtras* 21 and 22. (Madhva also starts such an *adhikaraṇa*). The *cha* in *Sūtra* 21 suggests the continuation of the old *adhikaraṇa*. Śaṅkara tries to

solve the difficulty by taking *cha* to refer to the last line of *Kaṭh. Up.* V. 15, in addition to the other lines describing the shining 'after Him'. Rāmānuja appears to feel that the word *anukṛīti* in the *Sūtra* cannot be made to mean *anubhāna* without misreading or misunderstanding it.

explained to relate to the Highest *Brahman* ; and in the aphorism—"That which is denoted by the word *Jyotis* (is the *Brahman*) because there is the mention of (His) feet (in a connected context)" (*Ved. Sūta*. I. 1. 25)—and in other aphorisms following it, it is made out that the Highest *Brahman* possesses the form of splendour : therefore, as no previous objection can be appropriately raised (in regard to the passage here), that (position) is untenable. Moreover, (under such a supposition) there has to be a misinterpretation of the words of the *Sūtras* (here).

ADHIKARANA VI

PRAMITĀDHIKARANA.

शब्दादेव प्रमितः

Sūtra 23. *Śabdādeva pramitaḥ.* (88)

He who is (spoken of as being) limited in size (to the size of a thumb is the *Brahman*) because the scripture itself declares (to that effect).

It is declared in the *Kaṭha-Upanishad* thus : "That person who is of the size of the thumb and who is the lord of the past, as well as of the future, sits at the centre within one's own self, and hence does not feel disgusted ; this (person) indeed is that (supreme object of attainment)" (*Kaṭh. Up.* IV. 12) ; "The person who of the size of the thumb, is (*i.e.*, shining) like smokeless fire—he is the lord of the past as well as of the future ; he is really to-day and will, as surely, be tomorrow : this (person) is that (supreme object of attainment)" (*Kaṭh. Up.* IV. 13) ; "The person

who is of the size of the thumb is the internal self of all beings and is always well settled in (their) hearts ; him one has with steadiness to draw out of one's own body, like the inner stalk of the *muñja* grass drawn out of its capsule. Let one know him as the brilliant and the immortal one ". (*Kaṭh. Up.* VI. 17).

Here the doubt is raised whether this person who is of the size of the thumb is the individual self, or whether he is the Supreme Self. What indeed is it then proper to hold ? That it is the individual self. Why ? Because elsewhere in the scriptures the individual self is declared to possess the size of the thumb, as in the passage—" The lord of life (*i.e.*, the individual self) wanders about through his *karmas* ; he is of the size of the thumb, and has a form brilliant in appearance like that of the sun ; he is associated with will and 'egoity' ". (*Svet. Up.* V. 8). Moreover, it is not declared elsewhere in the scriptures that the Supreme Self possesses merely the size of the thumb even for the purpose of being worshipped (as such). It being thus definitely settled that it (what is of the size of the thumb) is the individual self, the attribute of lordship will result to that (self), in so far at least as the body, the organs of sense, the objects of enjoyment and the means of enjoyment are concerned. 558

If it be so held, we state in reply : " Because the scripture itself declares (to that effect) " (*Ved. Sūta*. I. 3. 23). He who is of the size of the thumb is the Supreme Self. Why ? Because the scripture itself declares : " He is the Lord of the past as well as of the future "—(*Kaṭh. Up.* IV. 12 & 13). Further, it is not appropriate for the individual

558. Doubt arises over the identity of the thumb-sized person, because, (i) being small, he cannot be the *Brahman*, and (ii) being the lord of today and tomorrow, (*i.e.*, of all existing

things and things to be) he cannot be the *jīva*. 'Self' in 'one's own self' in *Kaṭh. Up.* IV. 12 may be taken to be the body. VI 7 lays down meditation on this person and the place with which he is associated.

self, who is subject to the influence of *karma*, to be the Lord of all, of the past as well as of the future. 559

If it be asked how then it is that the Supreme Self is of the size of the thumb, he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) says in answer as follows :—

हृद्यपेक्षया तु मनुष्याधिकारत्वात्

Sūtra 24. *Hṛidyapekshayā tu manushyādhikaratvāt.* ⁹

This (limitation in magnitude to the size of the thumb) is, however, in relation to the heart (of man), as man (alone) is qualified (to worship and meditate on Him).

Inasmuch as the Supreme Self exists in the heart of the worshipper for the purpose of being worshipped (therein), and inasmuch as also the heart of whrshipper is limited in magnitude to the size of the thumb, this limitation in magnitude (of the Supreme Self here) to the size of the thumb, in relation to that (heart), is appropriate. The character (supposed to be) possessed by the individual self, of being limited in magnitude to the size of the thumb, is, because he exists in the heart, dependent also on that same (heart), inasmuch as that (self) is declared in the scriptures (*i.e.*, in *S'vet. Up. V. 8*) to be only of the size of the point of a goad. Men are alone considered worthy to

559. The term, *śabda*, in the *Sūtra*, in the sense of an expression of the *Vedas*, stands for *īśāna* in *Kaṭh. Up. IV. 12 & 14*. *kāmānuja* quotes *bhūtabhavyasya* (*i.e.*, of the past and the future) only to draw attention to the narrowness with which the *pūrvapaksha* interprets *īśāna*. It has to be noted that if the *pūrvapaksha* is by *līnga* (or inferential marks) the *siddhānta* is by *śabda*. *Eva*

in the *Sūtra* suggests that the *śabda* referred to, namely, *īśāna*, has more force than the *līnga* the *pūrvapaksha* relies on, and that it is the reason on which the declaration in the *Sūtra* is based. Incidentally, the *pūrvapaksha* errs in denying that the Supreme Self is never described as of the size of the thumb. Moreover, the *jīva*'s size is atomic, according to the Scriptures.

be worshippers ; accordingly, all men are qualified to adopt and follow the *śāstras* ; and hence owing to the reason that the (interior of the) heart of every man is of the size of his own thumb, there is nothing wrong in the position maintained here, although asses, horses, serpents, etc., do not possess (a heart which is of) the size of the thumb.

560 What, however, remains undisposed of here will be concluded later on.

ADHIKARANA VII

DEVATĀDHIKARANA

तदुपर्यपि बादरायणस्सम्भवात्

Sūtra 25. *Taduparyapi Bādarāyaṇassambhavāt.* (90)

B daraya a is of opinion that that (*viz.*, the act of worshipping the *Brahman*) obtains (among those who are) above (*i.e.*, among the gods and others) also; because such a thing is appropriate.

For the purpose of justifying that the Supreme *Brahman* is limited in magnitude to the size of the thumb, it has been stated above that the *śāstra* (or science) relating to the worship of the *Brahman* is fit to be adopted and followed by men. Incidentally, in that connection, it is now enquired into whether the gods and others also have or have not the fitness to (study and practise) the science of the *Brahman*. What then surely is it proper to hold? That the gods and others have no (such) fitness. Why? Because they have not the requisite capability for it.

560. *Sūtras* 24-40 constitute only one *adhikaraṇa* according to Rāmānuja : included within it are three subsidiary *adhikaraṇas*, consisting of *Sūtras* 26-30, 31-33 and 34-38, and dealing with some questions that rise by the way.

Rāmānuja here says that he will take up the main thread again and complete the *adhikaraṇa* in *Sūtras* 39-40. Śaṅkara divides these 17 *Sūtras* into five main *adhikaraṇas*, consisting of *Sūtras* 24-25, 26-33, 34-38, 39 and 40.

In fact, the gods and others who are unembodied do not possess the requisite capability for conducting well that worship of the *Brahman* which is supported by the seven means ⁵⁶¹ known as discrimination, freedom, etc. Moreover, we find no authoritative means of knowledge to know that the gods and others possess bodies. Although, owing to the supposition that the power of words is to denote even such things as are naturally and of themselves understood, the *Vedāntic* texts possess the character of being the means of knowledge in relation to the Supreme *Brahman* ; ⁵⁶² nevertheless, there is not found (in *Vedāntic* scriptures) even a single sentence which is intended to establish that the gods and others possess bodies. The *mantras* and the *arthavādas* ⁵⁶³, on the other hand, relate to other things (than the possession of bodies by gods, etc.), inasmuch as they are auxiliary to the injunctions bearing upon *karmas* (or religious rites and duties), and do not therefore possess the power of proving that the gods and such others possess bodies. And the injunctions bearing upon *karmas* (or religious rites and duties) do not establish anything in relation to the gods, except the fact that they are connected with the object aimed at ⁵⁶⁴ by (those injunctions) themselves. For this very reason, it is not possible for them to possess also the character of the soliciting suppliant. Accordingly, owing to their not having the requisite capability, as well as the character of

561. Vide Vol. I, pp. 20-21 for the seven means.

562. See pages 215-229 and 287-292 of Vol. I.

563. See Note 232 of Vol. I.

564. The view of the *pūrvapaksha* here is that gods with bodies and powers are not implied by religious rituals. There is no need to introduce such gods to account for sacrifices, when they are not required for *dāna* or *tapas*. The Scripture mentions them as connected with rituals, and rituals are needed to achieve the aims of

the worshipper. It is no more correct to say that there is a god who is pleased by the sacrifice than that an image is pleased with the worship offered to it. Moreover, since all the fruits of all rituals are conferred by the *Brahman* according to the *Vedāntin*, why should he require minor gods also? The *pūrvapaksha* here may be regarded as being set up by the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsakas*—not Jaimini and his true disciples, but 'atheistic' misinterpreters of his *Sūtras*.

being the soliciting suppliant (in relation to the science of the *Brahman*), the gods and others are disqualified (for studying and following the science of the *Brahman*).

If it be so held, we state in reply :—“Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that that (*viz.*, the act of worshipping the *Brahman*) obtains (among those who are) above also (*i.e.*, among the gods and others); because such a thing is appropriate”. (*Ved. Sūt.* 1. 3. 25). “That obtains above also”. That, that is, the worship relating to the *Brahman*, obtains (among those who are) above also; that is, it is possible even for the gods and others. Such is the opinion of the venerable Bādarāyaṇa; because it is possible for them to possess the requisite capability, as well as the character of the soliciting suppliant.

Surely, the character of being the soliciting suppliant results (to the gods and others), inasmuch as they are severely afflicted with the highly insufferable miseries known as *ādhyātmika* etc.,⁵⁶⁵ and inasmuch as again, they have, in relation to the Highest *Brahman*—who is free from even the smallest taint of all that is evil and is possessed of myriads of innumerable and auspicious qualities unsurpassed in excellence—the knowledge that He is the object of enjoyment, etc., unsurpassed in excellence.

And the requisite capability (for worshipping the *Brahman*) appropriately results to them in consequence of their possessing bodies, organs of sense, etc., which are highly active and efficient. Further, the fact that (the four-faced) Brahmā (the creator) and other (gods) possess bodies, organs of sense, etc., is declared in all the *Upanishads*⁵⁶⁶ in those contexts which relate to the creation of the world as well as in those contexts which relate to the worship of the *Brahman*. Accordingly, (in the context relating to creation), beginning with the

565. Vide Note 12, Vol. 1.

566. Particularly, the *Chhān-*

dogya, the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and some other *Upanishads*.

passages—"Existence alone, my dear child, - this was in the beginning" (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 2. 1*); and "It thought, 'May I become manifold and be born'. It created *tejas* (or the element of fire)" (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 2. 3*)—it is stated that He (*i.e.*, the Lord) differentiated all the non-intelligent things into the several conditioned existences known as the elements of the fire, water, and earth etc.; that then He willed to the effect—"Entering along with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiations of name and form". (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 3. 2*); and that then He created the fourfold division of beings, beginning with (the four-faced) *Brahmā* and ending with the immovable objects, so that they may possess bodies suited to the respective *karmas* (or effects of past actions) of those beings, and acquire names in keeping therewith.

In this manner, it is declared in the scripture, in all parts which treat of creation, that created beings belong to four divisions, namely, gods, animals, men and immovable objects. (And here) the division of beings into gods and other such beings is dependent upon their being associated with bodies, organs of sense, etc., which are fitted for the enjoyment of results rightly accruing from the particular *karmas* (of those gods and other beings) — (the *karmas*) which obtain in the fourteen worlds ⁵⁶⁷ beginning with the world of (the four-faced god) *Brahmā*—because the character of being a god etc. does not belong of itself to the individual selves (in their undifferentiated essence).

Similarly, (in the scriptural context which relates to the worship of the *Brahman*), it is clearly made out that gods and other such (beings) possess bodies, organs of sense etc., as from the following passage beginning with : "Both the

567. These are the seven worlds above, namely, *bhūṣ* (the earth), *bhuvās*, *svār*, *mahās*, *janās*, *tapās* and *satya*; and the seven below, namely, *atala*, *vitala*, *sutala*, *rasātala*, *mahātala* and *pātāla*.

gods and the *Asuras* came to hear that (teaching of Prajāpati) indeed : they said Indra among the gods and Virochana among the *Asuras* went (to Prajāpati) : both of them, not recognising each other (through jealousy), went to Prajāpati (as pupils) with (the customary) fuel in their hands : indeed, they lived as celibate students for thirtytwo years : and Prajāpati spoke to them." (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 7. 2-3) etc.

From the following and other similar statements which are found in the *mantras* and the *arthavādas* also that are auxiliary to the injunctions bearing upon *karmas* (or religious duties and rites)—“Indra has the *vajra* ⁵⁶⁸ in his hand ;” (*Taitt. Br.* II. 6. 7. 2) ; “Therewith Indra took up his weapon, *vajra*” (*Taitt. Sam.* II. 4. 12. 38)—it is made out that gods (and others like them) possess bodies etc. : and this (corporeality), not being opposed to other authoritative sources of knowledge, is itself certainly intended to be authoritatively taught (here). Further it is not possible to say that from (the *mantras* and the *arthavādas*) which are concerned with the exposition of what is to be done and eulogy (of the same), there is no intention to teach anything else : because that (something else) is helpful to such eulogy etc., and because also without that (something else) eulogy would not be reasonably possible.

Indeed, the character of being an eulogy consists in the description of excellence, and in the absence of excellence, ⁵⁶⁹ the character of the eulogy as eulogy of itself, disappears. Moreover, by describing an excellence that is non-existent, there cannot arise a stimulation (for the performance of any work). Therefore, the *arthavādas*

568. *Vajra* is the ‘thunderbolt or the weapon of the god, Indra, said to have been formed out of the bones of the sage Dadichi. In the next quotation, he is said to raise this weapon with the help of the strength given by the third part of Vishnu placed on the earth,

569. Perhaps we should take this to mean “in the absence of the description of excellence”. The next sentence is said to recall a statement in the *Dramiḍakāshya*: “There can be no praise with the help of what is non-existent”.

which stimulate (the performance of religious rites and duties) teach without doubt the existence of excellence (in gods etc.). And while the *mantras*, which are used in various *karmas* for the purpose of obtaining some benefit or other, give out what is to be done, they confer (such) benefit in relation to those (*karmas*), at the same time that they declare the special attributes such as the body etc., which are possessed by the gods and others like them. Otherwise, it would not be appropriate (for the *mantras*) to specify Indra and other (gods). Moreover, an attributeless deity can hardly be conceived in the mind.

It being so, they (*i.e.*, the *mantras* and *arthavādas*) teach such attributes as are not arrived at by other means of knowledge, and then with the help of those (attributes), they (*i.e.*, the *arthavādas*) stimulate the (performance of) *karmas*, and they (the *mantras*) give out that (*karma*) which is characterised by (those) attributes. They (*i.e.*, the *mantras* and the *arthavādas*) also re-state all the attributes already arrived at by other means of knowledge, and with their help give out (what is to be done) and offer stimulation (for the doing thereof). In case of contradiction (between the attributes arrived at by other means of knowledge and what is stated by the *mantras* and the *arthavādas*), they (*i.e.*, the *mantras* and the *arthavādas*) express figuratively, by means of the words denoting them (*i.e.*, the aforesaid attributes), (other) uncontradicted attributes, and (thereby) carry out (stimulation and exposition).

The commandment to perform a religious ritual is dependent on the power of the divinity (who is propitiated by the rite). The (religious) works that are prescribed (in the *Vedas*) as having to be performed by a person desirous of attaining certain ends, being themselves destructible moment after moment, presuppose a means, which is capable of accomplishing the attaining of *Svarga* and other such (desired) results, all of which come into existence at another (subsequent and remote) time. In the following and other

passages to be found in the *mantras* and the *arthavādas* also, namely : "Indeed, Vāyu (or the god of wind) is the most quickly moving deity : him, with the portion due to him, does he (*i.e.*, the sacrificer) approach : he (*i.e.*, Vāyu) makes him (*i.e.*, the sacrificer) attain prosperity" (*Taitt. Sam.* II. 1. 1. 1) : "What he blesses through this oblation, may that be enjoyed, may that be increased : may the gods therefore be pleased with him (*i.e.*, the sacrificer)." (*Taitt. Br.* III. 5. 10. 5) :—the teaching is given that the gods, propitiated by means of (religious) works, possess the power of granting rewards (for these works) and possess also the needed lordship for it : this, on account of its having to be a presupposition, agreeably falls into line with the purport of the (connected) context. From the root, *yaj*, which means 'to worship the gods', it is made out that the (religious) work known as a sacrifice (or *yāga*) relates prominently to a deity which is worshipped thereby.

Therefore, on a careful consideration of all the scriptural contexts (consisting of the *mantras*, *arthavādas* and commandments), all that has to be presupposed by the injunctions (bearing upon *karmas* or religious works) comes thus to be known through these contexts themselves : hence the *apūrva* etc., which are not mentally sensed at the time that the knowledge of the meaning (of the scriptural texts) arises, need not be resorted to either as that thing which has to be declared, or as that thing which has to be assumed, in relation to the injunctions bearing upon (religious) works.⁵⁷⁰ Similarly, in the (*Smṛitis* or) law-books, *itihāsas*, and *purāṇas*, which are all based on the *brāhmaṇas* (or injunctions), *mantras* and *arthavādas*, all taken together,⁵⁷¹ it is quite clearly expounded in regard

570. The *apūrva* invented by the *Mīmāṃsakas* (about which, see Note 36 of Vol. I) is neither sanctioned by the *Śruti*, nor supported by the *Smṛiti*. The Supreme Lord is the granter of all rewards. In regard to the performers of

karmas, He works through the gods propitiated by the sacrifice or *dāna* or *tapas*.

571. The *Śrūtaprakāśikā* points out that *Śruti* texts always to be inferred and those claimed to be lost are excluded here.

to (the four-faced) Brahmā and others as well as in regard to gods, *Asuras*, etc., that they all have the body, the organs of sense etc., and have also differences in nature, special seats, enjoyments, actions, and so on. Therefore, the gods also, inasmuch as they possess bodies etc., certainly have the fitness (to adopt and follow the science of the *Brahman*).

विरोधः कर्मणीति चेन्नानेकप्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात्

Sūtra 26. *Virodhaḥ karmanītic Hennāneka pratipat-ter darśanāt.* (91)

If it be said that it (*viz.*, the corporeality of the gods etc.) gives rise to an inconsistency in relation to (religious) works, it is replied that it is not right to say so: because manifold adoption (of bodies) is seen to be possible (in the case of certain beings).

If it be admitted that gods and others possess bodies, etc., there arises "an inconsistency in relation to (religious) works", because it is not proper to hold when, for instance, in the following among other scriptural texts:⁵⁷² "O Agni, bring Agni" (*Taitt. Br.* III. 5. 6); "O thou Indra, come, come with yellow horses" (*Taitt. Ār.* I. 12. 3)—Indra, who is only one, is simultaneously invoked to attend many sacrifices, he can, when he has a body, attend (all of them). Moreover, the scripture declares the attendance of Agni and other gods at various (sacrificial) places, as in the scriptural passage—"Whose sacrifice, indeed, do gods attend, and whose not? Among many sacrificers, he alone who receives them first—he alone worships them as soon

572. This passage is cited with reference to the invoking of Indra to attend sacrifices, because, in the context, Agni is invoked to bring the gods to the sacrificer, to bring Agni, Soma, Prajāpati, Indra and others. The quoted

words are also found in *Taitt. Sam.* II. 5. 9. 4: "'O Agni, bring Agni here, bring Soma here,' he says; indeed, he summons the gods in order, 'Bring here the gods, O Agni, and honour them with a fair sacrifice.'"

as it is tomorrow." (*Taitt. Sam.* I. 6. 7. 1). Therefore, in case it is held that (gods) possess bodies etc., there arises an inconsistency in relation to (religious) works.

If it be so held, it is replied that it is not right to say so: "because manifold adoption (of bodies) is seen to be possible (in the case of certain beings)" (*Ved. Sū. I. 3. 26*). Indeed, simultaneous adoption of manifold bodies is seen in the case of Saubhari and others, endowed with special powers. 573

शब्द इति चेन्नातः प्रभवात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां

Sūtra 27. *Sabda iti chennātaḥ prabhavāt
pratyakshānumanābhyām.* (92)

If it be said that it is in relation to the scripture that that (inconsistency) arises, it is replied that it is not so: because (the gods and) all (other things) are born by means of that (*viz.*, the scripture) as may be made out directly and indirectly.

(Here) the word 'inconsistency' is to be supplied (from the previous *Sūtra*): Let it be that there is no inconsistency in relation to religious works from the adoption of many bodies (by any particular god). But in relation to the Vedic scripture (itself), there arises an inconsistency owing to the reason that that (scripture) imports a meaning which points to objects not always in

573. Saubhari was a sage who, after marrying the fifty daughters of King Māndhātṛi, lived happily with them (*V.P. IV. 2*). Śaṅkara cites here *Bṛih. Up. III. 9*, where 3003 gods are reduced to one. Rāmānuja's interpretation of this passage differs. Alternatively, Śaṅkara suggests that a god can receive offerings in many sacri-

fices at the same time, even as a worthy sage can receive respectful greetings from many simultaneously. Rāmānuja thinks that wherever the Vedic texts specifically say so, the gods personally come to the sacrifices to receive the oblations. (Normally, however, Agni conveys these to them).

existence. Indeed, it is unavoidable that Indra and other objects (denoted by the Vedic scripture) are transient in character, inasmuch as they are made up of parts, owing to the reason that they possess bodies. Therefore, as in the case of 'Devadatta' and other similar words, so also in the case of the Vedic words, 'Indra' and others, before the origin of Indra and other objects and after their destruction, there will be an absence of significance, or at least there will result a transitoriness in time (in relation thereto). ⁵⁷⁴

If it be so held, to such an objection, it is replied that it is not so : " because the gods and all other things are born by means of that (scripture) " (*Ved. Sūṭ.* 1. 3. 27)—that is, because Indra and other objects denoted by those very (Vedic) words, 'Indra' and others, are brought into existence again and again. What is said is this. As a matter of fact, unlike 'Devadatta' and other words of that kind, the Vedic words, 'Indra' and others, are not, in conformity with any convention, used to denote merely a particular individual : like 'ox' and other such words, they are used (without any convention) naturally to denote a particular genus. And therefore it is that after a particular Indra ceases to be, the Creator creates another Indra of the same kind with the help of those very Vedic words, 'Indra' and others, by revolving which in his mind he comes to know of the generic nature of Indra and of the other objects denoted by those (words) : as for instance, a potter, by constantly revolving the word 'pot' in his mind, (produces) a pot of the same genus (as is denoted by the word 'pot').

If it be asked how this is made out, the reply is : " As made out directly and indirectly." (*Ved. Sūṭ.* I. 3. 27). The meaning is that (it is made out) by means of the *Śrutis* and

574. The *pūrvapakṣa* here is that the Vedic scripture will be proved to be non-eternal, if its words refer to Indra and other gods who are subject to birth and

death. Before the gods are born, or when they are dead, the words referring to them can have no meaning, or there is no point in pronouncing them.

the *Smṛitis*. Indeed, the *S'ruti* says : "Prajāpati (or the lord of beings) by means of the Vedic scripture differentiated the two things, namely, the existent (or the intelligent) and the non-existent (or the non-intelligent)." (*Taitt. Br.* II. 7. 6. 2). Similarly, there are the following and other Vedic passages : "He pronounced the word 'bhūḥ' (meaning the earth), he created the earth : he pronounced the word 'bhuvaḥ', (meaning the mid-heaven), he created the midheaven." (*Taitt. Br.* II. 2. 4. 2). The meaning (of this) is that, after the pronunciation of (every) directly significant word, he recalled to his mind the configuration corresponding to the meaning of such particular word, and created the various things as associated with their own respective configurations (of generic attributes).

The *Smṛiti* also says : "The divine language of the *Veda*, which has neither beginning nor end, and from which are derived all living beings, was first sent forth by the Existent One." (*M. B.* XII. 238. 93). (It) says also : "Indeed, solely with the help of the Vedic words, He created the names and actions of all things separately in each case and also their different forms." (*V. P.* I. 5. 63). *Forms* mean configurations, which almost amount to shapes. To the same effect is the following passage : "Solely with the help of the Vedic words, He created the names and forms of all beings, such as the gods etc., and explained (to them) their duties". (*Manu* I. 21). Accordingly, although the gods and other such beings are admitted to possess bodies, it will not follow therefrom that the Vedic words are meaningless and that the *Veda* has a beginning in time.

अत एव च नित्यत्वम्

Sūtra 28. *Ata eva cha nityatvam* (93)

II. S.B.—21.

And it is for this very reason that it (the *Veda*) is eternal.

For whatever reasons, words like 'Indra', 'Vasishṭa', and others possess the power of denoting a god or a sage (*i.e.*, a corresponding genus of beings), and for whatever reasons, again, the creation of various things is brought about with the help of corresponding words (denoting them) so as to be preceded in time by the remembrance of the meanings of these (words),—for the same reasons, it is proper to hold that the *Veda* is eternal, even though it comes out, by means of the teaching in the following among other Vedic passages—"He begs a boon of the authors of the *mantras*" (?): "Salutation to the great seers who are the authors of the *mantras*" (*Taitt. Ār.* VII. 1): "The hymn (or *sūkta*) of Viśvāmitra begins with: 'This is that Agni'" (*Taitt. Sam.* V. 2. 4.)—that Vasishṭa and others possess the character of being the authors of the *mantras*, the character of being the authors of the *kāṇḍas* (or sections of the *Yajur-veda* etc.) and also the character of being seers.

By means of these very Vedic words (of the *mantras*) such as "He begs a boon of the authors of the *mantras*" (?)—Prajāpati (the creator) finds out after consideration the genus, power, etc., which characterise the very seers who are the authors of the several *kāṇḍas*, *sūktas* and *mantras*, and then creates them as possessing those very powers and as belonging to those very genera: and then assigns to them the work of composing those very *mantras*. They, also, being endowed by Prajāpati with their powers, perform *tapas* suited thereunto, and afterwards, without studying in the least degree those very *mantras* etc., which are eternally established and which were revealed by every previous Vasishṭa and such other (seers),—they (*i.e.*, the newly created seers) thus (newly) see and learn them (*i.e.*, the *mantras* etc.) without any error relating either to accents or letters. For this reason also, it is proper to hold that

the *Veda* is eternal and that those (seers) are the authors of the *mantras*. 575

It may again be held as follows. It may perhaps be proper to maintain that, in so far as the creation of Indra and others, in connection with the *naimittika pralaya* (or a partial and occasional dissolution of the world) and such other cosmic conditions, is concerned, the creation, by Prajāpati, of gods and such others, is brought about with the help of the remembrance of the various preceding Indras and other such gods : which is due to the words constituting the *Veda*. On the other hand, in connection with the final dissolution of the universe, seeing that the creator, Prajāpati, and the words, which are expressive of the modifications of the form of the material principle of egoity which is known as *bhūtādi*, are both destroyed, how is it possible to say that Prajāpati evolves creation with the help of the words previously learnt, or how again can the *Veda*, which is so destroyed, be said to be eternal? Therefore, he who maintains the eternity of *Vedas*, even when he admits that gods and other beings are embodied, has necessarily to accept the evolutionary activity of the world as beginningless and unbroken like a stream. 576

To this (objection), he (the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer thus:

575. The objection here is that the *mantras* and the *arthavādas* contain references to the authors of the *mantras*. The *Vedāntin*, who interprets them literally, cannot but accept that the *Vedas* came into existence at a particular point of time. The *Mīmāṃsakas* overcome the difficulty by regarding the *mantras* and *arthavādas* as of little or no significance, except in so far as they help ritual. In Rāmānuja's reply 'for the same reasons' may refer to *eva* of the *Sūtra*, and 'By those very Vedic

words' to *cha* therein.

576. The *Mīmāṃsakas*, in order to uphold the eternity of the *Vedas*, deny that a *mahā-pralaya* or complete dissolution of the universe occurs at any time. For the *Vedas* are words, words are sounds, and sounds, like all material things, are derived ultimately from *bhūtādi* or the *tāmasa* variety of *ahankāra*. (See *Ved. Sūt.* II, 2. 1). *Naimittika-pralayas* or partial and occasional dissolutions of the universe are, however, accepted by them.

समाननामरूपत्वाच्चावृत्तावप्यविरोधो दर्शनात् स्मृतेश्च

Sūtra 29. *Samānanāmarūpatvāchchā vṛttavapyavirodhe darśanāt Smṛiteṣha.* (94)

Because also there is a continued identity in respect of the names and forms (of things), there is nothing which is inconsistent with a revolution (of creation): because it is so seen revealed in the *Śrutis* and is also declared in the *Smṛitis*.

There is nothing inconsistent in respect of the accepted eternity of the *Veda*, even when there is a revolution of universal creation after a final dissolution of the world; simply because there is a continued identity in the names and forms of things as mentioned above. Accordingly, the Divine Lord, who is the Highest Person, remembers at the conclusion of the process of universal dissolution, the universe in its original configuration: then He resolves to the effect: "May I become manifold" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3): then He differentiates the totality of enjoyable things and enjoyers, which became completely absorbed in Himself but leaving their characteristic capacities untouched: then He creates as before the *brahmāṇḍa* (or the egg-shaped universe), beginning with the 'great principle' and ending with Hiraṇyagarbha: then He reveals the *Veda* which has been existent in a certain order of syllabic succession (known before) and teaches the same to Hiraṇyagarbha: then indeed He assigns to him as before the work of creating the world consisting of gods and other classes of beings: and He Himself stands as the Internal Self of that (Hiraṇyagarbha). Therefore, all that has been stated above is quite appropriate.

This indeed is what is meant by⁵⁷⁷ the eternity and superhuman character of the *Veda*, namely, that it is in accordance with the internal mental impress due to the order in which it was pronounced on several previous occasions that that same particular order of syllabic succession is remembered and it is again pronounced in that same order of syllabic succession. The process (of pronouncing the words of the *Veda* in an eternally continued order of syllabic succession) is the same in our case as in the case of the Lord of all. But there is this much peculiarity (in the case of the Lord of all). The Highest Person Himself bears the *Veda* in mind in proper order entirely without the help of any internal mental impress (due to the previous repetition of the *Veda*).

To the question how this is made out to be as stated above, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the answer: "Because it is so seen revealed in the *Śrutis* and is also declared in the *Smṛitis*." (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 3. 29). What indeed is seen revealed in the Vedic scriptures is this:—"He creates the four-faced *Brahmā* first: and then communicates the *Vedas* unto him." (*Śvet. Up.* VI. 18). The *Smṛiti*, attributed to *Manu*, also says the same thing in the context which begins with: "This (universe) existed in the shape of darkness." (*Manu*, I. 5): then continues: "He, desiring to produce beings of many kinds from His own body, first with a thought created the waters and placed His seed in them. That (seed) became a golden egg, in brilliancy equal to the sun: in that (egg), He Himself was born as *Brahmā* the progenitor of the whole world." (*Manu*, I. 8-9).

577. *Rāmānuja* here tells the *Mīmāṃsakas*: "What you claim about the *Vedas* being eternal can in reason only amount to this." The eternity of the *Vedas* cannot be proved by supposing syllables or words to be eternal; for this argument will equally establish the eternity of any human composition: So it can rest only on an eternal order of succession of syllables. But the

Mīmāṃsakas cannot think of an order of succession in space and time, on account of their doctrine that sound is eternal and all-pervasive. *Rāmānuja's* point is that the *Vedas*, being kept in God's mind eternally and being taught to every *Brahmā*, are seen to be superhuman (i.e., without any human author or beginning in time) and eternal (i.e., without any end in time).

To the same effect are the following *purāṇic* passages : “ In the navel of the Lord, who was asleep there, a lotus was born, in that lotus, O thou of great fame, was born Brahmā, who is well versed in the *Veda* and the auxiliary sciences, and he was told by Him, ‘O thou of great intelligence, do thou create the beings of the world.’”(?) Again, there is the passage: “The Highest Lord is Nārāyaṇa, and from Him was the four-faced Brahmā born.”(?). The same thing is again taught in the passages beginning with “ I shall not describe the first creation,”(?) and also these passages : “ Having created the waters known as Nara, I dwelt within them: therefore is my name Nārāyaṇa. In each period of time known as a *kalpa*, I sleep therein so that, when I am asleep, a lotus may grow out of My navel. O thou good goddess, in My navel, as I am so situated, the four-faced Brahmā is born, and to him I say: ‘ Do thou create the beings (of the world).’”(?)

Consequently, it is an established conclusion that the gods and other beings like them possess the fitness to adopt and follow the science of the *Brahman*, inasmuch as they have the character of being a soliciting suppliant and also the capability (needed for that science).

ADHIKARANA VIII

MADHVADHIKARANA

मध्वादिष्वसम्भवादनधिकारं जैमिनिः

Sūtra 30. *Madhvādishvasambhavādanadikāram*
Jaiminiḥ. (95)

In regard to the forms of worship in which the object of worship is conceived to be the honey etc., Jaimini speaks of the absence of fitness (of the gods etc., to be worshippers), because such a thing is impossible.

It has been stated above that the gods and other such beings possess the fitness needed to study and adopt the science of the *Brahman* (in general). The enquiry now undertaken is whether or not they have any similar fitness in relation to those (particular) kinds of worship in which the gods themselves form the object of worship.⁵⁷⁸

What then is the conclusion? Jaimini is of opinion that there is no such fitness in them in relation to those forms of worship in which the object of worship is conceived to be honey etc. Why? "Because such a thing is impossible". Indeed, it is not possible for a different sun-god, Vasus etc., to come into existence to be worshipped by the sun-god, Vasus etc., and in relation to the already existing Vasus and others, the character of being a Vasu, etc. cannot form the object of attainment: for such (as character) is already attained (by them).

In those scriptural contexts, which begin with: "The sun is indeed the honey of the gods," (*Chhānd. Up. III. 1. 1*): and then say: "On that nectar, which is the first of these, the Vasus live," (*Chhānd. Up. III. 6. 1.*): and then go on to mention: "He who thus knows (i.e., worships) this nectar, he becomes one of the Vasus, indeed, with Agni as their leader, and then he directly realises the nectar and always feels satisfied," (*Chhānd. Up. III. 6. 3*)—it is declared in connection with the form of worship in which

578. In *Chhānd. Up. III. 1.2* the sun is described as the honey of the gods. The mid-air is the honeycomb which rests on the horizontal bamboo of the heavens. The light-rays are the waters drawn by them, which are like the embryonic bees in the holes in the honeycomb. The *Vedas*, with the *itihāsas* and *purāṇas* and the *Upanishads*, are the bees. Several kinds of rituals are the flowers. The oblations generate nectar which flows into a part of the sun, and makes it red, white, dark, very dark, or agitated in

the centre. The Vasus, the Rudras, the Ādityas, the Maruts and the Sādhyas are said to live on these different kinds of nectar. One engaging in meditation about one of these kinds of nectar (as a form of worship of the *Brahman*) will become in due course one of the gods enjoying it and will ultimately attain the *Brahman*. The *pūrvapakṣa* here is that a Vasu, for instance, cannot be asked to meditate on himself as enjoying the nectar in the sun, and that too for the purpose of becoming what he already is.

the object of worship is conceived as nectar that the sun-god goes by the name of nectar (or *madhu*), inasmuch as he is the receptacle of the sweet and delightful liquid, which is obtained by means of the rays of the sun and is produced out of the *karma* (or religious works) dealt with in the *Rigveda* and other *Vedas* etc: that the parts of the sun-god, (so understood) which are enjoyed by the Vasus etc., possess the characteristic of being an object of worship, and that being a Vasu etc., is the object of attainment at the same time.

ज्योतिषि भावाच्च

Sūtra 31. *Jyotishi bhāvāchcha.* (96)

Because also it is in relation to the Light (that such worship by the Vasus etc., is taught to be performed).

In the passage, "The gods worship Him indeed who is the Light of lights, and who is immortal life as well," (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 16) it is declared that the gods have to worship the Light, that is, the Highest *Brahman*. The worship relating to the *Brahman* is common to both gods and men: hence the statement (here) which gives the character of worshippers to the gods, shows that the gods do not practise any other worship (than that of the *Brahman* as Light). Therefore in relation to those (forms of worship wherein the object of worship is conceived as nectar, etc.), Vasus and others (i.e., gods) do not possess the needed fitness.

भावन्तु बादरायणोऽस्ति हि

Sūtra 32. *Bhāvantu Bādarāyaṇo'sti hi.* (97)

Bādarāyaṇa, however, says that there is such a fitness (on the part of gods etc. to adopt the form of the worship of the *Brahman* known as the *Madhuvīdyā*) : for so it is.

The venerable **Bādarāyaṇa** is of opinion that even the *Ādityas*, *Vasus* and other gods possess the fitness needed for these (forms of worship wherein the object of worship is conceived as nectar etc.). "For so it is", that is to say, through the worship of the *Brahman*, who is realised as existing within themselves,⁵⁷⁹ it is possible for the *Ādityas*, *Vasus* etc. to desire the attainment of the *Brahman* subsequent to their attainment of the character of a *Vasu*, etc. Moreover, in relation to those who are already *Vasus*, the attainment of the character of a *Vasu* may possibly become an object worthy to be desired even in another *kalpa*.

Here (in this context) what is enjoined is the worship of the *Brahman* as existing in both the conditions of cause and effect. (In the context) which begins with, "The sun is indeed the honey of the gods," (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 1. 1) and concludes before, "Then having risen above that" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 11. 1), the *Brahman* is thought to be worshipped as existing in the condition of certain peculiar produced effects such as the sun-god, *Vasus* etc. In the passages beginning with, "Then having risen above that," (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 11. 1.), the same *Brahman* is taught to be worshipped as existing in the condition of cause and as constituting the Internal Self of the sun-god. Therefore he who worships the *Brahman* thus as existing in the conditions of both cause and effect, attains in another *kalpa* the character of being a *Vasu* etc., and then at the end of that (*kalpa*), he reaches that same Highest *Brahman* existing in the condition of cause.

579. The worshipper is the embodied *jīva*, and the object of his worship is the *Brahman* existing within him as the *Antaryā-*

min. In the *Indra-prāṇādhikāraṇa* (*Ved. sūt.* 1.1.29-32), a similar lesson is taught, but the attendant circumstances are different.

In this passage—" And indeed to him who knows the science of the *Brahman* (*Brahmopanishat*), the sun does not rise and does not set. For him there is day, once and for all." (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 11. 3)—the whole of the *Madhuvidyā* (or the form of worship where the object of worship is conceived as nectar) is declared to possess the character of the *Brahmopanishat* (i.e., science of the *Brahman*) : and it is also declared therein that the character of being a *Vasu* etc. is attained therefrom (as the result of such worship) ending in the attainment of the *Brahman*. For these two reasons, it is made out that the worship enjoined in regard to the parts of the sun, which constitute the objects of enjoyment to the *Vasus* etc., relates to the *Brahman* Himself who is realised as existing in the condition of these (*Vasus*, etc.). Therefore, this kind of worship is possible for the sun-god, *Vasus*, etc. to practise.

The *Brahman* alone, being in the result the object of worship, the passage which says : "The gods (worship) Him who is the Light of lights," (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 14. 1), is seen to be appropriate.⁵⁸⁰ Accordingly, the *Vṛittikāra* (*Bodhāyana*) also says : " Indeed, it is possible for the gods etc. to practise the forms of worship in which the object of worship is conceived as nectar etc., because it is the *Brahman* Himself who is in view and is realised everywhere (i.e., in all forms of worship). "

ADHIKARAṆA IX

APASŪDRĀDHIKARAṆA

शुगस्य तदनादरश्रवणात्तदाद्रवणात्सूच्यते हि

Sūtra 33. *Śugasya tadanādarāśravaṇāt tadādravaṇāt sūchyate hi.* (98)

⁵⁸⁰. Here is the reply to the interpretation of *Bṛih. Up.* IV. 14. 1 given in *Sūtra* 31. The *pūrvapakṣa* is that the gods can worship the *Brahman* in the form of Light only. The reply is that

what they worship is the *Brahman* only and nothing else. The quotation from the *Vṛittikāra* emphasises this and also replies to the view that *Madhuvidyā* only enjoins the worship of the sun.

Because it is shown (in *Chhānd. Up.* IV. 1-2) that, owing to his having heard their disrespectful remarks (i.e., of the swans), and owing also to his having then gone (to Raikva the teacher), grief arose in him i.e., Jāna'ruti, who is hence called "Śūdra" and not because he is a śūdra by birth).

The enquiry set on foot here is whether or not a Śūdra has the fitness needed to (study and adopt) the science of the *Brahman*. What then is the proper conclusion? That he has such (fitness). Why? For the reason that (such) fitness is determined by the characteristics of being a soliciting suppliant and possessing the needed capability, and it is therefore possible for a Śūdra to possess those (characteristics, i.e., fitness and capability).

Although owing to his unfitness to worship the sacrificial fire and to have the knowledge (of the *Vedas* needed therefor), a Śūdra has no fitness for the performance of religious rites which have to be accomplished through those fires and the knowledge (of the *Vedas* needed therefor): nevertheless, inasmuch as the worship of the *Brahman* is solely a function of the mind, a Śūdra certainly has the fitness needed for (practising) that (worship). Even though this worship presupposes the performance of religious rites mentioned in the *śāstras*, what is presupposed here being the performance of various religious rites suited to the various conditions and stages of life: in the case of the Śūdra also, the service rendered by him in accordance with his condition in life to the higher classes, constitutes the (*śāstraic*) action (so desired). In the statement, "Therefore the Śūdra is unfit for sacrificing," (*Taitt. Sam.* VII. 1. 6)—what is explained is that unfitness (of his) for the performance of religious rites and other works to be achieved through the sacrificial fire and the knowledge (of the *Vedas* required therefor), which is alone logically established.

It may, however, be asked how he who has not studied the *Veda* and has not learnt the *Vedānta* and who is (consequently) ignorant of the essential nature of the *Brahman* and (is ignorant) also of the forms of His worship, can possibly practise the worship of the *Brahman*. (In answer to this) it is stated that even he who has not studied the *Veda* and has not learnt the *Vedānta* texts, may, at least through learning the *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*, acquire the knowledge relating to the essential nature of the *Brahman* and to His worship. And permission is given to the Śūdra also to learn the *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*, as in the following among other passages: "Having the Brāhmaṇa in the forefront, let all the four castes be taught." (M. B. XII. 335. 48). Again, in the *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*, Vidura and other (Śūdras) are seen to be devoted to the *Brahman*.

Similarly, in the *Upanishads* also, in the portion in which the form of worship is described wherein the *Brahman* is taught to be worshipped as the All-absorber (i.e., in *Chhānd. Up.* IV. 1-3), it is found mentioned that a Śūdra also possesses the fitness for the (study and adoption of the) science of the *Brahman*. The teacher, Raikva (in the context), addresses his anxious pupil, Jānaśruti, indeed, as a Śūdra, and then teaches him the science of the *Brahman* in the passage beginning with: "You have brought these (as gifts), O Śūdra, and through them, as through a mouth, have you made me speak." (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 2. 3.).

Therefore, a Śūdra also may possess the fitness (needed) for the (study and adoption of the) science of the *Brahman*.⁵⁸¹

581. What is dealt with in the *Sūtras* is only a problem raised in the *Samvarga-vidyā*. Additional *pūrvapaksha* arguments also are here envisaged. Rāmānuja goes on to reply to them all, upholding the traditional caste restrictions

on the study and adoption of the *upāsana*s enjoined in the *Upanishads*. But he does not bar the gates of Heaven to anyone. Elsewhere he has taught ways of approach to God, open to all without any distinction of caste or sex.

If it be so arrived at, it is stated in reply that a Śūdra cannot possess the fitness (needed for the study and adoption of the science of the *Brahman*), because he has not the capability (needed for the study and adoption thereof). As a matter of fact, he who does not know the essential nature of the *Brahman* and also the various forms of His worship, and who is (moreover) disqualified for (the practice of) such essential features of such worship as recitation of the *Vedas*, (performance of) sacrifices etc., cannot possess the capability (needed) for the performance of (such) worship. And he who is not endowed with (this) capability, even though there may be present (in him) a longing (for the acquisition of such capability), does not gain fitness (on that account).

And (this) lack of capability arises from lack of study of the *Veda*. And just as the injunctions in regard to religious rites (such as sacrifices), on account of the acquisition of knowledge by study (of the *Veda*) in accordance with the injunction prescribing (such study) in the case of the three (higher) castes, are in harmony with the knowledge (of such rites) and the means of knowledge (relating thereto such as the study of the *Veda* etc.), and not with others (i.e., the knowledge possessed by other castes and the means relating thereto)—even so, in regard to the injunctions relating to the worship of the *Brahman*.⁵⁸² And because only such knowledge as is gained through a study which is in accordance with the injunctions relating to the study of the *Veda*, constitutes the means for the worship of *Brahman*, the Śūdra lacks capability for the worship of the *Brahman*.

582. Rāmānuja has here in mind the exceptions allowed by the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*. The *Nishāda-sthapati* and the *Rathakāra*, though not belonging to any of the three qualified castes, are permitted to perform certain rites and recite certain *mantras* in

connection therewith. No such exceptions are enjoined in regard to the *Brahma-Mīmāṃsā*. The injunctions here are in respect of the members of the three qualified castes who have studied the *Vedas* and otherwise acquired the necessary fitness.

Itihāsas and *purāṇas* assume the character of being (the) means for (the worship of the *Brahman*) only in so far as they develop the *Veda*, and not independently. And the knowledge gained by the *Sūdra* through hearing *itihāsas* and *purāṇas* is intended for the destruction of sins, and not for the worship for the *Brahman*. Vidura and such others were possessed of the knowledge (relating to the worship of the *Brahman*) on account of such knowledge gained by them in previous births not having been forgotten, and (they) attained this kind of birth (in the *Śūdra* caste) through the force of past *karma*—such is (the reason for) their being worshippers of the *Brahman*.

If it is argued that in the *Samvarga-vidyā* (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 1–3) the use of the vocative 'Śūdra' in regard to the disciple indicates the fitness of the *Sūdra* (to study and adopt the science of the *Brahman*), it is replied as follows : "Because it is shown (in the context) that, owing to his having heard their disrespectful remarks (i.e., of the swans) and owing also to his having then gone (to Raikva the teacher), grief arose in him (i.e., Jānaśruti, who is hence called *Śūdra*, and not because he is a *Śūdra* by birth)." (*Ved. Sūtr.* I. 3.33) On account of Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa, through lack of knowledge of the *Brahman*, having listened to scornful words spoken by swans, and thereupon resorting to Raikva, who had knowledge of the *Brahman*, it is indicated that grief arose in him. That is why he is called as 'Śūdra' and not because of his belonging to the fourth caste. For he who grieves is a *Śūdra*. The root, *śuch*, to grieve, takes on the suffix *ra* (*Uṇādi Sūtras* II. 21), and the root becoming elongated, *cha* becomes *dha*: and thus 'Śūdra'.⁵⁸³ Hence sorrowfulness is alone indicated by the use of the word, 'Śūdra,' and not caste.

583 The *Uṇādi Sūtras*, quoted here for the derivation of the word, *Śūdra*, are regarded as second only to Pāṇini in authority by the *Śrutaprakāśikā*. The

derivation, *Śrutāt dūrah*, (far from the *Vedas*) given on the basis of *Nirukta*, explains the usual meaning of the word.

Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa was a generous giver of wealth and generous giver of food. One of two sages, who were pleased with the piety of this first among the pious and were desirous of rousing in him the desire for the knowledge of the *Brahman*, flying near him at night in the form of swans, said to the other: "O fair-eyed (swan), the glory of Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa has spread like the day. Go not near him lest it should burn you." (IV.1.2) The other swan, having heard in this manner the speech in praise of Jānaśruti, replied: "How can you speak of him, being as he is, as if he were Raikva Sayugvān?" (IV.1.3) That is, how can you speak of him, Jānaśruti, being what he is, as if he were Raikva Sayugvān, who knows the *Brahman* and is endowed with the most excellent qualities?⁵⁸⁴ That Raikva, the knower of the *Brahman*, is alone endowed with the most excellent qualities in the world. What excellence is there in Jānaśruti who does not know the *Brahman*, even though he may be endowed with great piety? Can the glory born of his qualities, burn me like the glory of Raikva? (Such seems to be) the meaning. Asked "Who is this Raikva?" by the other swan, who was spoken to in this manner, (this swan) said: "He in whose works and knowledge are contained all the works whatsoever done by good men and all the knowledge of all conscious beings, he is Raikva."⁵⁸⁵

Jānaśruti, having heard that speech of the swan, implying dispraise of himself on account of lack of knowledge of the *Brahman*, and on account of possession of that

584. *Sayugvān*, according to the usual reading of the *Upanishad* and *Sayuktivān*, according to some editions of the *Śrībhāṣya*. The word may mean (i) one who has a cart and (ii) one whose qualities are excellent.

585. Rāmānuja is here paraphrasing *Chhānd. Up.* IV. 2. 2. He takes *Yastāṁ veda, yat sa veda* to mean: 'Whoever knows anything, that he (i. e., Raikva) knows.' In Vol. 1, p. 17, the same passage has been quoted in the

sense of 'He who is the knower of that (*Brahman* and that (*Brahman*) whom he knows'. Rāṅga-rāmānuja reconciles the two interpretations by referring to two readings of the *Upanishad* text—*sa mayaitad uktam* and *sa mayaitad uktah*. The interpretation here is based on the latter reading which refers to the person who is described, and that in Vol. I to the former reading which refers to what is said.

(knowledge), couched in praise of Raikva, at that very moment sent his door-keeper to seek and find out where Raikva was. When he learnt (where Raikva was) and came back, he (Jānaśruti) himself approached Raikva to be taught by him: and making a present to Raikva of six hundred cows, golden coins, mules and a chariot, requested him thus : “ Venerable sir, whatever deity you worship, teach me that deity.” (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 2. 2) The meaning is: Teach me that supreme deity, whom you worship.

And Raikva, who knew the three worlds through the greatness of his own *yoga*, understood that Jānaśruti was full of grief when he heard the speech of the swans, which, owing to his having no knowledge of the *Brahman*, contained disrespectful remarks in relation to him: he (Raikva) also understood that he (Jānaśruti) immediately afterwards made preparations with the object of attaining the knowledge of the *Brahman*. Then, learning that he had the fitness (to study and adopt the science of the *Brahman*), Raikva thought that, without service (as a disciple) for a long time, he (Jānaśruti) was rendering such service by the bestowal of wealth, and that the knowledge of the *Brahman* would become firmly fixed in him by his (Jānaśruti's) bestowal of wealth to the full extent of his power : then with the object of favouring him (Jānaśruti), he (Raikva) brought to his notice, by addressing him by means of the word ‘Śūdra’—that his being filled with sorrow clearly indicated his fitness for receiving the teaching (about the *Brahman*): and then said as follows: “Fie ! necklace and chariot be yours, O Śūdra, together with the cows.”⁵⁸⁶

586. In *Chhānd. Up.* IV. 2. 3, Raikva tells jānaśruti: *Ahaḥāretvā Śūdra tavaiva saha gobhirastu*. This is taken as ‘*Ahaḥāretvā*, in the sense of ‘O fie, the necklace and the chariot’. *Hāra* (necklace) with *itvā* (chariot) gives the compound word *hāretvā*. J. Muir in his *Original Sanskrit Texts*, Vol. III. objects to this interpretation on the ground that “although *itvā* might be the nominative of *itvān*, going, no such word appears in the lexicons with the sense of ‘chariot’.” He also

gives a suggestion of Prof. Goldsucker to the effect that the words might be split up as *Ahaḥāre tvā*, the *tvā* being taken as the nominative singular feminine of the Vedic pronoun *tvā*, meaning ‘someone’. The sentence under consideration may then mean: “O friend, some woman belongs to thee, O Śūdra. Let her be (i.e., come along) with the cows.” The further argument is that this interpretation is supported by jānaśruti taking his daughter to Raikva. *

The meaning is this : “ Let this chariot be with yourself along with your cows. By giving me this much, knowledge of the *Brahman* will not become firmly fixed in you, who are filled with sorrow, arising out of the desire to know the *Brahman*. ”

Then, that Jānaśruti gave cows and other kinds of wealth to the full extent of his power and also a maiden (to Raikva) and then approached (Raikva) to receive the teaching from him. And that Raikva, again, declaring his (Jānaśruti's) real fitness (to know the *Brahman*), addressed him by means of the word, ‘Sūdra’, and told him thus : “ You have brought these as gifts, O Sūdra, and through them as though a mouth have you made me speak.” (*Chhānd. Up. IV. 2. 5*). He told Jānaśruti : You have brought to me as a gift all this, that is, wealth to the full extent of your power : through this very means, even without attending (as a disciple on a master) for a long time, you have made me give utterance to the language relating to the teaching about the *Brahman*, as desired by you. So saying, he (Raikva) taught (the *Brahman* to Jānaśruti).

Therefore, what is indicated by the word ‘Sūdra’ is nothing more than (Jānaśruti's) grief for the purpose of declaring his fitness to receive the teaching (of the science of the *Brahman*), but it is not his belonging to the fourth class (of Śūdras, that is so indicated here).

क्षत्रियत्वगतेश्च

Sūtra 34. *Kshatriyatvagateścha.* 99)

Because also it may be made out (from the context) that he (Jānaśruti) is a Kshatriya.

This Jānaśruti is characterised as the lord of gifts by saying: “ He is the giver away of much wealth.” (*Chhānd.*

Up. IV. 1. 1): and he is made out to be the giver away of very large quantities of prepared food by means of the passage beginning with: "In his house, much food is cooked," and ending with: "On all sides, they eat of his food of this kind." ⁵⁸⁷ (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 1. 1): owing to these, and owing also to the fact of his having sent his door-keeper (to search for Raikva) as mentioned in the statement, "Indeed, he got up from his bed and spoke to his door-keeper" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 1. 5); and owing, again, to the fact of his having been the ruler of a country, as may be learnt from his gifts of many villages; it is made out that Jānaśruti is a Kshattriya and that he could not belong to the fourth class (of Sūdras).

It has thus been pointed out that from the story occurring in the beginning (of this context), he (Jānaśruti) may be made out to have been a Kshattriya. From the story occurring in the conclusion also of this context, it may be made out that he is a Kshattriya. Accordingly says (the *Sūtrakāra*):

उत्तरत्र चैत्ररथेन लिङ्गात्

Sūtra 35. *Uttaratra Chaitrarathena liṅgāt.* (100)

Because also there are in the later portion (of the context) bases of inference arising from Chaitraratha (being a Kshattriya and leading to the conclusion that Jānaśruti is also a Kshattriya).

In the conclusion of the context dealing with this very *Samvarga-vidyā*, which is taught to Jānaśruti, mention is

587. The text reads: "Sarvata evam etad annam atsyanti." The *Upanishad* reading is: "Sarvata eva me annam atsyanti." The latter means: "On all sides they will eat my food." This is what

Jānaśruti was thinking, when he constructed rest-houses, providing free boarding and lodging. Rāmānuja may be paraphrasing instead of quoting.

made of a Kshattriya under the name of Chaitraratha, otherwise known as Abhipratārin: through him (so ascertained to be a Kshattriya), it is made out that he, Jānaśruti, is a Kshattriya. How? By means of the passage beginning with: "Once, while Śaunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratārin Kākshaseni were being waited on at their meal, a religious student begged of them," and ending with: "O thou religious student, we do not worship that being" (*Chhānd. Up. IV. 3. 5 to 7*)—it is made out that Kāpeya, Abhipratārin and the begging religious student are all mentioned as being connected with the *Samvarga-vidyā*. And among these, Abhipratārin is a Kshattriya and the other two are Brāhmaṇas.⁵⁸⁸

In respect of this (*Samvarga-*) *vidyā*, the Brāhmaṇa may be seen to be connected with it (so as to have the privilege of practising it), and among those who are other (than the Brāhmaṇa), only the Kshattriya and not the Śūdra may be seen to be so associated with it. Therefore, it is proper that Jānaśruti also, who is other than the Brāhmaṇa Raikva who is connected with this (*Samvarga-*) *vidyā*, is also undoubtedly a Kshattriya: but does not belong to the fourth class (of Śūdras).

In the context here it is declared that Abhipratārin is a Kshattriya and that he is the same as Chaitraratha: and it may be therefore asked how this Abhipratārin is a Kshattriya and how he is the same as Chaitraratha. To this (objection), he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) says (in answer) thus: "Because there are bases of inference". From the

588. Jānaśruti learns from Raikva the worship of the *Brahman* as the *Samvarga* or the All-absorber. Air and the life-breath are taught to be meditated on as embodiments of the *Brahman* so characterised. Then the story is told of two other students of this *vidyā*, Kāpeya and Abhipratārin. While they are being served at dinner, a mendicant religious

student comes to them. As they do not offer him any food, he gets angry and boastful. He speaks of his worship of *Brahmā* the creator as the All-absorber, and demands food as a devotee practically identical with the deity. Abhipratārin corrects him, pointing out the *Brahman* to be the All-absorber.

association of Abhipratārin with Kāpeya as mentioned in the statement, "Once while Śaunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratārin Kākshaseni (were being waited on) etc." (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 3. 5)—taken as a basis for inference, it is made out that this Abhipratārin is associated with Kāpeya. Elsewhere (in the scriptures) also, by means of the statement : "The Kāpeyas, indeed, made Chaitraratha perform that sacrifice" (*Tāṇḍya-Brāhmaṇa*, XX. 12. 5)—it is declared that he who is so associated with Kāpeya is Chaitraratha. Similarly, in the passage, that from this, Chaitraratha, a chief of the Kshattriyas is born, ⁵⁸⁹ (*Tāṇḍya-Brāhmaṇa*, XX. 12. 5) (it is declared) that Chaitraratha is a Kshattriya. Therefore, it is made out that Abhipratārin is the same as Chaitraratha and is also a Kshattriya.

It has in this manner been pointed out that there are no bases of inference to establish that the Śūdra has any such fitness (for the study and adoption of the science of the *Brahman*)—which is opposed to reason. Now he (the *Sūtrakāra*) says that the *Śrutis* and the *Smritis* support the fact that, as established by reason, the Śūdra is unfit (to study and adopt the science of the *Brahman*).

संस्कारपरामर्शतदभावाभिलाषश्च

Sūtra 36. *Samskāraparāmarśāt tadabhāvābhilāpāchcha.* (101)

Because certain religious ceremonies are mentioned as needed (for the study and adoption of the science of the *Brahman*) and because the absence of these (ceremonies) is mentioned (in relation to the Śūdra).

589. The Kāpeyas were the priests who helped King Chaitraratha to perform a *dvirātra* sacrifice, which later came to be known by his name. The argument is that Kāpeya's Kshattriya

friend, Abhipratārin, in *Chhānd. Up.* IV. 2 must be this King. The second quotation from the *Tāṇḍya-Brāhmaṇa* refers to Chaitrarathin, and not to Chaitraratha.

In the contexts relating to the teachings bearing upon the science of the *Brahman*, the religious ceremony of *upanayana* (or initiation into Vedic studies) is mentioned (as necessary) as in the following among other passages: "I shall perform the *upanayana* ceremony unto you" (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 4. 5): "He (Uddālaka Āruṇi) performed the *upanayana* ceremony unto him (Śaukeya)" (*Śat. Brāh.* XI. 5. 3. 13). And the absence of *upanayana* and other such religious ceremonies is mentioned in relation to the *Sūdra* in such passages as the following: "In the case of the *Sūdra*, there can be no serious trespass (on account of failure to perform prescribed rituals), and he is not worthy to receive sacraments." (*Manu*, X. 126): "The fourth caste has one birth only." (*G. Dh. S. X.* 5) : "And he is not worthy to receive the sacraments."(?)

तदभावनिर्धारणे च प्रवृत्तेः

Sūtra 37. *Tadabhāvavirdhāraṇe cha pravṛtiteḥ.* (102)

Because also of the undertaking (of the teaching in the case of *Jābāla*) after making sure of its absence (i.e., of the absence of his belonging to the *Sūdra* caste).

According to the passage, "He who is not a *Brāhmaṇa* is not capable of saying this so plainly," (*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 4. 5)—it is only after making sure that the pupil, *Jābāla*, is not a *Sūdra* that the teaching of the science (of the *Brahman*) is proceeded with⁵⁹⁰ (in his case) : therefore also the *Sūdra* is not fit (to study the science of the *Brahman*).

श्रवणाध्ययनार्थप्रतिषेधात्

Sūtra 38. *Śravaṇādhyaṇāṛthapratishedhāt.* (103)

590. In *Chhānd. Up.* IV. 4, the teacher, Gautama, asks a young boy who seeks instruction, about his lineage. The boy frankly says that his mother does not know it. His name is Satyakāma, and his mother's name is *Jābālā*. Pleased at this candour, Gautama exclaims

that only a *Brāhmaṇa* could have spoken the truth thus. Then the initiation ceremony for the boy is performed by Gautama. Later, Satyakāma learns the worship of the *Brahman* as made up of sixteen 'parts' or 'aspects'.

Because (in the case of the Śūdra) there is prohibition in relation to the listening to, learning to recite and understanding (the *Vedas*).

Listening to the *Vedas*, learning to recite them and the practising of those things that are taught therein are all prohibited in the case of the Śūdra, as in the following passages: "For a Śūdra is indeed a moving cemetery, therefore the *Veda* should not be learnt in the neighbourhood of a Śūdra." (*Vas. Sm.* VIII. 9): "Therefore the Śūdra is *bahupaśu* and is unfit to perform sacrifices" (?)

The word *bahupaśu*⁵⁹¹ means (here) that he resembles cattle (in not being qualified for the study of the *Vedas*). In the case of one who cannot even hear (the *Veda* taught), it is not possible to learn to recite (the *Vedas*), to understand their meaning and to practise the things that are taught therein. Therefore, all these (last-mentioned things) are undoubtedly prohibited (in the case of the Śūdra).

स्मृतेश्च

Sūtra 39. *Smṛiteścha.* (104)

Because also it is so declared in the *Smṛitis*.

(In the case of a Śūdra) the prohibition in relation to listening to (the *Vedas*) etc., is also declared in the *Smṛitis*, as in the following passages: Now then, if he hears the *Veda*, his ears should be filled with (molten) lead and lac: if he utters it, his tongue should be cut off: if he carries it in his mind, his body should be broken to pieces. (*G. Dh.S.* XII. 3): "And he should not be taught any rules of conduct, and he also should not be taught any religious rites." (*Manu*, IV. 80)

591. The word *bahupaśu* ordinarily means one who possesses many heads of cattle: and as these help in the performance of sacrifices, this sense of the word makes

the Śūdra unfit to study the *Veda* and perform sacrifices. In the context, the word is used in a different sense.

Therefore, it is a demonstrated conclusion that the Śūdra has not the fitness (needed for the study and adoption of the science of the *Brahman*).

However, those who maintain that the Highest Reality is the *Brahman* alone, who is pure, attributeless Intelligence : that all else is unreal : that the bondage (of the soul) is also unreal and is capable of being removed solely through that knowledge which relates to reality as it is and is derived out of scriptural texts : and that such removal constitutes of itself (*moksha* or) final release—they⁵⁹² cannot say that the Śūdra and such others are unfit to know the *Brahman* because even he unto whom the *upanayana* ceremony is not performed, who has not studied the *Veda* and has not learnt the *Vedānta*, may have, produced in him, the knowledge relating to the Reality as it is by means of some such sentence as declares that the Highest Reality is the pure attributeless *Brahman* alone and that all else is superimposed on Him and (hence) unreal: because also the bondage (of the soul) may be removed by this much alone. And it is not possible to impose the restriction that the origination of knowledge has to take place solely by means of the scriptural sentence, "That thou art," (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 8. 1. etc.*)—, and other such (sentences), and not through any other (*i.e.*, non-scriptural) sentences: because knowledge is not subject to the control of any man⁵⁹³ for the reason that knowledge arises in him even when he does not like to have it, provided there are the requisite means for its production.

Further it cannot be said that freedom from bondage results, only when the knowledge of the Reality as it is arises through the *Vedic* statements : because when

592. The reference is to the *Advaitins* who believe *moksha* to be the direct result of meditation on the scriptural texts affirming the identity of the *Brahman* with the self. The argument here is that having rejected the *Karmakāṇḍa*, they allow no scope for the supersensuous (*adṛishta*) effects of rituals and Vedic recitation and study in qualifying one for *moksha*. Hence they may as well say

that the *Jñānakāṇḍa* is also unnecessary.

593. There is an implied contrast here between *jñāna* and *bhakti* as the means for the attainment of final release. Knowledge arises, whenever the necessary conditions for its rise are fulfilled. Perception, inference etc. are not dependent on the will and pleasure of the knowing agent. *Bhakti*, however is the result of effort.

the knowledge of the Reality as it is, arises by this or that sentence, there is (seen) the disappearance of illusion (or *avidyā*): that is because pure knowledge may arise even out of purely human utterances to the effect that the Highest Reality is the *Brahman*, who is pure, attributeless Intelligence and that all else is unreal: and because also illusion is removed through that much alone. For instance, even out of trustworthy human testimony, the illusion relating to the false perception of silver in the mother-of-pearl etc., is removed in the case of a *Brāhmaṇa* as well as in the case of a *Śūdra*. In this same manner, there may arise in the case of a *Śūdra* also the knowledge of the Reality as it is, with the help of the traditional utterances of those who know the *Veda*: and through the knowledge (so derived) the illusory apprehension of the world (by him) may become removed.

Moreover, it is not possible to say that, owing to the injunction contained in the passage, "And he should not be taught any rules of conduct, and he should not also be taught any religious rites" (*Manu*, IV. 80), those who know the *Veda* do not teach the *Śūdra* and such others: because those who have, through the scriptural sentence, "That thou art," (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7. etc.) and such others, understood⁵⁹⁴ that the *Brahman* is the self and take their stand on the crown of the *Veda* and are hence free from (such) limitations and qualifications (as determine the fitness for the performance of religious functions), are not, in consequence, bound down by any prohibitory regulations. Or knowledge may, indeed, be produced in *Śūdras* and such others by means of the utterances of those few who transgress all prohibitory laws (bearing hereon).

594. Rāmānuja here echoes the language of a verse from Suresvara's *Naishkarmya-siddhi*, which runs thus: "The sage, having burnt away all darkness by the fire of the knowledge of the *Brahman*, stands at the crown of the *Vedas*. How can he be a servant of the *Vedas*?" This

refers to the sage rising above all the do's and don't's affecting the average man. "The crown of the *Vedas*" usually means the '*Vedānta*'. Here there is a suggestion of the sage trampling down the *Vedas*. *Naishkarmya-siddhi* had attracted the attention of Yāmuna earlier.

Moreover, it cannot be urged that, unlike the removal of the illusion relating to the false perception of the silver in the mother-of-pearl etc., the illusory apprehension of the world by the Śūdra is not removed immediately after that knowledge of the reality is born (in him), which is due to (instructive) human utterances : the reason being, that the illusory apprehension of the world by the Brāhmaṇa is not removed immediately after he hears the sentence, "That thou art" (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 8. 7* etc.), and such others.

It may, however, be said that it is only after the innate impression of duality is removed through steady meditation (as practised in *yoga*) that the *Vedic* sentence, "That thou art," and such others generate the knowledge that removes (ignorance). (But) a human utterance also operates in the same manner in the case of the Śūdra and such others, and thus there is (here) no peculiarity. Steady meditation is, indeed, the process of mentally conceiving that thing, which is to be denoted by the sentence which says that the self is the same as the *Brahman*. This (steady meditation) alone removes the erroneous impression (of distinctions), and hence you say that the injunction bearing upon steady meditation aims at a directly producible result. The study and repetition of the *Veda* are useful only in producing the desire to know (the *Brahman*) : accordingly, when the desire to acquire true knowledge is (anyhow) produced in a Śūdra also, then through steady meditation etc. he gets rid of the erroneous innate impression (of distinctions), and (true) knowledge is in consequence born in him by means of human utterances. By means of this very (knowledge), the bondage that is unreal is also removed.

Or perhaps it may be said as follows. With the help of perception, supported by reasoning, and (also) with the help of inference,⁵⁹⁵ the Śūdra and also such others may

595. The reference is particularly to two arguments of the Advaitins known as *Pramāṇa-anupapatti* and *Prameya-anupapatti*: (i) Perception apprehends the attributeless *Brahman* and

not differentiation. (ii) Differentiation cannot be logically defined, being neither the essential nature of things, nor a qualifying attribute. See Vol. 1, pp. 37-39.

first definitely learn the character (of the *Brahman*) as being the witness of ignorance or (*avidyā*), and also learn that the world consists of the various and wonderful kinds of superimpositions conceived as the knower and the known, which are all due to that (*avidyā*), and learn further that all these are superimposed on the Internal Self, which is the self-luminous, pure and attributeless Intelligence : then they get rid of the erroneous innate impression (of distinctions) in connection with the above-mentioned Internal Self through continuous meditation (on Him as He is in reality) : then they directly realise that same Internal Self, and are thereafter finally released (from material bondage)—thus no useful purpose is seen to be served here by means of the *Vedāntic* sentences which relate to (the *Brahman's*) endless and false attributes not related to this world, such as (His) wonderful sovereignty, (His) wonderful powers of creation, etc.: therefore, it is really good to hold that the Śūdra and such others alone possess the fitness (needed for the study and adoption of the science of the *Brahman*). Since the Brāhmaṇas and others also may, in this same fashion, derive the knowledge of the *Brahman*, the poor and pitiable *Upanishads*, too, (owing to their uselessness) might be (deemed dead and) given the (funereal) oblation of water.

Again, it is not possible to say as follows : that it is only when it is pointed out by someone (or something) to a person wandering in error in the matter of practical realisations naturally obtaining in this world—that the practical realisations obtaining in the world are all illusory, and that the Highest Reality is indeed such and such, that there arises (in him) the desire to acquire true knowledge, which is learnt with the help of perception and inference, and therefore the revealed scripture which points out this (true knowledge), has to be accepted as necessary. The reason for this is that to those who are frightened by the errors of *samsāra*, even the Sāṅkhyas and others⁵⁹⁶ offer

596. The others are the Naiyāyikas, Buddhists, Jains etc.

explanations of the reality with the help of perception and inference, and thus generate in them that desire to know (the *Brahman*), which is due to perception and inference. And when such a desire to know (the *Brahman*) is born (in men), it can be clearly discerned with the help of perception and inference themselves which are entirely distinct in their nature, that the eternal, pure, self-luminous, and unchangeable Intelligence without a second is alone real, and all else is superimposed thereupon.

Moreover, in regard to the self-luminous Real Entity of this kind, it cannot be admitted that there is any other attribute which has to be learnt from the scripture. For in your opinion, the scripture is that which removes whatever forms the superimposed other-ness of things (in relation to the Reality). Further the *Upanishads* cannot be accepted as being necessary for obtaining the knowledge relating to the blissful nature of the really existent Self: because that (Self's) character as an intelligent entity, which is logically excluded from all other things not having the same nature with itself, constitutes by itself the blissful nature (mentioned here).⁵⁹⁷

On the other hand, in the case of the person who holds the view that the knowledge which is enjoined by *Vedāntic* teachings as constituting the means for obtaining final release is of the nature of worship; that that (worship) consists in pleasing the Highest Person, who is the Highest *Brahman*; that (the manner of) such pleasing is to be learnt solely from the *śāstras*; that the *śāstra* relating to worship accepts, as the means for its own realisation, only that knowledge, which, being produced by the *Veda* which has been studied by one who has been

597. Bliss, according to the *Advaitins*, is logical exclusion from unhappiness. The *Brahman* is bliss because He is logically excluded from whatever is material,

and is of the nature of *Chit*. There is therefore no need for a separate argument to prove that the *Brahman* is bliss.

purified by religious ceremonies such as *upanayana* etc., is helped by discrimination, freedom and other means⁵⁹⁸ (for its accomplishment); and that, finally, the Highest Person, who is pleased with a worship of this kind, frees the worshipper from (material) bondage, after previously destroying his ignorance born of *karma* through giving him the natural knowledge that appertains to the reality of his own self—in the case of a person who maintains such a view) it is appropriate for him to hold that, in accordance with the foregoing arguments, the Śūdra and such others have not the fitness (needed for the study and adoption of the science of the *Brahman*).

ADHIKARAṆA VI⁵⁹⁹

PRAMITĀDHIKARAṆA

Having thus concluded the above incidental and sub-incidental discussions (regarding the fitness of the gods and of the Śūdra for the study and adoption of the science of the *Brahman*), he (the *Sūtrakāra*) gives another reason which leads again to the view that He, who is of the size of the thumb and forms the subject under discussion here,⁶⁰⁰ possesses the character of the Highest Person as made out from His being the lord of the past and the future.

598. See Vol. I, p. 20.

599. *Adhikaraṇa* VI, interrupted by digressions from p. 147, is resumed now.

600. Śaṅkara begins a new *Adhikaraṇa* here, the *pūrvapakṣa* there being that *prāṇa* is the vital air. In Rāmānuja's view this doubt cannot arise because of *Kaṭh. Up.* IV. 12 and VI. 17. The doubt here is that, in spite of all that has been said, the thumb-sized Person, described as *īśāna* in *Kaṭh. Up.* IV. 12. & 13, may be the individual self, sovereign in

relation to the body. The answer is that in *Kaṭh. Up.* VI. 2 & 3, everything is said to tremble at him. So he must be the *Brahman*. Hence Rāmānuja says that a view once established and then shaken by a further doubt is here re-established. The object of this *Sūtra* is *uttambhana*. The *Śrūta-prakāśikā* justifies the digressions and their inclusion in Chap. I and not in Chap. III. of the *Ved. Sūt.* on the ground that they too help to establish the *Brahman* being the cause of the universe.

कम्पनात्

Sūtra 40. *Kampanāt* (105)

(He who is of the size of the thumb is th^e *Brahman*) on account of trembling (at Him being predicated in relation to the whole world).

Between these two passages, namely, "The Person who is of the size of the thumb sits at the centre within one's own self" (*Kaṭh. Up.* IV. 12), and "The Person who is of the size of the thumb is the Internal Self of all beings" (*Kaṭh. Up.* VI. 16), is found the passage : "The whole of this world—whatever there is—which is (existent) in *Prāṇa* and has proceeded therefrom, trembles, on account of great fear from Him who is like *vajra* (i.e., a powerful weapon) uplifted. Those who know this, they become immortal. Through fear for Him, the fire burns, through that fear the sun shines, through that fear, air and Indra (run, i.e., perform their duties) and Death runs as the fifth (i.e., performs its duties)" (*Kaṭh. Up.* VI. 2 & 3). Here it is declared there is shaking, that is, trembling, on account of the great fear that is due to Him, by the whole world, together with the god of fire, the sun-god and others, who are all existent in the Person who is of the size of the thumb and is denoted by the word *Prāṇa* : and who have also proceeded out of Him. The meaning is that, owing to the great fear that, if His commands are transgressed, something (serious) will happen, the whole world shakes as (one would) under an uplifted powerful weapon, inasmuch as this (passage) must have the same meaning with this other : "Through fear of Him, the fire burns." (*Kaṭh. Up.* VI. 3). The words, '*mahat bhayam vajram udyatam*'—which are all put in the first (or nominative) case, have (here) the significance of the fifth (or ablative) case.⁶⁰¹

601. These four words have been construed as ablatives, and rendered as if the text was: *mahataḥ bhayāt vajrāt udyatāt*. Taken as nominatives, they would

mean: "He is a great terror (like) the uplifted *vajra*." Rāmānuja rejects this interpretation as less suitable.

And such is the nature of the Highest Person : because from the following passages—" Indeed, under the supreme command of this *Akshara*, the sun and moon, O Gārgî, stand well supported." (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 9) : "Through fear of Him, the wind blows ; through that fear the sun rises ; through fear of Him fire and Indra (perform their duties) and Death runs as the fifth." (*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 1)—it is understood that it is only the Highest *Brahman*, who is the Highest Person, that can possess this kind of sovereignty (that is dreaded by all).

For the following reason also, He who is of the size of the thumb is the Highest Person :

ज्योतिर्दर्शनात्

Sūtra 41. *Jyotirdarśanāt* (106)

Because the splendour (of the *Brahman*) is seen (mentioned in the context, He who is of the size of the thumb is the *Brahman*).

Between these two passages (*Kaṭh. Up.* IV. 12 & VI. 17) relating to Him who is of the size of the thumb, there is the passage : " There the sun shines not, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, much less fire. He shining, all this shines after Him, and by His light is all this lighted up." (*Kaṭh. Up.* V. 15). From this it is seen that there is mentioned in relation to Him who is of the size of the thumb that splendour, which is peculiar to the Highest *Brahman*, which eclipses all (other) brilliance, which forms the cause of all (other) light and is also helpful to them. This very passage which is found in an *Upanishad* of the *Atharva-veda* (*viz.*, the *Muṇḍaka Upanishad*, II. 2. 10), is there given in reference to the Highest *Brahman*.

Moreover, it is declared everywhere in the *Vedānta* that to possess the character of Supreme Light (or the Greatest Splendour) belongs to the Highest *Brahman*, as, for instance, in the following among other passages :— “ Having reached the Highest Light (*i.e.*, the *Brahman*), he (*i.e.*, the released soul) manifests himself in his own true form”. (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 3. 4); “ Indeed, the gods worship Him who is the Light of lights and who is immortal life as well ” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 16); “ Now, that Light which shines beyond this Highest Heaven ” etc.— (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 13. 7).

ADHIKARAṆA X

ARTHĀNTARATVĀDIVYAPADEŚĀDHIKARAṆA

आकाशोऽर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात्

Sūtra 42. *Ākāśo'rthāntaratvādivyapadeśāt.* (107)

What is denoted by the word *Ākāśa* (is the *Brahman*), because it is taught (in the context) that it is, among other things, a different thing (from the individual self).

In the *Chhāndogya Upanishad*, it is declared to the following effect : “ Indeed, the *Ākāśa* is a differentiator (or creator) of name and form, and what is between these (*viz.*, name and form). That is the *Brahman*, That is immortality, That is the Self.” (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 14. 1). Here the doubt arises whether he who is pointed out by the word, *ākāśa*, is the released individual self, or whether He is the Supreme Self.⁶⁰² What then is the conclusion ?

602. According to Śaṅkara, the doubt here is whether the *ākāśa* referred to in the context refers to the *Brahman* or to elemental ether. Rāmānuja seems to feel that such a doubt has been settled once for all in the *Ākāśādhi-karaṇa* (I. 1. 23). Now the *pūrvapakṣa* is that the released

self can be held to be the differentiator of name and form, because in the state of bondage he was the instrument of the *Brahman* in this differentiation. Or *nirvalūṭi* may merely mean one who bears, *i.e.*, is the vehicle of name and form. His omniscience links him with undiminished light.

That it is a released individual self. Why? Because it is a released individual self that is dealt with in the immediately connected context in the passage: "Shaking off sin, just as a horse shakes off (dead) hair, and being freed like the moon from the mouth of Rāhu, (*i.e.*, from an eclipse), I shake off the body, and then I, the well blessed individual self, attain the eternal world of the *Brahmān*." (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 13. 1): 603 and because also the expression, "what is between these (*viz.*, name and form)," refers to that individual self who is freed from name and form in the statement, "The *ākāśa* is the differentiator of name and form"—it is that same (released individual self) that is intended to be denoted in its former condition (of bondage). Indeed, it is he that formerly had the forms of gods, etc., as well as their names. The present (free) condition of that same (individual self), as freed from name and form, is itself mentioned in the statement—"That is the *Brahman*, that is immortality". And the word *ākāśa* may be appropriately applied even to that (released individual self), inasmuch as he is associated with undiminished light.

It may, however, be said that this (passage), being complementary to the passage relating to the *daharākāśa* (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1 to 6), that same *dahārākāśa* is made out to be this (*Akāśa* here), and that it (*viz.*, the *dahārākāśa*) has been already determined to be the Supreme Self. It is replied that it is not right to say so, because the passage attributed to Prajāpati (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 6 to 12) intervenes (between the passage under discussion and that relating to the *daharākāśa*). And in the passage attributed to Prajāpati what is declared is the individual self's condition ending in his state of final release, and immediately thereafter, that very individual self in his state of final

603. Śaṅkara understands the simile about the horse to refer to the animal shaking off dust from its hair. Rāmānuja's interpretation of the passage is given clearly in the *Vedānta-Sāra* (III.

2. 20). Rāhu and Ketu, in mythology, are two demons who swallow the sun and the moon now and then and cause eclipses. In Indian astronomy, they represent the nodes of the moon.

release is dealt with in the passage—"Shaking off sin, etc." (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 13. 1*).

If it is so arrived at, it is stated in reply—"What is denoted by the word, *Ākāśa* (is the *Brahman*), because it is taught (in the context) that it is, among other things, a different thing (from the individual self)". (*Ved. Sū. I. 3. 42*). What is denoted by the word, *Ākāśa*, is the Supreme *Brahman*. Why? "Because it is taught (in the context) that it is, among other things, a different thing from the individual self". Surely, it is taught in the passage—"Indeed, the *Ākāśa* is the differentiator of name and form." (*Chhānd. Up. VIII. 14. 1*)—that it (*viz.*, the *Ākāśa*) is a different thing (from the individual self). To possess the capability to differentiate names and forms shows that the *Ākāśa* is a different thing from the individual self, which exists in both the conditions of bondage and final release. In the condition of bondage, he (*viz.*, the individual self) is himself subject to the influence of *karma*, and hence assumes names and forms. He cannot, therefore, differentiate names and forms. In the condition of final release, he (*i.e.*, the individual self) cannot at all possess the capability to differentiate names and forms, inasmuch as it is impossible for him to have any activity relating to the (creation etc. of the) world. 604

On the contrary, it is learnt from the scripture itself that the characteristic of differentiating names and forms belongs to the Lord, who is the mighty agent in the creation of all the worlds, as from the following, among other passages: "Entering in along with this individual self, which (also) is the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiations of name and form." (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 3. 2*): "He who understands all and who knows all and whose *tapas* consists of knowledge—from Him proceeds the undifferentiated creation as also the world of matter and soul

604. See *Ved. Sū. (IV. 4. 17)*.

characterised by the differentiations of name and form.” (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 9): “The omniscient Lord, who creates all beings, gives them names, and calling them (by these names) ever continues to be.” (*Taitt. Ār.* III. 12. 7). Therefore, this differentiator of names and forms is none other than the Highest *Brahman*, who is a different entity from the individual self whose names and forms have to be differentiated.

The expression—“what is between these (names and forms)” (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 14. 1.)⁶⁰⁵—explains this same thing. For whatever reason this *ākāśa* is between names and forms, that is, is untouched by them and constitutes a distinct entity, for that same reason, it (*viz.*, the *Ākāśa* or the *Brahman*) is the differentiator, that is to say, He differentiates (them) through His possession of the qualities of being free from sin, and of willing the truth. Here the expression, *other things*, includes in its import the character of being the *Brahman*, the character of being the Self, and the character of being immortal. Unconditioned greatness and other such (qualities) appropriately belong only to the Supreme Self. Therefore the *Ākāśa* here is undoubtedly the Supreme Self.

What has been stated above to the effect that in the passage “Shaking off this body, etc.”—(*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 14. 1)—the released individual self is dealt with in the immediately connected context—that is not right; because in the statement—“I attain the world of the *Brahman*” (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 14. 1)—the Highest *Brahman* Himself is dealt with in the immediately connected context. Although the Highest *Brahman* is pointed out here to be the object of attainment to the released individual self, who is the

605. Here *te yadantarā* of the *Upanishad* has been construed as *yat te antarā* in the translation. *Yat* of course refers to *Ākāśa* and *yasmāt kāraṇāt* is implied. This is

also Paṅgarāmānuja's rendering. The *Śrībhāṣya* text suggests an alternative interpretation, *yasmāt (kāraṇāt) (saḥ ākāśaḥ) te antarā*.

attainer (thereof), nevertheless, as the attainer, who is the released individual self, cannot possess the quality of being the differentiator of name and form, the Highest *Brahman* Himself who is the object of attainment (to him) has here to be understood (to constitute the subject of discussion).

Moreover, the *daharākāśa*, which constitutes the subject under discussion, is here referred to in recognition under the designation of *ākāśa*: and also the passage attributed to Prajāpati relates to the description of the essential nature of the worshipper (of that *daharākāśa*): therefore, the *daharākāśa* itself which forms the object of worship is summed up as the object of attainment. To hold so is thus appropriate. Again, the word *ākāśa* is hardly seen used anywhere to denote the individual self. Therefore, the *ākāśa* here (in the passage under discussion) is the Supreme *Brahman*.

Again, it may be said as follows:—⁶⁰⁶ There is no other self (or *ātman*) which constitutes a different entity from the individual self; because oneness is taught (in the *Vedānta*) between the Supreme Self and the individual self), and because also duality is denied (in respect of them). The individual self himself in his pure condition (of final freedom) is known under the names of the Supreme Self, the Supreme *Brahman* and the Supreme Lord. Hence what is (here) mentioned as the world who is the *Brahman* (or the *brahmaloka*), that is to be attained, is not a distinct thing from the attainer (thereof), who is the released

⁶⁰⁶ Śaṅkara begins a new *adhikaraṇa* here for *Sūtras* 43 and 44, the question at issue there being whether certain passages in *Bṛih. Up.* deal with the Self in the state of *samsāra* or with the Self beyond *samsāra*. Rāmānuj continues the same *adhikaraṇa* because, among other things, the word *vyapadeśāt* has to be taken over into *Sūtra* 43 from the previous one. The *pūrvapakṣa* for Rāmānuj here is

Advaita, based on (i) *Śruti* texts declaring oneness between the *Brahman* and the individual self like "That thou art" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7), and (ii) texts denying duality like "There is nothing here that is many and varied" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 19). Rāmānuj has argued at length against *Advaita* under I. 1. 1. Here the *Sūtras* themselves are regarded as refuting *Advaita*.

individual self and forms the subject under discussion here. Therefore, that same (individual self) deserves to be the *ākāśa* as the differentiator of name and form. To this (objection), he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) says in answer:

सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन

Sūtra 43. *Sushuptyutkrāntyorbhedena* ⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

Because of the teaching of difference (between the individual self and the Supreme Self) in the states of deep sleep and death (the individual self is different from the Supreme Self).

The phrase 'because of the teaching' (*vyāpadeśāt*) has (here) to be supplied (from the previous *Sūtra*). Because the Supreme Self is taught to be a distinct entity from the individual self in the conditions of deep sleep and death, the Supreme Self certainly exists as a distinct entity from the individual self. Accordingly, there is the teaching in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* of the Vājasaneyins about the individual self, who forms the subject matter of the context in the passage beginning with: "What is the self? He is that person who is (luminous) in the proximity of the *prāṇas*. . . and wholly consists of knowledge" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 7). He is (taught to be) not aware of anything in the condition of deep sleep, and to be embraced by the omniscient Supreme Self, as stated in the passage: "When he is embraced by the omniscient Self, he does not know anything that is external, nor anything that is internal." (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 21) Similarly, in relation to the condition of death also, it is declared thus: "He is ridden upon by the omniscient Self, and goes away, giving up his body." (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 35). And that (individual self) who does not know anything, while he is in the condition of deep sleep or death,—he cannot at that same time be possibly embraced or ridden upon by himself when he is omniscient.

Neither (can he be embraced or ridden upon) by another individual self; because it is not possible for this (other self) also to possess the quality of omniscience.

For the following reason also, he (*i.e.*, *Sūtrakara*) says that the Supreme Self is an entity distinct from the individual self.

पत्यादिशब्देभ्यः

Sūtra 44. *Patyādiśabdebhyaḥ* (109)

On account of the words, 'Lord' etc. (being found in the context, the Supreme Self is distinct from the individual self).

This Supreme Self, who embraces (the individual self), is mentioned under the designation of the Lord etc., as in the following passages occurring later on in the context : "He is the Lord of all,⁶⁰⁷ the controller of all, the ruler of all : He does not become greater by means of a good act, neither indeed does He become lesser by means of a bad one : He is the Lord of all, He is the master of all beings, He is the protector of all beings. He is the bridge and the support of all the worlds, so that they may not get into confusion. Brāhmaṇas desire to know Him by reciting the *Vedas* . . . Knowing Him alone, one becomes a *muni* (or meditating sage) : wishing to attain Him alone as the object of all attainment (the *sannyāsins* or) those who

607. The *Upanishad* text has "He is the lord of all" (*sarvasya adhipatiḥ*) after two other phrases. Rāmānuja places it first in his quotation because the *Sūtra* refers to it by the word '*pati*'. The compound word *patyādi* can be construed both as a *bahu vr̥hi* and a *tall uṇsha*. In the former case, it includes all that comes after the word '*pati*': in the latter, all that goes before. So the whole passage

is relevant. Moreover, the *Sūtra* uses *pati* instead of *adhipati* to call attention to *patim viśvasya* (*M. Nar.* XI. 3) where the identity between the *Brahman* and *Nārāyaṇa* is declared. This is indicated by Rāmānuja starting his commentary here by referring to the Supreme Self as *Paramātmān*, a term which is associated with the passage in *M. Nar.*

practise renunciation give up their worldly life.” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22) ; “He is indeed the great unborn Self, the giver of food, the giver of wealth—He who is free from old age, free from death, free from fear, and is the *Brahman*.” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 24 & 25). And these characteristics of being the Lord, the support of the world and the ruler of all, and other such ones, cannot in any manner whatsoever belong to the individual self, even in his condition of final freedom. Therefore, the *Akāśa*, which is the differentiator of name and form, constitutes a distinct entity from the finally released individual self.

The teaching of oneness (between the Supreme Self and the individual self), on the other hand, is based upon His being the Self of all ; because all things which are made up of the intelligent and non-intelligent objects, are all produced effects, of which the cause is the *Brahman*. And it has already been established (under *Ved. Sūta* I. 2. 1 etc.) that this (subject) is dealt with in the following among other passages : “All this indeed is the *Brahman* : all this is born in It, absorbed into It, and lives in It.” (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1). The negation of duality also follows from that same (relation of oneness between the *Brahman* as cause and the universe as effect).⁶⁰⁸ Thus it (*viz.*, our argument here in I. ii and I. iii) is flawless.

608. According to the *Advaitin*, subsists between the *Brahman* and however, the relation of oneness the individual self.

PART IV
ADHIKARAṆA I

ĀNUMĀNĀDHIKARAṆA

आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेन्न
शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेर्दर्शयति च

Sūtra 1. *Ānumānikamapyekeshamiti chenna śarīra-rūpakavinyastagṛhīter darśayati cha.* (110)

If it be said that according to some the *ānumānika* (or 'Pradhāna') also (is the cause of the world), it is replied that it is not so; because what is understood (in the context by the word, 'avyakta', is not the *pradhāna* or material Nature, but it) is that which is made metaphorically to represent the body: and the Scripture declares accordingly.

It has already been stated (in *Ved. Sūt.* I. 1) that the *Brahman* who is the cause of the creation etc. of the world, and who has to be enquired into and realised as the means for the attainment of final release, which possesses the characteristic of the highest object of human pursuit, is entirely distinct from the *pradhāna* and other non-intelligent things, as well as from the intelligent individual selves both in their conditions of cause and of final release; (in I. 2) that He is devoid of even the smallest taint of all that is evil; that He is omniscient, omnipotent, and wills the truth; that He is characterised by all auspicious qualities; and (in I. 3) that He forms the Internal Self of all and possesses unlimited sovereignty. Now, the supposition is raised (in I. 4.) to the effect that in some of the recensions of the *Veda* there also occur certain passages, which, in the way of explaining the

pradhāna, the *purusha* etc., that have not the *Brahman* for their self and are so established in the science propounded by Kapila, go in the direction of indicating that the *pradhāna* may be stated to be the cause of the world; and then this (supposition) is disproved for the purpose of firmly establishing that the *Brahman* forms the only cause of the world.

In the *Kaṭha-Vallī* it is declared as follows :—“The objects of the senses are indeed superior to the senses ; and the mind is superior to the objects of the senses ; and the faculty of intellection is superior to the mind : the great self is superior to the faculty of intellection : the *avyakta* is superior to (that) great thing (self) : the *purusha* is superior to the *avyakta* : there is nothing superior to the *purusha* : that is the highest limit : that is the final goal.” (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 10 & 11). Here the doubt arises whether or not it is *pradhāna*, which has not the *Brahman* for its internal self and is established as such in the science propounded by Kapila, that is here denoted by the word, ‘*avyakta*’.

It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is (that) *pradhāna*.⁶⁰⁹

Why? Because in the (above) statement—“The *avyakta* is superior to (that) great (self) ; the *purusha* is superior to the *avyakta*”—it is that same (*pradhāna*) that is brought out (by the word ‘*avyakta*’) for the reason that

609. The doubt raised in the *Sūtra* is about the meaning of the word ‘*avyakta*’ in *Kaṭh. Up.* III. 10. (Whether the *Brahman* or the *pradhāna* is there described to be the material cause of the universe is a further and consequential question.) The *pūrvapakṣa* is that ‘*avyakta*’, means ‘*pradhāna*’ while Rānānuja holds that the word stands for the body. The *pūrvapakṣa* arguments are:

(i) The word ‘*avyakta*’ generally means the *pradhāna*; (ii) The statement in *Kaṭh. Up.* III. 10 that the *avyakta* is superior to the *mahat* is in accordance with the Sāṅkhya view that the *avyakta* (or *pradhāna*) is the cause of *mahat* (one of its evolutes). (iii) The Sāṅkhyas who do not believe in God hold the *purusha* or the individual self to be the highest entity; as set out in *Kaṭh. Up.* III. 11.

its position in the system (of Kapila) is recalled (by the above statement), and because also in the statement—“ There is nothing superior to the *purusha*; that is the highest limit, that is the final goal”—there is the negation of any real principle over and above the *purusha* constituting the twentyfifth (principle).⁶¹⁰ It is thus arrived at that the *avyakta* (i.e., the *pradhāna*) is the cause of the world. It is this same thing that is mentioned (in the *Sūtra*) thus :--“ If it be said that according to some the *ānumānika* (or the *pradhāna*) also (is the cause of the world) etc.” (*Ved. Sūta*. I. 4. 1). ‘According to some’, that is, in the recensions of the followers of certain *Vedic* schools, the *ānumānika*, that is, the *pradhāna*, also is declared to be the cause of the world.

If it be so held, the answer thereto is that it is not (right to say) so. Here the *pradhāna*, that has not the *Brahman* for its internal self, is not denoted by the word ‘*avyakta*’. Why? “Because what is understood (in the context by the word ‘*avyakta*’ is not the *pradhāna* or material Nature, but it) is that which is made metaphorically to represent the body.” (*Ved. Sūta*. I. 4. 1) That is, because that which is metaphorically described as the body is understood by the word ‘*avyakta*’ (here). The meaning is that it is because in connection with the self, the body, the faculty of intellection, the mind, the senses and the objects of the senses, which are all metaphorically described to possess the characteristics of the chariot—i.e., the chariot, and other things, the body which is metaphorically described to be the chariot, is denoted by the word ‘*avyakta*’.⁶¹¹

⁶¹⁰. See Vol. I, Notes 39 and 169.

⁶¹¹. Rāmānuja carefully follows the *Sūtra* in taking *śarīra* as a *viśeṣaṇa* and *rūpa-vinyāsta*

as the *viśeṣya*. This helps the *Sūtra* to refer to all things metaphorically represented in the context.

What is said is this:⁶¹²—Indeed, at the beginning (of the context here) in the passages beginning with—“Know the (individual) self to be the rider in the chariot and the body itself to be the chariot. Know the faculty of intellection also to be the charioteer and the mind itself to be the reins. The senses are called horses, and the things within their sphere of operation are called their objects.” :—and ending with—“He reaches the other end of the path, and that is the highest seat of Vishṇu.” (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 3-9).—the worshipper who desires to reach the highest seat of Vishṇu, which is at the other end of the path of *samsāra*, is metaphorically described to be the rider in the chariot and such other things to be the chariot and its accessories ;⁶¹³ then it is stated that he in whose control the chariot and other things are—he alone reaches the highest seat of Vishṇu which is at the other end of the path of *samsāra* ; and thereafter in the passage beginning with :—(“The objects of the senses are indeed) superior to the senses.” (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 10)—it is pointed out in connection with the body and the other things mentioned above, which are metaphorically described to be the chariot etc., which things, in the course of their being brought under control, are more important than others (in the same course).

It being so, the perceivable objects metaphorically described as things falling within the sphere of the operation (of the senses) are, in the course of those (senses) having to

612. The order of importance of the several things mentioned in *Kaṭh. Up.* III. 10 & 11 is with reference to steps in self-realisation and God-realisation. The presence of the objects of the senses draws the senses to them. Even their absence does not help in self-control, if the mind is attached to them. This attachment can be prevented by the determination of the *buddhi*. The *buddhi* is an instrument of the soul, who is the agent. But this agency depends on the soul having

a body. And the body can subserve the interests of the soul through God's grace. The moral discipline consists of control of the mind, resolution of the *buddhi*, strengthening the soul's desire for defeating the senses, controlling the body by eating food which develops the *sattvaguna* and seeking refuge with God.

613. *Rathāṅga* has been translated as 'accessories of the chariot' to suit the context here. Its ordinary meaning is 'wheel'.

be under control, more important than the senses, which are metaphorically described to be horses ; because even he who has brought his senses under control, cannot easily restrain the senses when the perceivable objects are near. More important than these (perceivable objects) is the mind which is metaphorically described to be the reins ; because when the mind is bent upon the objects of sense-perception, even the non-proximity of (those) objects of sense-perception is of no use (in controlling it). The faculty of intellection, which is metaphorically described as the charioteer, is more important than (that) mind also ; because in the absence of (the required) resolution even the mind is of no use. The (individual) self described metaphorically as the rider in the chariot is more important than that (faculty of intellection)—also owing to his superiority in his capacity of an agent. All these things (mentioned above) are indeed subject to the will of the self himself, and therefore it is that he is characterised as being *great*.

The body which is metaphorically described as chariot is more important than that (self) also ; because all the activities which serve as the means of realising the ends of life aimed at by the individual self, are dependent upon that (body). More important than even that (body) is the Supreme Person, who forms the Internal Self of all beings, controls them from within, and is the goal of attainment (in relation to the goal of *samsāra*) : because all the things mentioned above, up to and inclusive of the individual self, have their activities dependent on His will. He, indeed, it is, who, as the controller (of all beings) from within, is the accomplisher of the act of worship. For, it will be stated later on under the aphorism—"It (*viz.*, the self's character of being the agent) is indeed due to Him who is the Highest (*Brahman*) ; because the scripture declares accordingly." (*Ved. Sūta*. II. 3. 40)—that the individual self's quality of being the agent is dependent upon the Supreme Person. It is He Himself who forms the

culmination of the several means which have to be adopted for the purpose of accomplishing the worship that consists in bringing (all the above-mentioned things) under control. This same thing is thus declared : “ There is nothing superior to the (Supreme) *Purusha* ; that is the highest limit ; that is the final goal.” (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 11).

Similarly in the *Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa* (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7), in the passage beginning with “ He who dwelling in the self ”—(*Mādḥ. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 22)—and in other similar ones, it is stated that He directly perceives all things and controls them all ; then in the passage “ There is no seer other than Him.” (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 23)—a controller other than Him is denied to exist.

In the *Bhagavad-gītā* also, it is declared thus : “ Here (we require) the abode, similarly the agent, the various kinds of instruments and then the various kinds of distinct activities, and the deity (or *daivam*) as the fifth (among the causes of work).” (*B. G.* XVIII. 14). In this passage, the word *daivam* (or deity) denotes the Supreme Person Himself ; because it is thus declared (also in the *Bhagavad-gītā*) : “ And I am also seated in the heart of all beings, and from Me proceed memory, knowledge and forgetfulness.” (*B. G.* XV. 15). And to win Him is the same as to seek refuge with Him. To that effect runs the passage : “ O Arjuna, the Lord exists in the region of the heart of all beings, and (from there) by means of His wonderful powers He causes the revolutions of all beings that are mounted upon the mechanism (of the body). Seek refuge with Him alone.” (*B. G.* XVIII. 61-2).

In this foregoing manner (the mind and) the senses and other things which are metaphorically described as the rider in the chariot and other things in accordance with the passage beginning with, “ Know the (individual) self to be the rider in the chariot.” (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 3)—are again identified by words directly denotative of themselves in the

passage beginning with "The objects of the senses are indeed superior to the senses" (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 10); but not the body which is metaphorically described to be the chariot; since in this manner it remains (unidentified), it is ascertained that it is denoted by the word '*avyakta*'. Therefore, there is here no room whatsoever for the *pradhāna* that is established in the system of Kapila.

Nor is there any recognition here of the method adopted in that system. Because, according to the passage, "The objects of the senses are, indeed, superior to the senses", the objects of the senses, such as sound etc. are spoken of as being more important than the senses. Indeed, sound and other (objects of sense-perception) do not, according to that system, form the causes of the senses. The statement, "And the mind is superior to the objects of the senses," (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 10.) is not also in agreement with that system for the very reason that it (*viz.*, the mind) is not the cause thereof.⁶¹⁴ Similarly, the statement, "The great self is superior to the faculty of intellection" (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 10)—is not also appropriate: because it is admitted (by them) that the word, '*buddhi*' (meaning the faculty of intellection), denotes the 'great principle' (or *mahat*). It is not possible for the 'great principle' (or *mahat*) to be superior to the 'great principle' (or *mahat*) itself. And to characterise the 'great principle' (or *mahat*) by the word, *ātman* (or self) is also not appropriate.⁶¹⁵ Therefore, only those things which are metaphorically described (in *Kaṭh. Up.* III. 3 etc.) are what are understood (in the passage under reference).

614. Rānānuja omits here any reference to the statement: "The *buddhi* is superior to the *manas*". This is probably because the Sāṅkhyas can argue that *buddhi* as *mahat* is the material cause of *manas* through *sātvika ahaṅkāra*. But this argument fails because, in respect of the various other things in the context described as

superior and inferior to one another, this relationship of cause and effect cannot be predicated even by the Sāṅkhyas.

615. The Sāṅkhya argument will take the word *ātman* to mean a pervader and argue that undifferentiated *mahat* pervades differentiated *mahat*.

“And the scripture declares accordingly.” The scripture also declares the same thing in the passage: “The Self is hidden in all beings and does not reveal Himself. He is, however, directly perceived by subtle seers by means of their sharp intellect. The wise man should restrain his speech within the mind, he should restrain that (mind) within the faculty of intellection belonging to the (individual) self; he should restrain the faculty of intellection within the great self; he should restrain that (self) within the ever-peaceful (Supreme) Self.” (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 12 & 13). It is taught here that that Highest Person is incapable of being perceived directly by those who have not conquered their external and internal organs (of action and sense); and accordingly, the manner in which the senses etc., which are metaphorically described as horses etc., may be brought under control is thus stated.⁶¹⁶

Yachchhed vānmanasī = He (*i.e.*, the wise man) should restrain his speech within the mind. The meaning is that the organs of activity which are headed by the organ of speech, and the organs of sense should all be restrained within the mind. In the word, *vāk*, the accusative case-suffix disappears in accordance with the grammatical rule: “(In the *Veda*) the affix *su* sometimes takes the place of the case-endings of words, sometimes the case-endings disappear etc.” (*Pāṇini*, VII. 1. 39). In the word, *manasī*, which is in the locative case, the lengthening of the final vowel, *i*, is in accordance with Vedic usage.

Tadyachchhet jñāna ātmani = He shall restrain that (mind) within the *jñāna* in the self; that is, he should restrain that mind within the faculty of intellection of the

616. The control of speech (*i.e.*, the senses) in the mind—note that *vānmanasī* does not mean ‘speech and mind’—consists of making them indifferent to functioning in a way contrary to what is desired by the mind; that of mind is to make it carry out the resolve of

the *buddhi* to the effect that the experience of the senses is not worthy; that of the *buddhi* is to make it resolve on self-realisation; and that of the soul is the realisation of its utter dependence on God. (*Śrutaprakāśikā*).

self. Here *buddhi* (or the faculty of intellection already mentioned above) is denoted by the word *jñāna*. The locatives, *jñāne* and *ātmani*, are distinct and are not grammatically equated. The meaning is that it (*viz.*, the mind) should be restrained in the *jñāna* (or faculty of intellection), which is existent in the individual self.

Jñānam ātmani mahati niyachchhet = He shall restrain the faculty of intellection within the great self: that is, the faculty of intellection should be restrained within the great self that forms the agent. *Tadyachchhet śānta ātmani* = He shall restrain that within the (ever) peaceful Self. That agent (*viz.*, the individual self) should be restrained within the (ever peaceful and) Supreme *Brahman*, who controls all things within. The neuter gender in regard to the word '*tad*' (which has here the word *ātman* in the masculine for its antecedent) is due to a permissible interchange (of gender in grammar). The meaning is that the rider in the chariot, who is of the description given above, has for his goal the abode of *Vishṇu*.

It may be asked how the word '*avyakta*' (meaning 'unmanifest') can denote the manifest body. In answer to this (objection), he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) says:

सूक्ष्मन्तु तदहत्वात्

Sūtra 2. *Sukshmantu tadarhatvāt.* (111)

The subtle (*avyakta* or the unmanifest elementary matter), however, (is the body), because it (*i.e.*, the body) is fit to be of use.

Indeed, the undifferentiated and subtle elementary matter, when it assumes a specific condition, becomes the body; and this undifferentiated matter is, in the condition of its constituting the body, denoted here (in the context) by the word '*avyakta*'. "Because it is fit to be of

use". That is, because that same non-intelligent and unmanifest matter, having undergone a modification, deserves to be, like the chariot, the means of accomplishing the objects of human pursuit. 617

If it be acknowledged that the subtle elementary matter is the subtle and unmanifest one (or *avyakta*), then what is the objection to the acceptance of that (*avyakta* or *pradhāna*) which is established in the system of Kapila? Indeed, in that (system) also, the (ultimate material) cause of all beings is itself called the *avyakta*. In reply to this, he (*viz.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) says thus :

तदधीनत्वार्थवत्

Sūtra 3. *Tadādhi natvādarthavat.* (112)

It (*viz.*, the *avyakta* here) is useful because it is subject to Him.

The subtle elementary matter is useful in that it is subject to the Supreme Person, who forms the Supreme Cause (of all things).

What is said is this. It is not that we do not altogether admit this *avyakta* (or undifferentiated matter) as well as its several modifications; on the contrary, (we do not admit them) as unassociated with Him as their Self, owing to their constituting the body of the Highest Person. Simply because they have Him alone as their (internal) Self, *prakṛiti* (or matter) and other such things accomplish their purposes; otherwise, in relation them all, there will be no distinctions of nature, continued existence and activity.

617. The argument here is a reply to an implied question: if *avyakta* in III. 11 means the body by

virtue of *śarīra* in III. 3, why not vice versa? Why not take *śarīra* in III. 3 to mean *avyakta*?

Because it is not at all so admitted (by the followers of Kapila), the method worked out in (their) system is set at naught.⁶¹⁸

It is well known that in the Vedic scriptures and in the *Smṛitis*—in the sections dealing with the creation and absorption of the world as well as in the section dealing with the greatness of the Supreme Person, *prakṛiti*, its modifications, and the *puruṣas* (or the individual selves) are all described as having Him for their Self. For instance, there is the passage:—"The element of earth is absorbed into the element of water... The material elements in the subtle condition are absorbed (back) into the *bhūttādi*:⁶¹⁹ the *bhūttādi* is absorbed (back) into the *mahat*; the *mahat* is absorbed (back) into the *avyakta*; the *avyakta* is absorbed (back) into the *akshara*; the *akshara* is absorbed (back) into the *tamas*; the *tamas* becomes one with the Supreme Lord." (*Sub. Up.* II). To a similar effect is the passage:—"He whose body is the element of earth....whose body is the element of water....whose body is the element of heat... whose body is the element of air... whose body is the element of ether...whose body is the material principle of egoity... whose body is the intellect... whose body is the *avyakta*...whose body is the *akshara*... whose body is *mṛityu*...He is the internal Self of all beings, He is devoid of sins, He is the Divine Lord, He is the One Nārāyaṇa." (*Sub. Up.* VII. 1). The same thing is stated in the following passage:—"This *prakṛiti* of Mine is divided into eight parts in the form of the element of earth, of water, of fire, of air, and of ether, the mind, the *buddhi*

618. According to the *Vedānta*, the nature, continued existence and activity of the *prakṛiti* and its evolutes are dependent on the Supreme Person. Kapila believes the *prakṛiti* to be entirely independent.

619. *Bhūtādi* strictly denotes *tāmāsa ahaṅkāra*, or a division of the material principle of egoity

arising from the quality of *tamas* inherent in the *prakṛiti*. There are two other divisions of *ahaṅkāra*—*rājasā* and *sāttvika*. *Bhūtādi* here obviously denotes all the three divisions of *ahaṅkāra* produced from *mahat*. See *V.P.* II. 32. 6. For further explanation about the *Sub. Up.* passages, see Notes 90, 91, 184 and 185 of Vol. I.

(or *mahat*) and the *ahaṅkāra* (or the material principle of egoity). This is My lower *prakṛiti*. Know that to be My higher *prakṛiti*, which is other than this (lower one) and which consists of individual selves. By it, this world is supported, O thou mighty-armed one (Arjuna). Know that all (created) beings have these (two *prakṛitis*) for their source. I am the source as well as the destruction of the whole world, O Dhanañjaya, there is nothing else higher than Me. All this (creation) is strung on Me like a number of gems on a thread." (B.G. VII. 4-6). To the same effect is this passage also, namely,—“Vishṇu is the manifest (*prakṛiti*), as also the unmanifest; He is the *puruṣa* (or the individual self), and is Time itself.” (V.P. I. 2. 18). And the following passage also says the same thing thus:—“The *prakṛiti* (i.e., material Nature), which has been spoken of by Me as possessing a manifest and unmanifest nature, and the *puruṣa* (i.e., the self), are, both of them, absorbed (back) into the Highest Self. And the Highest Self who is the support of all and the Highest Lord is celebrated under the name of Vishṇu in the *Vedas* and in the *Vedānta*.” (V.P. VI. 4. 39 & 40).⁶²⁰

ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच्च

Sūtra 4. *Jñeyatvāvachanāchcha* (114)

Because also that (*viz.*, the *avyakta* here) is not stated to possess the character of that which has to be known (for the attainment of final release).

If that (*pradhāna* or material Nature), which is established in the system (of Kapila), is intended to be meant

620. Yādvavaprakāsa has interpreted this *Sūtra* to mean that the soul is subject to the body in regard to action; and that therefore the declaration of the superiority of the *avyakta* (or the body) to the soul becomes meaningful. Thus the *Sūtra* is

taken to reinforce I. 4. I. by furnishing an additional reason. Rāmānuja can concur in this view. But he chooses to interpret differently because there is need for a *Sūtra* to establish that the *prakṛiti* has the *Brahman* for its Self.

here, then it would also have been considered desirable to teach that it has to be known (for the attainment of final release) ; because the followers of (that) system (of Kapila), who uphold the view⁶²¹ that final release results from the knowledge of manifested and unmanifested (matter), as also (from the knowledge) of the knower (or the individual self), admit that all (these) have to be known (for the attainment of final release). And this (*avyakta*) is not mentioned (here) as a thing that has to be known (for the attainment of final release). Therefore that (*avyakta*) which is established (as the *pradhāna* by Kapila) is not meant here (in the context).

वदतीति चेन्न ब्राह्मो हि प्रकरणात्

Sūtra 5. *Vadatitichenna brājñō hi prakaraṇāt.* (115)

If it be held that it (*vis.*, the scriptural context) speaks (of the *avyakta* having to be known for the attainment of final release), it is not right to say so; because, according to the context, it is the Omniscient One (that is referred to therein as such).

It may, however, be held that this scriptural passage, namely,—“That eternally indestructible one, which is characterised neither by sound nor by touch, nor by form and colour, nor similarly by taste nor by smell : which has no beginning and no end ; which is higher than the *mahat*—realising that One, one is freed from the jaws of death.” (*Kaṭh. Up. III. 15*),—states immediately afterwards that the *avyakta* has to be known (for the attainment of final

621. The Sāṅkhya view is that final release results from the distinction between matter and spirit (*prakṛiti* and *puruṣa*) being fully understood. Matter itself has to be comprehended both as the primordial source and its various modifications. Thus the knowledge of the *avyakta* (or

pradhāna, the primordial undifferentiated source of the material universe), the *vyakta* (its various modifications like *mahat* etc.) and *jñā* (the knower or the individual soul) is enjoined. Vide Īśvara-Kṛishṇa's *Sāṅkhya-Kārikās* (2) with the commentary of Vāchaspati Miśra.

release).⁶²² But it is replied that it is not so. Indeed, the Omniscient One, who is the Highest Person Himself, is declared in the *śloka* here to be object of realisation; because it is the Omniscient One Himself who forms the subject-matter of the context here thus:—"But that person who has understanding for his charioteer and the mind (or the internal organ of attention) for the reins,—he reaches the other end of the path, and that is the highest seat of Viṣṇu." (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 9). "The Self is hidden in all beings and does not reveal Himself; He is, however, directly perceived by subtle seers by means of their sharp intellect." (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 12). For this very reason, what is negated in the statement—"There is nothing superior to the *puruṣa*," (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 11)—is not an entity over and above the twentyfifth (entity in the system of Sāṅkhya which is the individual self and is called *puruṣa*). And the attribute of not being characterised by sound, and other such attributes are well known to belong to the Supreme Person, in accordance with the scriptural passage, "That (being) which is invisible, which cannot be seized". (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 6). Moreover, what is taught in the statement—"It is superior to the *mahat* (i.e., the great one or the self)" (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 10)—is assuredly the superiority in relation the individual self already dealt with in earlier statement, "The great self is superior to the faculty of intellection." (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 10).

अथाणमेव चैवमुपन्यासः प्रश्नश्च

Sūtra 6. *Trayāṇāmevachaiṣamupanyāsaḥ praśnaścha.*

Accordingly, this exposition and question (in the context here) relate only to the three.

Indeed, in this context here, it is only in relation to these three, namely, the means of attainment, the object of

622. *Kaṭh. Up.* III. 15. is here understood as referring to the *avyakta*. Sound, taste, etc., do not belong to primordial, undifferentiated matter, but only to

its evolutes like *mahat*, being the cause of the latter. Other implied *pūrvapakṣa* arguments are disposed of below.

attainment and the attainer, that the exposition is seen ; the exposition is seen to relate to what has to be known ; the question also is seen to relate to the same but not to the *avyakta* (i.e., *pradhāna*) or any other such thing.⁶²³ Thus, Nachiketas, who was desirous of attaining final release, was given three boons by the god of death ; as the first among the boons he obtained what conferred on him fitness for the attainment of the objects of human pursuit, namely, the favourable disposition of his father towards (Nachiketas) himself ; then as his second boon, he chose that knowledge which relates to the Nāchiketa fire and forms a means of attaining final release, in accordance with the passage : “ O god of Death, you who are so (wise) know the fire relating to *svarga* (or final release which possesses the characteristics of the highest object of human pursuit). Teach that unto me who have faith. Those who have gone into the world of *svarga* (or final release) attain immortality. This I choose as my second boon.” (*Kaṭh. Up.* I. 13). Here the word, ‘*svarga*’, stands for final release, which possesses the characteristics of the highest object of human pursuit ; because in the above statement, “(Those who have gone to the world of *svarga*) attain immortality,” he who is in that world is declared not to undergo birth or death ; because also later on in the same context (i.e., in *Kaṭh. Up.* I. 26), the disapprobation of (ceremonial) works yielding transitory results is seen ; and because again there is this reply given (to Nachiketas), namely, “He who learns the three *trināchiketa anuvākas*, who performs the three (sacrificial) works, who obtains by means of the three fires (beatific) union (with God) and thus transcends birth and death, I

623. Rāmānuja's view here may not appear to differ much from Śaṅkara's, according to which Agni (or the fire sacrifice), the *jīva* and the *Brahman* are the three under reference. Rāmānuja, however, prefers to analyse the three topics as the attaining *jīva*, the object of attainment consisting of the *Brahman* as well as the pure

state of the *jīva*, and the means of attainment, consisting of the *upāsana* and the fire-sacrifice as an element in it. This analysis is claimed to be precise, while Śaṅkara's appears to make no reference to the means of attainment, which is very much in evidence in the context.

desire to learn this taught by you.”⁶²⁴ (*Kaṭh. Up.* I. 17). In the following passage, namely, “After a man (finally) departs from this world, there is this doubt ; some say that he is, while others say he is not. As taught by you, let me know this. Among the boons, this is the third boon.” (*Kaṭh. Up.* I. 20)—after introducing the question in relation to the essential nature of final release, the third boon is asked in reference to the essential nature of the object of attainment, to the essential nature of the attainer, and to the essential nature of the worship which, as helped on by ritualistic works, forms the means of attainment (thereof).

Having been thus questioned on final release, he (*i.e.*, Yama or god of death) examined his fitness to receive the teaching relating thereunto and then taught him thus : “By means of that self-knowledge which is derived from *yogic* self-concentration, the wise man comes to know that God, who is difficult to be seen and is hidden, who has entered into all beings and is placed within the ‘cave’ (of the heart), who exists in the inmost recesses (of all beings as the Internal Controller of their souls) and is ancient ; and then he gives up pleasure and pain.” (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 12). After he was thus taught in general terms, Nachiketas became pleased ; and in order further specially to examine the essential nature of the Lord who has been pointed out in the statement—“(He) comes to know (that) God,”—and forms the object of attainment ; the essential nature also of the individual self which is the attainer and which has been pointed out in the statement—“By means of that self-knowledge, which is derived from *yogic* self-concentration”—as that which has to be previously known ; and the

624. A fire-sacrifice taught earlier by Yama is named after Nachiketas to honour his gallant quest after truth (I. 16). Here three *anuvākas* of the *Yajur Veda* are referred to as ‘trīnāchiketaḥ’. The three ‘works’ are explained as sacrificial worship, learning the *Vedas* and giving gifts. The

three other traditional duties or functions of the Brahmins—officiating at the sacrifices of others, teaching and receiving gifts—are renounced by this aspirant. He is supposed to effect a *sandhi* or union with the *upāsana*, which ultimately leads him to God.

essential nature of the worship which relates to the *Brahman* and which has been pointed out in the statement—"The wise man comes to know (that God). . . and then gives up pleasure and pain,"—(in order specially to examine these three) he again questioned thus: "That which is other than *dharma* (or the ordinary means) and *adharma* (or the ordinary ends), that which is other than the present, the past and the future, say if thou seest that." (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 14).⁶²⁵

Accordingly, when questioned about these three things which are altogether different from all other ends, from all other means and from all other agents either in the past or in the future or in the present, then (in the way of reply), the syllable *Om* is first praised: and what is denoted by it, the essential nature of the object of enjoyment; and what is included in it, the essential nature of the attainer; and what forms the means of attainment, namely, its own vocal form as a word (*Om*)—all these were again explained in general terms. Thus it is the syllable *Om* that is taught in the passage:—"That end which all the *Vedas* declare, which all penances proclaim, and desiring which celibacy is observed, that I shall briefly tell you. It is the syllable *Om*." (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 15) After teaching him thus, and after praising the *praṇava* (or the mystic syllable *Om*), again,

625. This verse may also be interpreted thus: "That (meditation on God) which is other than *dharma* and *adharma* (i.e., the means respectively for *pāpa* and *puṇya*), that which is different from this present, the past and the future (i.e., God in whom is included the individual soul), say if thou seest that." Among the verses of *Kaṭh. Up.* referred to below, the following may be noticed. "The (potentially) omniscient one (i.e., the individual self) is neither born, nor dies. It is not (produced) from something, and it did not become something. It is unborn, immortal, eternal (without having an origin)

and ancient. It is not killed when the body is killed. If one thinks to kill, considering one to be killer, and if one, being killed, thinks that one is killed, both these do not know (the truth). He is not the killer, nor is he killed" (II. 18. 19). "He is subtler than the most subtle and greater than the greatest. He is the soul of this individual self and placed in the cave (of the heart). One who gives up rituals for the satisfaction of selfish desires, sees Him who makes one great, through the grace of (that) Supporter, becomes free from grief." (20).

the essential nature of the individual self who is the attainer, is however given (as a matter of course) in the passage beginning with : "The (potentially) omniscient one (*i.e.*, the individual self) is neither born, nor dies." (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 18).

The essential nature of Viṣṇu who is the object of attainment and forms the Highest *Brahman* is taught in the passage beginning with : "He is smaller than the smallest", and ending with "Who can definitely know how He is?" (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 20-25) : in the middle, in the passage, beginning with "This Self is not reached either by reflection, or by steady meditation, or by largely hearing the scripture" (*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 23), it is further stated that worship which forms the means of attainment possesses the character of loving devotion. In the passage beginning with : "There are the two that 'drink in' (*i.e.*, enjoy) the reward of works," (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 1), it is taught that, owing to the object of worship being mentioned as existing in the same place with the worshipper, worship is easy to perform ; then in the passage beginning with "Know the self to be the rider in the chariot," and ending with, "The wise say that the path (to the Self) is hard" (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 3-14)—the methods of performing worship are declared, (and it is also declared that) the worshipper attains unto the highest abode of Viṣṇu ; and finally, it (*viz.*, the context here) is concluded with the passage : "That One is characterised neither by sound nor by touch." (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 15). Therefore it is only those three things which are expounded and questioned about as things that have to be known. Accordingly, what is to be understood (by the term '*avyakta*') in the context here is not the *pradhāna* accepted by the followers of the system (of Kapila).

महद्वच

Sūtra 7. *Mahadvachcha.*

Also, as in the case (of the term) '*mahat*' (the term '*avyakta*' has to be construed otherwise than in the system of Kapila).

In the statement, "The great self is superior to the *buddhi* (that is, the faculty of intellection)." (*Kāth. Up.* III. 10), it (*viz.*, the '*mahat*' meaning 'great') is in the same grammatical equation with the word *ātman* (or self); hence it does not mean the 'great' material principle (*i.e.*, the *mahat* or *buddhi*) which is established in the system (of Kapila). In the manner in which this is so, in that same manner, owing to the fact of its having to be superior to the self, the term '*avyakta*' also does not denote that *pradhāna*, which is established in the system of Kapila. Such is the settled conclusion.

ADHIKARĀṆA II

CHAMASĀDHIKARĀṆA

चमसवदविशेषात्

Sūtra 8. *Chamasavadaviśēshāt.* (117)

(The word, '*ajā*', cannot mean *pradhāna* in the context here) because there is no special characterisation in (the context so as to make it signify the *pradhāna*), as there is in the case of the word, '*chamasa*' (or 'cup').

Here also the method adopted in the system (of Kapila) is disproved, but not the essential nature of *prakṛiti* (or matter), of *mahat* (or the 'great' principle), of *ahaṅkāra* (or the material principle of egoity) etc., as having the *Brahman* for their (internal) Self; because *Śrutis* and *Smṛitis* declare them as having the *Brahman* for their Self.

It is declared in the scriptures as follows: "That (*prakṛiti*) which is the mother of all modifications, which is non-intelligent, which is eightfold in nature, which is *ajā* (or unborn) and indestructible,—that is thought of by

Him : and presided over by Him, it is made to expand and is then made to evolve : presided over by Him alone, it produces and serves the ends of the *purusha* (or the individual self). It is the cow without a beginning and an end, it is the mother and source of all beings : it is white, black and red (at the same time) : it is the Lord's milch-cow of all desires : ignorant children drink of her who is characterised by an impartial disposition (in yielding them milk according to their *karma*) ; but the Lord alone drinks of her according to His free-will, holding her under subjection. That great and divine Lord, through His thought and act (of creation), forcibly enjoys her who is the milch-cow belonging to all in common and who is made to yield milk (for enjoyment) by those who perform sacrifices." (*Chūlikā Up.* 3-7) : "The *avyakta* (or the non-manifest), which is counted as the twentyfourth (among the ultimate entities of the universe) is spoken of as the *vyakta* (or the manifest, when evolved)." (*Chūlikā Up.* 14). The essential nature of the *prakṛiti* and of the other principles is mentioned here.

That Supreme Person whom the above-mentioned *prakṛiti* and the other (ultimate entities) have for their (internal) Self, is also (therein) declared thus : "Some say that He is the twentysixth principle : others that He is the twentyseventh principle : the followers of *Atharvaśiras* know the *Purusha* (or Person) as capable of being grasped by the intellect and devoid of (evil) qualities." (*Chūlikā Up.* 14). Again, there are other *Atharvaṇikas* who read in their scriptures thus : "The original states of *prakṛiti* (or matter) are eight, while the modifications there of are sixteen." (*Garbha Up.* III. 7).⁶²⁶

626. Rāmānuja here seeks to show that the Sāṅkhya position lacks support both from the text under consideration and from other scriptural passages. First, the *Chūlikā Upanishad*, otherwise known as the *Mantrikopanishad*, and the *Garbha Upanishad* are quoted. The *Chūlikā* passage (3-7)

describes creation by elaborate figures of speech. *Prakṛiti* is eight-fold, because it evolves into *mahat*, *ahankāra* and the five elements. Compare *B. G.* VII. 4. After this stage in creation (which is *samashṭi* or general), individual souls are given suitable bodies (when creation becomes *vyashṭi* or

The *Śvetāśvataras* also declare the essential nature of the *prakṛiti*, of the individual self and of the Lord to be as follows: "The Lord supports the whole of this world, which is both manifest and unmanifest, and is composite, being made up of the destructible (*prakṛiti*) and the indestructible entity (*i.e.*, the individual self): and the individual self, which is not master of itself, gets into bondage, owing to its condition of being the enjoyer, and after knowing the Lord, is released from all sins." (*Śvet. Up.* I. 8). "The two unborn, the intelligent and the ignorant, (are) the Lord and the non-lord: one *ajā* (unborn) is indeed intended for the enjoyment of the enjoyer (or the individual self): the Infinite Self has a universal form and is surely not an agent: when one realises all these three, then that is the (attainment of the) *Brahman*." (*Śvet. Up.* I. 9): "The destructible is the *prakṛiti*: the immortal and the indestructible is the *hara* (*i.e.*, the individual self): and the Lord alone rules over the destructible (*prakṛiti*) and the individual self: through repeated meditation of Him, through the practice of *yoga* and through the direct realisation of Him as He is (in union with the real entities), ignorance is completely removed at the end." (*Śvet. Up.* I. 10). Similarly, it is said thus: "The *Vedas*, sacrifices, religious ceremonies, preparatory and purificatory rites, things in the past, things in the future, and all such things as the *Vedas* mention—out of (all) this, He who is the owner of the *māyā* (*i.e.*, the Lord) creates this world, wherein another being (*i.e.*, the individual self) is bound down by *māyā*." (*Śvet. Up.* IV. 9): "Know then

particular). The three colours of the cow, white, black and red, refer to *sattva*, *tamas* and *rajas* respectively. The impartial disposition of the cow is due to her yielding milk according to the *karma* of each soul. The ritual of sacrifice yields results in the form of milk. *Chūl. Up.* 14 may mean that the *vyakta*, which is the effect, is identical with the cause, the *avyakta*. Another reading of the *Upanishad*, *avyaktam*

vyaktam eva cha, suggests that both the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* are to be known. For the 24 principles, see Note 169 of Vol. I. The 25th principle is the *purusha* or the individual soul. Some take *kāla* or time to be the 26th and the *Brahman* to be the 27th. Others, who include time in the first 24, take the *Brahman* to be the 26th. For the 8 original states and 16 modifications of *prakṛiti*, see Note 170 of Vol. I.

that *prakṛiti* is *māyā*, and the great Lord, the *Māyin*, (i.e., the possessor of *māyā*) ; indeed, the whole of this world is filled with what constitutes His limbs." (*Śvet. Up.* IV. 10). Later on again, there is given the following passage also to the same effect : " He is the Lord of the *prakṛiti* (Nature) and of the individual soul, and is the regulator of the qualities (of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*). He is the cause of *samsāra*, of final release, of existence and of bondage." (*Śvet. Up.* VI. 16). 627

The *Smṛiti* also (declares the same thing) thus : " And know that the *prakṛiti* and the *puruṣa* are both beginningless : and also know that (unwholesome) emotions and (wholesome) qualities are born out of the *prakṛiti*. The *prakṛiti* is said to be responsible for giving rise to the idea of agency in relation to the (body which is an) effect and to (the senses which are) the cause (of activity), while the *puruṣa* is said to be responsible for giving rise to the idea of the enjoyer in relation to pleasure and pain. The *puruṣa*, when in association with the *prakṛiti*, does indeed experience (pleasure and pain which are) the results of the qualities born of the *prakṛiti* (such as *sattva* or goodness etc.) : the cause of his births out of good and bad wombs is his attachment to (pleasures which arise out of) the qualities (of *sattva* etc.) " (B. G. XIII. 19-21) : " The essential qualities known as goodness, passion and darkness are produced out of the *prakṛiti* (i.e., known by their effects in the evolution of *prakṛiti*) : they bind down to the body the embodied and undecaying (individual soul), O you the strong-armed one ! " (B. G. XIV. 5). To the same effect are the following passages : " All created beings, O son of Kuntī, enter into My *prakṛiti* at the end of each *kalpa*, 628 and at the beginning of each *kalpa*, I again send

627. In *Śvet. Up.* I. 8, the unmanifest is the soul and the manifest is matter. In I. 9, the intelligent one is the Lord and the ignorant one the soul. The next *mantra* names the soul as *hara*, the abductor, because it seizes the

prakṛiti for enjoyment. *Māyā* in IV. 9 means the *prakṛiti*, which is the cause of wonderful and varied creation. The limbs of the Lord in IV. 10 stand for the souls.

628. See Note 246 of Vol. I.

them forth. Transforming My own *prakṛiti*, I send forth again and again the whole of this collection of beings, which is itself not free, inasmuch as it is under the influence of *prakṛiti*." (B. G. IX. 7 & 8): "Presided over by Me, *prakṛiti* gives birth to all this movable and immovable creation. Indeed, for this reason, it is, O son of Kuntī, that the world goes on undergoing transformation." (B. G. IX. 10).⁶²⁹ Thus, the *prakṛiti* and the other (principles), which are all in the system of Kapila held not to have the *Brahman* for their Self, are (as such) disproved.

In the *S'vetāśvatara Upanishad*, it is revealed thus: "There is one unborn female being (*ajā*) which is red, white and black, and which produces numerous offspring of the same kind as herself: there is another being (*aja*) who loves her and is close to her: there is still another male being (*aja*) who, after having enjoyed her, gives her up." (*S'vet. Up.* IV. 5). Here the doubt arises whether what is mentioned in this *mantra* is merely the *prakṛiti* that is established in the system of Kapila, or whether (it is the *prakṛiti*) that has the *Brahman* for its Self. It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the pure and simple one (*i.e.*, the *prakṛiti* of the system of Kapila). Why? Because in the (above) statement—"There is one unborn female being (*ajāṃ ekāṃ*)"—this *prakṛiti* is spoken of as not being a produced effect, and because also, in the statement—"which produces numerous offspring of the same kind as herself"—that (*prakṛiti*) is spoken of as

629. The *Gītā* passages also describe creation. In XIII. 19, *vikārāḥ* is taken to mean emotions like desire and hatred which cause bondage. The *guṇas* are redeeming qualities like lack of pride etc. Both these are caused by the soul's association with the body. In XIII. 20, *kārya* is the body and *kāraṇa* the eleven senses. It is the body which acts, but the soul is the

experiencer of pleasure and pain. In XIV. 5, the production of the qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* from the *prakṛiti* has to be taken to mean that they become manifest in the later stages of evolution of the *prakṛiti*. For they are its essential and inseparable attributes—See Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Gītā*.

independently creating many offspring similar to herself. 630

If it be so arrived at, it is thus stated in reply : “ (The word ‘*ajā*’ cannot mean the *pradhāna* in the context here) because there is no special characterisation (in the context so as to make it signify the *pradhāna*) as there is in the case of the word ‘*chamasa*’.” (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 4. 8). That is, because the word ‘*ajā*’ means that which is not born, and hence, the attribute of mere ‘unbornness’ is denoted by it, and there is not found any peculiar characterisation (in the case of that word ‘*ajā*’) so as to enable us to understand thereby that it is that ‘*ajā*’ (or *pradhāna*) which is established in the system (of Kapila) as not having the *Brahman* for its Self.

“ As there is in the case of the word ‘*chamasa*’.” For example, in the *mantra*, which begins with the statement— “ The *chamasa* has its mouth turned downwards and its bottom upwards ” (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 2. 3), what is made out by the word ‘*chamasa*’ (etymologically) is that the *chamasa* is something which possesses the character of an instrument fit to be used in eating food, and hence, by this much alone, no particular kind of *chamasa* is meant to be pointed out ; because words which are etymologically significant cannot have the power of definitely denoting any specific meaning without the help of the topics (capable of being indicated), contexts and such other things (relating to interpretation like particularising attributes). In the above case, by means of the complementary passage beginning with “ That is this head : it is this *chamasa* indeed which has

630. There are two arguments here: (i) whatever is unborn cannot be a produced effect, and hence the *prakṛiti* cannot be the effect of the *Brahman*; (ii) the *śānach* suffix in *śṛijamānā* indicates, according to Pāṇini’s grammar, an independent agent. Śaṅkara’s *pūrvapakṣa* is that the *prakṛiti* evolving into *tejas*, water and

prithvī is not meant here, but only the primordial *prakṛiti*. The gloss called *Bhāmātī* on his commentary sets out the position in a way which brings it near Rāmānuja’s; is the independent *prakṛiti* meant here, or that which is the *māyā* energy of the Lord and is the cause of the evolution into *tejas* etc ?

its mouth turned downwards and its bottom upwards," (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 2. 3), the conclusion is positively arrived at that the head is conceived to be the *chamasa* here. Similarly, here also in the case under discussion the meaning of the word '*ajā*' has to be determined solely through the aid of the topics (capable of being indicated), the context and other such things (relating to interpretation). And no (related) topic (capable of being indicated), or context, or any other such thing is seen to exist, so as to be the means of making us understand here that *ajā* (or *pradhāna*), which is established in the system of Kapila.

Further, it (*viz.*, Kapila's *ajā*) is not made out here to possess the power of being the creating agent independently and of itself; because it is merely the power of being the creating agent that it is understood to possess, in accordance with the expression here, namely, "which produces numerous offspring." Therefore, by means of the *mantra* under reference here, what is pointed out is not the '*ajā*' (or *pradhāna*) which has not the *Brahman* for its Self.⁶³¹

He (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) says in the following manner that there are special reasons for understanding in the context only that *ajā* (*prakṛiti*) which has the *Brahman* for its Self.

ज्योतिरुपक्रमा तु तथाह्यधीयत एके

Sūtra 9. *Jyotirupakramā tu tathāhyadhīyata eke.* (118)

Indeed it (*viz.*, the *ajā*) has the Light for its source, because some declare it in their scriptures accordingly.

631. In *Bṛih. Up.* II. 2. 3, the skull is referred to metaphorically as an inverted cup. The inversion differentiates it from cups in general. In *Śvet. Up.* IV. 5, the *prakṛiti* is referred to merely as unborn. There is nothing to indicate how it is to be distinguish-

ed from the other unborn entities mentioned there and whether or not it is independent. The agent of an action in grammar is not necessarily free, independent or sovereign. Hence *srijatnānā* cannot prove the Sāṅkhya thesis.

The word *indeed* (*tu*) imports emphasis.⁶³² This *ajā* has indeed the Light for its source. The Light (mentioned here) is the *Brahman*, because that word is well-known (to denote Him) in the following among other passages :— “The gods (worship) Him who is the Light of lights.” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 16) ; “Now that Light which shines beyond this Highest Heaven. . . .” (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 13. 7.) “It has the Light for its source”. The meaning is that it (*viz.*, the *ajā* or *prakṛiti*) has the *Brahman* for its cause. “Because some declare it in their scriptures accordingly.” The word *because* (*hi*) denotes a reason ; the reason here being that *some*, namely, the followers of a recension of the (*Yajur*) *Veda*, the *Taittirīyas*, declare it in their scriptures that this *ajā* (or *prakṛiti*) has the *Brahman* for its cause.

Thus, in the passage—“The Self who is smaller than the smallest atom and greater than the greatest is ever present in the ‘cave’ (of the heart) of this created being.” (*M. Nār.* VIII. 3)—the *Brahman*, as an object of worship, is declared to dwell ever in the ‘cave’ of the heart ; then in the passage beginning with—“Out of Him proceed the seven *prāṇas*”. (*M. Nār.* VIII. 4),—it is stated that all the worlds, as well as the four-faced *Brahmā* and others, have their origin in Him : then in the passage—“There is one unborn female being (*ajā*) which is red, white and black, and which produces numerous offspring of the same kind as herself : there is another male being (*aja*), who, after having enjoyed her, gives her up” (*M. Nār.* IX. 2),—what is mentioned is that *ajā* (or *prakṛiti*), which, forming the source of all things, is itself born out of Him.

The meaning is this : that inasmuch as the whole totality of things other than Him are born out of Him, they

632. The word *tu* is a disjunctive particle, generally meaning ‘but’, ‘on the contrary’ etc. Here it suggests that the statement that the *ajā* has Light for its source is based on authority, unlike the

statement that this *ajā* is independent. Moreover, the negative conclusion of the previous *Sūtra* is reinforced by a positive one here.

are (here) being taught to have Him for their Self ; and it is in this context that it (*viz.*, the *ajā*) is mentioned : hence it has to be understood that that *ajā* also, which produces many similar offspring, which is enjoyed by the individual self that is under the influence of *karma* (or the results of works), and which is given up by the other individual self of wisdom (that is, the freed soul), is, like the *prāṇas*, oceans, mountains, and other things, born out of the *Brahman* and has (like them) the *Brahman* for its Self.⁶³³ Therefore, just as a specific kind of *chamasa* (or cup) is made out (to be the meaning of the word '*chamasa*') from the complementary passage (above mentioned), (so also) the word '*ajā*', which is controlled in meaning by a sentence of the same character, given in another recension of the *Veda* and tending to have (this) meaning naturally brought to mind—is definitely determined to denote that which has the *Brahman* for its Self.

In the beginning of the context under reference here also, there occurs the passage, "Is the *Brahman* the cause? . . . They (the seers) who have adopted the practice of contemplation, have seen the Lord's own power (*i.e.*, the *prakṛiti*), which is hidden by means of its own qualities (of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*)" (*Śvet. Up.* I. 1-3) ; here the *ajā* is made out to be a power of the Supreme *Brahman*

633. In *M. Nār. Up.* the same *mantra* as *Śvet. Up.* (IV. 5) is found with a slight variation—'dābhīm prajān janayantīm sarūpām' instead of 'dābhīm prajāḥ sṛ janānām sarūpāḥ'. Rāmānuja's point is that in *M. Nār. Up.* the *mantra* is found in the context of the creation of the world by the Supreme *Brahman*. First, His nature is described : He is greater than the greatest and subtler than the subtlest. Then the seven *prāṇas* (or the five senses together with *manas* and *budhī*) are said to be born out of Him. Similarly, the seven fires, the fuel and other ingredients of sacrifice,

the seven tongues of flame, the seven worlds, the seas, mountains, rivers, and plants are all born out of Him. He remains as the internal soul. He is the four-faced *Brahmā* among the gods, the first among poets, the hawk among birds of prey. After saying all this, the *M. Nār. Up.* refers to the *ajā* of three colours. Then it goes on to speak of the *Brahman* being the fierce sun of summer, the wind in the sky, the priest on the sacrificial altar, the guest in the home etc. Thus the context in the *M. Nār. Up.* makes it clear that the *ajā* is born of the *Brahman* and has Him for its soul.

Himself ; later on (in the same context), in the passages—
 “ Out of this, He who is the owner of the *māyā* (i.e., the Lord) creates this world wherein another being (viz., the individual self) is bound down by *māyā*.” (*Śvet. Up.* IV. 9);
 “ Know then that the *prakṛiti* is *māyā* and the great Lord the *Māyin* (i.e., the possessor of the *māyā*)”. (*Śvet. Up.* IV. 10) ; “ He who presides over every cause (of the world).” (*Śvet. Up.* IV. 11) ⁶³⁴ ;—(in these passages) the same *ajā* (or *prakṛiti*) itself is dealt with.

For these reasons, in the *mantra* under reference here, there is not the least reference to the idea of any independent *prakṛiti* as established in the system (of Kapila).

It may, however, be asked, how then under these circumstances this *prakṛiti*, which has the Light for its source and possesses the red, white and black colours, can be said to be unborn (or *ajā*), or how that which is unborn (or *ajā*) can have the Light for its source. In answer to this, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) says thus :

कल्पनोपदेशाच्च मध्वादिवद्विरोधः

Sūtra 10. *Kalpanopadeśāchcha madhvādivadavirodhaḥ.*
 (119).

Because, however, the teaching (here) relates to the production (of the world), there is nothing contradictory (in it) ; as in regard to (the teaching relating to the worship of the sun-god under the symbol of) honey and other such things.

634. The primordial *prakṛiti* and its various evolutes like *maḥat* etc. which are the ‘causes’ of the world that we see around, are referred to here. Some editions of the *Śrībhāṣya* quote the passage as

‘yo yonir yonir’. This is probably a misquotation. If it were right, we should translate: “ He who is the source (presides over) the source etc.”.

The word 'however' ('*cha*') here is intended to remove the doubt raised. It is nothing contradictory for this *prakṛiti* to be unborn (or *ajā*) and at the same time to have the Light for its source. Why? "Because the teaching (here) relates to the production (of the world)." 'Production' is 'making', that is, 'creation'. The meaning is that the teaching relates to the creation of the world. For instance, the word 'production' (*kalpana*) is used in the sense of creation⁶³⁵ in the passage: "The creator (*i.e.*, the four-faced Brahmā) created (*akalpayat*) the sun and moon as before." (*M. Nār.* V. 7). Here also (*i.e.*, in the context under reference), the creation of the world is taught in the passage: "Out of this, He who is the owner of the *māyā* (*i.e.*, the Lord) creates this world." (*Śvet. Up.* IV. 9); the meaning is that the Lord of all who is the owner of the *māyā*, creates the whole world out of this cause (*i.e.*, the *prakṛiti*) in its subtle condition, wherein it is inseparable from Himself.

The existence of this *prakṛiti* in both the condition of effect and the condition of cause is understood from this teaching here relating to creation. Indeed, at the time of universal absorption, it (*viz.*, the *prakṛiti*) enters into the state of the *Brahman* (in the condition of cause)⁶³⁶ and, without the differentiation of name and form, exists in a subtle condition. At the time of universal creation, however, it has its qualities of *sattva* or goodness etc., made manifest, possesses the differentiations of names and forms, is capable of being denoted by the word '*vyakta*' (or

635. *Kalpana* is taken by Śaṅkara to mean an imaginary mental conception, regarding something as something else. He goes on to argue that the *ajā* is the *prakṛiti* in the image of a she-goat. Kāmānuja interprets *kalpana* as creation on the authority of Vedic usage. The author of the *Sūtras* was steeped in the *Vedas* so that he spontaneously used words in their Vedic

sense, explains the *Śruti-prakāśikā*.

636. The *prakṛiti* cannot become the *Brahman*. But in *pralaya*, it becomes one with the *Brahman* so as to be indistinguishable from Him. Compare *Sub. Up.* (II): "The *taṃas* becomes one with the Lord." In other words, the *Brahman* who has the *prakṛiti* for His body, attains the causal state during *pralaya*.

'manifest') and other similar words, and having become modified into the elements known as *tejas* (or the element of light and heat), water and earth, it exists as red, white and black in colour : thus its causal condition is the *ajā* (or unborn one), and its condition as effect has Light for its source ; therefore, there is nothing contradictory (here).

“ As in regard to (the teaching relating to the worship of the sun-god under the symbol of) honey and other things. ” For instance, the sun-god, who, in the condition of cause is altogether one with the Lord, is made into honey in the condition of effect in order to be enjoyed by the Vasus and the other gods, for the reason that he is the abode of the nectar, which is produced by means of the religious works mentioned in the *Ṛig Veda*, the *Yajur-Veda*, the *Sāma-Veda* and the *Atharva-Veda* ; moreover, he is made to rise and set (in the same condition of effect) ; and yet, in relation to him, there is no contradiction in his having been made into honey and made to rise and set. This has been taught in the *madhu-vidhyā* ⁶³⁷ in the passages which begin with “ This sun-god is indeed the honey of the gods ” (*Chhānd. Up. III. 1. 1*) and ending with “ Then, having risen above that (condition of effect), he (*i.e.*, the sun-god) does not rise, does not set, is *ekala* altogether and remains in a neutral condition.” (*Chhānd. Up. III. 11. 1*). The word ‘*ekala*’ means that he has a uniform nature.

Therefore, by means of the *mantra* under reference here, that *ajā* (or *prakṛiti*) alone is denoted which has the *Brahman* for its Self ; but that (*ajā* or *pradhāna*) which is postulated in the system of Kapila is not denoted thereby : this is the demonstrated conclusion (here).

637. In the *Madhu-vidyā* taught in *Chhānd. Up. (III)* and explained in the *Madhvadhikaraṇa (Ved. Sūt. I. 3. 30-32)*, the worship of the sun is taught in both the conditions of cause and effect. In the condition of cause, he becomes one with the *Brahman*. This is how the

contradiction between the sun described in one place as rising and setting and in another as never rising nor setting is reconciled. See page 165 above. The *ajā* in the condition of cause is one, while in the condition of effect it is red, black and white, etc.

There are, however, others (*i.e.*, the Advaitins) who say that, in the *mantra* under reference here, the *ajā* that is mentioned is a single entity characterised as consisting of the elements of *tejas*, water and earth. They have to be questioned⁶³⁸ whether the elements of *tejas*, water and earth merely constitute that only entity of the *ajā* which is characteristically made up of the elements of *tejas*, water and earth; or whether it is the *Brahman* Himself (as effect and) in the form of the elements of *tejas*, water and earth (that is that *ajā*); or whether it is something else (*i.e.*, the primordial *prakṛiti*) which is the cause of the elements of *tejas*, water and earth (that is the same *ajā*).

In the first alternative, the scriptural statement, "There is one *ajā*" (*Śvet. Up.* IV. 5) will be contradicted, owing to the elements of *tejas*, water and earth being more than one in number. And it should not be urged here that, although the elements of *tejas*, water and earth are more than one in number, they nevertheless possess the character of being together one, in consequence of the (wellknown) process of tripartition:⁶³⁹ for, even in this process of tripartition their manifoldness does not disappear; and because also in the scriptural statements, "These are the three deities"⁶⁴⁰ (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 2 & 3 etc), and "I make each one of them tripartite" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3), the process of tripartition is taught in relation to every one of these.

The second alternative itself admits two alternatives, namely, whether the one entity, *ajā*, is the *Brahman* Himself who has undergone the modifications known as the

638. If the *ajā* stands for the three elements, it cannot be *ekā* or one. The same is the case, if it denotes the *Brahman* in the condition of effect. The *Brahman* as the cause cannot be characterised by the three colours. If it is argued that the reference is indirectly to Him and directly to the *prakṛiti* as His effect, then this is

saying almost the same thing as Rāmānuja. Lastly, why should the *ajā* be taken to denote the three elements first and then the *prakṛiti* through them? Better to refer thereby to the *prakṛiti*, which is the cause or source of the three elements.

639. See Note 166 of Vol. I.

640. See Note 248 of Vol. I.

elements of *tejas*, water and earth, or whether it is the immovable (*Brahman*) existing in His true nature (that is the same *ajā*). The first alternative is disproved, merely because manifoldness does not disappear. In the case of the second alternative also, there is contradiction of the scriptural statement, "There is one *ajā* which is red, white and black." (*Śvet. Up.* IV. 5). It is impossible even to say that the *Brahman*, as He exists in His true nature, is characterised by the elements of *tejas*, water and earth as attributes.⁶⁴¹

Under the third alternative also, it has to be accepted that, by the word '*ajā*', the elements of *tejas*, water and earth are first pointed out, and then through those elements their causal condition has to be inferred. It is better to say that the word '*ajā*' denotes only that (*prakṛiti*) which is declared in the scriptures as forming the causal state of the elements of *tejas*, water and earth.

Again, it is held (by the same Advaitins) that what is taught by the word '*ajā*' is that that *prakṛiti* is presented in the image of a she-goat. This also is inappropriate, because such (an image) is useless.⁶⁴² For instance, in such scriptural statements as "Know the self to be the rider in the chariot (and the body to be the chariot)" (*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 3.), figurative representations of the chariot, etc., in relation to the body, etc., are made with the object of showing that they possess the characteristic of being the

641. This explanation accounts for the *ajā* being *ekā*, but it cannot explain how this 'unborn one' can be red, black and white. Moreover, it also contradicts the interpretation of the previous *Sūtra* by the Advaitins. There '*vyotirupakramā*' was taken as 'the group of things (i.e., the elements) starting with light', or in other words, the elements of light, water and earth. The 'unborn one' cannot mean the three elements there, and the *Brahman* here.

642. The contention here is that an expression has to be understood figuratively only when its conventional or etymological meanings are inappropriate. The figurative interpretation should make for special propriety and help in understanding connected words. These conditions are satisfied in the case of the self being regarded as the rider in the chariot and the sun being regarded as honey. But they are not satisfied here.

means for reaching the *Brahman*. For instance, again, the sun-god is presented in the image of honey for the purpose of showing that he is (as such) capable of being enjoyed by the Vasus and the other (gods). To conceive of this *prakṛiti* as a she-goat is of no such use anywhere ; not only is it of no use whatever, but it is hostile also (to what is said in the context about it). It (*viz.*, the *prakṛiti*) is the cause of the whole world ; to all the intelligent souls themselves, which are tied down to it from beginningless time, it forms the means of experiencing all pleasures and pains and also of attaining final release ; and it is non-intelligent : accordingly, it is certainly wrong to suppose the *prakṛiti* (which is of this nature) to be like it (*i.e.*, a she-goat) merely for the purpose of showing it to have the nature of a she-goat, which is capable of giving birth to only a few offspring, which, for a time, is accidentally associated with a single intelligent individual soul, which is the means of obtaining some very small benefit of some particular kind (like milk), and which, being capable of giving up those with which it, itself incapable of serving as the means for being given up, is associated, is an intelligent soul. 643

And moreover, it is not good to assume a variety of meanings in relation to the word *ajā* in the expressions, “There is one *ajā*”, “There is one *ajā*”, and “There is (still) another *ajā*” (*Svet. Up.* IV. 5.) If it be said that in all these cases the characteristics of the goat will have to be assumed, then, it would be exceedingly unreasonable to suppose it (*viz.*, the *prakṛiti*) to be such a goat as is capable

643. Rānānuja here institutes a contrast between the *prakṛiti* and the goat, to show that the latter cannot be used in a metaphor to represent the former. The *prakṛiti* produces all the things and creatures in the world: the goat has only a few young ones. The former helps all the souls to experience all pleasures and pains: the benefits from the latter consist of a little milk etc. The former is

unintelligent: it cannot give up the intelligent souls with which it is associated: nor can it prompt them to give it up. The goat is an intelligent creature and if it is meant here, it has to be regarded as something capable of being given up by others. Moreover, the goat as an intelligent creature can give up its associates, if it wants to do so.

of coming into association again with that wise man who, as implied in the statement—"There is still another male being, *aja*, who, after having enjoyed her (the *ajā*) gives her up." (*S'vet. Up.* IV. 5),—has finally and altogether given up the *prakṛiti*—with him (the wise man) or with someone else. 644

ADHIKARAṆA III

SAṆKHYOPASAṆGRAHĀDHIKARAṆA

न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि नानाभावादतिरेकाच्च

Sūtra 11. *Na saṅkhyopasaṅgrahādapi
nānābhāvādātirekāchcha.* (1:0)

Even accepting the number (to be the same as that known to the Sāṅkhyas) still, they (i.e., the principles of the universe according to the Sāṅkhyas) are not (taught here); because they are different (from those that are given in the context here), and because also these (latter) exceed (the former in number).

The *Vājasaneyins* declare in their scriptures thus :—
"He in whom the five *pañchajanas* ⁶⁴⁵ (are established) and the element of ether is established, (is the Self) ; he who is other (than the gods), (*viz.*, a man), who knows such Self to be the immortal *Brahman*, becomes immortal." (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 17). Here the doubt is raised whether this

644. Are all three unborn ones, one female and the other two males, to be regarded as goats? If so, how can a she-goat be finally given up, as the *prakṛiti* is given up by the freed soul?

645. The term *pañchajanas* is regarded by the Sāṅkhyas as meaning "groups, each of which

consists of five." The five groups of five are: (i) the sense-organs of action, (ii) the five elements, (iv) the five rudimentary elements, and (v) the remaining five principles of the Sāṅkhyas. According to Rāmānuja, the term stands for "sense organs"—*tvak* or skin, eye, ear, *anna* or nose and tongue, and mind.

mantra aims at teaching the principles postulated in the system of Kapila or not. It is perhaps thought right to hold that it aims at teaching the principles postulated in the system (of Kapila). Why? Because from the word, '*pañchajanas*', as qualified by the word 'five', the twentyfive principles (which are known to the Sāṅkhyas) are made out.

What is said is this. The compound word '*pañchajanāḥ*' denotes an aggregate ; that is, a number of collections consisting of five principles each are the *pañchajanāḥ* : like the word '*pañchaphūlyāḥ*' (which denotes a number of collections, each consisting of five small bundles of straw). The difference in the gender of the word '*pañchajanāḥ*' is due to *Vedic* usage.⁶⁴⁶ And if it is asked how many such collections there are (here mentioned), then those collections are made out to be five, from the first word 'five' which qualifies the word '*pañchajanāḥ*', in the same way as in the expression, '*pañcha pañchaphūlyāḥ*' or 'five collections of straw each of which is made up of five small bundles' (where we have the qualifying numeral 'five' attached to a term meaning 'a collection of five bundles'). Thus the expression, 'five *pañchajanāḥ*' is to be understood as denotative of twentyfive principles, and when it is asked what they are, they are made out, in consequence of the context relating to final release, to be only the *prakṛiti* and the other principles which are all proved in the *Smṛiti* (of Kapila), as being objects worthy to be known by all those who are desirous of attaining final freedom.⁶⁴⁷ The well known theory of the followers of Kapila is indeed thus given :—"The primordial *prakṛiti* (or material Nature) which is the root of all things, is unevolved ; the principles beginning with the 'great' principle are seven, and they are

646. The correct form of the word as a *Samāhāra-dvigu* ought to be '*pañchajanī*' in the feminine gender whereas it is masculine as given above.

647. According to the Sāṅkhya, the true nature of the primordial matter (*avyakta*), that of its

modifications (*vyakta*), and that of the individual self (*jīva*) have to be understood in order to achieve final release. Since saving knowledge is mentioned in the *Upanishad* passage, the latter should deal with all the three things referred to above.

both evolvers and the evolved ; the purely evolved things are sixteen ; the *purusha* (or the individual soul) is neither the evolver nor the evolved." ⁶⁴⁸ (*Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*. III). Therefore it (*viz.*, the *mantra* under reference here) aims at teaching the principles enunciated in the system (of Kapila).

If it be so arrived at, we state in reply thus :—" Even accepting the number (to be the same as that of the principles known to the Sāṅkhyas). . ." (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 4. 11). Even assuming that the expression '*pañcha pañchajanāḥ*' denotes the number twentyfive, the principles mentioned in the system (of Kapila) do not thereby suggest themselves to the mind. Why? "Because they are (*nānā*) different (from those given in the context here)." That is, because these *pañchajanāḥ*, as qualified by the number *pañchan* ('five'), are distinct from the principles which are proved in the system (of Kapila). From the scriptural expression here—" He in whom the *pañcha pañchajanāḥ* (are established) and the element of ether is established"—it is borne in upon the mind that these principles, owing to their having for their support the *Brahman* who is pointed out by the word 'He', have indeed the *Brahman* for their Self. In the scriptural statement—" he who is other (than the gods, *viz.*, a man) who knows such Self to be the immortal *Brahman*, becomes immortal." (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 17.)—from the reference indicated by the word 'such', what is pointed out by the word 'He' (in the earlier part of this passage) is made out to be the *Brahman*. Therefore, the *pañchajanāḥ* (here mentioned) are different from those (of the

648. What is said here is this. The primordial *prakṛiti* is the unproduced basis of the world. Out of this are evolved seven other principles, which, while they are themselves produced, are also the producers of other principles. These seven are *mahat*, *ahaṅkāra* and the five *tanmātras* or subtle bases of the five elements. Out of these are evolved sixteen other principles—

the five elements, the five organs of action, the five senses and the internal organ of sense or *manas*. These do not, through any further modification, give rise to other produced principles. Then there is the *purusha* or the soul, which is neither a produced thing nor a producer, neither modified nor modifiable.

Sāṅkhyas), and so they are not the ones proved in the system (of Kapila).

“And because also these (latter) exceed (the former in number)”. The principles mentioned here in the context are further in excess of the principles postulated in the system of Kapila. The Supreme Self indicated by the word ‘He’ and the element of ether are the two in excess here. Therefore, in accordance with the passage—“Some say that He is the twentysixth principle; others say that He is the twentyseventh principle” (*Chūlikā Up.* 14)—it is the Highest Person, who is the Lord of all things and who is the support of all the principles well known in the scriptures, that is taught here.

The word *even* in the expression, “Even accepting the number . . .” (*Ved. Sū. I. 4. 11*), is intended to show that even the suggestion of twentyfive principles cannot possibly be made by the expression ‘*pañcha pañchajanāḥ*’. How? Because there are no five collections, each of which is made up of five (principles).⁶⁴⁹ Indeed, in relation to the principles postulated in the system (of Kapila), there are no generic attributes and other such things which are connected with five things at a time and cause the addition of that number, (‘five’ to a sub-divided group of those principles).

649. The twentyfive principles of the Sāṅkhyas can with some difficulty be divided into five groups of five—(i) the five senses, (ii) the five organs of action, (iii) the five subtle bases of elements, (iv) the five elements and (v) the remaining five principles, namely, primordial matter, *mahat*, *aḥaṅkāra*, *manas* and the soul. But there is the difficulty here that in the passage under reference, one of the five elements, ether, and the *ātman* are mentioned in addition to twentyfive principles. The Sāṅkhya explanation says that they are mentioned on account of their importance and distinctive

qualities. An alternative quintuple division is also referred to in the *Śrutaparakāśikā*. Here primordial matter is taken to be made up of three substances—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Thus the twentyfive principles become twentyseven, and there is no double mention of the ether or the self. The five groups are (i) *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*, *mahat* and *aḥaṅkāra*; (ii) the four elements, (i.e., all of them except ether) and the sense of smell; (iii) the four remaining senses and *manas*; (iv) the five subtle bases of elements; and (v) the five organs of action. Both the divisions are illogical.

It should not be urged that from the groupings,—namely, the five organs of activity, the five senses of knowledge, the five great external elements, the five rudimentary elements of matter and the five that remain over,—there is reason surely for prefixing the number ‘five’ before each of these sub-divisions: for the reason that, owing to the separate mention of the element of ether (in the *mantra* under reference here), there can be no grouping of the great elements so as to constitute a group of five.

Therefore, the compound word, ‘*pañchajanāḥ*’, refers to no kind of collections; on the other hand, it means a specific name in accordance with the grammatical rule: “A word denoting direction in space or a word denoting number is compounded with other words when the compound word so formed signifies a name.” (*Pāṇini*. II. 1. 50). Otherwise, the word, ‘*pañchajanāḥ*’, will have to undergo a change of gender (and become *pañchajani*). There are some things that are called *pañchajanāḥ*, and they are qualified by the numeral ‘five’ in the expression, ‘*pañcha pañchajanāḥ*’, which resembles the expression ‘*sapta saptarshayaḥ*’ (‘seven seven-*rishis*’) ⁶⁵⁰

To the question what indeed are those that are called *pañchajanāḥ*, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the following answer :

प्राणद्वयो वाक्यशेषात्

Sūtra 12. *Prāṇādāyo vākyaśeshāt*. (121)

They (i.e., the *pañchajanāḥ*) are the *prāṇa* and the rest, as appears from the complementary passage (in the context).

650. The expression, “seven seven-*rishis*” is from V.P. ‘Seven-*rishi*’ is taken to refer to a member of the group of seven *rishis*. So we can have reference to one or more of such members.

From the complementary passage—namely, “They understand Him (*i.e.*, the *Brahman*) to be the *prāṇa* of the *prāṇa*,⁶⁵¹ the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear and the food of the food, the mind of the mind. . .”. (*Mādh. Brīh. Up.* IV. 4. 18)—the *prāṇa* and the other things which are dependent upon the *Brahman* are themselves made out to be the five *pañchajanāḥ*.

Again, it may be objected thus. The *mantra*, beginning with “He in whom the *pañcha pañchajanāḥ*”, (*Brīh. Up.* IV. 4. 17), is common to both the Kāṇvas and Mādhyandinas; but in the complementary passage beginning with “They understand Him to be the *prāṇa* of the *prāṇa*” (*Brīh. Up.* IV. 4. 18), the expression, ‘the food of the food’, is not found in the reading of the Kāṇvas; it is not therefore possible to say in their case that the expression ‘*pañcha pañchajanāḥ*’ denotes the *prāṇa* and the other things here. To such an objection, he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the following reply :

ज्योतिषैकेषामसत्यन्ने

Sūtra 13. *Jyotiṣaikeshāmasatyanne* (4-22).

According to some (the meaning of the word *pañchajanāḥ* is determined) by means of the word, ‘light’, although ‘food’ is not (mentioned in the passage referred to here).

In the reading according to some, that is, according to the Kāṇvas, ‘food’ (*anna*) is not made mention of; yet, by means of the word, ‘light’ (occurring in the context),⁶⁵² the things called ‘*pañchajanāḥ*’ are made out to be (so

651. The *prāṇa* here means the sense of touch.

652. The word ‘*jyotiṣ*’ occurs twice in *Brīh. Up.* (IV. 4. 16), once in the accusative and again in the genitive case. The word in the genitive case is here referred to.

According to Śaṅkara, the reference is to the other word in the accusative case, which denotes the *Brahman*. His explanation is that in the place of *anna*, the Kāṇvas include the *Brahman* to make up the five *pañchajanas*. Rāmānuja takes a different view.

many) senses (of knowledge). The complementary passage (under reference) is intended to point them out.

What is said is this. In the *mantra*, namely, "Indeed the gods worship Him who is the Light of lights and who is immortal life as well" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 16), which occurs just before the one beginning with "He in whom the five *pañchajanāḥ* (are established)" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 17), the *Brahman* is mentioned to be the Light of lights; it being so, some 'lights' are made out to exist which have their functions dependent upon the *Brahman*; and these are made out to be the senses of knowledge (*indriyas*), which bring external objects to the light of consciousness, because there is in the statement beginning with "He in whom the five *pañchajanāḥ* (are established)" the mention of a specific (numeral) attribute in relation to what is (otherwise) undetermined.

In the passage beginning with—" (They understand Him to be the *prāṇa* of the *prāṇa* " (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 18), it is the sense of touch that is meant by the word *prāṇa* in the expression, "of the *prāṇa* ", because the sense of touch is associated with the element of air, and because also the principal vital air is incapable of being pointed out by the word, '*jyotis*' (or 'light'). The word, 'eye', in the expression, 'of the eye', (occurring therein) refers to the sense of sight; the word, 'ear', in the expression, 'of the ear', refers to the sense of hearing. The word '*anna*' (food) in the expression 'of the food (*annasya*)', by reason of its being used in more than one significance so as to avoid repetition,⁶⁵³ comprises in its meaning both the sense of smell and the sense of taste; the sense of smell is understood by this word (*anna*) because it (*i.e.*, the sense of smell) is associated with the element of earth,

653. The word *anna* is here made to denote two things as if it were used twice. Such use of a word is called *tantra* in the text. *Tantra* means the doing of an act only once but in such a way that it may simultaneously be of use in

more than one case. An example is the placing of a lamp in the midst of an assembly so that it may be of use to every one of its members at the same time. See *Pūr. Mīm. Sūt.* XI.

which also is denoted by the word '*anna*'; and by it the sense of taste also is understood inasmuch as it (*viz.*, the word '*anna*') signifies that through which food is eaten. The word 'mind' in the expression, 'of the mind', refers to the mind.

Since both the sense of smell and the sense of taste are here denoted together and at the same time (by the use of the word '*anna*' in more than one significance so as to avoid repetition), the statement that they (*viz.*, the instruments of knowledge referred to herein), are five in number is also not to be contradicted. These illuminating instruments of knowledge up to and inclusive of the mind are what is pointed out by the word, '*pañchajanāḥ*'. In order that this may hold true, both the sense of smell and the sense of taste are understood here at the same time by the use of a word ('*anna*') in more than one significance so as to avoid repetition.

Accordingly, in the passage beginning with "He in whom the five *pañchajanas* (are established) and the element of ether (*ākāśa*) is established" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 17), it is declared that the instruments of knowledge, which are pointed out by the word "*pañchajana*", and the great elements which are suggested by the word *ākāśa* (or ether) are all established in the *Brahman*; and hence it is taught that all the principles are dependent upon the *Brahman*: therefore, the twentyfive principles postulated in the system (of Kapila) are not dealt with (here). Consequently, whether the number here is accepted (to be a measure of the principles of the Sāṅkhyas) or not, it is a well established conclusion that nowhere in the *Vedānta* is there any acceptance of the principles postulated in the system of Kapila. 654

654. If the twentyfive principles of the Sāṅkhya are to be taken as being referred to here, they are referred to only as dependent on the *Brahman*. Alternatively, the twentyfive are not referred to at all. Rāmānuja also appears to be dismissing here the view of

Yādvaprakāśa, who takes the next aphorism to refer to *M. Nār.* (XXIII. 1) where another reference to five groups of five is supposed to be found. No such cases can help the Sāṅkhyas in the light of the reasoning here.

ADHIKARAṆA IV

KĀRAṆATVĀDHIKARAṆA

कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः

Sūtra 14. *Kāraṇatvena chākaśādishu
yathāvyapadishṭōkteḥ.* (123)

(The *Brahman*) is the only cause of the world, because He, as already taught, is indeed mentioned (in the context here) to be the cause of ether, etc.

Those, who maintain the theory that the *pradhāna* (or material Nature) is the cause of the world, again raise the following objection (here). In the whole *Vedānta*, it is not declared that the creation (of the world) proceeds out of (only) one thing ; therefore it is not right to say that the *Brahman* is the sole cause of the world. Thus, in the scriptural passage, "Existence, alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1), creation is declared to be based upon (an already existing) *sat* : and it is also (declared to be) based on (an already existing) 'non-existence' (*asat*) in the passage, "Non-existence, indeed, this was in the beginning." (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1). Elsewhere also it is declared thus : "Non-existence (*asat*) alone, this was in the beginning ; it became existence (*sat*), and then it developed into being." (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 19. 1). Therefore, it being undetermined in the whole *Vedānta* who the (only) creator (of the world) is, it is not possible definitely to arrive at the conclusion that the *Brahman* is the sole cause of the world.

On the contrary, it is possible to determine definitely that the *pradhāna* is the sole cause (of the world). In the passage beginning with "Indeed, this was then undifferentiated (*avyākṛita*)" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 7), it is

declared that the world is absorbed into the *avyākṛita* (or undifferentiated) *pradhāna* : then (in the same passage) by means of the statement, "It has been now differentiated by means of names and forms" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 7), the creation of the world also is declared to proceed out of that same *avyākṛita*.

The *avyākṛita* is indeed the unevolved ; it is not differentiated by means of names and forms ; that is to say, it is not yet manifest. This unevolved (or unmanifest) thing is surely the *pradhāna* itself. And this (*pradhāna*) is essentially eternal and is the seat of modifications ; therefore, in relation to it, the use of the two words, 'sat' (or 'existence') and 'asat' (or 'non-existence'), which occur in the scriptural passages that mention the cause of the world, is not contradictory, as it is contradictory in relation to the *Brahman*.

After the undifferentiated (*pradhāna*) has thus been definitely determined to be the cause (of the world), the activities of 'seeing' etc.,⁶⁵⁵ which are associated with what forms the cause (of the world), have to be taken to denote the ready fitness thereof to do the work of creation. The words, '*Brahman*' and '*Ātman*', also (which are applied to such a cause) denote the *pradhāna* itself, in consequence of their respectively meaning the quality of greatness and the quality of being all-pervading. Therefore, what is mentioned in *Vedānta* passages to be the cause (of the world) is the *pradhāna* itself, which is proved by means of revealed tradition as well as by means of reasoning.⁶⁵⁶

655. "Seeing" in the sense of "willing" is mentioned in *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 2. 3) as preceding creation by the *Brahman*. A parallel passage is *Taitt. Up.* (II. 6) which speaks of the *Brahman* as desiring to become manifold, indulging in *tabas* or thought and exerting Himself in creation. In *Bṛih. Up.* (I. 4. 7), there are references to His seeing, hearing and thinking. Such activities are included along with "seeing" here.

656. The *pūrvapakṣa* objection here is that the *Brahman* cannot

change or evolve from an undifferentiated to a differentiated condition, while *pradhāna* does so. The answer from Rāmānuja's standpoint is that creation and dissolution involve modifications in *chit* and *achit* and not in the *Brahman*. While the *avyākṛita* becomes differentiated, the *Brahman* does not change. *Ikṣhāṇa* relates to the *Brahman* as the *nimitta-kāraṇa*, while the differentiation is in respect of the 'body' or modes of the *Brahman* as the material cause.

If it be so arrived at, we state in reply thus : “ (The *Brahman* is the only cause of the world) because He, as already taught, is indeed mentioned (in the context here) to be the cause of the ether, etc.” (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 4. 14.) The word ‘*cha*’ (in the aphorism here) has the sense of ‘*tu*’ (and means “indeed”). It is possible to determine definitely that the world is produced out of the Supreme *Brahman* alone, who is omniscient, who is the Lord of all, who wills the truth, and who is free from even the least taint of all that is evil. He (*i.e.*, the *Brahman*), as already taught, is the *Brahman* who has been declared in the aphorism, “(The *Brahman* is that) from whom (proceed) the creation, etc. of this (universe)” (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 2), and in other aphorisms,⁶⁵⁷ to be characterised by the qualities of omniscience, etc. Because He alone (*i.e.*, the *Brahman* Himself) is mentioned (in the context) to be the cause of the element of ether, etc. In the following, among other passages—“From that same Self, indeed, the spatial ether came into existence.” (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), and “It created *tejas*”. (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3.)—the omniscient *Brahman* Himself is declared to be the cause (of the world).

Accordingly, the omniscient *Brahman* Himself, who constitutes the subject-matter introduced in the passage—“The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge and Infinity . . . He (*i.e.*, the released soul) attains with the ‘intelligent’ (or omniscient) *Brahman* all the auspicious qualities.” (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.)—is referred to in the expression : “From that same (Self) indeed . . .” (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.) Similarly, the omniscient *Brahman* Himself, who is pointed out in the statement—“It thought, ‘May I become manifold’” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3)—is referred to in the statement, “It created *tejas*”. (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3). It has to be

657. Śaṅkara takes the *Sūtra* to refer to the *Vedānta* texts by the phrase, “as already taught”. Rāmānuja thinks that the reference is to previous *Sūtras*. His

view appears to be that since the *Sāṅkhyas* also rely on *Vedānta* texts, it becomes necessary to refer to earlier *Sūtras* where these texts have been properly interpreted.

understood thus in all the passages relating to creation.⁶⁵⁸ Therefore, it is definitely determined that the world has the *Brahman* for its only cause.

It may, however, be objected that in the passage, "Non-existence (*asat*), indeed, this was in the beginning" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1), non-existence alone is taught to be the cause (of the world), and that under this circumstance the question may be asked, how it may be determined definitely that the *Brahman* Himself, who is omniscient and wills the truth, can be the cause (of the world). To this objection, he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the following answer :

समाकर्षात्

Sūtra 15. *Samākarshāt.* (124)

(The *Brahman* is the cause of the world) because of His being drawn in (here in the context).

The omniscient *Brahman* Himself, who consists of bliss and wills the truth, is drawn into the passage beginning with, "In the beginning this was non-being" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7). (It could be asked) how? (We have to consider the context wherein it is stated :) "The Self consisting of bliss is different from this (self) consisting of understanding. . . . He wished, 'May I be many'. . . . He created all that the world is. Having created (it), He entered into it. Having entered into it, He became⁶⁵⁹ *sat* and *tyat*." (*Taitt. Up.* II. 5 to II. 6) etc. In this scriptural passage it is stated that the *Brahman* who consists of bliss and wills the truth,

658. This *Adhikaraṇa* is taken to cover a host of scriptural texts relating to creation, especially those where *pradhāna* appears to be definitely mentioned and meant as the creating cause. Here what is pointed out is that the scripture always describes creation only after referring to the omniscience of the creating agent. Examples

of such passages given by the *Śrutapraśāṅgikā* include *Ait. Up.* (I. 1.), *Mund. Up.* (I. 1. 9) and *A. M. Nār.* (1). The argument is that the *pradhāna*, lacking omniscience and indeed any knowledge whatsoever, cannot fulfill this role.

659. For the meaning of '*sat*' and '*tyat*', see Note 163 in Vol. I.

is the Creator of all and is the Self of all, having entered into them all. Thereafter, this stanza, beginning with, "In the beginning this was non-being", (II. 7. 1) occurs. Therefore, this stanza, "In the beginning this was non-being," supports the thesis already set forth by making the *Brahman* the witness of everything. In the passage beginning with, "Through fear of Him the wind blows" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 1), the very same *Brahman* is drawn into the context, and then the quality of His being the Ruler of all, the quality of His possessing unsurpassable bliss and other such qualities are mentioned therein. Therefore the *mantra* under reference here relates only to Him.

At that time (*i.e.*, before creation) there being no differentiation of name and form, there is no existence (of Him) in association with them; therefore the *Brahman* Himself is denoted by the word 'non-existence' (*asat*). This is the very method of disposal to be adopted in the case of the following passage also :—"Non-existence alone, this was in the beginning" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 19. 1 and VI. 2. 1).

It has been stated above that in the passage, "Indeed this was then (*avyākṛita*) or undifferentiated" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 7.), the *pradhāna* itself is declared to be the cause of the world. It is replied that it is not right to say so. In this passage also the *Brahman* Himself, who has the *avyākṛita* (or undifferentiated material Nature) for His body, is dealt with, because in this passage,—namely, "This aforesaid (*Brahman*) has entered into these beings up to the very tips of their finger-nails. . . Doing the act of seeing, He is called the eye; doing the act of hearing, He is called the ear; doing the act of thinking, He is called the mind (*manas*). . . Let him worship Him as the self itself. . ." (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 7)—by means of the word 'this' (*saḥ*) in, "This aforesaid (*Brahman*)", He who is pointed out (before) by the word *avyākṛita* (or Undifferentiated) is followed up as the Ruler after He has entered (into the world); and because also, in accordance with the scriptural

statements, "Having created that, He entered into that same (world)" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1), and "Entering in along with this individual self which (also) is the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiation of name and form" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2), the Omniscient and Highest *Brahman* who is the Creator, is well known to evolve the differentiations of name and form by entering into (the world of) effect. In the passage, "He, who has entered within, is the ruler of all things that are born and is the Self of all" (*Taitt. Ār.* III. 21), the act of entering into (things) is stated to be for the purpose of controlling them (from within); therefore this kind of entering into things is impossible in the case of the non-intelligent *pradhāna*. Therefore the *avyākṛita* (or undifferentiated one) is the *Brahman* who has the *avyākṛita* (or undifferentiated *prakṛiti*) for His body. In the statement, "It has been now differentiated by means of names and forms". (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 7), it is declared that this very *Brahman* (*avyākṛita*), who was not differentiated by means of names and forms, who is omniscient and wills the truth, has of Himself and through Himself differentiated Himself into names and forms.

If such is the case, the activities of 'seeing' etc., mentioned in the context, will surely have their real and natural significance (as predicates in relation to the *Brahman*). The words, '*Brahman*' and '*Ātman*', also cannot in any manner whatsoever appropriately relate (here) to the *pradhāna*, inasmuch as it does not possess the quality of unsurpassable greatness as well as the quality of pervading (all things) for the purpose of controlling (them from within).⁶⁶⁰ Therefore, it is a well settled conclusion that the world has the *Brahman* solely for its cause.

660. The *pūrvapakṣa* is that, since differentiation has to be understood in a figurative or secondary sense in regard to the *Brahman*, there is no harm in understanding 'seeing' etc. in a

similar way in regard to the *pradhāna*. It is pointed out here that, while the *pūrvapakṣa* interpretation of such passages is forced, that of the *Vedānta* is natural and appropriate.

ADHIKARANA V

JAGADVĀCHITAVĀDHIKARANA

जगद्वैचित्वात्

Sūtra 16. *Jagadvāchitvāt.* (125).

(The *Brahman* is the only cause of the world) because (the word '*karman*' in the context) denotes the world as an effect (produced by Him).

The Śāṅkhya again raises the following objection (here). No doubt the *Vedānta* passages declare an intelligent being to be the cause of the world ; nevertheless, other than the *pradhāna* and the *purusha*, which are postulated in the system (of Kapila), nothing which is the cause of the world comes out from those passages to be the object of knowledge. Accordingly, in the dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru, the *Kaushitakins* read in their scriptures that the *purusha* (or the individual self), who is the enjoyer himself and the cause (of the world), is the object of knowledge in the context beginning with, "I shall teach you the *Brahman*," and ending with, "He, indeed, O Bālāki, who is the creator of these *purushas*, and whose *karma* indeed this is—he has surely to be known" (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 18). It is determined that the *Brahman* who is taught to be the object to be known, is the enjoying (or experiencing) *purusha* who presides over *prakṛiti* by reason of his association with *karma*, as described in the statement, "whose *karma* indeed this is." It (*viz.*, the object of knowledge here) is none other, because that (other, namely, the *Brahman*) is not admitted to be associated with *karma* (or the innate impression of works). And this *karma*, which is characterised as merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*apūṇya*), accrues only to the individual soul.

It should not be urged that by etymologically interpreting the word '*karma*' here to mean 'that which is produced', the expression '*etat karma*' (or '*this karma*') denotes the (phenomenal) world, which is presented to consciousness by perception and all the other means of true knowledge, and that, since it is he, whose work the whole world is, who has to be known, an entity different from the individual soul is itself to be understood here: for then the two separate descriptions, "He, indeed, O Bālāki, who is the creator of these *purushas*" and "whose *karma*, indeed, this is", would become purposeless. And further there is the reason that both in ordinary usage and in the *Vedas* the word '*karma*' is well known to denote only that *karma* which is of the nature of merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*pāpa*). Moreover, since the world is created on the basis of the various kinds of *karma* of the various 'enjoyers' thereof, the expression, "(He) who is the creator of these *purushas*," is appropriately applicable only to the enjoying individual self.

Therefore, the meaning is this. He (*i.e.*, the individual self) who is the cause of these *purushas*, that is, of those who dwell in the orb of the sun and elsewhere, who constitute the objects of enjoyment and the auxiliary implements of enjoyment in relation to the individual selves, and to whom (conceived as the cause of the world) belongs the *karma* which is characterised as merit and demerit, and which forms the means of his being such a cause—"he has surely to be known": that is, his essential nature (in his pure state) has to be known as being distinct from *prakṛiti*.⁶⁶¹

661. The Sāṅkhya view is that the individual selves become the objects of enjoyment to one another through their *karma*, and that creation takes place for the working out of this *karma*. Knowledge of the real nature of the self as distinct from *prakṛiti* is required for liberation. They rely

on the customary or conventional meaning of the word, '*karma*'. The individual self alone is associated with *karma* in this sense. It is the self in its pure state who has to be known. But this self is pointed out by reference to its whilom association with *karma*.

Similarly, later on in the context, it is said : “Both of them (*viz.*, Bālāki and Ajātaśatru) went near a *purusha* (or person) who was fast asleep. . . then he (Ajātaśatru) struck him with a stick”. (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 18). The act of going near a person who was fast asleep, the act of striking him with a stick and such other acts (which are here mentioned) are all such characteristics as indicate altogether the enjoying individual self. Similarly, further on also in the context, the enjoying individual self himself is dealt with as in the passage :—“Just as a rich merchant enjoys (life) in the company of his own people, or just as his own people enjoy the rich merchant—in this very same manner this intelligent self enjoys (its enjoyments) in the company of these selves ; in this same manner (also) these selves enjoy that (self)”. (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 20).

Similarly, the things asked in the question, “Where, indeed, O Bālāki, was it that this person slept? Where was he then? and whence did he come?” (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 18), were unknown to him (*i.e.*, Bālāki). Therefore, Ajātaśatru himself spoke to him thus :—“There are the veins called *hitas* : when a man is in deep sleep, then he resides in them ; then he sees no dream-image ; then it has attained union with this *prāṇa* itself (*asmin prāṇa eva*) ; then speech enters and becomes absorbed therein along with all names, the mind (or *manas*) enters and becomes absorbed therein along with all thoughts ; when he wakes up, then, just as from a flaming fire sparks proceed in all directions, in the same manner, the *prāṇas* proceed towards their respective quarters from this self, from the *prāṇas* proceed the *devas* (or senses), and from the *devas* proceed the *lokas* (*i.e.*, knowledge or objects of knowledge)” (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 19).

That is, he (Ajātaśatru) says that this very individual self who exists in the conditions of dreamless sleep, dreaming and wakefulness, and who forms the abode into which speech and the other senses enter and out of which they

emerge—(this self) is the thing which forms the basis of dreamless sleep,⁶⁶² in accordance with the statement “*Athāsmiṇ prāṇa eva ekadhā bhavati*”. (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 19). The word ‘*asmin*’ (lit. ‘in this’) means in the individual self. The word ‘*prāṇa*’ here is necessarily denotative of the state of one who is the support of the *prāṇa*; because in the expression ‘when he wakes up’, that which is pointed out by the word, ‘*prāṇa*’, is said to become wakeful; and because also the principal vital air as well as the Supreme Lord cannot possibly have the dreamless and waking states. Or the locatives, ‘*asmin*’ and ‘*prāṇa*’, may denote the different locations (so as to mean, ‘in the *prāṇa* which is in this’). The totality of speech and the other instruments of the mind have become one with the *prāṇa* itself, which is in this (*asmin*) self. Therefore, although the word ‘*prāṇa*’ denotes the principal vital air, the individual self alone is dealt with in this context; because the vital air is of itself an instrument of the individual self.⁶⁶³

Thus the *Brahman*, which has been introduced as the subject matter to be dealt with in the very beginning of the context here, is the *puruṣa* (or individual self); consequently, the Lord who is other than him, is not shown (to be the subject of discussion here). The activities of ‘seeing’ etc. also, which are the characteristic qualities of intelligent beings and which are associated with what forms the cause of the world, are appropriate predicates only in relation to this (*viz.*, individual self). Therefore, the

662. According to the Sāṅkhyas, Ajātaśatru’s query in *Kaush. Up.* (IV. 18.) is about the position of the individual self during deep, dreamless sleep. In IV. 19, he himself explains that all the activities of the senses etc. then come to rest in the soul and cease. (What is translated as “it has attained union” refers collectively to these activities.) The word ‘*prāṇa*’ first mentioned in singular number is the self. When mentioned for the second time in plural number, it denotes the five vital airs.

Rāmānuja’s interpretation of the passage is quite different; and it is stated later on.

663. Śaṅkara takes the subject of this *Adhikaraṇa* to be whether it is the individual self, the principal vital air, or the *Brahman* who is described as the object to be known in *Kaush. Up.* (IV). Rāmānuja thinks that the choice is confined to the individual self and the *Brahman*. The reference to the *prāṇa* is really a reference to the self, whose instrument it is.

pradhāna, which is presided over by this (*puruṣa* or individual self), is itself the cause of the world.

If it be so arrived at, we state in reply thus : “(The *Brahman* is the only cause of the world), because it (*i.e.*, the word ‘*karma*’ in the context) denotes the world as an effect (produced by Him).” (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 4. 16). He who is mentioned in the context here is not the *puruṣa* (or individual self), who is subject to the influence of merit and demerit, who is a very insignificant creature, who is the ‘knower’ of the body, and who, by reason of the superimposition on himself of the qualities of the *prakṛiti*, forms the source of its modifications ;⁶⁶⁴ on the other hand, He who is mentioned here is the Supreme Person, who is free from even the least taint of all that is evil such as *avidyā* (or ignorance), who is the inexhaustible mine of crowds of innumerable auspicious qualities, and who is the only cause of the whole world. Why ? Because in the expression, “*yasya vaitat karma*” the word ‘*karma*’ (‘work’), which is associated with the word ‘*etat*’ (‘this’), denotes the world which is an effect produced by the Supreme Person. Indeed, the word ‘*etat*’ (‘this’), which has its significance uncontracted by the subject-matter, context or other aids to interpretation, denotes in a general way the whole world which is directly presented to consciousness by perception and the other means of true knowledge, and which consists of intelligent and non-intelligent things. And the meaning of the word ‘*karman*’ here is not the *karma* which is characterised as merit and demerit.⁶⁶⁵

664. The Sāṅkhya view is that the self is inactive, but that its presence stimulates the activities of the *prakṛiti*. The superimposition is of the *prakṛiti*’s agency on the self.

665. If the *pūrvapakṣa* relies on the conventional and customary meaning of ‘*karma*’ in ‘whose *karma* indeed this is’, Rāmānuja relies on the word, ‘this’ (*etat*). Taken in its unrestricted sense

‘this’ indicates the visible universe. It is a strained interpretation to suppose that it merely draws attention to the role of the innate impression of good and bad deeds in making the self the cause of creation. Hence ‘*karma*’ has to be understood here in its etymological sense of ‘what is produced’ and not in its conventional sense of ‘the innate impression of good and evil deeds’.

Thus, the *purushas* (or individual selves) who are resident in the orb of the sun and other places and who are pointed out by Bālāki to be the *Brahman* in the very beginning of the context here, which opens with the statement, "I shall teach you the *Brahman*" (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 1)—(those *purushas*) are not the *Brahman* intended to be taught; and hence in the statement, "That is surely wrong; do not argue" (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 1 to 17), he (Ajātaśatru) takes exception to him (*i.e.*, to Bālāki), who speaks about things which are other than the real *Brahman*; in order to teach him (Bālāki) the *Brahman* who was not known to him before, he (*i.e.*, Ajātaśatru) introduces into the context the following statement, which begins with: "He, indeed, O Bālāki, etc." (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 18). The persons who are resident in the orb of the sun and in other places and who are associated with *karma* which is characterised as merit and demerit, and those other persons also who are similar in kind to these (former)—(they) were all known to that (Bālāki) himself; hence the word '*karma*' here is intended to bring into mind a particular person who was not known to him before; it does not denote merely merit and demerit, just as it does not denote mere activity (on the part of the principal vital air); on the other hand, it denotes the whole world as a produced effect. In this manner, indeed, is the thing which was not known before taught (to Bālāki). 666

Moreover, if the teaching here is that the unknown *purusha* (or individual self) whose inherent nature is only accidentally associated with *karma* (or the innate impression of works), has to be known, then a secondary (or indirect)

666. *Kaush. Up.* (IV) relates how the sage, Bālāki, comes to King Ajātaśatru of Kāśī and offers to teach him the *Brahman*. He proceeds to suggest the worship of the *purusha* in the sun, in the moon, in lightning, in thunder, in ether, in air etc., one after another,

The king considers none of them to be the *Brahman*. When Bālāki is unable to say anything more, the king points out that the supreme object of knowledge is the creator of the *purushas* mentioned by the sage. The entire universe is His handiwork. He is the *Brahman*.

significance ⁶⁶⁷ will have to be adopted (in relation to the word '*karma*'); further, mere association with *karma* (or the innate impression of works) being the sole characteristic of the essential nature of the thing to be known (as given here), that (thing to be known) may well be learnt merely through (saying) this much, that 'he whose is the *karma*, has to be known'; and in consequence the word, '*etat*' ('this'), in the expression, "he whose *karma* indeed this is", becomes useless. ⁶⁶⁸

Moreover, the object with which the descriptive expressions—"He who is the creator of these" and "He whose *karma* indeed this is"—are separately given, is this. He who is the creator of those persons (*purushas*), who have been mentioned by you (Bālāki) as being the *Brahman*, and He whose produced effects they are—why is He (further) particularised here? (It is to show that) He whose produced effect the whole world is, and in being whose produced effects all things, namely, the superior and inferior intelligent things, as well as non-intelligent things, are equal,—He is the Supreme Cause and the Highest Person that has to be known. Although the production of the world is based upon the *karma* (or the innate impression of works) belonging to the individual selves, yet the individual self is itself incapable of creating its own objects of enjoyment and auxiliary implements of enjoyment etc.; on the other hand, it only enjoys all such things created by the Lord as are in accordance with its *karma* (or innate impression of works); therefore, it cannot appropriately possess the power of being the creator of *purushas* (or individual selves).

(67. In *Kaush. Up.* (IV. 18), the self which has to be known is described as "he who is the creator of these *purushas* and whose *karma* indeed this is". The *Sākhya* view is that this teaches the quest after the self in his pure state, though the reference is to his being in association with *karma*.

The oblique way of referring to the pure self by his past association with *karma* is criticised here.

668. 'This' in 'this *karma*' becomes superfluous, if the intention is merely to refer to the past association between *karma* and the self.

Consequently the *Supreme Brahman* who is well known in the whole *Vedānta* to be the supreme cause, is Himself taught in the context here to be the object that has to be known.

जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेत्तद्व्याख्यातम्

Sūtra 17. *Jivamukhyapraṇaliṅgānneti*
chettad vyākhyātam.

(126)

If it be said that the characteristics of the individual self and those (indicated by the mention) of the principal vital air are mentioned (here in the context)—that has been already dealt with.

Now what has been stated above to the effect that, through the characteristics of the individual self and also through the characteristics which distinctly mention the principal vital air, ⁶⁶⁹ the enjoying individual self itself is dealt with in the context here, and not the Supreme Self—that has been already dealt with. The method of disposal adopted in regard to this objection has been given already in connection with the worship taught to Pratardana. ⁶⁷⁰

What is said is this. It has been stated there (*i.e.*, in connection with that worship) that, where after a careful consideration of the beginning as well as the conclusion of a context, a certain sentence is definitely determined to relate to the *Brahman*, there the other indications, mentioned in the same context, have to be explained in accordance with that determination. In the very beginning

⁶⁶⁹. RĀMAṆUJA takes care to point out that the *Sūtra* refers not to the characteristics of the principal vital air, but only to a characteristic of the self, indicated by the mention of the vital air as its instrument.

⁶⁷⁰. See *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 1. 29 32) (where *Kaush. Up.* III is the subject of discussion) and RĀMAṆUJA's commentary thereon.

of the context here, also, the *Brahman* has been introduced as the subject-matter of discussion in the sentence, "I shall teach you the *Brahman*." (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 1). In the middle also (of the same context), it has been declared that, in the expression beginning with "(He) whose *karma* (work) indeed this is" (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 18), what is pointed out is not the mere *purusha* (or individual self), but the *Brahman* Himself who is the only cause of the whole world. Again, in the conclusion (of this very context), namely, "He who knows this gets rid of all his sins and then attains that complete self-lordship,⁶⁷¹ which consists in superiority and overlordship in relation to all things" (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 20), there has been declared that result which is invariably associated with the worship of the *Brahman*, which consists in self-lordship and which comes after the destruction of all sins. Therefore, the passage under reference here having been thus definitely determined to deal with the *Brahman*, the characteristics mentioned therein as indicative of the individual self and of the principal vital air have also to be interpreted as relating to Him (*i.e.*, to the *Brahman*).⁶⁷²

Indeed, in connection with the worship taught to Prātardana, the characteristics mentioned there⁶⁷³ as indicative of the individual self and of the principal vital air have

671. It is the salvation of soul-
emancipation and God-attainment
which is described here. Getting
rid of sins, and evils like old age,
death etc., which are their conse-
quence, the emancipated soul
becomes *superior* to those entan-
gled in the world. It becomes like
unto the *Brahman* who is the
overlord of the universe. Its
complete self-lordship means
that it is free of bondage and
dependence, and capable of willing
the truth. Compare *Chhând. Up.*
(VIII. 1. 5 & VIII. 7. 1).

672. The rule of interpretation
used in regard to the worship
taught to Prātardana (Vol. I,
p. 387) says that when an indi-
vidual self or non-intelligent thing is
mentioned in association with the
distinctive attributes of the *Brah-
man*, or is grammatically equated
to Him, then His worship is
intended to be taught as having
that self or non-intelligent thing for
His body. Here the soul is said
to become one with the *prāṇa*
during deep sleep. As the *Brahman*
alone can be such a resting place,
His worship as having the *prāṇa*
for His body is here taught.

been declared to relate to the *Brahman*, in order that the threefold worship (of Him) as taught therein may be carried out well.⁶⁷³ In the context here also, in the statement, "Then he attains union with this *prāṇā* (*athāsmiṇ prāṇa evaikadhā bhavati*)", there is a grammatical equation possible between *asmiṇ* and *prāṇa*; and it is improper to assume different locations as their denotation. Moreover, the word '*prāṇa*' has already been definitely determined to denote the *Brahman* Himself; consequently, the characteristic which indicates the *prāṇa* and which is intended to be helpful in the worship of the *Brahman* as having the *prāṇa* or principal vital air for His body, is appropriately mentioned here.

To the question, how such characteristics as belong to the individual self may relate to the *Brahman*, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the following answer :—

अन्यार्थन्तु जैमिनिः प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्यामपि चैवमेके

Sūtra 18. *Anyārthantu Jaiminiḥ
praśnavyākhyānābhyamapi chaivameke* (127).

Jaimini, however, thinks that they (i.e., the characteristics of the *jīva*) relate to the other (viz., the *Brahman*), because of the question and the answer (in the context relating to Him); and thus (i.e., of this opinion) are some others also.

The word '*tu*' ('however') is intended to show that, by mentioning the individual self, the possibility of the passage (under reference here) relating to him, is excluded. "They relate to the other". The teacher, Jaimini, thinks

673. The threefold worship of the *Brahman* consists of meditation on His essential nature, meditation on Him as having the

individual selves for His body and meditation on Him as having the *prakṛiti* for His body. See Vol. I., p. 386.

that the mention of the individual self is made (here) with the object of teaching the essential nature of the *Brahman* who is other than the individual self. Why? "Because of the question and the answer (in the context, relating to Him)".

First of all, as mentioned in the statement beginning with "Both of them (*viz.*, Bālāki and Ajātaśatru) went near ⁶⁷⁴ a *puruṣha* (or person) who was fast asleep" (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 18), he who was fast asleep and whose *prāṇa* was wide awake, did not respond when he was addressed by the names of the *prāṇa*, ⁶⁷⁵ and he was awakened by means of a stroke with a stick; by means of these two acts, the individual self, who is other than the *prāṇa* etc., was roused from sleep; and then it is that the question which is given thus—"Where, indeed, O Bālāki, did this person (*puruṣha* or the individual self) lie down for (dreaming) this? Where was he (during deep dreamless sleep)? And whence did he come?" (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 18)—is seen to relate to the teaching of the *Brahman* who is other than the individual self.

The answer also which runs thus—"When a man, is in deep sleep, he sees no dream image; presently he attains union with this *prāṇa* (*i.e.*, the *Brahman*) itself. . . . the *prāṇas* (*i.e.*, the individual selves) proceed towards their respective quarters from this self; from the *prāṇas* proceed the *devas* (or senses); and from the *devas* (or senses) proceed

674. The Sanskrit word which has been translated as "went near" is *ājagmatuḥ* in the *Srībhāṣya* here as well as under I. 4. 16. *Kaush. Up.* (IV. 18), which is being quoted, reads *īyatuḥ*. Both the words have more or less the same meaning. In *Bṛh Up.* where the same story of Bālāki is given, the corresponding description of awakening the sleeping man uses *ājagmatuḥ*.

675. The *Upanishad* states (IV. 18) that Ajātaśatru addressed the sleeping man as *bṛihat* (the great one), *pāṇḍaravāsas* (the white-robed one), *Soma* (the moon) and *rājan* (the king). The *Śruti-prakāśikā* explains, on the strength of other Vedic passages, that these names refer to the *prāṇa*.

the *lokas* (*i.e.*, knowledge of the objects of knowledge).” (*Kaush. Up.* IV. 19),—certainly relates to the Supreme Self who is a different entity from the individual self.⁶⁷⁵ For He in whom the individual self dwells in dreamless sleep, and is quite serene owing to the absence of stain due to the varied experience of pleasure and pain that is associated with the states of wakefulness and dreams, and attains the condition of being at home with himself; and from whom, he (*i.e.*, the individual self) emerges for the purpose of enjoying enjoyments; such an One is the Supreme Self.

Accordingly, as stated in the passages, “My dear child, He is then (*i.e.*, during deep sleep) in union with the *Sat*” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 1); and “When he is embraced by the *prājñā-ātmā* (Omniscient Self), he does not know anything that is external nor anything that is internal.” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 21)—He who is well known to be at the basis of deep sleep, is the Omniscient (*prājñā*) and Supreme Self, who is a different entity from the individual self. Therefore, by means of the question and answer (in the context here), it is definitely determined that the mention of the individual self is made therein with the object of teaching that Supreme Self, who is a different entity from the individual self.

It has been stated above that both the question and answer (referred to) relate to the individual self, that further the seat of (the soul during) deep sleep is the veins themselves,

676. Rāmānuja gives here his own interpretation of the dialogue between Ajātaśatru and Bālāki, setting aside the Sāṅkhya view reported under Sūtra 16. Bālāki's notions about the *Brahman* are inadequate and imperfect. Ajātaśatru defines and describes the *Brahman* in *Kaush. Up.* (IV. 18.) He then proceeds to distinguish Him from the individual self and the latter from the principal vital air. He goes with Bālāki to a sleeping man and tries in vain to rouse him by calling him with the names of the vital air. This shows

the self to be different, not merely from the senses now in repose, but also from the ceaselessly active vital air. Then questions about the positions of the self during dreaming and deep sleep are raised and answered in IV. 18-19. (*Etat aśayishṭa* = lay down for this. But *etat* in *etadabhūt* and *etadagāt* means ‘he (the individual self)’, despite difference in gender. Alternatively, *etat* in all the three places may be roughly taken as ‘when’ and denoting three different periods of time.)

and that the whole range of the instruments (of the mind) has become one within the individual self itself, which is pointed out by the word, '*prāṇa*'. All this is not right, because the veins form the seat of (the soul during) dreams,⁶⁷⁷ and because also, as already stated above, the *Brahman* Himself constitutes the basis of deep sleep, and because, again, both the individual self and the totality of speech and the other senses, which form his auxiliary instruments, are separately mentioned in the context as having become one with the *Brahman* Himself who is pointed out by the word, '*prāṇa*'.

"And thus (*i.e.*, of this opinion) are some others also". In this very dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru (as described in the *Bṛih. Up.*), the Vājasaneyins distinguish from him (*i.e.*, the individual self), who goes to deep sleep and consists of wakeful consciousness, the Supreme Self who forms the abode of that individual self in the following scriptural passage: "Where was this *puruṣa* (or individual self) who consists of wakeful consciousness, then, and whence did he come?" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 1. 16); "When he, this *puruṣa*, who consists of wakeful consciousness, was sleeping this (deep sleep), then (he), taking (with him) the knowledge derived from the senses along with the mind, sleeps within the *ākāśa* which is within the heart." (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 1. 17). The word, '*ākāśa*', is well known to indicate the Supreme Self: (as, for example, in) "There is within that small *ākāśa* etc." (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 1.)⁶⁷⁸

677. The relevant passage in *Kaush. Up.* (IV. 19) runs: "(He, the individual self) is then (*tadā*) in them (*i.e.*, the veins called *hitas*), when (*yadā*) he is in deep sleep, he sees no dream-image, subsequently (*atha*) attains union with this *prāṇa* itself." The Sāṅkhyas connect the *tadā* with the subsequent *yadā*: thus the self is taken to be in the veins during dreamless sleep. But this view has to explain away the force of *atha*. Rāmānuja's point is that *atha* implies a state different from and subsequent to that marked by

the self's presence in the veins. Since this later state is said to be dreamless, the earlier one is shown to be marked by dreaming.

678. The *Bṛih. Up.* also reports the dialogue between Ajātaśatru and Bālāki (in II. 1), but with some variations. In the passage corresponding to *Kaush. Up.* (IV. 19), it is made clear that the individual self is with the *Brahman* during deep, dreamless sleep. This is a further refutation of the Sāṅkhya view that the self then remains in the veins.

Thus it is seen that the mention of the individual self here is for the purpose of teaching the Supreme *Brahman*, who is different from it and who is omniscient. It is therefore definitely established that nowhere in the *Vedānta* is the causality (of the universe) attributed to the individual self who is established in the system (of Kapila), or to the *pradhāna* presided over by him, as from this sentence, the Supreme *Brahman* alone, who is different from the individual self and who is the cause of the entire universe, is to be known.

ADHIKARĀṆA VI

VAKYĀNVAYĀDHĪKARĀṆA

वाक्यान्वयात्

Sūtra 19. *Vākyaṅvayāt* (128).

(The person pointed out as the object of spiritual sight etc. in the context is the *Brahman* Himself) because of the purport of (all) the passages (therein).

Here (in this *adhikarāṇa*) also⁶⁷⁹, he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) raises the doubt that, because here and there in the context (under reference here) there are seen to occur passages dealing with the *purusha* (person or individual self) who is established in the system of Kapila, it is indeed impossible to postulate any one as the Lord; and then he (*i.e.*, that same *Sūtrakāra*) dispels it.

In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka (Upanishad)*, in the section called the *Maitreyī-Brāhmaṇa*, (*i.e.*, Chapters II and

679. In this *Adhikarāṇa* as well as in its predecessors in this *Pāda*, the opponents are the Sāṅkhyas who do not admit of God. Rāmānuja here hints that disputa-

tion with them is finished for the time being and that in the next *Adhikarāṇa* the opponents are the so called theistic school of the Sāṅkhyas.

IV), there are declarations made, which begin with the passage, "My darling, the husband becomes dear (to the wife), not indeed in accordance with the desire of the husband : but the husband becomes (so) dear in accordance with the desire of the Self," (II. 4. 5 & IV. 5. 6) and end with the passage, "My darling, everything becomes dear, not indeed in accordance with the desire of everything, but everything becomes dear in accordance with the desire of the Self. The Self, indeed, has to be heard, reflected and steadily meditated upon. O Maitreyi ! when the Self, indeed, has been seen, heard, reflected on and known, all this becomes known, my darling." (*Bṛih. Up.* IV.5.6). Here the doubt arises whether the *purusha* taught in this passage as being the object of (spiritual) sight is that very *purusha* who is established in the system of Kapila, or whether he is the Lord of all, who is omniscient and wills the truth. It is perhaps thought fit to hold that it is the *purusha* (taught by Kapila).

Why? Because in the beginning, middle and end (of the context here), surely, by reason of association with attachment to husband, wife, son, wealth, cattle, etc., the individual self itself is made out (to be the subject-matter thereof) ; in the middle (of that same context) also, from the association with birth and death, as stated in the passage, "He is altogether a mass of knowledge, rises up from these (external) elements and then perishes after them ; after death, there is no (individualised) knowledge" (*Bṛih. Up.* II.4.12), that very (*purusha*) is made out (to be the subject-matter) ; similarly, in the concluding part (of this context) also, in accordance with the passage, "By what, my darling, should one know the knower?" (*Bṛih. Up.* II.4.14), that same individual self, who is the knower, is taught (to be the subject-matter), and the Lord is not (so taught). Therefore, it is definitely determined that this passage aims at propounding the *purusha* who is established in the system (of Kapila).

It may, however, be said that, inasmuch as the commencement of the context here is made with the passage, "There is, indeed, no hope of immortality through wealth" (*Bṛih. Up.* II.4.2 & IV.5.3), the whole of the passage in the context here is made out to have in view the teaching of the means for the attainment of immortality ; and so it may be asked how this context can have for its object the teaching of the *purusha* (of Kapila). To this, the reply is that for that very reason, ⁶⁸⁰ indeed, the proof of the individual self (as conceived by Kapila) is (undertaken) in the context here. As a matter of fact, in the system (of Kapila), the very knowledge of the truth of the essential nature of the individual self, who is freed from the superimposition of the properties of non-intelligent matter, is spoken of as being the means for the attainment of immortality. Therefore, here (in the context under reference) the essential nature of the individual self which is freed from matter, is taught by means of the statement beginning with, 'The self has indeed to be seen', (to be the means) for the attainment of immortality.

The essential nature of all the individual selves which are freed from matter is uniform ; therefore, by means of the knowledge of the truth of one's own self which is freed from matter, all the individual selves themselves become known ; consequently, through the knowledge of the (individual) self, the knowledge of all things appropriately results. In all beings, beginning with gods and ending with the immovable things, the essential nature of the individual self possesses a uniform mode of knowledge ; therefore, the teaching of the oneness of the self is given in the statement, " All this, whatever there is, is this self " (*Bṛih. Up.* II.4.6 & IV.5.7); and because the

680. 'For that very reason', namely, that the context deals with the means of obtaining immortality. The Sāṅkhyas believe that

the realisation of the truth about the essential nature of the self leads to immortality.

material embodiments of the gods, etc. possess the nature of 'non-self', the existence of any other nature (than its own) as established above) is denied (in regard to the self in view of such a nature tending to evil), in the statement commencing with "All things abandon (or scorn) him" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 6 & IV. 5. 7) Moreover, through the negation of manifoldness, as is given in the statement, 'Indeed, where there is duality, as it were', it is the manifoldness of the self which undoubtedly is essentially of a uniform nature—a manifoldness which is due to the distinctions of the modifications of matter known as gods—that is declared to be false. Also the statement which begins with—"That which is this *Rig-Veda*, is, indeed, the breath of that Great Being" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV 5), appropriately fits in (here in the context), because the origination of the world is due to the instrumentality of the individual self as the presiding deity over matter.⁶⁸¹

It having thus been definitely determined that this passage (under reference here) deals with the individual self, all the *Vedānta* passages, owing to their having to import the same meaning as that (passage), propound the very individual self who is established in the system (of Kapila). Consequently, the *prakṛiti* (matter) itself, presided over by that (self), is the material cause (of the universe), and the Lord is not (that cause).

If it be so held, we state in reply as follows :—" (The person pointed out as the object of spiritual sight, etc., in the context is the *Brahman* Himself), because of the purport of all the passages (therein)" (*Ved. Sūt.* I. 4. 19). In all the passages (in the context under reference) here, the Lord of all things is Himself taught (to be the subject-matter). How? Indeed, it is only thus (by so construing the passages) that the mutual

681. The *Rig Veda* is regarded as a body of sound, and as arising from the influence of the individual

selves on matter, leading to creation and evolution.

relationship among the component parts of the passages here becomes perfectly consistent.

When it was affirmed by Yājñavalkya, "There is, indeed, no hope of obtaining immortality" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4.2 & IV. 5.3), then, Maitreyī, after disregarding wealth, etc. for the reason that they do not form the means of obtaining immortality, as stated in the passage—"That by means of which I do not become immortal, what am I to do with that; what you, my lord, surely know, do teach me that very thing." (*Bṛih. Up.* II.4.3)—prayed for (the knowledge of) the very means which leads to the attainment of immortality.

This Self who is then taught to her as being worthy of direct realisation, owing to His being the means of that (immortality), is, undoubtedly, the Supreme Self; because, in the following and other similar passages—"Knowing Him alone, one transcends death" (*Śvet. Up.* III.8); "He who thus knows Him becomes immortal here; there is no other path for the attainment of immortality." (*Taitt. Ār.* III.12.7)—immortality is declared to have for its only means the knowledge of the Supreme Self. The true knowledge of the essential nature of the individual self, who forms the glory of the Supreme Person and who is the attainer (of immortality), has to be understood as being helpful to the knowledge of the *Brahman* that forms the means of final freedom, and not as being an independent means of itself. Therefore, here (in the context under reference), in the passage beginning with 'He (*i.e.*, the Self) has to be seen' (*Bṛih. Up.* II.4.5 & IV.5.6.), the Supreme Self Himself is taught to be the means of immortality.

Similarly, in the passage beginning with "That which is this *Ṛig-Veda*, is, indeed, the breath of this Great Being" (*Bṛih. Up.* II.4.10 & IV.5.11), the attribute of being the cause of the whole world is declared; and it

cannot accrue to any person who is other than the Supreme Person, and who is either subject to the influence of *karma*, or is freed from, bondage or is merely a person of no activity⁶³². In the statement beginning with 'Through the sight of the Self indeed' (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 5), the proposition that through knowing the One Self, all selves become known is given ; and it is rightly applicable only in the case of the Supreme Self who is the Self of all (other selves).

What has been already stated above to the effect that, owing to the selves having a uniform nature, knowledge of all the selves (and of all inanimate beings) is stated to result through the knowledge of (any) one self, that is improper : because, in the absence of the knowledge of the inanimate world (of non-intelligent matter), the knowledge of all things does not exist. And with the object of proving the (said) proposition, the context begins with the statement, "This is the Brahmin (caste), this is the Kshatriya (caste)" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 6 & IV. 5. 7), and ends with the sentence, 'All this, whatever there is, is this Self' (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 6 & IV. 6. 7); here, the world which is proved by direct perception and the other (means of knowledge) and which consists of intelligent and non-intelligent things, is pointed out by the word 'this' ; the teaching then given regarding the oneness of the Self, to the effect that all this is the Self, appropriately fits in only in relation to the Supreme Self. Indeed, the world which is denoted by the word 'this' and which is made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things, cannot become identical with the person (*i.e.*, the individual self), who is associated with non-intelligent matter, or who is finally freed from that (matter), or who exists in his true (revealed) form. For this very

632. According to the *Vedānta*, the individual self is either in a state of bondage, or is freed from it. In either state, he cannot become the cause of the creation of the universe. According to the

Sāṅkhyas, the individual self is merely a witness of the changes undergone by matter, and is himself devoid of all activity, intellectual or other. Such a self cannot create.

reason,⁶⁸³ disparagement also of the knowledge of all things, as dissociated from Him, is made in the passage, 'All things abandon (or scorn) him who knows all things apart from the Self'. (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 6. & IV. 57). Similarly, in the first *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* (i.e., *Bṛih. Up.* II. 4), the auspicious qualities of greatness etc., revealed in the statement, "The Great Being is infinite and unfathomable (or inexhaustible or out of reach)" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 12), appertain only to the Supreme Self. Therefore, He alone is dealt with here (in the context under reference).

What has been stated above to the effect that, inasmuch as the individual self who is associated with the love of husband, wife, son, wealth, cattle, etc. is, in the beginning of the context here, undoubtedly declared to be the object of investigation, the passage (under discussion) here has that (self) itself for its subject-matter—that is improper : because, if in the sentence, 'In accordance with the desire (*kāma*) of the self (*ātman*), (all things become dear)" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 5. & IV. 5. 6), by means of the word '*ātman*' the individual self is denoted, then it will give room to want of logical connection⁶⁸⁴ of that (sentence) with the following sentence : "The Self (*Ātman*) has to be (directly) seen" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 5 & IV. 5. 6). It is clearly ascertained (here) that the teaching contained in the sentence, "In accordance with the desire (*kāma*) of the Self (*Ātman*), all things become dear", is given as being helpful to the direct perception of the (Supreme) Self (*Ātman*) as the

683. 'For this very reason', namely, that the *Brahman* is the Self of all. Every thing is the *Brahman* because it has the *Brahman* for its Self. To regard any thing as not having the *Brahman* for its Self is to regard it in a wrong light and to court continuance in *samsāra*. This view is in contrast with that of the Sāṅkhyas set down earlier. To them everything is the self because all individual selves possess a uniform mode of knowledge. By

the same token, to regard them as varied on account of their different embodiments is wrong and spiritually disastrous. Rāmānuja agrees that all souls are similar, but he denies the *Upanishad* teaches this here.

684. The object of investigation will then have to be what is desired by the individual self, and not the individual self. Hence the two sentences here will not agree in meaning.

object (of investigation), as stated in the sentence, 'The Self (*Ātman*) has to be seen.' (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 5 & IV 5. 6) The phrase, 'In accordance with the desire (*kāma*) of the Self', means "in abundant fulfilment of the desire of the Supreme Self": *kāmas* (desires) are those things which are coveted; in other words, it means that it is for the sake of the full accomplishment of the desires of the Self (*Ātman*), that all things become dear.

Moreover, if it be said that the husband, etc. become dear for the sake of the fulfilment of the desires of the individual self, the essential nature of the individual self does not become the object of investigation. Indeed, what is dear is itself the object of search, but not that essential nature of what is the principal thing (*viz.*, the individual self) in relation to (the subordinate thing, namely) what is dear—an essential nature which is dissociated from what is dear. For whatever reason, the husband, etc., become dear for the sake of the fulfilment of the desires of the individual self, for that same reason, completely giving up the husband and all other dear things, that essential nature of the individual self which is dissociated from all those (dear things) has to be sought after: this is inconsistent. On the contrary, if it be said that the dearness of the husband, etc., is not due to their being subservient unto the husband, etc., but that the dearness of the husband, etc., is due to their being subservient unto the individual self (*ātman*),—then those things (*viz.*, the husband etc.) themselves will have to be accepted as being subservient unto themselves.⁶⁸⁵ If there be a want of logical connection of the sentence 'All things become dear in accordance with the desire of the *ātman* (self)', with the next (sentence),⁶⁸⁶ then a splitting up of the whole passage will be the result. Even if it be admitted that there is (here) a splitting up of the (whole) passage,

685. Bec use this is inconsistent with the view that one has directly to perceive the individual self,

after giving up all other things. (*Śrutaprakāśikā*).

686. The next sentence is: "The self has to be seen."

it is not seen that the earlier sentence is of any use. Therefore, in whatever manner it is ascertained that the self has to be sought after, completely giving up the husband and all other dear things, in that manner is to be explained the meaning of the whole passage (here).

The aforesaid (meaning) is given thus. In the sentence beginning with "There is indeed no hope of attaining immortality through wealth," it is stated that wealth etc. form no means for the attainment of immortality, which has a nature that is eternal and free from all evil and is bliss, unsurpassed in excellence: then (it is stated that) the dearness which is experienced of wealth, son, husband, wife etc., which is surpassed in excellence, is mixed with misery and is transient, is not due to the essential nature of the husband, etc., but is due to the Supreme Self who has a nature of bliss unsurpassed in excellence; therefore, it is taught (in the context here) that whoever, being of Himself possessed of bliss unsurpassed in excellence, brings about in regard to others also a condition of being the abode of a modicum of dearness, that Supreme Self Himself has to be directly seen.

Hence the meaning is this. There is the passage: "The husband becomes dear, not, indeed, in accordance with the will (*kāma*) of the husband" (*Bṛih. Up* II. 4. 5 & IV. 5. 6). In fact, the husband, wife, son, wealth, etc. do not become dear in accordance with their own will to this effect, namely, "I become dear to this (or that) thing for my own benefit." On the other hand, (they become dear) in accordance with the will of the Self, that is to say, for the fulfilment of the Supreme Self's desire, which consists in giving to His worshippers a reward which is dear to them (in return for the worship offered by them.)⁶⁸⁷

687. *Kāma* in the passage here is taken to be 'will' or '*sañkalpa*': whereas in the Sāṅkhya view stated earlier, it is 'desire'. People and things are dear, according to

the desire of the individual self, say the Sāṅkhyas. They become dear on account of the will of the Supreme Self, the *Vedānta* holds.

Indeed, the Supreme Self being worshipped by means of religious works, brings about in regard to (His) worshippers dearness as existing in each particular thing severally, in accordance with each individual religious work and invariably subject in each case to the limitations of place, time, kind and degree; because the scripture declares: "Indeed, He alone causes bliss" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7). Each particular thing is not essentially of its own nature dear or non-dear. To the same effect is given the following: "One and the same thing gives rise to pleasure (at one time), and again gives rise to pain. Because one and the same thing produces anger (at one time) and tranquillity (at another time), therefore there is nothing that has in itself the nature of pleasure." (*V. P.* II. 6. 46-47).

Even though the sentence, "But (all things become dear) in accordance with the desire of the *ātman* (self)", be taken to deal with the individual self, the sentence, 'The *Ātman* (Self) has to be seen', has, however, to deal with the Supreme Self Himself. In this case, the meaning is this. Because, for the sake of fulfilling the desires of the husband, etc., the husband, etc. are not accepted as being dear by one who is subject to their influence, but are independently accepted by him as being dear for the sake of fulfilling the desire of the individual self; therefore, that Supreme Self Himself who is unconditionally, stainlessly and unsurpassingly dear to the individual self,—He alone has, indeed, to be seen,⁶⁸⁸ and not the objects known as husband, wife, son, wealth etc., which are associated with the results of pleasure and pain and are mixed up with miseries, and whose several characteristics are dependent upon the Supreme Being.

688. Here Rāṇuṇja is setting out a view which, though having his formal approval, is still not to his liking. Persons and things are dear to the individual self, according to his desire. But the self is free to like or dislike as he pleases.

The true nature of the self will become dear on account of its blissfulness. The Supreme Self, by the same token, will become supremely dear on account of His supreme blissfulness.

In this context (under reference) here, however, the Supreme Self Himself is denoted even by the word ⁶⁸⁹ denoting the individual self; therefore, in both the sentences, "But (he becomes dear) in accordance with the will of the *Ātman* (Self)" and "The *Ātman* (Self) has, indeed, to be seen", the two words, '*Ātman*' and '*Ātman*', denote the same thing in both the places in the manner aforesaid.

He (i.e., the *Sūtrakara* gives the following two aphorisms) to show that even according to other schools (than his own) ⁶⁹⁰ the Supreme Self is denoted by the word (denoting the) *jīva* (or the individual self occurring in the context here).

प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेलिङ्गमाश्मरथ्यः

Sūtra 20. *Pratijñāsiddher liṅgam*
Āsmarathyaḥ. (129)

Āsmarathya is of opinion that it (i.e., the denoting, in the context, of the Supreme Self by

⁶⁸⁹. Rāmānuja has so far answered all the points except one, raised by the *pūrvapakṣa*, and it is this single point which is dealt with in the ensuing three *Sūtras*. The texts at the beginning and end of the context here, and indeed the *Maitreya-Brāhmaṇa* as a whole have been shown to relate to the Supreme Self. But one statement in *Bṛih Up.* (II. 4. 12 & IV. 5. 13) still offers some difficulty. It speaks of a mass of knowledge (*viññāna-ghana* or *prajñāna-ghana*) rising up from the external elements and then perishing after them. This spiritual entity is also called the *ātman*: and as it is associated with birth and death, it seems to be the individual self. If it is taken to be so, the other references to the *ātman* in the context also may have to be so understood. This difficulty is dealt

with in the three *Sūtras* that follow, where three different theories are put forward to show that the Supreme Self is referred to even here.

⁶⁹⁰. *Āsmarathya*, *Anuḍulomi* and *Kāśakṛtsna* explain in three different ways how the apparent reference to the individual self in *Bṛih Up.* (II. 4. 12. & IV. 5. 13) is really a reference to the Supreme Self. *Āsmarathya*'s views might have inspired *Yādava-prākāśa*. (See Vol. I, Note 235). *Bhāskara* and *Śhākara* may derive support from *Anuḍulomi*, the former holding the limiting conditions to be real and the latter unreal. Rāmānuja is of opinion that only *Kāśakṛtsna* has the support of the *Sūtras*, since he is not criticised and is referred to last.

words ordinarily denotative of the individual self) is a proof of the proposition (that by the knowledge of a certain one thing the knowledge of all things results).

This is the characteristic (means) of the proof of the proposition that the knowledge of all (other) things results through the knowledge of a certain one thing—namely, that, through the words denoting the individual self, the Supreme Self is denoted : the teacher Āśmarathya is of this opinion. If it cannot be that this individual self, on account of its being a produced effect of the Supreme Self, is the Supreme Self Himself, then, owing to its being distinct from Him, the knowledge relating to it will not result through the knowledge of the Supreme Self. In the passage, “The Self, indeed, this one only, was in the beginning”, (*Ait. Up.* I. 1.) oneness (of all things with the Supreme Self) is ascertained to exist before the creation of the world ; in the following and other similar passages—“Just as from a well-lighted fire thousands of sparks similar to it in nature take their birth, similarly, my dear child, manifold beings are born out of the Indestructible One and go to Him alone (at the time of destruction)” (*Mund. Up.* II. 1. 1),—the individual selves are declared to take their birth from the *Brahman* and are also declared to be absorbed in Him alone ; for these reasons the individual selves, owing to their possessing the character of being the produced effects of the *Brahman*, are made out to possess oneness with the *Brahman*. Therefore, the Supreme Self is denoted by means of the words which denote the individual self.

उत्क्रमिष्यत एवंभावादित्यौडलोमिः

Sūtra 21. *Utkramishyata evam-*

bhāvādityauḍulomiḥ. (130)

Audulomi is of opinion (that the words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self), because he (i.e., the individual self) at the time of final departing (from the body) gets into the state (i.e., of identity with the *Brahman*).

What has been already stated above (in *Ved. Sū. I. 4. 20*) to the effect that, through the oneness of the individual self with the *Brahman*, owing to its being a produced effect of the *Brahman*, the proposition that the knowledge of all things results through the knowledge of a certain one thing, has to be proved, and that for that purpose the *Brahman* is denoted by the words which denote the individual self—that is improper. Because, in the passage beginning with “The intelligent being (i.e., the individual self) is neither born, nor dies” (*Kāth. Up. II. 18*), birthlessness is declared to exist (in relation to the individual selves); because also the creation of the world is admitted to be due to the enjoyment of the fruits of the ancient *karmas* (or the effects of works) of the individual selves; because, again, unequal creation would otherwise be inappropriate; and because, also, inasmuch it is impossible for the individual self, which is a produced effect of the *Brahman* to avoid, even like the ethereal space (which is also a produced effect of the *Brahman*) and similar things, the attainment of final release which is characterised as getting into the state of the *Brahman*, the practising of the prescribed means for the attainment of that (final release) would be meaningless; moreover, the attaining of the cause (i.e., the *Brahman*), as in the case of pots (attaining unto the condition of the causal clay) being of the nature of destruction, will come to possess the character of being an undesirable aim of life. The appropriateness of the arguments bearing upon the

origination and absorption of the individual selves will be explained at length later on.⁶⁹¹

Hence, according to the passages—"This serene being (*i.e.*, the individual self), rising up from this body, attains unto the Supeme Light and is revealed in his true form" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 3. 4), and "Just as flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and form, so also the wise man, free from name and form, reaches the Divine Person who is higher than the highest" (*Mund. Up.* III. 2. 8),—he (*i.e.*, the individual self), when finally departing from the body, attains unto the state of the Supreme Self. Therefore the teacher Auḍulomi is of opinion that the Supreme Self is denoted by means of the words denoting the individual self.

अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः

Sūtra 22. *Avasthiteriti Kāśakṛitsnaḥ.* (131)

Kāśakṛitsna is of opinion (that the words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self also) because of the abidance (of the Supreme Self as the Self of the individual self).

What has been stated above (in the *Ved. Sūt.* I. 4. 21) to the effect that, inasmuch as the individual self, which is finally departing from this body, gets into the state of the *Brahman*, the *Brahman* is denoted by the words denoting that individual self—that also is not right; because it does not admit anyone of the alternative views (that alone are possible in regard to its nature). It may be asked whether the non-existence or absence of that state (of the *Brahman*) in relation to the individual self before it finally departs from this body is natural or conditional to it; and in this (latter) case, also, whether it is real or unreal.

⁶⁹¹. See, for instance, the discussions under *Ved. Sūt.* (II, 3. 18 & IV, 3. 1).

If it is natural, the state of the *Brahman* cannot appertain to it (*i.e.*, the individual self) ; because, owing to its distinction (from the *Brahman*) being due to its essential nature itself, so long as its essential nature is actually existent, that (distinction) will never cease to exist. Again, it may be said that the essential nature also ceases to exist simultaneously with the distinction. If so, as that (essence) itself ceases to exist, it cannot get into the state of the *Brahman*, and there will result the error of that (state) being no aim of life and other similar errors.

If it (*i.e.*, the absence of the state of the *Brahman*) is real and conditional, then even before (departing finally from the body), it (*i.e.*, individual self) is the *Brahman* Himself, and therefore it is not proper to insert the qualification given in the aphorism : “Because he (*i.e.*, the individual self) at the time of finally departing (from the body) gets into that state (*i.e.*, of identity with the *Brahman*)” (*Veḍ. Sūt. I. 4. 21*). According to this view, there is indeed nothing else than the *Brahman* and the limiting conditions, and it is impossible for the indivisible *Brahman* to undergo divisions and other (modifications) through limiting conditions. Therefore, the distinction (between the individual self and the Supreme Self) is solely due to limiting conditions : consequently, it (*i.e.*, individual self) is the *Brahman* Himself even before finally departing from this body.⁶⁹²

If the (above) conditional distinction be unreal, it has to be stated to whom at the time of final departure from the body this state of the *Brahman* belongs. If it be said that it belongs to the *Brahman* Himself who has His own essential nature concealed by the limiting condition of ignorance, it is replied that it is not right to say so ; because in the case of one whose essential nature is eternal, free, self-luminous intelligence, it is not possible to

692. Bhāskara's position is here stated and refuted.

postulate concealment by means of the limiting conditions of ignorance. Concealment is well known to be the cessation of the luminosity of a thing, when the essential nature of that thing is actually existent. If it be accepted that luminosity itself is the essential nature of the thing (*Brahman*), then there will be either the absence of the concealment (thereof), or the destruction of the essential nature (itself).⁶⁹³ Thus, as he (*i.e.*, the individual self) has his own essential nature eternally revealed, so at the time of finally departing from this body, nothing special accrues to him from the attainment of the state of the *Brahman*. Therefore, the qualification (inserted in the aphorism), “after the time of finally departing from this body”, is certainly useless.

The passage beginning with—“he, rising up from this body, attains the Supreme Light” (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 3. 4 & VIII. 12. 3)—does not then (*i.e.*, while finally departing from the body) predicate the assumption of the state of the *Brahman* in regard to one who never had that state before; on the other hand, (it predicates of him) the manifestation of the already existent essential nature. In fact, he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) says the same thing under the following and other aphorisms: “Having reached the Highest Light (*i.e.*, the *Brahman*), he (*i.e.*, the released soul) manifests himself in his own true form, on account of the use of the word *sva* (*i.e.*, one's own) in the context” (*Veḍ Sūt.* IV. 4. 1).

Thus, according to the following passages—“Entering in, along with this individual self which is the same as Myself, (I evolved names and forms)” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2); “He who, dwelling in the self is within self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, who internally rules thy self,—He is thy Internal Ruler and Immortal Self” (*Mādh. Br̥h. Up.* III. 7. 22); “He who is

693. Śaṅkara's position is here stated and criticised. Compare what is said on the same lines in Vol. I, p. 142.

moving within the *akshara*, whose body is the *akshara*, whom the *akshara* does not know, He is the internal self of all beings, He is devoid of all senses, He is the Divine Lord, the one Nārāyaṇa" (*Sub. Up.* VII. 1.) ; and "He who has entered within, is the ruler of all things that are born, and is the Self of all" (*Taitt. Ār.* III. 21)—(according to these passages), He (*i.e.*, the *Brahman*) abides as the Self in the individual self which forms His own body.⁶⁹⁴ Therefore, the *Brahman* is denoted by the words denoting the individual self.

The teacher, Kāśakṛitsna, is of this opinion. And it has been already explained, in connection with the scriptural passage, "I evolve the differentiation of name and form" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2)⁶⁹⁵, that the words denoting the individual self are certainly denotative of the individual self up to and inclusive of the Supreme Self and not merely of the individual self pure and simple.

If in this manner, through the relation of the soul and the body, the identity (between the *Brahman* and the world) is propounded, then all the scriptural passages,—*viz.*, those which deal with the Supreme *Brahman*'s qualities of being free from sin, of being omniscient etc., ; those which explain that, in regard to the individual self which is ignorant and suffering from misery, final freedom results from the worship of the *Brahman* ; those which speak of the creation and destruction of the world ; and those which aim at teaching the identity of the world with the *Brahman*—(all these) become well established and expounded. This is the very view of Kāśakṛitsna, which the *Sūtrakāra* has accepted.

The meaning here is this. When Maitreyi questioned him as to what the means for attaining

694. It may be noted that Kāśakṛitsna's explanation that there is *avasthiti* or abidance by the Supreme Self raises for Rāmānuja the question : where does He

abide? To Śaṅkara the problem appears to be : how does He abide?

695. See Vol. I, p. 175 and p. 337. Rāmānuja agrees with Kāśakṛitsna's views.

immortality was, Yājñavalkya stated, in his reply beginning with "The Self, my darling, has indeed to be seen" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 5 & IV. 5. 6), that the worship of the Supreme Self is the means for attaining immortality.⁶⁹⁶ Then, in a general manner, he gave the characteristics of (the *Brahman* who is) the object of worship in the sentence beginning with "When the Self, my darling, is seen, all this becomes known indeed" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 7 & IV. 5. 8). And by means of the illustrative examples of the kettledrum etc., (he explained in a general way) the duty of restraining the mind and the other senses which form the auxiliary instruments of worship.⁶⁹⁷ Then, in the passage beginning with "Just as, out of fire (kindled) from wet fuel, (various kinds of smoke proceed)" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 10 & IV. 5. 11), and "Just as the ocean is the sole reservoir of all waters," (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 11 & IV. 5. 12), he (Yājñavalkya) respectively taught at length that the Supreme *Brahman*, who is the object of worship, is the only cause of all the worlds, and that it is obligatory (on us) to restrain the whole group of the senses which are the sources of (our) activities in regard to all the objects of sense.⁶⁹⁸ Then, in the passage beginning with "Just as a

696. This is elaborately demonstrated in what is known as the *Laṅghu-siddhānta* or 'Small Conclusion' under *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 1. 1) in Vol. I, pp. 13-24.

697. The examples of the kettledrum, the conch and the *vīṇā* are given in *Bṛih. Up.* (II. 4. 7 to 9 & IV. 5. 8 to 10)). First Yājñavalkya says: "Just as it is not possible to stop the sounds issuing from a kettledrum when it is being beaten, and the sounds can be stopped by restraining the kettledrum (from being beaten), or by restraining the drummer (from beating it), (even so, it is impossible to restrain the mind and the senses when they are in contact with the objects of the senses: but they can be controlled by keeping the

objects of the senses away from them or by restraining them from getting interested in these objects of the senses)." The blowing on the conch and the playing on the stringed musical instrument known as the *vīṇā* are then similarly dealt with

698. The *Brahman* is taught to be both the material and the instrumental cause of the world in II. 4. 10: "Just as out of fire kindled with wet fuel, various kinds of smoke proceed, even so (all) this is the breath of this Great Being." '(All) this' is elaborately expanded to include the four *Vedas*, the *Itihāsas*, the *Purāṇas*, the *Upanishads*, the *Smṛitis*, the *Sūtras*, the various sciences, the commentaries and the

lump of salt (has no interior or exterior)" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 13), with the object of encouraging the activities which relate to the adoption of the means for the attainment of immortality, he demonstrated that the Supreme Self who abides in the form of the individual self, possesses the sole nature of unlimited intelligence. Then he spoke of that same being of the nature of unlimited intelligence, taking up, in the condition of *samsāra*, the modifications of external elements in the passage beginning with "He who is indeed a mass of intelligence rises up from these (external) elements and perishes after them" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 12 & IV. 5. 13). Then in the sentence, "There is no (individualised) knowledge after death (in the final body)" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 12. & IV. 5. 13), he stated that in the condition of final release there is no contraction of the natural and unlimited intelligence of the soul. Hence there is then no such knowledge of the material embodiments of the gods etc., arising from the individual self blending itself as one with the collection of external elements (ie., its bodies).⁶⁹⁹ Then again in the passage beginning with "Where there is duality as it were" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 14. & IV. 5. 15), holding that the direct perception of

sub-commentaries. In IV. 5.10, a few more items are added to the list: sacrifices, fire-oblations, food, drink, this world and the next, and all creatures. Smoke is regarded as having for its material cause wet fuel and for its instrumental cause the heat of the fire. The creation by the *Brahman* is as easy as the exhalation of breath. Self-restraint is taught in some detail in II 4. 11 and IV. 5.12. The sea continually receives waters from everywhere, but is never so full as to be incapable of receiving more. Similarly, the senses, the mind and the organs of action come into contact with countless experiences, but are never satisfied. The implication is that they have to be controlled to facilitate the worship of the *Brahman*.

699. In IV. 5. 13, we are taught: "Just as a mass of salt has no interior or exterior, is wholly a mass of (salty) taste only, even so this Self has no interior or exterior, is everywhere in the form of the mass of intelligence (called the individual self), and (as such) rises from these external elements and perishes after them. There is no (individualised) knowledge after death (in the final body)." This corresponds to II 4. 12; which, however, begins differently, referring to dissolved salt becoming one with water and describing the Great Being as infinite in nature and limitless in qualities. What has been rendered as "(individualised) knowledge" is *saṃjñā*, which means here the delusion of identifying the body with soul.

manifold beings as not having the *Brahman* for their Self, is due to ignorance, he negated, for one who has all ignorance destroyed and who experiences the whole world as having the *Brahman* for its Self, the direct perception of distinction, on account of there being no entity apart from the *Brahman*.⁷⁰⁰ And then he said, "By whom one knows of this, by what is one to know Him?" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 14 & IV. 5. 15) "By whom", that is, by the Supreme Self, who abides as his own self, the individual self has his knowledge imparted to him and thus knows everything: he (the individual self), "by what is he to know Him?" By nothing whatever (except through His grace). Thus he (Yājñavalkya) propounded that the Supreme Self possesses the character of being difficult to be comprehended. Then, in the sentence beginning with "This aforesaid Person is comprehended as not this, not this" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 15), thinking that the Lord of all things, who, while being possessed of a nature which is entirely distinct from all intelligent and non-intelligent things, yet has all things for His body, abides as the Self of all things, he declared that He is untouched by any of the evils which are found in the intelligent and non-intelligent things that form His own body.⁷⁰¹ Then, in the passage, "By what is one to know the (Ommiscient) Knower (the *Brahman*)? Thus, Maitreyī, have you deserved to be taught as aforesaid. This much indeed, my dear one, is immortality" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 15),

700. The passage is as follows : "Where there is indeed duality (or the sense of being independent from the *Brahman*) as it were, then one smells another, then one sees another, then one hears another, then one speaks to another, then one thinks of another, then one knows another. Where indeed to one everything becomes the Self only, then by what (independent organ) can one (independently) smell what (independent thing)?..." (II. 4. 14). The corresponding IV. 5. 15 is slightly different. Distinctions

based on the denial of the *Brahman* being the Self of all things are denied here.

701. This sentence, found only in IV. 5 and not in II. 4, runs thus: "This aforesaid Person is comprehended as not this, not this. This Self is incapable of being perceived and is not perceived, is incapable of being broken into bits and is not broken, is incapable of being attached (to material things) and does not get attached, is unbound and does not suffer, and does not perish." (IV. 5. 15).

he taught: by what is one to know the Supreme Person, who is different from all things and who forms the only cause of the whole universe—except through worship in the manner stated above? (He taught) thus that this very worship (of the *Brahman*) is the means for attaining immortality and that the attainment of the *Brahman* is declared to be immortality.

Consequently, it is an established conclusion that inasmuch as the Supreme *Brahman* Himself is expounded in the context (under reference here) the Supreme *Brahman* Himself is the cause (of the world): and that the *purusha* (or the individual self) and *prakṛiti* (matter), presided over by that (*purusha*), are not (that cause).

ADHIKARANA VII

PRAKṚITYADHIKARANA

प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्

Sūtra 23. *Prakṛitiścha*

pratijñādṛishṭānuparodhāt. (132)

(The *Brahman* is) also the material cause (of the world) because (in the context) there can be no stultification of the proposition and the examples illustrative of it.

The follower of Sāṅkhya who does not admit a Lord (of all things) having been thus refuted, the follower of another school of Sāṅkhya who admits a Lord (of all things) raises the following objections. Indeed, the *Vedānta* propounds the Omniscient Lord (of all things) as the cause of the world through associating Him with the attributes of seeing (*i.e.*, of thinking) etc. Nevertheless, it is made clear that the *pradhāna* (matter) itself is propounded to be the material cause of the world by the same *Vedānta* itself. Indeed, the *Vedānta* does not teach the Lord of all things,

who is omniscient, who is immovable, and who presides over all things, as the cause of the world (solely by Himself and) without the help of the *pradhāna*, which is presided over by Him, is non-intelligent and subject to modification.

Accordingly, the following scriptural passages teach that He is immovable and that the *prakṛiti* presided over by Him is subject to modification :—"He is without parts, without action, tranquil, devoid of blemishes and untainted" (*Śvet. Up. VI. 19*) ; "This aforesaid Great Self is indeed devoid of birth, devoid of old age and devoid of death" (*Bṛih. Up. IV. 4. 24*) ; "She (*prakṛiti*) is the mother of all modifications, is non-intelligent, is eight-fold in nature, has no birth and is indestructible" (*Chūlikā Up. 3*) ; "It (*prākṛiti*) is thought of by Him ; presided over by Him alone, it is made to expand and then made to evolve ; presided over by Him alone, it gives birth to the world and serves the ends of the *puruṣa* (i.e., the individual self)" (*Chūlikā. Up. 4*) ; "The cow (i.e., matter) has no beginning and end, is the mother and source of all beings (i.e., the author of general creation and of secondary creation)" (*Chūlikā. Up. 5*).

Similarly, it is declared in the following scriptural passages that the Lord, only by presiding over the *prakṛiti* (matter) which is the material cause, creates the whole universe :—"Out of this (*prakṛiti*) the Possessor of *māyā* (or *prakṛiti*) creates the universe" (*Śvet. Up. IV. 9*) ; "Know then that *māyā* is *prakṛiti* and that the Possessor of *māyā* is the Great Lord" (*Śvet. Up. IV. 10*). The *Smṛiti* also says the same thing in the following passage :—"The *prakṛiti*, presided over (and thought over) by Me, gives birth to all movable and immovable things" (*B. G. IX. 10*).

Thus, even though it may be argued that it is not declared in the scripture that the *pradhāna* is the material cause, the essential nature of the *pradhāna* and its being the material cause of the world when presided over by the

Lord are both established, as the scriptural passages which declare the *Brahman* to be the cause of the world cannot be otherwise understood.

In fact, in the world very great difference is seen to exist in this way between the material and the instrumental cause. It is invariably observed that clay, gold, etc., which are non-intelligent, form the material cause of pots, bangles, etc.; and that potters, goldsmiths etc., who are intelligent, form the instrumental cause thereto. And the production of effects is invariably seen to require many agencies. Thus, by disregarding the invariable rule relating to the difference between the instrumental cause and the material cause and the invariable condition which makes the production of effects dependent upon many agencies, the *Vedānta* passages cannot possibly establish that the one and the same *Brahman* is both the material cause and the instrumental cause. Therefore, the *Brahman* is only the instrumental cause and not the material cause (also). The material cause, however, is the *pradhāna* (matter) presided over by Him.⁷⁰²

If it be so held, it is stated in reply : “(The *Brahman* is) also the material cause (of the world), because (in the context), there can be no stultification of the proposition and of the examples illustrative of it” (*Ved. Sū. I. 4. 23*). (He is) also the *prakṛiti*, i.e., is also the material cause. The meaning is that the *Brahman* is not merely the

702. The theistic Sāṅkhya is now dealt with for the first time. The *pradhāna*, he says, is the material cause; it is distinct from the *Brahman*, and does not have the *Brahman* for its Self. The *Brahman* is the instrumental cause only. He cites some scriptural texts and calls in support the general sense of the *Vedas*. Moreover, in the world, the material cause is always different

from the instrumental cause. The reply establishes the *Brahman* to be both the material and the instrumental cause from the examples given in *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 1. 4-6). Scriptural texts against the Sāṅkhya are quoted, and the general sense of the *Vedas* correctly interpreted. The *Brahman* being unique, the conditions of the world do not apply to Him.

instrumental cause; the material cause also is the *Brahman* Himself.

Why? Because (in the context in *Chhānd. Up.* VI) there can be no stultification of the proposition and of the examples illustrative of it. Indeed, the proposition and the examples illustrative of it (as given in the context) do not contradict each other, (as may be seen) thus. Surely, the proposition deals with the knowledge of all things through the knowledge of a certain one thing, as stated in the passage: "You are motionless (i.e., stupid). Did you ask for that Controlling Entity (*ādeśa*) by which what is not heard becomes heard, what is not thought becomes thought and what is unknown becomes known?" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 3); and the examples illustrative of it deal with knowledge of produced effects as resulting from knowledge of their causes, as in the following passages: "My dear child, just as through (knowing) one lump of clay, all that is made up of clay becomes known" (*Ibid.* VI. 1. 4); "My dear child, just as through (knowing) a lump of gold (all that is made up of gold becomes known)" (*Ibid.* VI. 1. 5); "My dear child, just as by (knowing) a lump of iron (all that is made up of iron becomes known)" (*Ibid.* VI. 1. 6); and "Just as by (knowing) one pair of nail scissors (all the instruments become known)" (*Ibid.* VI. 1. 6).

If the *Brahman* were merely the instrumental cause of the world, then through knowing Him the whole world will not become known. In fact, through knowing the potter etc., pots etc. do not become known. Therefore, there would be contradiction between the proposition and its illustrative examples. If the *Brahman* alone is the material cause of the world, then just as through knowing the material causes like a lump of clay, a lump of gold and a lump of iron, there results the knowledge of their (respective) effects such as pots and dishes, bracelets and crowns, hatchets and axes, similarly, through knowing the *Brahman* who constitutes the material cause of all the

world, the whole universe, which is the produced effect, becomes known. The effect is nothing else than the cause itself passing into a different condition, and not a different substance. Thus, by means of the illustrative examples of the clay and its modifications etc., which exist in the form of cause and effect, the proposition (under reference) is proved. Therefore, it is definitely determined the *Brahman* is the material cause also (of the world).

What has been already stated above to the effect that the distinction in nature between the instrumental cause and the material cause is made out from the scripture itself—this is not right. For what is made out therefrom is the identity between the instrumental and the material cause, as in the following passage :—"Did you ask for that *Ādeśa* by knowing which all that is not heard becomes heard?" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 3). The word '*ādeśa*,' means that by which (others) are directed, he by whom commands are given. For it is stated in the *Śruti* : "Oh Gārgī, under the supreme command (*praśāsana*) of that *Akshara* (the sun and the moon are held apart)". (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 9). The subject (of the predication of commanding) is intended to be denoted (here by the word '*ādeśa*') as being the immediate cause most efficient (in the action of commanding).⁷⁰³ (So the text about the *ādeśa* means) : Did you ask for (knowledge of) that Ruler by knowing whom what is unheard becomes heard? That is

703. *Ādeśa* has been taken by Śaṅkara to mean *upadeśyam*, that which is to be taught. Rāmānuja understands it to be that by which commands are given. The word is formed from the root *diś* with the preposition *ā* and the suffix *ghaṇ*. This suffix cannot be used in respect of a word formed to mean something standing in a nominative relation to the verbal root. Śaṅkara uses the accusative and Rāmānuja the instrumental case in deriving the meaning. Śaṅkara relies on the suffix; the

root, however, is given an unusual meaning; and to refer to the *Brahman* as something to be taught does not distinguish Him in any way. Rāmānuja relies on the root meaning, which also helps to characterise the *Brahman* distinctly as the Supreme Commander. But he is obliged to identify the means of commanding with the commanding agent. See Rāṅgarāmānuja's commentary on *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 1. 1) for an elaborate grammatical discussion.

to say, by hearing of Him who is the supreme ruler and the presiding deity, even what is unheard becomes heard. Thus, oneness is definitely made out to exist between the instrumental and the material cause.

(This is also made out) because, from the passage, "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only (without a second)" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1), oneness (between the instrumental and the material cause) is ascertained to exist before the creation of the world, and because also, from the use of the expression, "without a second", another presiding deity (than the *Brahman*) is denied to exist in relation to the world.

It may however be asked how, if it were so (*i.e.*, if the *Brahman* were also the material cause), it is appropriate for the *prakṛiti* (matter) through being devoid of beginning and end, to possess eternality and also to possess the character of being the material cause of the world, as stated in the following and other similar passages: "She (*i.e.*, matter) is the mother of all modifications" (*Chūlikā Up.* 3); "The cow (*i.e.*, matter) is without beginning and end" (*Chūlikā Up.* 5).

It is replied to as follows. In that case also, the *Brahman*, who is undifferentiated by names and forms and who exists in the condition of cause, is Himself denoted by the word '*prakṛiti*,' because there is no separable entity existing apart from the *Brahman*. The following scriptural texts also are to the same effect: "All things abandon (or scorn) him who knows all things as apart from the Self" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 6 & IV. 5. 7); "Where, to one, all things become the Self, indeed, then by what (independent organ) should one (independently) see whom?" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 15 & II. 4. 14.) There is also the further reason that the scriptures declare as follows: "All this indeed is the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd Up.* III. 14. 1); "All this has Him for its Self" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7). Thus,

it is made out (from these texts) that the whole world, both in its condition of cause and in its condition of effect, has the *Brahman* for its Self.

What is said is this. It is declared in the scriptural passage, beginning with "He who is moving within the earth, whose body is the earth, whom the earth does not know" and (ending with) "He who is moving within the *avyakta*, whose body is the *avyakta*, whom the *avyakta* does not know He who is moving within the *akshara*, whose body is the *akshara*, whom the *akshara* does not know" (*Sub. Up.* VII.) ; (and) in the passage beginning with "He who, dwelling in the earth, is inside the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, (and) who internally rules the earth" and (ending with) "He who, dwelling in the (individual) self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self and who internally rules the self, He is thy Internal Ruler and Immortal Self" (*Mādh. Br̥h. Up.* III. 7. 3 to 22) ;— that the Supreme *Brahman* is always the Self of all things, owing to His having all the intelligent and non-intelligent things as His body ; that He is sometimes differentiated by names and forms and sometimes undifferentiated by names and forms ; that when He is differentiated by names and forms, then He is Himself said to be manifold and to be in the condition of effect ; and that when He is undifferentiated by names and forms, then He is said to be one only without a second, and the cause.

That condition of cause, which thus belongs to the Supreme *Brahman* who has always all the intelligent and non-intelligent things as His body, and which is undifferentiated by names and forms, is described in the following and other similar scriptural passages : "The cow (*i.e.*, matter) is without beginning and end" (*Chūlikā Up.* 5) ; "It (*i.e.*, matter) is the mother of all the modifications and is ignorant" (*Chūlikā Up.* 3) ; and "It (*i.e.*, matter) is unborn, is one" (*Svet. Up.* IV. 5.)

It may, however, be said from the scriptural passage relating to the dissolution of the world, viz., "The *mahat* is absorbed into the *avyakta*, the *avyakta* into the *akshara*" (*Sub. Up.* II), that the *avyakta* is made to possess origination and destruction. Similarly, it is also stated in the *Mahābhārata*: "Oh thou best among the twice-born, the *avyakta* characterised by the three qualities (of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) was born out of that" (*M. B.* XII. 342. 32); "Oh Brahmin, the *avyakta* is fully absorbed into the *Purusha* who is destitute of actions" (*M. B.* XII. 347. 31).⁷⁰⁴

This is nothing wrong, because what is denoted by the word '*avyakta*' and is conditioned by the three qualities (viz., the *prakṛiti* or matter) is a produced effect of the *Brahman* who has the non-intelligent thing (i.e., matter) for His body. The passage, "When there is *tamas*, then there is neither day nor night . . ." (*Svet. Up.* IV. 18), declares that even at the time of universal dissolution, the non-intelligent thing (i.e., matter) having the *Brahman* for its Self exists in a very subtle condition.⁷⁰⁵ Hence the non-intelligent thing, which forms a mode of the Supreme *Brahman* who is the cause of the world, and which is very subtle, is undoubtedly eternal. Therefore the *Brahman* Himself, who has that (non-intelligent thing) as His mode, is dealt with in the passage, "The cow (i.e., matter) is without beginning and end" (*Chūlikā Up.* 5), and other similar texts.

And for this very same reason (i.e., because the *tamas* exists even during *pralaya*) the *tamas* is declared to become one (with the Lord) and not to be dissolved (or absorbed) in the following scriptural text: "The *akshara*

^{704.} Both the citations from the *Mahābhārata* are from the *Mokshadharma* section of the *Sānti-parvan*. In the first, Nārada is being taught by Nārāyaṇa at Badari; the same

sage is addressed by the Lord in *Śvetadvīpa* in the other verse.

^{705.} This non-intelligent thing in an extremely subtle condition is known by the name of *avibhakta-tamas*. See Note 185, Vol. I.

is absorbed into the *tamas*, the *tamas* becomes one with the Supreme Lord" (*Sub. Up.* II.) By means of the expression, "becoming one", is denoted the existence in a condition undifferentiated by names and forms of the *Brahman* who has for His mode the non-intelligent thing (i.e. matter) in an extremely subtle state, as denoted by the word '*tamas*'.

To the same effect are the following and other scriptural texts: "There was *tamas*, intelligence was in the beginning concealed by *tamas* By power, it was born out of *tamas*. It is one." (*R.V.* X.129. 3. & *Taitt. Br.* II.8. 9).⁷⁰⁶ The following passage attributed to *Manu* also says the same thing: "This was in the condition of *tamas*, incapable of direct perception, devoid of characteristics, uninferable and altogether incapable of differentiated knowledge, as if it were in a condition of dreamless sleep" (*Manu.* I. 5.); and in fact immediately after the text, "Out of this, the Possessor of *māyā* creates the whole of the universe" (*Śvet. Up.* IV. 9), are declared those texts which deal with the immutability (of the *Brahman*).⁷⁰⁷

It has been already objected above that one and the same thing cannot possess the character of the instrumental as well as that of the material cause. Further, an effect is incapable of being produced through only one agency, because it is observed to be so as a general rule in the world. Therefore, the *Vedānta* passages can no more establish the origination (of the world) out of only one being than (we can make sense) out of the (inconsistent) sentence, "One should sprinkle with fire".

^{706.} The passage in *Taitt. Br.* (II. 8. 9) speaks of creation from out of *tamas*. In the *Rig-Veda* we have the same passage, except for *tapasastat* in the place of *tamasastat*. The reference is to the *tapas* of the *Brahman* before creation.

^{707.} See *Śvet. Up.* (IV. 11), which refers to the *Brahman* as "He who presides over every cause (of the world), in whom all things gather and become one (at dissolution) and from whom they emerge and disperse (during creation)."

To this, the following reply is given. Everything can be properly predicated in relation to the Supreme *Brahman*, who is entirely distinct from all other things, is omnipotent, is omniscient and is one only. In regard to non-intelligent things like clay etc., owing to their possessing no intelligence, there can be no association with the quality of being the presiding agent. Potters etc. who preside over (operations on clay, etc.) have no capability to undergo varied modifications (like material causes), nor have they the power to will the truth. (For these reasons) there is (in such cases) the rule from observation (that there must be more than one cause for an effect).

Consequently, the *Brahman* Himself is both the instrumental and the material cause of the world.

अभिधयोपदेशाच्च

Sūtra 24. *Abhidhyopadeśāchcha* (133)

(The *Brahman* is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) because also of the teaching relating to His thinking and willing (to the effect that He will become manifold and be born).

For the following reason also, the *Brahman* Himself is both (the material and the instrumental cause of the world) : namely, because, in the following passages, “It desired (*i.e.*, thought), ‘May I become manifold and be born’ ” (*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1), and “It saw (*i.e.*, thought), ‘May I become manifold and be born’ ” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3), the teaching given relates to the Supreme *Brahman*, who is the creator, thinking and willing to the effect that He will Himself become manifold. Indeed, what is taught here is that creation is preceded by (His) thinking and willing thus : “I will Myself become manifold in the form of the

varied intelligent and non-intelligent things, and be born accordingly”.

साक्षाच्चोभयाम्नानात्

Sūtra 25. *Sākshāchchobhayāmnānāt* (134)

(The *Brahman* is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) also because He is directly revealed in the scriptures to be both.

This teaching (*viz.*, that He is both the causes) is definitely determined not only with the help of “the proposition and the examples illustrative of it”, and of “the teaching relating to His thinking and willing” (set forth above) and other such things (as may be mentioned later). That the *Brahman* alone possesses both the character of the instrumental cause and the character of the material cause is directly revealed in the scriptures, as in the following passages: “Which indeed is the wood and which, indeed, is that tree out of which they fashioned Heaven and earth? O wise men, question your mind as to which things He presided over—He who bears the worlds. The *Brahman* is the wood, the *Brahman* is that tree out of which He fashioned the Heaven and earth: the *Brahman* who supports the worlds presides over Himself with His mind, I tell you, O you wise men” (*Taitt. Br.* II. 8. 9).⁷⁰⁸

708. The previous two *Sūtras* have relied on the general sense of the *Vedas*. Now and in *Sūtras* 26 and 28, specific texts are cited in favour of the position taken by the *Vedānta*. Śaṅkara takes the text referred to here to be *Chhând. Up.* (I. 9. 1.) The text quoted by Rāmānuja is apt and very much to the point. Here certain disciples ask their teacher: “Where was

the universe before creation? What is its material cause? What are the instruments used by the Lord in creation?” The teacher answers: “The *Brahman* is the place, He is the material cause, He presides over Himself in the form of instruments.” Note that a plurality of creators is not intended by the plural number of the verb in the question.

Indeed, if it is asked (by way of objection to the *Brahman* being both the causes) from the point of view of ordinary people in this world, what the material is for the *Brahman* who is the Creator and what His auxiliary implements for creation are, the answer is given in disproof, that inasmuch as it is nothing wrong for the *Brahman*, who is entirely distinct from all other things, to be in association with omnipotence, the *Brahman* Himself is both the material cause and the auxiliary implements (of creation). For this reason also, the *Brahman* is both (the material and the instrumental cause of the world).

आत्मकृतेः

Sūtra 26. *Ātmākṛiteḥ* (135)

(The *Brahman* is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world) because (also) of His making Himself (into the world is taught in the scripture).

In regard to the *Brahman*, who at the beginning of the context is taught to be desirous of creating (the world), as in the passage, "He desired, 'May I become manifold and be born'" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 6.), it is made out from the (subsequent) passage, "Therefore He Himself made Himself (into many)" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7), that He possesses both the quality of being the Creator and the quality of being the object of creation. Therefore, He Himself multiplies Himself into the world. Consequently, it is ascertained (therefrom) that to Him alone belongs both the character of being the material cause and the character of being the instrumental cause (of the world). The Supreme Self, when undifferentiated by names and forms, is the agent (of the act of creation); He Himself, being differentiated by names and forms, is the effect (or object of the act of creation in the form of the world). Thus there is

nothing wrong in His being both the agent and the object of creation. Inasmuch as He Himself made Himself into that (form of the world), He is both the instrumental cause and the material cause (of the world).

The Supreme *Brahman* is devoid of even the slightest trace of the evil that is found to exist in all the intelligent and non-intelligent things, and He is the sole abode of all knowledge and bliss unsurpassed in excellence, according to the following passages of the scriptures : “The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity” (*Taitt. Up.* II.1.1.); “The *Brahman* is bliss” (*Taitt. Up.* III. 6. 1) : “He is devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger and free from thirst” (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5) ; “He is without parts, without actions, tranquil, devoid of evil and untainted” (*Śvet. Up.* VI. 19.) ; “This aforesaid Person is indeed the Great Self, who is free from birth, free from old age and free from death” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 25.). Here he (*i.e.*, the *Sūtrakāra*) raises in regard to Him the doubt as to how, through thinking and willing to become manifold, there can happen to Him the evolution of manifoldness in the form of the wonderfully infinite world which is the abode of all wrong aims of life and is made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things. And he dispels (that doubt) as follows :

परिणामात्

Sūtra 27. *Pariṇāmāt* (136)

(The *Brahman* is both the material and instrumental cause of the word) because of the evolution (relating to Him as taught in the scriptures being peculiar).

That is to say, because of His having a peculiarly evolving nature. The nature of the evolution which is taught here is such that it does not bring about imperfection

in the Supreme *Brahman*. On the contrary, it undoubtedly assigns to Him unobstructed sovereignty. Such is the idea.⁷⁰⁹

The modification (or evolution here under reference) is indeed taught to be of this character. The Supreme *Brahman* is the opposite of all that is evil and the sole seat of all auspicious qualities. He is entirely distinct from all other things (than Himself). He is omniscient, and He wills the truth. He has all His desires fulfilled; He is bliss unsurpassed in excellence; owing to His possessing as His body the whole of the totality of intelligent and non-intelligent things, which form the instruments of His play, He is their Self. When the world, which forms His body, becomes reduced at dissolution, through a succession of causes beginning with the *tanmātras* (rudimentary elements), *ahaṅkāra* (the principle of egoity) etc., to an extremely subtle, non-intelligent thing that is denoted by the word, '*tamas*', and when (this) *tamas*, on account of its assumption of a very subtle state which cannot be separately pointed out even as His body, has passed into the state of oneness with Himself: then the *Brahman*, who has such a *tamas* for His body, thinks and wills to the effect, "May I, as before, have for (My) body the world of intelligent and non-intelligent things differentiated by names and forms". Then, in the reverse order of dissolution (of the principles constituting the world), He modifies His own self so as to have the (created) world for His body. This is the modification taught in all the *Vedānta* texts.

That the whole world forms the body of the *Brahman* and that the *Brahman* forms its Self is indeed taught in

709. The reference to evolution may, on the face of it, seem an objection to the view that the *Brahman* is the material cause. So Rāmānuja explains that the *Sūtra* refers to the nature of the *Brahman* Himself. He at once proceeds to make it clear that this evolution is peculiar to the *Brahman* and does not indicate any imperfection in Him.

this very manner thus in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka (Upanishad)*:
 “He who, dwelling in the earth is within earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who internally controls the earth, He is thy Internal Ruler and Immortal Self . . . (He) whose body is the waters . . . whose body is the fire . . . whose body is the mid-heaven . . . whose body is the air . . . whose body is the heavens . . . whose body is the sun . . . whose body is the directions in space . . . whose body is the moon and the stars . . . whose body is the ethereal space . . . whose body is the *tamas* . . . whose body is the light . . . whose body is all the beings . . . whose body is the *prāṇa* (vital air) . . . whose body is the speech . . . whose body is the eye . . . whose body is the ear . . . whose body is the mind . . . whose body is the skin . . . whose body is the understanding” and ending, according to the recension of the Kāṇvas, with : “He whose body is the seed . . .”.

According to the recension of the Mādhyandinas, however, there is this difference, namely, that in the place of the expression, “(He whose body is the) understanding”, there is the passage, “He whose body is the (individual) self” : and there is this in addition, that the worlds, the sacrifices and the *Vedas* form the body of the Supreme Self.

In the *Subālopanishad* also, it is first declared that the earth and the other entities form the body of the Supreme Self, and then it is declared that the entities not mentioned in the *Vājasaneyaka (i.e., Bṛih. Up.)* form His body and the *Brahman* forms their Self, as in the following passage :—“He whose body is the intellect . . . whose body is the material principle of egoity . . . whose body is the mind . . . whose body is the *avyakta* . . . whose body is the *akshara* . . . who moves within the *mṛityu*, whose body is the *mṛityu*, whom the *mṛityu* does not know, He is the Internal Self of all beings, is devoid of sin, is the Divine Lord, the one Nārāyaṇa.” (*Sub. Up. VII*).

Here, by the word, ' *mṛityu* ', is denoted the extremely subtle thing which is denoted by the word ' *tamas* '; because in that same *Upanishad*, the order of succession (at dissolution) is thus recognised :—" *Avyakta* is absorbed into the *akshara*, the *akshara* is absorbed into the *tamas*." (*Sub. Up.* II). Inasmuch as it is at the root of the evils arising on account of its veiling the knowledge of all the individual selves, that *tamas* itself is indeed capable of being denoted by the word ' *mṛityu* '.⁷¹⁰

In the *Subālopanishad* itself, it is declared, as in the following passage, that all the entities undergo absorption into *Brahman* Himself, as they have Him as their Self, on account of their forming the body of the *Brahman* :—" The element of earth is absorbed into the element of water ; the element of water is absorbed into the element of fire : the element of fire is absorbed into the element of air : the element of air is absorbed into the element of ether : the element of ether (is absorbed) into the senses : the senses (are absorbed) into material elements in the subtle condition : the material elements in the subtle condition (are absorbed back) into the *bhūtādi* : the *bhūtādi* is absorbed (back) into the *mahat* (or the ' great ' principle) : the *mahat* is absorbed into the *avyakta* : the *avyakta* is absorbed into the *akshara* : the *akshara* is absorbed (back) into the *tamas* : the *tamas* becomes one with the Supreme Lord." (*Sub. Up.* II).

He (that is, the *Sūtrakara*) says later on under the aphorism : " If it be said there is no *karma* (or results of works before creation) because of the declaration in the scriptures of the non-distinction (between the individual selves and the *Brahman* prior to creation), it is replied that it is not right to say so ; because

710. Both the words, ' *tamas* ' and ' *mṛityu* ', mean 'matter'. The former, which literally signifies 'darkness', appropriately refers to matter : for matter veils know-

ledge. *Mṛityu* usually means 'death' : as matter is responsible for the disasters and bondage of *samsāra*, it can be very well called ' *mṛityu* '.

both (the selves and *karma*) are beginningless. It (*i.e.*, the non-distinction) is appropriate and it (*i.e.*, the beginninglessness of souls) is also declared in the scriptures" (*Ved. Sūtra*. II. 1. 35)—that, even in the condition of non-differentiation, all the intelligent and non-intelligent things exist in association with the innate impressions of *karman*s (or effects of works).

In this manner, in relation to the *Brahman* who has as His body all the intelligent and non-intelligent things, which are in an extremely subtle condition and are one with the Supreme Self owing to their being incapable of being pointed out separately from Himself; who is (thus) one without a second; who is possessed of bliss unsurpassed in excellence; who is omniscient; and who wills the truth—modification, in the form of the world and preceded by thinking and willing to the effect that He will become manifold through having as His body all the intelligent and non-intelligent things in their gross state when they are capable of being differentiated into names and forms, is declared⁷¹¹ in the following scriptural passages:—"The *Brahman* is existence, knowledge, infinity" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1); "Different from this, indeed, which consists of knowledge is the other, the internal Self which consists of bliss" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 5.1); "He causes bliss indeed" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1); and "He desired, 'May I become manifold and be born'; He performed *tapas*; after performing *tapas*, He created all this, whatever there is; having created it, He entered into that same thing; having entered into it, He became the *sat* and the *tyat*,⁷¹² the defined and the undefined, the possessor of a home and the homeless, the intelligent thing

711. The evolutionary nature of the *Brahman* (*Sūtra* 27) is intended to explain how He could have made Himself into the world as declared in *Sūtra* 26. The discussion thus has its basis in that declaration in *Taitt. Up.* (II. 7. 1). So Rāmānuja quotes extensively from that text.

It is to be noted that the *Chhândogya* authority for the *Brahman* being one only without a second (VI. 2. 1) is deliberately omitted as outside the present context.

712. See Note 183, Vol. I.

and the non-intelligent thing ; while being the unchangeable (individual self or *satya*) and the changeable (matter), He has (nevertheless) remained true to His own nature" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1).

Here, by the word '*tapas*' is denoted knowledge which relates to the complete thinking over about that configuration of the world which was created before ; because the scripture declares so in the following and other similar passages : "His *tapas* consists of knowledge" (*Mund. Up.* I. 1. 9).⁷¹³ The meaning is that after completely thinking out that configuration of the world which was created before, now (that is, subsequently) also, He created the world as having that same configuration. In this very same manner, indeed, does the *Brahman* create the world of only one and the same nature in all the periods of time known as *kalpas*, as declared in the following scriptural passage : "The Creator created the sun and moon as before, as also heaven and earth and the mid-heaven and Svarga" (*M. N. Up.* V. 7) ; as well as in the following passage taken from the *Smṛiti* : "Just as the manifold seasonal characteristics during the seasons appeared in similar conditions during the (next) reversion (of the seasons), similarly the various (types of created) beings also (reappear) at the beginning of the periods of time known as *yugas*" (*V. P.* I. 5. 65).

Therefore, the meaning is this. The Supreme Self, who is of Himself possessed of a nature of unlimited knowledge and bliss, in consequence of His owning as His body all the intelligent and non-intelligent things which form the auxiliary instruments of His mere play and are almost in a state of non-existence owing to their being extremely subtle in nature, consists of all those things (in the state of *pralaya*). With the object of adopting wonderfully invented toys for His play, He transforms

713. See also Note 345, Vol. I.

Himself, as having each particular thing as His body, in the order of succession relating to the aggregate creation of the matter and individual souls forming His body, and ending with the great external material elements. And consisting of those things, He again assumed the form of the world, which begins with the gods and ends with immovable things and in which are mixed up the varied intelligent and non-intelligent things that are denoted by the words, 'sat' and 'tyat', respectively.

In the passage, "He entered into that same thing; having entered into it, etc." (*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1),⁷¹⁴ what is stated is that the Supreme Self Himself, who, in the condition of cause, existed as the Self, existed as the Self, in the condition of effect also, of the changing substance which is produced as effected, and thus became each particular (produced) thing. In regard to this transformation in the form of the world, which consists of the combination of the Supreme Self, the intelligent (individual soul) and the non-intelligent (matter), all the wrong aims of life appertain undoubtedly unto the intelligent part of the body of the Supreme Self and all the substantial modifications belong to the non-intelligent part similarly circumstanced. For the Supreme Self, to be the (produced) effect is to be the Self as the controller of those two parts existing in that condition (of effect). The Supreme Self, however, who, owing to His being the controller of those two parts which form His body, constitutes their Self, is not touched by the wrong aims of life associated therewith as well as by the modifications (relating thereto). Consisting of unlimited knowledge and bliss, and being always of a uniform nature, He exists in association with the mere sport of revolving the world.

The same thing is said in the passage: "While being the unchangeable (individual self or *satya*) and the

714. The *Śrutaprakāśikā* points out that the creation of the world by God and the *anupraveśa* (or the entering by Him into the

created world) must be both deemed to be simultaneous, and that this is the purport of Rāmānuja's explanation here.

changeable (matter), He has (nevertheless) remained true to His own nature". (*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1). The meaning is that the *Brahman* remained unchanged, although He underwent modifications in the form of the varied intelligent and non-intelligent things : being devoid of even a little of all that is evil, and being possessed of unlimited knowledge and bliss, He existed with one and the same nature.

All the intelligent and non-intelligent things, when they assume their subtle state, as when they are in the gross state, form the auxiliary instruments of the mere play of the Supreme *Brahman*. Creation etc. are His play. This has been so taught by the venerable Dvaipāyana, Parāśara and others, as in the following and other similar passages :—"One should know that all this, which begins with the *avyakta* and ends with particularity (i.e., the earth) and is associated with modification and growth, is the mere play of Hari (God) and is destructible." (?) ; "Of Him who is like unto a playing child, listen to the activities" (*V. P.* I. 2. 18) ; "He resembles a child by reason of his toys". (*Vāyu Pu. Utt.* XXXVI. 69). And he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) says later on (the same thing) under the aphorism : "Mere play (is all His purpose in the creation etc. of the world), as indeed is the case (in regard to a king etc.) in the world." (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 1. 33).

According to the passage, "Out of this the Possessor of *māyā* creates the whole of this world, wherein the other (i.e., the individual self) is bound down by *māyā*" (*Śvet. Up.* IV. 9), although the *Brahman* undergoes modifications in the form of the world, all the substantial modifications appertain unto the non-intelligent part which forms His mode, and all the wrong aims of life appertain unto the individual self which (also) forms His mode. To make this discrimination, the teaching given relates to the distinction (from the *Brahman*) of matter and the individual self, which form the body of the *Brahman*, even when, owing to their having assumed an extremely subtle state, (i.e. prior to creation) they are incapable of being

pointed out as such and are one with the *Brahman*. Because it (*i.e.*, this passage) has to have oneness of meaning with the following and other similar passages : “Therefore, He made Himself (manifold).” (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7). To the same effect is the following passage attributed to Manu : “After thinking and willing (that He might become manifold) He became desirous of creating various kinds of creatures ; He created only waters in the beginning and put His seed therein.” (*Manu.* I. 8.) For this very reason, the scriptural passages which deal with the *Brahman* being free from evil as well as with His being free from modification, are also appropriate. Consequently, the *Brahman* Himself is the instrumental cause as well as the material cause (of the world).

योनिश्च हि गीयते

Sūtra 28. *Yoniścha hi giyate* (137)

(The *Brahman* is also the material cause) because also He is declared (in the scriptures) to be the source (of the world).

For the following reason also,⁷¹⁵ the *Brahman* is the instrumental cause as well as the material cause of the world—for the reason, that in the following passages He is declared even to be a *yoni* (or source of the world) : “The *Brahman* is the creator, lord, *puruṣa* and *yoni*.” (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 3) ; and “The wise perceive Him to be the *yoni* of all beings.” (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 6). That the word ‘*yoni*’ denotes the material cause is made out from the complementary passage : “Just as the spider sends forth and draws in (its web) . . .” (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 7).

715. This *Sūtra*, also like *Sūtras* 25 and 26, is concerned with specific scriptural texts declaring the *Brahman* to be both the material and the instrumental

cause. It is placed last probably because the *Muṇḍaka* texts cited now refer to the subject incidentally (III. 1. 3), or incompletely (I. 1. 6).

ADHIKARANA VIII

SARVA-VYĀKHYANĀDHIKARANA

एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता व्याख्याताः

Sūtra 29. *Etena sarve vyākhyātā vyākhyātāḥ* (138)

By means of the foregoing (reasoning), all other (similar passages) have been explained, have been explained.

‘By means of the foregoing’ means ‘through the whole body of the group of arguments stated in all the four parts (of the first chapter)’.

‘All’ means the particular passages which in all the *Vedānta* scriptures aim at dealing with the cause of the world. They have been explained as dealing with the *Brahman*, who is entirely distinct from all intelligent and non-intelligent things, who is omniscient and who is omnipotent.⁷¹⁶

716. A new *Sūtra* or *Adhikarāṇa*, which relies on previous reasoning or conclusions, has to justify itself by dealing with some additional doubt. Here such a doubt is raised and solved. The theme of the first chapter is to establish that the *Brahman* is the cause of the world. This is sought to be proved by a critical examination of all the passages in the scriptures concerned with the subject. They fall more or less into eight types. (i) Some indicate the cause of the world by words like ‘*Sat*’, ‘*Brahman*’ and ‘*Akshara*’ which may denote matter, the individual self, or the *Brahman*. (ii) & (iii) There are sentences using words like ‘*kshetrajña*’ and ‘*gau*’, which

respectively denote the individual self and matter exclusively. (iv) In some cases we have words like ‘*ātman*’ which can denote either the individual self or the Supreme Self. (v) In a few other cases there are found ambiguous words which may denote particular individual selves or particular modifications of matter, as for instance in the *Vaiśvānara* passages. (vi) & (vii) Then again there are passages with words denoting particular individual selves (like *Indra*) and those with words denoting particular modifications of matter (like *ākāśa*). (viii) Finally, words exclusively indicative of the *Brahman* are also found used, as in the *Antaryāmi-Brahmaṇa*. In all

The repetition of the expression, "have been explained," is intended to mark the close of the chapter,

these cases, the *prima facie* view sought to prove something other than the *Brahman* to be the cause of the world on the ground that characteristics of this other thing are indicated or implied. The unmistakable characteristics of the *Brahman* to be found therein dispelled these objections. Now the problem is; what about passages where the cause of the world is mentioned barely, without being associated with the

characteristics of the *chit*, the *achit* or the *Brahman*? The answer to this doubt is that the *Brahman* is to be regarded as being indicated in every such case, as the *Brahman* alone has been established to be the cause of the world. The *Śrutaprahāṣikā* explains at very great length where and how the principles of interpretation and steps of reasoning already set out are to be applied.

CHAPTER II

ADHIKARANA 1

SMṚITYADHIKARANA

स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्नान्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात्

Sūtra 1. *Smṛityanavakāśaprasaṅga iti
chennānyasmṛityanavakāśadoshaprasaṅgāt*
(137)

If it be said that (in case the *Vedānta* is accepted as teaching the *Brahman* to be the cause of the world) the *Smṛiti* (of Kapila) will have no scope (as supporting and supplementing the *Vedānta*, it is replied that) it is not right to say so; because such (a view) will lead to the evil of other *Smṛitis* not finding scope.

In the first chapter, it has been stated that the Supreme *Brahman* is an entity distinct from non-intelligent matter, which falls within the range of direct perception and other means of proof (i.e., logical inference); and (distinct) also from both the intelligent individual self that is associated (in *samsāra*) with that (non-intelligent matter) and the intelligent individual soul which is dissociated from it (in *moksha*); that He is devoid of even the slightest trace of all that is ignorance and of all other wrong aims of life; that He is the infinite and sole abode of the quality of being knowledge and the quality of being bliss; that He is

possessed of an ocean of noble qualities which is infinite; that He is the sole cause of the whole universe; that He is the internal Self of all beings; and that He is capable of being known by means of the *Vedānta*.

Immediately afterwards the second chapter is introduced with the object of showing that this teaching (of the first chapter) is unassailable from any and every (possible or imaginable) point of view.

First of all, then, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) raises the doubt that in consequence of their opposition to the *Smṛiti* of Kapila, the *Vedānta* texts do not deal with that (*Brahman* taught earlier). And he dispels that (doubt).

How can it be said that the scripture deals with other things (than the said *Brahman*), because it contradicts the *Smṛiti* (in general)? For it is declared in the following aphorism that the *Smṛiti*, which is opposed to the scripture, has to be disregarded: "Where, however, there is contradiction (of the *Smṛiti* with the *Śruti*), it (i.e., the *Smṛiti*) is to be disregarded; (where, however, there is no such contradiction, then there arises the presumption that a scriptural text forms the basis of the *Smṛiti*)." (*Pūr. Mīm.* I. 3. 3).⁷¹⁷ True (that it is so declared). In regard to scriptural sentences like, "After touching the *udumbara* stick, one should begin to sing" (?), it is possible to determine definitely the meaning solely by means of these sentences themselves, and therefore the *Smṛiti*, which is opposed to such (sentences) has to be disregarded altogether. But here (in the case under reference), owing to the real entity taught in the *Vedānta*

717. The usual illustration given of the contradiction between *Śruti* and *Smṛiti* texts is indicated in part by Rāmānuja. The *Śruti* injunction is that there should be singing of *Sāman* hymns after touching a post made of the wood

of a kind of fig tree (*udumbara*). This is contradicted by a *Smṛiti* text which requires: "The whole of the *udumbara* should be covered over (with cloth)". In view of the clear injunction of the *Śruti*, the *Smṛiti* has to be disregarded.

being difficult to comprehend, there will be no definite determination that such and such is the meaning, if there is contradiction (of the scripture) with the *Smṛiti* composed by the great sage (Kapila). And thus it is nothing wrong to propound with the help of the *Smṛiti* that the scripture does not deal with that (i.e., the *Brahman*).

What is said is this. The great sage and seer, Kapila, accepts as they are in reality all the religious rites such as the *agnihotra*, the new moon and full moon sacrifices and the *jyotishṭoma*, which are dealt with in the earlier part (of the *Vedānta*) as forming the means for attaining all prosperity. He is spoken of in the scriptures, *Smṛitis*, *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas*, as being faithful (and authoritative) in such passages as "Kapila was born as a sage." (*Svet. Up. V. 2.*) Without the help of the supplementary exposition composed by him in the form of a *Smṛiti* (for elucidating the *Vedānta*) as a result of his being the knower of the highest good and all the means of attaining it, it is not possible for persons of little knowledge and dull intellects to determine definitely the meaning of the *Vedānta*. And if what is made out (from the *Vedānta*) is merely the popular verbal meaning (thereof), the whole of the *Smṛiti* of the Sāṅkhyas will have no scope (in leading to the real meaning thereof). For these reasons, it has necessarily to be accepted that the very meaning, well known to be taught by the *Smṛiti* (of Kapila), is itself the teaching of the *Vedānta*.

It should not, however, be urged that under such circumstances, room will be given for the evil of excluding the *Smṛiti* of Manu and other *Smṛitis* which deal with the *Brahman* as the sole cause (of the universe). For those (*Smṛitis*) which support and supplement the earlier part which deals with religious duties, have their scope undoubtedly (in helping one to understand the *Veda*). The whole of this (*Smṛiti*), however, aims at establishing the truth (of the *Pradhāna* as the cause of the universe).

And hence if it is not accepted to be so, it will surely have no scope (in helping one to understand the *Veda*). Therefore, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakāra*) raises this doubt, namely, "If it be said that (in case the *Vedānta* is accepted as teaching the *Brahman* to be the cause of the world), the *Smṛiti* (of Kapila) will have no scope (as supporting and supplementing the *Vedānta*) " (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 1. 1.).⁷¹⁸

To this it is replied that it is not right to say so, because such a view will lead to the evil of excluding *Smṛitis* other than that of Kapila from being accepted as guides to the *Vedānta*. Indeed, other *Smṛitis* like that of Manu declare the *Brahman* to be the sole cause (in relation to the world). Manu says thus: "This was in the condition of *tamas* Then the self-existent divine Lord, being possessed of that splendour which consists of the knowledge of His will operating on the great external elements, being unmanifest became manifest as the dispeller of darkness. After thinking and willing to the effect that He would become manifest, He, with the desire of creating various kinds of creatures out of His body, created the waters alone at first and therein put His seed." (*Manu* I. 5-8).⁷¹⁹ In the *Bhagavadgītā*, also, there is the following passage to the same effect: "I am the source as well as the destruction of the whole world" (*B. G.* VII. 6.); and

718. The argument is based on a general principle of interpretation that an injunction which has no other scope than the matter under consideration, is to be deemed applicable there, in preference to other injunctions which may press their claims here, while having scope elsewhere. (*Sāvakāṣa niravakāṣaḥ niravakāṣo bahīyān*). The work of Kapila has scope only in metaphysics, while those of Manu etc. are claimed to deal primarily with duties and rituals and

incidentally with metaphysics. The reply is that the works of Manu and others cannot be said to be primarily interested only in duties etc.

719. The passage from Manu is cited to indicate that the duties later laid down are intended to be of the nature of the worship of the Lord, who is the cause of the universe. Manu starts with a discourse on the Lord as a necessary preliminary to an account of the duties and rituals which constitute His worship.

"I am the source of all beings and everything proceeds from Me." (*B. G. X. 8.*)

Again, in the *Mahābhārata*, there are the following passages to the same effect : " Whence was all this world, immovable and movable, created? and to whom does it go at dissolution? Tell me all about this, grandfather." (*M. B. XII. 180. 1.*) Having been thus questioned (by Yudhishthira), he (Bhishma) said : "Nārāyana has the world for His body. He consists of countless selves and He is ancient." (*M. B. XII. 180. 11.*) Similarly, there is the passage : "O thou best among the twice-born (*i.e.*, Nārada), the *avyakta* characterised by the three qualities (of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) was born out of that (*Purusha*)" (*M. B. XII. 342. 32.*)—and also the passage : "O Brahmin (Nārada), the *avyakta* is fully absorbed into the *Purusha*, who is destitute of actions" (*M. B. XII. 347. 31.*) The venerable Parāśara also says the same thing in the passage : "The world was born out of Viṣṇu and is existent in Him alone. He is the preserver and controller of the world. And He is Himself the world." (*V. P. I. 1. 35*)⁷²⁰

Āpastamba also says the same thing in the passage beginning with "All the living beings are themselves the body of Him who is in the interior of all beings, who is incapable of being killed and who is free from sin" (*Āp. Dh. I. 22. 4.*), and ending with "Therefore all beings spring from Him as (His) bodies; He is the source; He is everlasting; He is eternal." (*Āp. Dh. I. 23. 2*)⁷²¹

If the definite determination of the teachings of the *Vedānta* is arrived at with the help of the *Smṛiti* of Kapila, then the great evil of lack of scope of all these

720. See Note 704 for the quotations from the *Mahābhārata*, and Note, 107, Vol. I, for the passage from the *Viṣṇu purāṇa*.

721. The passage from Āpastamba not merely describes creation from the *Brahman*; it also teaches the relationship of body and soul between Him and the world.

other *Smṛitis* (as aids and supplements) to the *Vedānta* will accrue.

The meaning is this. No doubt, inasmuch as the *Vedānta* passages aim at establishing the entity which is beyond the range of the competency of direct perception and all other means of knowledge, therefore, for the purpose of elucidating that entity, there is need of supporting and supplementing again the meaning (of the *Vedānta*) for the beginners whose knowledge is very little. Nevertheless, lack of scope should not accrue to many *Smṛitis*, which, following the teaching of that (*Vedānta*), have been composed by those who are most faithful and authoritative, and which have been promulgated for supporting and supplementing that meaning. Therefore, the *Smṛiti* of Kapila, whose teaching is opposed to the scripture, has to be disregarded. To support and supplement (the *Vedānta*) means to elucidate the meaning taught in the *Śruti*. And that is not possible to bring about by means of a *Smṛiti*, whose teaching is opposed to the scripture.⁷²²

Moreover, the scope for these other *Smṛitis* does not arise from their elucidating the section in the earlier part (of the *Vedānta*) relating to the religious duties, because these (*Smṛitis*) lay down the religious duties as constituting the worship of the Supreme Person who is (also) the Supreme

722. The main *pūrvapakṣa* arguments are: (i) that the obscure and contradictory *Vedānta* texts have to be understood only in the light of the *Smṛiti* of Kapila, which has no scope anywhere else, and of the stray texts which support them; (ii) that Kapila is a sage whose teachings are authoritative; (iii) and that Manu and others who teach differently are authoritative only in respect of the duties and rituals enjoined by them. The answer is (i) that while Kapila is a sage with some authority, Manu and others are most authoritative; (ii) that,

as against the single *Smṛiti* of Kapila, there are many *Smṛitis* by Manu and others; (iii) that the teachings of these are authoritative not merely in respect of duties and rituals but also in respect of philosophy and metaphysics; (iv) that the stray texts on which the Sāṅkhya relies are those which are apparently at variance with the numerous other texts so far interpreted in accordance with various principles of interpretation by the *Vedānta-Sūtras*; and (v) that even these stray texts have to be understood in harmony with the rest.

Brahman. If they do not propound the Supreme Person, who forms the object of worship, it is not possible for them to propound the religious duties which constitute His worship.

Accordingly, it is taught in the following passages of (these) *Smṛitis* that all works possess the characteristic of constituting the worship of the Supreme Person: "He, out of whom proceeds the activity of beings and by whom all these is pervaded, by worshipping Him by means of his own religious works, man obtains perfection" (B. G. XVIII. 46); "Even in the case of bathing and other actions, one should contemplate upon the Lord Nārāyaṇa. One thus obtains the world of the *Brahman* and does not return to the world again" (*Dakṣa-smṛiti*); and "O Lord, there are these people who are devoted to their own religious duties; and when You are worshipped by such people, they transcend all this *mayā*, so as to obtain their own final freedom." (V. P. V. 30. 16).

Moreover, the scope for these (*Smṛitis*) does not arise, from their propounding the religious rites which form the means of obtaining the fruits of *samsāra* in this and the other world. For the essential nature of those works also is to constitute the worship of the Supreme Person. To this effect, it has been said: "And they, too, who are devoted to the worship of other deities and who are endowed with faith, even they, O son of Kuntī, worship Me alone, though not in conformity with the scripture. I am also indeed the enjoyer as well as the Lord of all sacrifices. They do not however know Me in reality. Therefore, they fall." (B. G. IX. 23. 24). To a similar effect is the passage: "Oh! You, the Undecaying One, consist of all the gods; daily You are worshipped by means of sacrifices. You are the only eater of the offerings to the gods and of the offerings to the manes. You bear the forms of both the gods and the manes." (V. P. V. 20. 97).

What has been already stated above to the effect that because "Kapila was born as a sage" (*S'vet. Up. V. 2*), he has been spoken of as being faithful and authoritative, and that therefore it is right to determine the meaning of the *Vedānta* in accordance with that (*Smṛiti*)—this is not right. For Bṛihaspati has been spoken of in all the scriptures and *Smṛitis* as the finest example of those who are unsurpassed in the knowledge; therefore, can room be given for the determination of the meaning of the scripture with the help of the system of materialism promulgated by him?

It may again be objected that, inasmuch as Kapila possessed through the power of his *yoga* the knowledge of the truth of things, therefore, the meaning of the *Vedānta* has to be determined according to his *Smṛiti*. Therefore, he (the *Sūtrākāra*) makes the following reply thereto :

इतरेषां चानुपलब्धेः

Sūtra 2. *Itareshām chānupalabdheḥ* (140)

Because, however, of there having been no percepts (of the *pradhāna* as the cause) on the part of others (like Manu etc.)

The word '*cha*' (which usually means 'and') has here the sense of the adversative particle, '*tu*' (which means 'but', 'however', or 'on the contrary') and is intended to dispel the doubt raised above. The 'others' 723 are Manu and many others who, through the greatness of *yoga*, had direct perception of the truth of the higher

723. According to Śaṅkara this *Sūtrā* refers to 'other' principles than the *pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhya, namely, *mahat* etc., which are not known from the

world or from the *Vedas*. These 'effects' being imaginary, their cause, the *pradhāna*, also is imaginary.

and lower realities, and are celebrated in the scriptural text, "Whatsoever Manu said, that is medicinal" (*Taitt. Samh.* II. 2. 10. 2), as having given utterance to words which form the medicine to the world (for the disease of *samsāra*). They have no perception of true knowledge as seen by Kapila. Therefore, the perception of Kapila, which is opposed to scripture, is based on error. Consequently, it is an established conclusion that the meaning of the *Vedānta* as aforesaid is incapable of being disturbed by means of that (perception of Kapila).

ADHIKARANA II

YOGAPRATYUKTYADHIKARANA.

एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः

Sūtra 3. *Etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ.* (141)

By means of this (reasoning), the *yoga* (system of Hiraṇyagarbha also) is contradicted.

"By means of this (reasoning)," that is, through the method adopted for rejecting the *Smṛiti* of Kapila, the *Yogasṁṛiti* (of Hiraṇyagarbha) also is contradicted.

What then is the additional doubt here to answer which the argument (used in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*) is to receive extended application by analogy? It is this that in the *Yogasṁṛiti* (of Hiraṇyagarbha) a (Supreme) Lord is admitted, and the *yoga* (of devotion) described in the *Vedānta* as the means for the attainment of final release is (also) mentioned therein; and the teacher, Hiraṇyagarbha, is competent to promulgate the whole of the *Vedānta*.

For these reasons, it is but right by means of his *Smṛiti* to support and supplement (the *Vedānta*).⁷²⁴

The answer (to this), however, is as follows. (In that *Smṛiti*) is the doctrine by which the *pradhāna* (or material Nature) which does not have the *Brahman* for its Self, is upheld to be the (material) cause of the world. The (Supreme) Lord is accepted to be merely the instrumental cause. The *yoga* (mentioned therein), which consists of contemplation and which is capable of being defined solely in relation to the object of contemplation, is not based upon the *Veda*, inasmuch as the individual self and the Lord, who form the objects of contemplation (therein), are devoid, the one of the character of having the *Brahman* as the self and the other of the quality of being the material cause of the world and all other auspicious qualities. The teacher, Hiraṇyagarbha, who is also an individual self, is capable at times of being subdued by the qualities of passion (*rajas*) and darkness (*tamas*).

For these reasons, the *Yoga-smṛiti* also, like those *Purāṇas* composed by Him which are based upon passion and darkness,⁷²⁵ is based upon error. Consequently, by means of this (*Smṛiti*), it is improper to support and supplement (the *Vedānta*).

724. Hiraṇyagarbha is here taken to be *Brahmā*, the four faced creator. His authority is questioned on the ground that he too, like any other individual self, is liable to be overcome by *rajas* and *tamas*. The meditation taught by him is not of the kind required by the *Vedānta*. Śaṅkara argues that while part of the teaching of the *Yogasmṛiti* is acceptable, another part relating to the

pradhāna being the cause of the world, has to be rejected.

725. All the *purāṇas* are deemed to be the works of *Brahmā*. But they fall in'to three divisions, according to the *guṇa* of *prakṛiti*—*sattva*, *rajas* or *tamas*—dominant at the time of composition in *Brahmā*. Only those composed under the influence of *sattva* are held to be authoritative.

ADHIKARANA III

VILAKSHNĀTVĀDHIKARANA.

नविलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात्

Sūtra 4. Na vilakshnatvādasya tathātvam cha
śabdāt (142)

(The causality of the *Brahman* in relation to the world) cannot be predicated because of this (world) having an entirely distinct character (from Him); and (its having) such a character is made out from the scripture.

Again, those who argue in support of the contradiction (of the *Vedānta*) by the *Smṛiti* (of Kapila) raise the following objection depending upon logical reasoning. It has been already stated above, in refuting the *Smṛiti* of the Sāṅkhyas, that the world is the produced effect of the *Brahman*. This position 'cannot' properly result (from the *Vedānta*), because 'this' world, which is made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things, is arrived at, by means of direct perception and other means of proof, to be (largely) inanimate, impure, subordinate and full of misery, and (thus) entirely distinct in character from the *Brahman*, who, as admitted by you (the *Vedāntin*), is omniscient, the lord of all, the opposite of all evil and the sole seat of bliss.⁷²⁶ It is not merely through direct perception and other means of proof that the entirely distinct character of the world (from the *Brahman*) is arrived at. 'Such a

726. The authority of the *Smṛitis* of Manu and others is here attacked on the ground that, in teaching the *Brahman* to be the cause of the world, they are unreasonable. For there is no similarity between the *Brahman* and the world, as may be seen by

the attributes of the one being the opposites of those of the other. Kapila's *Smṛiti* conforms to reason by denying the dissimilar *Brahman* to be the cause and accepting the similar *pradhāna* in His place.

character', namely, its being distinct, is made out also from the scripture.

In the following and other similar passages—"Knowledge and non-knowledge" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 6); "... even so, these subtle material elements are made to depend upon the subtle intelligences and the subtle intelligences are made to depend upon the *Prāṇa*" (*Kaush. Up.* III. 9); "On the same tree the individual self sits immersed in grief, and being ignorant and powerless, he feels sorry" (*S'vet. Up.* IV. 7); "He who is not the Lord is the individual soul and is bound down in consequence of his being the enjoyer" (*S'vet. Up.* I. 8)—the qualities of being not intelligent, miserable, etc. are pointed out in relation to the world which is indeed a produced effect. Whatsoever is indeed the produced effect of another thing, that (produced effect) is not distinct from that other thing, just as pots, necklaces etc. are the produced effects of clay, gold etc. (and are non-distinct from clay, gold etc.). Therefore, the world which is distinct from the *Brahman* cannot possibly have the character of a produced effect of His. Consequently, in accordance with the *Smṛiti* of the Sāṅkhyas, only material Nature which is similar in character to the produced effect (*i.e.*, the world) deserves to be the cause (thereof).

Moreover, though the scripture, which is an independent (means of knowledge), deals with the things that transcend the senses, logical reasoning has necessarily to be adopted (here). For all the means of knowledge will become the cause of determining the true meaning of some matters here and there (*i.e.*, in cases of ambiguity), only when they are supported by logical reasoning.

Logical reasoning is indeed well known to be that knowledge which in any particular matter determines the means of establishing it either by explaining it in relation to the essential nature of the thing (to be proved), or to

the apparatus (of proof), and determines the nature and necessary details of the procedure to be adopted in regard to that (means of proof), and is synonymous with purposefully assumed apprehension. ⁷²⁷

The need of this (logical reasoning) is equal for all the means of knowledge. The scripture, however, possesses especially the character of being a means of knowledge that is dependent on the knowledge of expectancy, juxtaposition and compatibility. It needs logical reasoning throughout in all cases, and it is stated by Manu : "He who studies with the help of logical reasoning knows duty and not the other (who makes no such study)." (*Manu*, XII. 106) And that is why the establishment of the meaning of the scripture with the help of logical reasoning is referred to by the *Śruti* in statements like "It has to be meditated upon". (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 5 & IV. 5. 6). ⁷²⁸

It may, however, be objected (by the followers of Yādavaprakāśa) that when it is definitely determined through the scripture that the world has the *Brahman* for its sole cause, then the persistence of consciousness in the world, which is the produced effect, has to be accepted ; that just as an intelligent being has no manifestation of consciousness in the states of dreamless sleep and swooning, similarly the consciousness which is really existent even in pots and other similar things is unmanifest ; and that the distinction of things as the intelligent and the non-intelligent is due to this reason.

⁷²⁷. The two modes of logical reasoning are illustrated in the *Śruti-prakāśikā*. When the *ākāśa* is determined to be incapable of ocular perception on account of its having no form, we have a case of determining the essential nature of a thing. When the scriptural injunction not to kill is determined to refer to cases other than those of victims in

enjoined sacrifices, the apparatus of proof is involved.

⁷²⁸. Manu's statement is quoted with a significant omission, so as to support the Sāṅkhyas. The reference is only to such logical reasoning as is in support of the scripture. The whole stanza is quoted later under *Ved. Sū.* (II. 1. 12).

It is not right to say so, because the non-manifestation at all times (of a thing) proves only (its) non-existence. Therefore, even the association of the faculty of consciousness with those things (i.e., pots etc.) is refuted, for he who attributes to a thing which at no time or place shows the power of producing an effect, the power of producing that effect—let him grow eloquent in the assemblies of the sons of barren women on their mothers' capacity to bear children.

Moreover, it is (first) proved from the *Vedānta* texts that the *Brahman* is the material cause of the world. From this, it is determined that pots and similar things possess potential consciousness, or that they possess unmanifested consciousness. From this conviction, (in turn) it is determined that the *Vedānta* texts establish the *Brahman* to have the character of being the material cause of the world. In arguing thus, there arises the fallacy of reciprocal dependence.

It is certainly quite impossible to predicate the relation of cause and effect between two things distinct from each other. What then is meant by similarity in character between material Nature, and its modification, owing to the absence of which (similarity) you speak of the impossibility of establishing the *Brahman* as the material cause of the world? Surely, there is no similarity in respect of all attributes (between them), because (in such a case) the relation of cause and effect is impossible (between them). Indeed, in pots, dishes etc., which are the effects of a lump of clay, the persistence of the character of the lump of clay etc. is not seen to exist. Again, it may be said that similarity (between them) is in respect of some attribute or other, and that such (a similarity) is possible between the world and the *Brahman* in respect of existence and other such attributes (like substantiality etc.).

To this, it is replied thus. By means of whatever characteristic quality, the entity which forms the cause is

differentiated from other entities, the persistence of that characteristic quality even in the produced effect of that (cause) is the similarity in character between the cause and the effect. Indeed, through whatever characteristic, gold is differentiated from clay etc., the persistence of that characteristic is seen to exist in ear-rings and other produced effects of that (gold). And the *Brahman* is of that nature which is the opposite of all evil, and which consists of knowledge, bliss and sovereignty, and the world has a nature opposite to that (of the *Brahman*). Therefore, it does not have Him for its material cause.

It may, however, be again said that even in the case of dissimilarity (between two things), the relation of cause and effect is (sometimes) seen to exist (between them). For instance, out of the intelligent individual soul, non-intelligent things like hair on the head, nails, teeth and hair on the body are born. Again, for example, out of the non-intelligent cowdung, the intelligent scorpion is born, and out of the intelligent spider the non-intelligent cobweb is born. It is not right to say so. For even in these cases, the relation of cause and effect exists among the non-intelligent parts.⁷²⁹

It may again be objected as follows. Even in regard to those things which are accepted to be non-intelligent, association with the power of consciousness is declared in the scriptures as in the following passages: "The earth spoke to him" (*Taitt. Samh.* V. 5. 2. 10); "Indeed, the waters desired" (*Taitt. Br.* III. 1. 5); "Indeed, these *prāṇas*, competing with one another for their own importance, went to Brahmā (the four-faced creator)" (*Bṛih. Up.* VI. 1. 7) Those who are well-versed in the

729. The arguments here are close to those of the *Vedānta*. They concede the possibility of life springing from non-life under

exceptional circumstances. The stock examples are the production of the scorpion from cowdung and of worms from honey.

Purāṇas maintain that rivers, oceans, mountains etc. also possess consciousness.⁷³⁰ Therefore, there is no distinction in nature between the *Brahman* and the world. To this, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the following reply.

अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम्

Sūtra 5. *Abhimānivyapadeśastu*

viśeṣhānugatibhyām (143)

(Where non-intelligent things are mentioned as possessing consciousness) it is, however, the presiding deities that are taught, because it is made out to be so by means of the qualifying attribute and of the movement (of those deities) subsequent (to creation).

The word, “however” (*tu*), is intended to remove the objection raised. The deities presiding over the earth etc. are denoted by the words “earth” etc. in the passages like “Indeed, the earth spoke to him.” (*Taitt. Samh.* V. 5. 2. 10). A particular quality is a qualifying attribute. The earth etc. are mentioned as qualified by the word “deity”. In the passage, “Indeed I enter into these three deities” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2), the elements of fire, water and earth are qualified by the word “deity”. There are also the following passages to the same effect: “Indeed, all the deities competing with one another for

730. The earth in the context protests to Prajāpati against piling fire for the sacrifice. The deities of the water are stated to yearn for controlling the waters of the ocean. The senses, on the advice of Brahmā, discover the

principal vital air to be the most important among them. In its absence, the body becomes putrid. (*Bṛh. Up.* VI. 1.7 appears to have ‘*Brahmā*’ in the place of ‘*Brahmānam*’ as quoted.)

their own importance Those deities, taking bliss to be seated in the *prāṇa*” (*Kaush. Up.* II. 14).⁷³¹

“Subsequent movement” is subsequent entry. In the passage beginning with “Agni (the god of fire), becoming speech, entered the mouth ; the sun-god becoming the eye entered the eye-sockets ; Vāyu (the god of air), becoming the *prāṇa*, entered the nostrils” (*Ait. Ār.* IV. 2. 4.), the subsequent entry of Agni etc. as the presiding deities over speech etc. is declared. Therefore, it is inappropriate for the world, which, owing to its being non-intelligent, is entirely distinct in nature from the *Brahman*, to be the produced effect of the *Brahman*. Consequently, in accordance with the *Smṛiti* (of Kapila) that is supported by logical reasoning, the causality of material Nature in relation to the world is expounded in the *Vedānta*.

If it be so held, it is replied to as follows :—

दृश्यते तु

Sūtra 6. *Dṛśyate tu* (144)

But it (i.e., the fact that the *Brahman* or the cause is distinct from the world or the effect) is directly revealed in the scriptures.

The objector's view turns back through the word, “but”. What has already been stated above to the effect that, owing to the world being entirely distinct from the *Brahman*, it cannot possibly have the *Brahman* as its cause—that is not proper, because the relation of cause and

731. In *Chhând. Up.* (VI. 3. 2), the material elements are indicated by mention of their presiding deities. Similarly, when elements are mentioned elsewhere, the deities can be meant. The *prāṇas* in *Kaush. Up.* (II. 9.) are the

senses. The passage quoted from this *Upanishad* appears to have variant readings. ‘*Etā ha vai devatā*’ is found in many editions for ‘*sarvā ha vai devatā*’. ‘*Taddevāḥ*’ occurs for ‘*te devāḥ*’ as quoted,

effect is seen to exist even between two things which are entirely distinct from each other ; in fact, insects etc. which are entirely distinct from honey etc. are seen to take their birth out of those (honey etc.).

Was it not indeed stated above that, owing to the relation of cause and effect existing only between non-intelligent parts, there is similarity between them? True, it was so stated. By that much, the similarity accepted by you is not established between cause and effect. If somehow or other there be such a similarity, all things will come to be similar with all else. And this leads to the risk of the birth of all things taking place out of all things. Hence the similarity you have accepted is the persistence of the characteristic which forms the cause of distinguishing one thing from another. But this invariable restriction is not seen to exist in regard to the birth of worms, etc. out of honey etc. Thus it is not inappropriate even for the world which is distinct from the *Brahman* to be the produced effect of the *Brahman*. Indeed, the persistence of the peculiar attribute which forms the cause of distinguishing them from other things is not seen to exist in the case of the causes, honey and cowdung, and their respective effects, insects and scorpions, as it is seen in the case of the causes, clay and gold, and their effects, pots and coronets (respectively).

असदिति चेन्न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात्

Sūtra 7. *Asaditi chenna pratishedhamātratoāt* (145)

If it be said that (in case distinction between the cause and effect is accepted, then) the non-existence (of the effect in the cause will have to be accepted), that is not right. Because, what is stated thereby is merely that there is no such invariable rule (that like gives birth to like).

If the *Brahman*, who is the cause, is distinct from the world which is the effect, then, owing to the cause and the effect being distinct substances, the world which is the effect cannot exist (as itself) in the Supreme *Brahman* who is the cause. Thus, the birth of the world will be from non-existence.

If it be so argued, it is replied that it is not right to say so. Indeed, in the previous aphorism (II. 1. 6), what was intended was merely the rejection of an invariable rule of similarity between cause and effect, and not of the effect as a substance being distinct from the cause. This position, however—that the *Brahman* Himself, who is the cause, undergoes modifications in the form of the world which is distinct from Himself—is not given up. Indeed, between the insect and its cause, the honey, even when there is distinction, there exists oneness of substance as there is between ear-rings and gold.⁷³²

Here, he (the objector) raises an objection.

अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम्

Sūtra 8. *Apītau tadvat prasaṅgādasamañjasam* ⁽⁴⁶⁾

The re-absorption (of the world into the *Brahman*) as in that case (i.e., of the gold and the ear-rings)⁷³³ will lead to the attribution (of modification etc., to the *Brahman*) and come to be therefore inconsistent (with the *Vedānta* teaching of the oneness of cause and effect).

732. The *Vedāntin* understands *sat-kārya vāda*, the view that the effect is only the cause transformed, to mean that there is oneness of substance between cause and effect. Similarity (*sālakṣaṇya*) of the kind implied by the *Sāṅkhyas* may or may not be present.

733. 'Tadvat' ('as in that case') of the *Sūtra* is explained

in three ways in the *Śrūta-prakāśikā*. (i) As in the case of the illustrative example of gold and ear-rings set out under the previous *Sūtra*. (ii) As in the case of the world, so too in the *Brahman*, there is the possibility of evil being present. (iii) *Tadvat* may indicate 'the possessor of these (evils of the world)', as this is implied by the possession of the world.

By 're-absorption' is meant the creation etc. preceded by absorption, because (the teachings relating to) creation etc. are seen as being preceded by the teachings relating to the condition of absorption in the following and other similar passages: "Existence, alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1.); and "The Self alone, this one only, was in the beginning" (*Ait. Up.* I. 1. 1). If oneness of substance between the cause and effect is admitted, then, when creation out of and absorption into the *Brahman* and such other things take place in regard to the world, the *Brahman* Himself will come to be in association with those conditions (of the created and absorbed world). Therefore, all the wrong aims of life themselves, which are found to exist in the effect, will have to get attached to the *Brahman*, just as the peculiarities existent in the ear-rings are existent also in the gold (which is their cause).

In such a case, all the *Vedānta* passages will become quite inconsistent in teaching oneness of substance between cause and effect. For, according to the following passages, there is the possibility of mutually hostile (passages) being made to refer to one thing only (and not different things as they ought to): "He understands all and knows all" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 9); "He is devoid of sins, devoid of old age, devoid of death" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1.5); "He has neither work nor implements of work. There is none seen equal to Him and none superior to Him" (*S'vet. Up.* VI. 8); "One of the two eats the sweet *pippala* fruit" (*S'vet. Up.* IV. 6); "The individual self, who is not the Lord, is bound down in consequence of his being the enjoyer" (*S'vet. Up.* I. 8); and "He feels sorry, through not being the Lord" (*S'vet. Up.* IV. 7).

Again, it may be argued thus. The Supreme *Brahman* Himself, who owns all the intelligent and non-intelligent things as body, possesses the condition of the cause as well as that of the effect. All the blemishes are found to

exist in the intelligent and non-intelligent things. Hence, there is no possibility of the attribution (of the blemishes) to the *Brahman*, who is the soul, either in the condition of cause or in the condition of effect.

This is not right, because the relation of cause and effect is impossible between the *Brahman* and the world, and because, if such a relation were to exist, it will be impossible for all the blemishes, consequent on connection with the body, (not to exist) in the *Brahman*.

It is not possible for the intelligent and non-intelligent things to be the body of the *Brahman*. The body indeed is a particular collection of earth and other elements, which is sustained by its dependence on the vital breath with its fivefold functions, and which is the substratum of the sense organs that form the means for the experience of pleasure and pain that is of the form of the fruits of *karma*.⁷³⁴ For the condition of the body is well known to be of this kind both in the *Smṛiti* and the *Vedas*.

But in regard to the Supreme Self, it is declared in the following and similar texts that He is free from *karma* and the experience of its fruits, that He is free from experience which is dependent on the sense organs, and that He is free from having the vital air: "He is devoid of sins, devoid of old age" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5); "The other one shines without eating" (*Svet. Up.* IV. 6); "He is without hands and feet, but He moves quickly and seizes (things): without eyes He sees, without ears He hears" (*Svet. Up.* III. 19); and "He is without the vital air, He is without the mind" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 1. 2).

Hence, in regard to Him, the condition of being the body cannot be predicated of intelligent and non-intelligent

734. This is more or less a paraphrase of the definition of the body given by Gautama in his *Nyāya-Sūtras* (I. 1. 11) to the

effect that it is the substratum of physical activities, the senses and the experience of pleasure and pain.

things. Moreover, the state of being the substratum of sense organs and such other things cannot arise in respect of grass, twigs, etc., which are non-intelligent things in their individual forms or in respect of the elements in their subtle state in their collective form. The condition of being a collection of the earth and other elements cannot arise in respect of elements in their subtle state. And because all this cannot arise in respect of the intelligent thing, which is solely of the form of knowledge, much less can there be the possibility of its being the body.

There can be no condition as body on the basis that to be the body is to be the ground for experience. For it is well known that the condition of body is not present in many grounds of experience like palaces, etc. If it be said that, while it exists, there should be experience of pleasure and pain, and this alone is the ground of experience (mentioned as constituting the body), it is not correct. For it is well established that when another body becomes the ground of experience in the form of pleasure and pain arising from entry into the other body, (that other body) is not the body of the soul which has entered it. Moreover, in regard to the experience of the Lord whose unsurpassed bliss is eternal and spontaneous, there cannot be any dependence on intelligent and non-intelligent things as the ground of experience. By means of this (argument), the objection that what is merely a means of enjoyment has the character of the body has been answered.

Again, it may be argued as follows. On the desire of whatever (other) thing is dependent the essential nature, existence and activity (of a thing), that (latter) thing is the body of that other (former) thing.⁷³⁵ And so, as all

735. This is more or less identical with Rāmānuja's own definition of the body given under the next Sūtra. Certain prelimi-

nary objections such as that it cannot apply to diseased or dead bodies or to puppets etc. are raised here.

things have their essential nature, existence and activity dependent upon the Lord, it is possible for them to constitute the body of the Lord. This opinion also is not better (than the previous one), because, among things which are well known to have the character of the body, their essential nature is not dependent on the will of the particular intelligent souls (associated with them). For a diseased body does not have its activity dependent on the will of that (soul). Again, the dead body does not have its existence dependent upon the will of that (soul). Moreover, dolls and other things, whose essential nature, existence and activity are dependent on the will of intelligent individual souls, are well known not to form the body of those (souls). The intelligent individual soul which is eternal, has not got its essential nature dependent on the will of the Lord. So, there is no possibility of its forming His body.

Moreover, it should not be urged that what is restrained solely by another, supported solely by another and is subservient solely unto the glory of another—that is the body of that other: because this (definition of the body) is too wide in that it is applicable to the category of action and such others. And it is predicated of the Lord that He is not possessed of a body by means of the following passages among others: "He is bodiless in bodies" (*Kāth. Up.* II. 2.); and "He is without hands and feet, but He moves quickly and seizes (things): without eyes He sees, without ears He hears" (*Svet. Up.* III. 19).

Therefore, there results mutual inconsistency among the *Vedānta* passages, on the view that the *Brahman* is the cause of the world, inasmuch as there is no relation of the body and the possessor of the body between the world and the *Brahman*; and even if such (a relation) were possible, the possibility of evil appertains to the *Brahman*.

To such (an argument), the answer is :—

न तु दृष्टान्तभावात्

Sūtra 9. *Na tu dṛishṭāntabhāvāt* (146)

There is, however, no (such inconsistency); because examples (illustrative of the position that the *Brahman* is untainted by evils in both the states of cause and effect) are available.

There is, indeed, no such inconsistency, because even where one and the same thing is associated with two conditions, examples illustrative of the separate existence of good and evil (in those conditions) are available. The word “*tu*” (‘however’) points out the impossibility of the accrual (to the *Brahman*) of even the trace of any contact with evil 736

What is stated is this. There is no inconsistency at all, even when there is association with the two conditions of existence as cause and effect, which are of the nature of contraction and expansion respectively, for the Supreme *Brahman* who, for the reason that He owns the intelligent and non-intelligent things as His body, forms their Self. Because the contraction and expansion appertain unto the intelligent and non-intelligent things, which form the body of the Supreme *Brahman*.

736. The previous *Sūtra* has criticised the view that the *Brahman* is the cause of the world on the ground that in the state of *apṛiti* (or dissolution) the evils of the world must attach themselves to the *Brahman*. Here that criticism is refuted. There is no inconsistency between the *Brahman* being the cause of the world and His being untouched by evil. Rāmānuja now seeks to explain why in addition to the negative particle (*na*) the *Sūtra*

has a disjunctive particle (*tu*). While *na* condemns the previous aphorism, *tu* draws attention to the relation of body and soul between the world and the *Brahman*: this relationship is enough to account for the *Brahman* being pure. Another view is that *na* denies the inconsistency alleged in the previous *Sūtra* and *tu* the possibility of evil accruing to the *Brahman* on the basis of an analogy.

Indeed, it is well known that the evils existent in the body do not appertain unto the soul and the auspicious qualities of the soul do not appertain unto the body. For instance, childhood, youth, old age, etc., which belong to the bodies of gods, men and other embodied souls, are not associated with the soul; and knowledge, happiness, etc., which are existent in souls, are not associated with the body. Then, again, the statements, "A god is born", "A man is born", and similarly "He is indeed a boy, a young man and an old man", have a primary significance. He (the *Sūtrākāra*) will teach under the aphorism beginning with "While going to another than that (*i.e.*, than this body)..." (*Ved. Sūt. III. 1. 1*), that it is the individual soul, only as associated with the body made up of the subtle rudimentary elements, that assumes the conditions of gods, men, etc.⁷³⁷

Again, what has been already stated to the effect that it is inappropriate for the world, which consists of intelligent and non-intelligent things and which is existent in the gross as well as the subtle condition to stand in the relation of the body to the Supreme *Brahman*—that is (merely) the display of the bad logic evolved out of his own brain by one who has not understood the groups of *Vedānta* passages in the light of sound reasoning. Indeed, all the *Vedānta* passages declare that all intelligent and non-intelligent things, both in their gross and subtle states, stand in the relation of the body to the Supreme Self. Surely, in the *Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa* (*i.e.*, *Bṛih. Up. III. 7.*) in the recension of the Kāṇvas and in the recension of the Mādhyandinas, both of which belong to the school of Vājasaneyins, in the passage beginning with, "He who stands in the earth.....He whose body is the earth", all the non-intelligent things are individually pointed out;

737. The point here is that the expansion and contraction, experienced during creation and dissolution respectively, by the

universe, which is the *Brahman's* body, may be spoken of as appertaining unto the *Brahman* Himself.

and in the passages, "He who stands in (the self who is of the nature of) knowledge He whose body is knowledge (*i.e.*, the self)" and "He who stands in the self . . . He whose body is the self", the intelligent thing (or the individual self) is separately pointed out, and all such particular things are declared to form the body of the Supreme Self.

In the *Subālopanishad* also, in the passage beginning with "He who moves within the earth, whose body is the earth", it is quite similarly declared that both the intelligent and non-intelligent things existing in all conditions constitute the body of the Lord. And then it is declared that He is the Self of all beings in the passage: "He is the eternal Self of all beings, is devoid of sins, is the divine Lord, the one Nārāyaṇa" (*Sub. Up.* VII).

The *Smṛitis* also declare the same thing in the following passages: "The whole world is Your body" (*Rām.* VI. 120. 29); "That water is the body of Viṣṇu" (*V.P.* II. 12. 37); "All that, indeed, is the body of Hari" (*V.P.* I. 22. 37); "All those things are His body" (*V.P.* I. 22. 84); and "After thinking and willing (to the effect that He would become manifest), He (with the desire of creating various kinds of creatures) out of His own body..." (*Manu.* I. 8). The meaning is (that He desired to create the universe) out of His own body, consisting of the subtle elements.

In the ordinary world also, the word 'body' has not obtained, like the words 'pot', etc., the significance of invariably denoting substances of the same kind or form, but is seen used in its non-secondary significance to denote things having forms quite distinct from one another, such as worms, insects, fireflies, snakes, men and animals. Therefore, the definite determination of its natural and primary significance has to be arrived at solely in accordance with its use in all cases. And the definition of

its significance given by you, such as that it is the means of enjoyment of the fruits of *karma*, is not in accordance with its general use in all cases. For that (definition) does not extend to the earth, etc., which are stated above to form the body of the Lord.

Moreover, this definition cannot extend to the bodies of the Lord which are chosen of His own free will and the bodies of the finally released souls which are to be understood from passages like the following: "He (the released soul) is one". (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 26. 2). For, in regard to them, there is no occasion for the experience of the fruits of *karma*.

The chosen bodies of the Supreme Person are not particular combinations of earth and the other elements, because the *Smṛiti* says: "The body of the Supreme Self is not a particular combination of the elements." (?). Therefore, the definition of the body as a combination of elements, is narrow. The character of having its support dependent upon the fivefold activity of the vital air does not extend to the bodies of immovable beings. For, even though there is the existence of the vital air in immovable things, there is no existence as the supporter of the body after being modified fivefold. In the case of Ahalyā and others, the character of being the abode of (active) senses and of being the means of enjoying pleasure and pain, does not extend to (their) bodies of stone, wood, etc. (regarded as) arising out of *karma*. 738

738. The well known story of Ahalyā, the lovely wife of the sage, Gautama, is referred to here. On her seduction by Indra she was cursed to become invisible according to Vālmīki (*Rām.* I. 48) and to become a stone according to the *Purāṇas*. The two versions can be reconciled by supposing that Ahalyā became invisible in her own form when she became a

stone. In that condition, capacity to know and feel must have been dulled. Still, she expiated her sin by suffering. The body of stone was not for her the means of experiencing her *karma*, but only of undergoing the suffering brought about by the curse. Hence the definition of the body under reference does not apply to her case.

Therefore, this is the definition of the body which is to be accepted. That substance which, in regard to all things as can be accomplished by it, is completely (and always) capable of being controlled and supported by an intelligent soul, and which has its essential nature solely subservient unto the glory of that (intelligent soul),—that (substance) is the body of that (intelligent soul).⁷³⁹ The non-perception of control in regard to diseased bodies etc. is due to the obstruction of the actually existent power of control, as in the case of the non-perception of heat etc. in fire etc., owing to an obstructing cause. The dead body has begun to disintegrate even at the time of separation from the soul and in the next moment goes to pieces. There is description here as a body on account of its being a part of a combination completely formed earlier (as a body).

Therefore, inasmuch as all things are completely controlled and supported by the Supreme Person in regard to what they can do and have their essential nature solely subservient unto His glory, all intelligent and non-intelligent things form His body. Statements like "He is bodiless in bodies" (*Kaṭha. Up. II. 22*) relate to the negation in His case of bodies arising from *karma*, because it is declared in the scriptures that He has all things for His body as aforesaid.

739. This definition of the body is central to Rāmānuja's system of thought. For in his view the fundamental relation between God and the universe of matter and individual selves is that of soul and body. Every element in this definition has been critically examined and shown to be essential. 'Body' and 'soul' are shown to be reciprocal terms; the intelligent soul is called *chetana* to differentiate it from *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* which also in a sense controls the body; again the support given to the body by the

soul is not like the support given to a parasite by the body; the body is a substance and not an action or quality; it is controlled at all times as long it lasts by the soul, unlike the servants of a king who are controlled in a less comprehensive way; the control over the body is exercised in respect of the things which the body can do; and the body has the capacity for being controlled, though the control may be more or less complete under varying circumstances.

In the succeeding sections also (e.g., *Adhikarāṇa* VII) this will be expounded. By the two aphorisms—"The re-absorption (of the world into the *Brahman*) as in that case (i.e., of the gold and the ear-rings) will come to be therefore inconsistent (with the *Vedānta* teaching of the oneness of cause and effect)" (II. 1.8) and "There is however, no (such inconsistency); because examples (illustrative of the position that the *Brahman* is untainted by evils in both the states of cause and effect) are available" (II. 1. 9)—the teaching established in the section beginning with "Owing to the other (i.e., the individual self) being described (as identical with the *Brahman* . . ." (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 1. 21) is indicated.

स्वपक्षदोषाच्च

Sūtra 10. *Svapakshadoshāchcha* (149)

(The *Brahman* is the cause of the world) also because of fallacies in his (objector's) own view.

It is not merely because the argument that the *Brahman* is the cause of the world is free from fallacies that it is accepted. It alone has to be accepted, because the argument that material Nature is the cause of the world is full of fallacies and has to be rejected. Indeed, according to the view that material Nature is the cause of the world, the coming forth of the world is not properly explained. For, according to that view, the coming forth of the world is based on the superimposition of the attributes of material Nature, through the proximity of material Nature, upon the individual soul, who is subject to no modifications and is essentially of the nature of pure intelligence.

It has here to be investigated, of what nature is that proximity to material Nature, which forms the cause of the

superimposition of the attributes of material Nature on the individual soul, who is subject to no modifications and is of the nature of pure intelligence. Is it merely the existence of material Nature, or is it any modification belonging to it, or is it any modification actually existent in the individual soul? Surely it is not (any modification that is) existing in the individual self, because such (a modification) is not known. It is not modification of material Nature either, because it (the modification) is admitted to be an effect of superimposition and cannot possibly form the cause of the superimposition. If the mere existence (of material Nature) be accepted as (its) proximity (to the individual soul), then there arises the possibility of the superimposition even in regard to finally released souls. Thus, according to your view, the coming forth of the world is inappropriate. This topic will be elaborately dealt with on the occasion of refuting the views of the Sāṅkhyas under the following aphorism and others : "Even if it be accepted (that it may be proved that material Nature is the cause of the world, it should not be inferred as such a cause), because there is no purpose (served by the inference)" (*Ved. Sūtra*. II. 2. 8.)

तर्कप्रतिष्ठानादपि

Sūtra 11. *Tarkāpratishṭhānādapi* (149)

(The view that material Nature is the cause of the world cannot prevail) also because (mere) syllogistic reasoning (in support of it) is devoid of solid ground.⁷⁴⁰

The view that the *Brahman* is the cause of the world, which is based on the scriptures, is alone to be accepted,

740. *Sūtras* 11 and 12 are taken as one by Śaṅkara. The justification for Rāmānuja's arrangement is that *Sūtra* 12 raises and answers an objection, which can

arise only after the disposal of *Sūtra* 11. Similar cases occur with reference to I. 1. 5 & 6, I. 1. 12 & 13, and I. 4. 4 & 5.

because also (mere) syllogistic reasoning has no firm foundation. And the view that material Nature is the cause of the world should not (be accepted). The instability of (mere) syllogistic reasoning is seen from the mutual conflict of the hypothetical arguments advanced by the Buddhists, the Vaiśeṣikas, the followers of Akṣhapāda, the Jains, Kapila and Patañjali.⁷⁴¹

अन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवमप्यनिर्मुक्तप्रसङ्गः

Sūtra 12. *Anyathānumeyamiti*
chedevamapyanirmokṣhaprasaṅgaḥ (150)

If it be said that it (i.e., material Nature) has to be inferred (as the cause of the world) otherwise (than in the manner of other schools), in that manner also there occurs the possibility of getting no freedom (from the evil of instability of mere syllogistic reasoning).

After having rightly found fault with the now actually available syllogistic reasoning of the Buddhists and others, it may be said that we shall infer the view that material Nature is the cause of the world 'otherwise', that is, in such a manner that it overcomes the errors pointed out. If it be so held (it is stated in reply that) 'in that manner also', that is, in regard to you, who have the support only of logical reasoning which has its source in the intellect of man, there exists the possibility of its being condemned in that same manner and at different times and places by logical arguments conceived by persons more skilful than you in perverted reasoning. Thus, it is not possible to

741. Śākya, Ulūkya, Akṣhapāda, Kṣhapāna, Kapila and Patañjali are listed as makers of philosophical systems based on mere logical

reasoning. The four names stand for the Buddha, Kaṇḍa, Gautama and Jina. Patañjali is the founder of the Yoga system.

avoid the absence of freedom from the evil of the instability of logical reasoning. •

Therefore, the *śāstra* alone is the criterion of truth in regard to the subject which is beyond the reach of the senses. Only for the purposes of supplementing and supporting it, logical reasoning has to be adopted. And accordingly the following passage says :—"Whoever with the help of logical reasoning which is unopposed to the *Veda-śāstra*, puts together the teaching on duty as given by the sages, he knows duty and not others." (*Mam.* XII. 106). (Here) the meaning of being 'unopposed to the *Veda-śāstra*' is that it is not opposed to the *śāstra* known as the *Veda*.⁷⁴²

Therefore, inasmuch as it is opposed to the *Veda*, the *Smṛiti* of the Sāṅkhyas has to be disregarded for the purpose of obtaining therefrom logical arguments, which, as aids and supplements to the *Veda*, have the character of explaining the teaching of the *Veda*.

ADHIKARANA IV

SISHTĀPARIGRAHĀDHIKARANA

एतेन शिष्टापरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याताः

Sūtra 13. *Etēna śiṣṭāparigrahā api*
vyākhyāthāḥ (151)

By means of this (reasoning), the other unacceptable views are also explained.

"The other" means the rest (of the views). The unacceptable views are those in which the acceptance of

⁷⁴². '*Veda-śāstra*' may also be taken to mean '*Veda* and *śāstra* (of Kapila)'. Hence Rāmānuja's explanation of the correct meaning.

the *Veda* finds no place.⁷⁴³ What remain to be considered and are unacceptable are the other views in which the *Veda* finds no acceptance. "By means of this (reasoning)," i.e., by refuting the view of the Sāṅkhyas which is not accepted by the *Veda*, it is to be understood that the views of the Vaiśeṣikas, the Naiyāyikas, the Jaiṇas and the Buddhists stand refuted.

An additional doubt, however, is raised to the effect that, inasmuch as all these schools agree in holding the infinitesimal atoms to be the cause of the world, it is not possible to say that the logical reasoning which relates to the (establishment of the) causal entity has no solid foundation. The answer to this objection is this. There is certainly agreement among them so far. But there is no difference among them in regard to their being based upon (mere) logical reasoning; and in regard even to the essential nature of the infinitesimal atoms, there is disagreement among them. They hold them—(i.e., the atoms) to have the character of the void and not to have the character of the void, to possess the character of knowledge and to possess the character of an object of knowledge, to be momentary and to be eternal, to be absolute and to be restrained in more than one place, to be real and to be unreal, etc.⁷⁴⁴ For these reasons, it (i.e.,

743. The expression 'śiṣṭa-parigrahaḥ', in the *Sūtra* is interpreted by Rāmānuja differently from Śaṅkara. The latter took it to stand for 'those views which are not accepted by disciplined exemplars'. Rāmānuja tries to include Sāṅkhya also among the unacceptable views by his explanation. The additional doubt here, according to Śaṅkara, is that logic cannot be lightly dismissed as inconclusive, as it has been well developed by the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas. Rāmānuja feels that the atomic theory of the origination of the

universe has to be specifically referred to here.

744. Among the atomists, the Mādhyamika school of the Buddhists believe the atom to have the character of the void; the Yogācāra school regard it as having the character of knowledge; all Buddhists except the Mādhyamika hold the atom to be momentary; the Jaiṇas suppose it to be restrained in more than one place; the Yogācāras think that it is unreal, while the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas declare it to be real. More particulars about these systems are given later in *Ved. Sūtr.* (II. 2).

their logical reasoning) undoubtedly possesses no solid basis to rest upon.

ADHIKARANA V

BHOKTRĀPATTYADHIKARANA.

भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत्स्याल्लोकवत्

Sūtra 14. *Bhoktrāpatteravibhāgaśchet*

syāllokavat (152)

If it be said that because it (i.e., the possession of the body) makes Him get into the condition of the enjoyer (of pain and pleasure), there is non-distinction (of the *Brahman* from the individual soul), it (i.e., distinction) is possible, as in the world.

Again, the Sāṅkhya raises the following objection. It has been already stated above that the Supreme *Brahman*, who owns, as His body, all the intelligent and non-intelligent things, both in their gross and subtle states, possesses the character of both the cause and the effect, and that therefore there is a distinction in nature between the individual self and the *Brahman*. This distinction, however, cannot possibly exist. For, when the *Brahman* possesses a body, He gets into the condition of the enjoyer; and it is impossible in the case of the Lord also, as in that of the individual self, to avoid the condition of being the enjoyer of pleasure and pain arising from the condition of being the possessor of a body.

It may, however, be said that the reply to the possibility of such enjoyment taking place in the case of the Lord has been given in the aphorism: "If it be said that (owing to His association with the heart which is a

part of the body) there results (to Him) the experience (of pleasure and pain), it is replied that it cannot be so; because that (which gives rise to such an association) is different (from mere corporeal association)." (*Ved. Sū.* 1. 2. 8). It is not right to say so.

Indeed, under that (aphorism), it has been stated that to Him, who as the object of worship is ever seated in the abode of the heart (of the worshipper), there is no possibility of enjoyment (of pleasure and pain) merely by reason of His being inside the body. Here, however, it is stated that if, like the individual soul, the *Brahman* also is associated with a body (as its lord), then, as in the case of that (individual soul), the possibility of being the enjoyer of pleasure and pain cannot be avoided. It is in fact observed in regard to the individual souls which are embodied that, though there are no modifications like childhood, old age etc. due to the body, there is association with pleasure and pain arising (respectively) from the harmony and imbalance of the humours of the body.

The scripture also says the same thing thus:—"To him who remains with a body, there is, indeed, no destruction of the pleasing and the unpleasing; the pleasing and the unpleasing touch not him who remains without a body". (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 1.). Therefore, according to the view which upholds the *Brahman* with a body to be the cause of the world, it is impossible for any distinction to exist between material Nature and the individual soul, and according to the view (of *Yādavaprakāśa*) which upholds the absolute *Brahman* to be the cause of the world, there will result to Him the condition of being the substratum of all characteristics existent in the world, such as wrong aims of life etc., as in the case of clay, gold and such other things (in their causal state becoming the substrata of their characteristics in the state as effects). For these reasons, the view which maintains material

Nature to be the cause of the world is, indeed, better.⁷⁴⁵

If it be so argued, the reply thereto is as follows. "It (*i.e.*, distinction) is possible as in the world". Indeed, distinction obtains between the nature of the individual souls and that of the Lord. As a matter of fact, the attainment by the individual self of the condition of the enjoyer of pleasure and pain, which is due (respectively) to the harmony or disharmony of the humours of the body, is not due to his being possessed of the body. On the other hand, it is due to his *karmas*, which consist of merit and demerit. The passage beginning with "To one who has a body " (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 1.) relates to the body produced through the effects of *karma*, because there is not even the trace of the wrong aims of life in relation to the individual self who is freed from the bondage of *karma*, who has his true form revealed and who possesses a body, according to the following passages : "He is one, he is three-fold" (*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 26. 2.) ; "If he became possessed of the desire to go to the world of the manes " (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 2. 1.) ; and "He moves about there, eating, playing, enjoying" (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 3.). There cannot at all be the possibility of the slightest trace of the wrong aims of life in regard to the Supreme Self, who is devoid of sin, because there is not the slightest trace of contact with *karma* (in His case), even though He has for his

745. The problem of evil is discussed under this *Sūtra* as well as under I. 2. 8 & III. 2. 12. In all three places the relationship of the *Brahman* as the soul to the world which is His body, is dealt with. Under I. 2. 8, the question was whether evil does not taint the *Brahman* by His mere presence in the body. The reply drew attention to the fact that the *Brahman* and the individual self are present in the body for different reasons.

Now it is asked whether lordship over the body does not taint the *Brahman*. The answer is that the individual self does not experience pain and pleasure by reason of his being the lord of the body, but on account of the effects of *karma*. These effects are again in the form of the favour or disfavour of the *Brahman*. Another aspect of the problem will be dealt with under III. 2. 12.

characteristic the possession of the entire universe in its gross and subtle states as His body.⁷⁴⁶

"As in the world." For instance, in the world, although in regard to those who obey the king's mandate and those who disobey it, there is association with pleasure and pain arising out of the king's favour and disfavour (respectively), yet there does not result to the king who issues the mandate, merely by reason of his possessing a body, the condition of the enjoyer of the pleasure and pain consequent upon obedience and disobedience to the mandate.

The commentator, Dramiḍa, says the same thing thus : "Just as in the world a king, while he is in a place which is full of insects, extremely unpleasant and beset with evils, is not touched by the evils having his body fanned to by fans etc.; protects his beloved people; and uses enjoyable things like sandal paste etc. which cannot be enjoyed by all ordinary people; similarly, this Lord of the worlds, who has His own power as his moving *chowrie* fan, is not touched by evils, protects His world like the world of Brahmā (the four-faced creator) and uses enjoyable things which cannot be used by ordinary people."

Modifications in regard to the essential nature of the *Brahman* are not admitted, as are admitted in the case of clay, gold and other such things (in their causal condition). For there are scriptural texts which declare that He has an immovable nature and that He is devoid of all evil etc.

746. It should be noted that the scriptural passages under reference are interpreted differently by the Sāṅkhya and the Vedāntin. Mere association with the body is taken to be meant by the Sāṅkhya; the latter understands here only the association of the self with a

body under the influence of *karma*. The possession of a body or bodies by the freed soul does not bring it misery. Neither can any evil attach to the Lord who does not acquire His body under the influence of *karma*.

This aphorism, however, has been interpreted by other schools⁷⁴⁷ as intended to deal with the distinction (between the *Brahman* and the individual self) by means of the illustrative example of the foam, the wave and the ocean, after raising the doubt that there is no distinction between the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment according to the view which upholds the *Brahman* to be the cause of the world. It is not right to say so. Because those who accept the view that creation proceeds out of the *Brahman*, which is possessed of a limiting adjunct, or nescience, or a power contained within itself, cannot consistently make out such an objection and answer it (under this aphorism as we have done). That which is conditioned by the limiting adjunct, or nescience, or power involved in the causal entity possesses the state of the enjoyer, and the limiting adjunct (as well as the nescience or the power) possesses the condition of the object of enjoyment. It is indeed impossible for those two things (the *Brahman* and Its limiting adjunct) which are distinct from each other to attain the state of each other.

The modification of the essential nature (of the *Brahman*) cannot certainly be accepted by those (schools) also, because according to the aphorism (II. 1. 35) beginning with "If it be said there is no *karma* (or results of works) before creation because of (the declaration in the scriptures) of the non-distinction (between the individual selves and the *Brahman* prior to creation), it is replied that

747. The reference is to Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Yāṭava-prakāśa. Nescience is posited by Śaṅkara, limiting adjuncts by Bhāskara and a power or capability by Yāṭavaprakāśa. See Note 235 and pp. 275—281 of Vol. I for outlines of the views of Bhāskara and Yāṭavaprakāśa. It may be noted that, while Rāmānuja and Nimbārka take *bhoktrāpatti* in the *Sūtra* to mean the attainment of the

condition of the enjoyer by the *Brahman*, Śaṅkara understands thereby the object of enjoyment becoming the enjoyer. It may also be noted that Vallabha's interpretation is similar to Śaṅkara's. Madhva seeks to establish the difference between the individual self and the *Brahman* in *moksha* on the basis of the known difference in *samsāra*.

it is not right to say so, because both (the selves and *karma*) are beginningless. . . ,” the beginninglessness of the individual souls and of the *karman*s associated with them is propounded. Even if the modification of the essential nature of the *Brahman* be accepted to be the world, the doubt regarding the acceptance of the non-distinction between the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment does not arise in any one ; because the distinction between the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment is appropriately raised as in the case of pots, dishes, bracelets and crowns etc., which are the modifications of clay and gold. And even if there should be any modification of the essential nature (of the *Brahman*), the *Brahman* Himself will have both the state of the enjoyer and the state of the object of enjoyment. Thus, again, there arises inconsistency (according to the view of these schools).

ADHIKARANA VI

ĀRAMBHAṆĀDHĪKARANA.

तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः

Sūtra 15. *Tadananyatvamārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ*
(153)

The identity (of the world) with Him is made out from the passages containing the words *ārambhaṇa* etc.

In the aphorism, “ If it be said that (in case distinction between the cause and the effect is accepted, then) the non-existence (of the effect in the cause will have to be accepted), that is not right. Because what is stated thereby is merely that there is no such invariable rule (that like gives birth to like)” (II. 1. 7) and other such (aphorisms), the *Brahman* was propounded to be the cause of the world on the assumption that there is identity of the world, which is the produced effect, with the *Brahman*, who is

its cause. Now that same identity is first controverted and then established.

Here the followers of Kaṇāda (i.e., the Vaiśeṣikas) hold as follows:—It is not possible for the effect to be identical with the cause, because (the idea of) that effect is recognised as a distinct state of consciousness (from that of the cause). Indeed, the states of consciousness relating to the cause and the effect, as, for instance, to the threads and the cloth, the lump of clay and the pots, are not of one and the same form. Because there is also a difference in the words (denoting the cause and the effect). As a matter of fact, threads are not cloth, nor is the cloth called the threads.

Again (there can be no such identity), because there is difference (between the causes and effects) in regard to the work (done by them severally). Surely, water is not brought by a lump of clay, nor is a wall built by a pot. (There can be no such identity) also, because there is difference in time (between causes and the effects). At a former time is the cause and at a later time the effect. (There can be no such identity) also, because there is the difference in shape (between the causes and their effects). The cause (i.e., clay) has the form of an undefined lump of matter, the effect (i.e., the pot) has the form of a central portion resting on a broad base. It is only thus that a pot is said to be destroyed, even though the lump of clay is existent. There is also seen to be a difference in number (between causes and effects). Threads are many and the cloth is one.

Moreover, the activity of the agent (producing effects) would be useless. If the effect is the cause itself, what is there that remains to be accomplished by the activity of the agent? If it be said that, though the effect is existent (already in the cause), the activity of the agent is necessary for (acquiring) fitness to do work (such as bringing water

by means of the pot), then the activity of the agent has always to continue. And as the whole would always have to exist, the distinction of eternal and non-eternal things ceases to exist.⁷⁴⁸

Again, it may be said that the effect which is itself previously existent in an unmanifested condition is made manifest by means of the active interference of the agent (producing effects); and that, therefore, it is held that the agent has a purpose and that the distinction of eternal and non-eternal things remains. This is not right; because, on the supposition that one manifest thing (*i.e.*, effect) stands in need of another manifest thing, there will result the fallacy of a *regressus ad infinitum*; and because also, on the supposition that there is no such need, it follows that the effect has to persist eternally before consciousness, and because, again, if it be admitted that the manifestation (of the effect) has an origin, room is given for the view that the effect is non-existent (in the cause).⁷⁴⁹

Moreover, if it be held, that the activity of the agent is that which manifests a thing, then it will follow that by means of the activity of the agent which relates to (the manifestation of) a pot, there is manifestation also of the water-jar of the ascetic and such other things. For lamps and such other things, which admittedly possess the power of manifesting things, are not seen restricted to any particular thing to be manifested. Indeed, it is not true

748. Eight reasons are here given why there can be no identity between the cause and the effect, according to Kanāda. (i) The ideas and (ii) the words descriptive of them are different. (iii) Their shapes and (iv) numbers vary. (v) Different works are done by the cause and the effect. (vi) They exist at different times. (vii) The effect is brought about by work done on the cause. (viii) Non-eternal things show the

cause and the effect to be different. Two other arguments are implied. (ix) There is difference on account of modification and size. (x) When the cause exists, the effect does not exist, and *vice versa*.

749. The followers of Kanāda here attack a theory of causality very similar to that of the *Vedāntin*. Three possibilities from the theory are envisaged, and all the three are criticised as illogical.

that the lamp lit for (making) a pot (visible) does not manifest water-jars of the ascetic and such other things. Therefore, it is only as forming the cause of the origin of an effect that is non-existent that the activity of the agent has a purpose.

Thus, the view is disproved that the effect is (previously) existent (in the cause). And it cannot be said that the postulation of an invariable (antecedent) cause (for any particular effect) proves the effect to have surely existed (previously) in the cause. Because this is appropriate solely through the fitness inherent in the cause (for giving rise to a particular effect).⁷⁵⁰

It may again be objected that the activity of the agent finds no scope even according to him who holds that the effect is non-existent in the cause. Inasmuch as before its being produced the effect has no existence, the activity of the agent has to exist elsewhere than in the effect. In such a case, as those other things (where the effect exists) are undetermined, it follows also that the activity of the agent which is related to the threads may be said also to produce the pot. But it is not right to hold this view. For a particular cause is capable of producing a particular effect, and by means of the activity of the agent which is associated with that cause, the production of that effect is accomplished.

In this connection, some (*i.e.*, the *Advaitins*) say as follows: The effect is identical with the cause. For there is nothing which is called an effect, which is in reality

750. The answer is here given by the followers of Kāṇḍa to the objection: if the effect is altogether new, why should particular causes be chosen to be wrought upon for the production of particular effects? The reply is that a particular cause has a peculiar capacity or fitness rather

to produce the effect associated with it. The potter chooses clay for the making of a pot, because the clay has a fitness for giving rise to a pot on being worked upon, and not because the pot exists in a latent condition in the clay.

other than its cause. For every effect and the way in which it is practically realised are founded on ignorance. For instance, effects such as pots and dishes, that are conditioned in their existence solely by means of the way in which they are realised for practical purposes and that again are other than the clay which forms their cause and which is perpetually known to exist in its modifications like pots and other things—(these effects) are all unreal, while it is the substance of the clay itself forming their cause which is real.

Similarly, the whole of this universe, which is other than the *Brahman* who is pure existence devoid of attributes and forms its cause, and which in practical realisation is conditioned as the principle of egoity and so forth, is unreal; while it is the *Brahman* Himself who is pure existence and who forms the cause, that is real. For whatever reason this is so, for that same reason there is no effect other than the cause. Hence the effect is identical with the cause.⁷⁵¹

It should not, however, be said that the illustrative example (given above of pots and clay) is inappropriate, for the reason that unreality is not established in regard to pots and such other effects, as it is in regard to silver and other things falsely perceived to exist in the mother-of-pearl etc. For there, also, it is merely the substance of clay that is alone established by reasoning as being real; and anything other than it (i.e., clay) is disproved to exist by reason.

What then is the reasoning here? It has already been observed that the substance of clay alone is capable of

751. The *Advaitins* interpret this *Sūtra* to mean that there is nothing real other than the *Brahman* who is the cause. *Ananyatva* is not taken to indicate being non-different from (i.e., identical with) the effect, but having none else in existence other than oneself. The *Advaitins* also oppose the *Vaiśeṣika* thesis that the effect is different from the cause, but they do so by denying

that any real effect other than the cause exists. Their general view on the *Brahman* being the sole reality has been stated at some length in Vol. I, pp. 24-47. The reasoning hereafter is more or less on the same lines, but with special reference to the context here. The reality of distinction was denied there, the reality of effect is denied here.

persisting before the consciousness and that anything other than it is logically excluded in perception ; and that in the illustrative example of the snake (or crack in the earth, or stream of water) falsely perceived to exist in the rope, and in other such (examples), it has indeed been observed that ropes and other such things which persist before the consciousness and form the basis (of false knowledge), are all real, and that the snake, crack in the earth, stream of water etc., which are logically excluded in perception, are all unreal. Similarly, the substance of clay itself which persists before the consciousness and forms the basis (of false knowledge) is real, while pots, dishes etc., which are logically excluded from perception, are all unreal.⁷⁵²

Moreover, the Self which has real existence has no destruction, and the horns of the hare etc., which have no real existence have no manifestation (to consciousness). Therefore, an effect which is capable of both manifestation and destruction is known to be that which is indescribable either as existence or as non-existence. And what is (thus) indescribable is quite unreal, like the silver etc. falsely perceived to exist in the mother-of-pearl etc., and the indescribability also of such (silver etc.) is established by means of perception and stultification.⁷⁵³

752. Compare Vol. I, pp. 39-40, and the syllogisms given there. Similar syllogisms underlie the reasoning here; (i) The substance of clay is real, because it continues to persist like the rope in the instances of the rope-serpent etc. (ii) Pots, dishes, etc., are unreal, because they are all excluded from perception, one after another, like the snake, the crack in the earth, the stream of water etc., in the above examples.

753. Here the world is sought to be proved to be unreal on the ground that it is neither a real entity like the *Brahman* nor a non-

entity like the horns of a hare. See Note 143 of Vol. I. The syllogism here is: Pots, dishes etc. are unreal, because they are neither entities nor non-entities, like the silver falsely perceived to exist in the mother-of-pearl. Unreality here is not regarded as failure to persist before the consciousness, but as that which is liable to be stultified by knowledge. See the definition of 'unreality' given in Vol. I, p. 26. This view of unreality is ascribed to the *Vivaraṇa* school of *Advaitins*, deriving from Padmapāda, a disciple of Śaṅkara.

Again, it may be asked whether the causal substance of clay and other such things which produce effects, do produce such effects in their unmodified state, or do so after assuming any particular condition. Surely, they do not do so in their unmodified state, because (then) it follows that they are always producing effects. Nor do they do so after assuming any particular condition. For this assumption of a particular condition also has to be similarly based on another previously assumed particular condition; and that (previously assumed condition) has to be similar (that is, based on another condition). There will thus result the logical fallacy of a *retrogressus in infinitum*.

If it be said that it (i.e., the causal substance) in its unmodified state alone, but in association with a particular place or a particular time or a particular instrumental cause, produces its effect, it is replied that it is not right to say so. For the association (of the cause) with a particular place etc. also does not, for the reasons stated above, exist in regard to it, either in its unmodified state or in any particular condition.⁷⁵¹

Again, it should not be urged that pots, necklaces, curds, etc. are respectively seen to be produced out of clay, gold, milk, etc., that no stultification is seen by reason of

754. Here a possible objection to the inference that pots, dishes etc. are unreal, because they are all excluded from perception, one after another, is sought to be answered. Exclusion is not concomitant with unreality. "The logical exclusion of a thing (which is perceived in relation to a particular place and a particular time) from a different place and a different time is not ... seen to be invariably concomitant with unreality..." (Vol. I, p. 57.) The logical exclusion is concomitant with unreality when the limiting conditions as regards stultification are perceived. These are per-

ceived in regard to the cognition of silver in the mother-of-pearl, but not in regard to the cognition of pots, potsherds etc. The argument is similar to pointing out that the inference that the mountain is smoky because it is fiery is fallacious; for smokiness is concomitant not with fire in general, but with fire in association with wet fuel. The reply to this criticism is that the effect, if real, should be capable of being logically defined. But it is not so, and is hence unreal. Compare the *Advaitins'* similar argument about differentiation in Vol. I, p. 38.

the condition which is perceived in relation to time, place, etc., unlike in the case of the silver falsely perceived in the mother-of-pearl (where such stultification is seen) ; and that, therefore, those who depend upon perception, have necessarily to accept the view that the effect is produced out of the cause. (This view is untenable) because, in regard to this view, no alternative of any kind is admissible.

(Thus) it is asked whether it is merely the gold and other things that are the cause of the mystic cross (*svastika*) etc.; or whether it is (the form of) the necklaces and others that is the cause thereof, or whether it is the gold etc. as forming the basis of necklaces, etc.⁷⁵⁵ Surely, the gold and other things themselves are not such causes, because there is no effect that is different from the gold etc., and because also nothing can possibly form its own cause. If it be said that the (effect of the) mystic cross (*svastika*) is seen to be distinct from the gold (i.e., the cause), it is replied that it is not distinct. For gold is recognised (in both), and because also nothing is perceived (that is) over and above gold. If it be said that the distinct entity (in the effect) is proved by a difference in the knowledge (relating to both) as well as by a difference in the words (expressive of both) and by other differences, it is replied that it is not right to say so. Because the difference in knowledge, in words and other differences which are all conditioned to arise in relation to an indefinite entity, have an erroneous basis,—like the difference in words, and the difference in expression of and relative to the knowledge of silver in the mother-of-pearl and other differences,—and in

755. Gold, a primary product (*ruchaka*) and a secondary product (*svastika*) are here under consideration. '*Ruchaka*' has been taken in its ordinary sense of 'necklace', but it may also mean a coin. The *svastika* jewel is supposed to be made by melting the

ruchaka. The point here is that neither mere gold as substance, nor the form of the *ruchaka*, nor gold as qualified by the form of the *ruchaka*, can be shown to be the cause of the effect, *svastika*.

consequence, they (i.e., such differences) are incapable of proving the existence of any other entity distinct (from the cause).

Nor are golden necklaces etc. the causes of the mystic cross (*svastika*) etc. For the golden necklace is not perceived by you in the mystic cross (*svastika*), as threads are perceived in the cloth. Nor again is gold as forming the basis of golden necklaces (the cause). For gold is not perceived in the mystic cross in the form in which it forms the basis of the golden necklace.

Thus, an effect which is other than the cause, such as clay, etc., is seen to possess the character of an unreality. Therefore, the whole world which is other than the *Brahman*, being an effect, is unreal.

The aforesaid view regarding the unreality of the effect has been explained on the basis of the assumed reality of clay and other (causes), in order that it may be the more easily understood that whatever is distinct from the *Brahman* possesses the character of unreality. In reality, however, clay, gold and other such causes are unreal like pots, golden necklaces, and other such effects (respectively). For all of them are alike one another in being the effects evolved out of the *Brahman*.

It may be made out that whatever is distinct from the *Brahman* possesses the character of unreality, (not merely from reasoning but) also from the following and such other passages from the scriptures: "All this has its Self in That; It is true" (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 8. 7.*); and "There is nothing here that is many and varied; he who sees the world as though it were varied attains death from death" (*Bṛih. Up. IV. 4. 19*); "Where, indeed, there comes into existence duality as it were, there one sees another. Where, however, all has become the Self to him, there who shall see whom by what?" (*Bṛih. Up. II. 4. 14. &*

IV. 5. 15) ; and "Indra is known to assume many forms through the power of illusions" (*Bṛih. Up.* II. 5. 19).⁷⁵⁶

Moreover, it should not be supposed that the purport learnt from the scripture is contradicted by perception. For every effect is, in the manner mentioned above, known to possess the characteristic of unreality. Further, perception has pure existence for its object. Even if there be contradiction (between perception and scripture), there is the reason given (in support of the view) that the *śāstra* is a more powerful criterion of truth⁷⁵⁷—the *śāstra* which cannot possibly have any defects such as those arising out of the innate impression of distinction ; which finds its scope at last (after other means of proof have been stultified) ;⁷⁵⁸ which, though in regard to its essential nature (as a collection of words), and in regard to its other characteristics, it stands in need of perception and other means of proof, does not desiderate any (such other means of proof) for making out its meaning ; and which does not also admit of errors cropping up. Thus, all things other than the *Brahman* who forms the cause, are unreal.

It should not moreover be supposed that, owing to the unreality of the world, there arises unreality in regard to the individual self (also). For it is the *Brahman* Himself who has assumed the condition of the individual self. It is

756. The authority of the scripture is invoked to support the conclusions reached by reasoning. The first quotation from the *Chhând. Up.* (VI 8. 7) strikes the keynote. The grammatical equation here is taken to show the stultification of the reality of the world, and the affirmation of the *Brahman* as the sole reality. When a pillar, for instance, is mistaken for a thief in the dark, the statement, "The pillar is the thief", stultifies a previously exist-

ing wrong conception. Compare Vol. I, pp. 188-189. Indra in the passage from *Bṛih. Up.* stands for 'the Highest Lord'.

757. It is declared here that the *Vedas* do show the effect to be unreal, that this will have to be accepted even if it is contradicted by perception, and that it is not so contradicted. Compare Vol. I, pp. 29-30 and 37-38.

758. The reference is to the so called *apachchheda nyāya*, explained in Vol. I, Note 30.

indeed the *Brahman* Himself that experiences the condition of the individual self in all bodies, according to the following among other scriptural passages: "Having, as this, individual self, entered into . . ." (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3 2); "The one Lord is hidden in all beings" (*Śvet. Up.* VI. 11); "The one God was in many places" (*Taitt. Ār.* III. 13); "This Self, hidden in all beings, does not shine" (*Kāth. Up.* III. 12); and "There is no seer other than Him" (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 3. 23).

It may, however, be objected⁷⁵⁹ that if the *Brahman*, who is only one, experiences the condition of the individual self in all bodies, then the perceptual recognition of the pain and pleasure in all bodies will have to be as in the expressions, 'There is pain in my leg,' and 'There is pleasure in my head'. Moreover, there will have to be no such settled relative positions such as the individual self and the Lord, the bound and the released, the pupil and the teacher, and the state of ignorance and the state of knowledge.

Here (in this connection) some who certainly are of opinion that the *Brahman* has no second, explain the present position thus.⁷⁶⁰ The quality of being the enjoyer of pleasure, the quality of being the enjoyer of pain, and all other such qualities, all of which belong to the individual

759. The objectors here may be taken to be Rāṇānuja and the followers of *Bhedābheda*.

760. Among the *Advaitins*, there is a wide variety of views in regard to fundamental problems. Most of them may be found summed up in Appayya Dīkshita's *Siddhāntaleśasāṅgraha*. Two broad divisions of thought seem to be referred to now by Rāmānuja—those who locate ignorance in the *jīva* and those who locate it in the *Brahman*. The former school,

associated with Vāchaspati Miśra, is first outlined. Rāṅgarāmānuja quotes from Vāchaspati's *Bhāmātī* on Śaṅkara's commentary on *Veā. Sūt.* (I. 4. 3 & 9) to show that ignorance is located in the *jīvas* and that every *jīva* has a different ignorance. To Vāchaspati, the individual self is Pure Consciousness defined and delimited by the internal organ. It is not a reflection of the *Brahman* in ignorance, as some others hold. But he uses the analogy of reflection to clarify his points.

selves that are the reflections of the *Brahman* who is one only, are fixed with reference to the influence exercised by particular limiting adjuncts (on those selves); in the same way in which smallness and largeness, purity and impurity, and other such qualities which are observed in reflections of the same one face in gems, swords, mirrors and other such things (appertain to the limiting adjuncts and not to the face).

It might be objected that, as has already been stated, the individual selves are not distinct from the *Brahman* in the following scriptural passage: "Having, as this individual self entered . . ." (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2). This is true as a fact of the highest reality. But the conclusion under reference is arrived at on the basis of distinctions that arise out of illusion. Who is it then to whom this illusion belongs? Certainly, it cannot belong to the *Brahman*, because He consists of pure intelligence and is (therefore) devoid of illusion. Nor does it belong to the individual self, because (under such a supposition) the fallacy of reciprocal dependence results. Thus, the state of the individual self is, indeed, dependent on the illusion, and the illusion is dependent on the individual self.

But this is not so, because ignorance (*avidyā*) and the state of the individual self are both beginningless, according to the argument derived from the seed and the sprout. Moreover, like the swallowing up of a palace (in a magic show by a magician) and other such (inconsistent) things, ignorance, which is not a real thing, has altogether the nature of inconsistency, and in relation to it, the fallacies which appertain to real things such as the fallacy of

reciprocal dependence, do not help to bring about its disproof.⁷⁶¹

As a matter of fact, the individual souls which are not distinct from the *Brahman* naturally possess the quality of purity. Nevertheless, it is possible for them to possess a conditional impurity, just as blackness and other impure qualities belong to the reflection of a face in swords and other things. Therefore, it is appropriate for those (individual selves) to form the abode of ignorance. Accordingly, it is appropriate for them to possess the quality of being the products of illusion. The impurity found in the individual self is an illusion like the blackness and other impurities found in reflected images. Otherwise, it would follow that they (i.e., the individual selves) will obtain no final freedom (from bondage). As the stream of illusion, appertaining to the individual souls, has no beginning, its origin need not be investigated.⁷⁶²

The aforesaid argument, advanced by those who do not know the truth regarding *Advaita*, is paraded with the object of gaining respectful recognition at the hands of

761. The criticism here is that the individual self, being a product of ignorance, cannot be the locus of the ignorance as well. A very similar objection is referred to by Vāchaspati under *Ved. Sū.* (I. 4. 3). The reply uses the principle of the seed and the sprout. There is no reciprocal dependence between the two, as the seed of one plant gives rise to the sprout of a different plant. Likewise, the ignorance which causes the condition of an individual self is different from the ignorance located in that self.

Infinite regress, which may be alleged, cannot bring about disproof in regard to the phenomena of illusion and ignorance.

762. The (illusion of) impurity affecting the individual self is the liability for association with ignorance, which in turn leads to its being subject to the illusion of birth, death etc. Here too there is an infinite regress, impurity giving rise to ignorance and ignorance giving rise to impurity. The reply is that the stream of illusion is beginningless.

those who have faith in the doctrine of distinctions.⁷⁶³ Thus, if it be said that in its natural and unfictitious condition, the individual soul forms the abode of ignorance, then the statement amounts to saying that it is the *Brahman* Himself who forms the abode of ignorance. If it be said that, in any form other than this (natural one) which is assumed to exist, it forms the abode of ignorance, then it will have been argued that non-intelligent matter forms the abode of ignorance. Indeed, the *Advaitins* do not accept any form other than these two.

It may again be said that, in its essential form itself, which is associated with the form assumed by illusion, it forms the abode of ignorance. But this is not so. For it has not been established that its essential form, which consists of one indivisible uniform essence, has a form which is not qualified save by ignorance. Indeed, it is only that form which forms the abode of ignorance as explained (by you).⁷⁶⁴

Moreover, the acceptance of the view that the individual self is conditioned by ignorance is, indeed, for the purpose of arriving at the distinction between bondage

763. Another school of *Advaitins* here come forward to criticise those who locate ignorance in the individual selves. In Suresvara's *Sambandha-vārtikā*, there seem to be indications that ignorance is to be located in the *Brahman*. This line of thought was subsequently developed. Here this school of thinkers criticise Vāchaspati's followers as advancing arguments pleasing to dualists and realists. The suggestion is that they hover between monism and pluralism and fall between two stools.

764. Corresponding to the gold, the *ruchaka* and the *svastika* mentioned earlier (p. 344), we have here the *Brahman*, the

fictitious form of the *jīva*, and the *Brahman* as having this form. Ignorance can be located in the *Brahman*, but not in the form. For the *Brahman* alone is intelligent and real; anything else is both unreal and non-intelligent. Ignorance cannot be located in non-intelligent matter. Failure to realise this indicates that those who try to locate ignorance in the *jīva* are not true *Advaitins*. Nor can the *Brahman* as qualified by any form be the locus of ignorance. A kind of circular reasoning is here alleged. It is the location of ignorance which creates the form, and it is the form which is said to bring about the location of ignorance.

and freedom.⁷⁶⁵ But this definite determination cannot be arrived at, even according to the view, which says that the individual self is conditioned by ignorance. Indeed, the destruction of ignorance is itself final freedom. It being so, if one (individual self) is finally released from bondage, there results the destruction of ignorance, and in consequence all the other (individual selves) will also obtain final release. It may be said that those others do not obtain final release, and that, therefore, ignorance still continues to be. Then, in such a case, not even a single individual self can have final release, because ignorance has not met with destruction.

It may again be said that a different variety of ignorance is fictitiously assumed with regard to each individual self. Under such (an assumption), whoever has his ignorance destroyed, he obtains final release ; whereas whoever does not have his ignorance destroyed, he continues to be in bondage. But it is not right to say so.

You speak of each individual self after accepting the distinction with regard to individual selves. Is that distinction relating to individual selves natural or manufactured by illusion? Surely, it is not natural, because it is not accepted (by you), and because also (in such a case) the fictions of ignorance, which are resorted to for the purpose of establishing distinctions, will be of no use.

Again, it may be said that it (i.e., distinction) is manufactured by ignorance. If so, it is asked whether the ignorance, which serves to manufacture the distinctions in regard to the individual selves, belongs to the *Brahman*, or whether it appertains to the individual selves. If you

765. The charge of bringing about the emancipation of all individual selves by the destruction of the ignorance of one self has been brought against Vāchas-

pati, who replies to it under *Vedī Sūti*. (II. 3. 40). There too he uses the analogy of the reflection of a single face in many media like gems, swords etc.

say that it belongs to the *Brahman*, then you return to my own view.⁷⁶⁶ If you say that it belongs to the individual selves, it is again asked (of you) whether you forget that this (ignorance) serves the purpose of causing the production of the distinctions in regard to the individual selves.

Again, you may hold that whatever kinds of ignorance are fictitiously assumed for the purpose of arriving at a definite determination in regard to the conditions of bondage, freedom, etc., with reference to each individual self—by those very kinds (of ignorance) there results also the distinction in regard to the individual selves. Then (it follows that) on proof of the distinction in regard to the individual selves, those (kinds of ignorance) are proved ; on proof of those (kinds of ignorance), the distinctions in regard to the individual selves are true. Thus, there arises the fallacy of reciprocal dependence.

Moreover, in this case the argument derived from the seed and the sprout is hardly maintainable. Indeed, among the seeds and the sprouts, one particular seed produces one particular sprout. But in the case under consideration, whatever individual selves are fictitiously manufactured by whichever kinds of ignorance, on those very (individual selves) is the existence of those kinds (of ignorance) dependent. Such a procedure is no proof.⁷⁶⁷

You may again hold that, according to the arguments derived from the seed and the sprout, each kind of ignorance, resident in a prior individual self, manufactures a posterior individual self. If so, there results the

766. 'My own view' is that of the upholders of the location of ignorance in the *Brahman*.

767. The charge of the fallacy of reciprocal dependence can be disproved, if there is scope for the

application of the principle of the seed and the sprout. If one ignorance manufactures a *jīva*, and the *jīva* manufactures another ignorance, this principle will apply. But it is declared here that this is not the case. Cf. p. 348.

momentariness of the individual self, and room is given for admitting the experience (by a self) of the effects of what has not been done (by it) as well as the destruction of the effects of what has been done (by it) and so on. For this very reason, the view also is set at naught, that from the *Brahman* every kind of ignorance resident in each prior individual self produces the condition of each posterior individual self.⁷⁶⁸

If a stream of unceasingly flowing ignorance is accepted, then in the same manner the state of the individual self, fictitiously called into existence by that ignorance, will also have to be beginningless, like an unceasingly flowing stream, and will not have the character of unchanging permanence. That permanence, which it is required that the condition of the individual self should possess until the attainment of final freedom, will not be available.⁷⁶⁹

It has further been stated above that, in relation to the ignorance which does not have the character of a real thing and is solely of the nature of inconsistency, the evils which appertain to real things, such as the fallacy of reciprocal dependence, do not bring about any disproof (of the individual self). Under such a supposition, ignorance has to abide in the released individual selves as well as in the Supreme Self. It may be said that, as they possess the nature of pure knowledge, that which has the nature of impurity (i.e., ignorance) cannot affect them. Then, it is asked whether ignorance is founded on any logically consistent reasoning. If so, on account of the logical arguments given above, it (i.e., ignorance) cannot reside in the individual selves also.⁷⁷⁰

768. A beginningless series of *jīvas* is here denied.

769. *Advaitins* require that the state of the individual self should be beginningless and that it should last till emancipation is achieved. Only thus can there be harmony

with the scriptures. One list makes out the following to be *anādi* (beginningless) in their view: the *jīva*, *Īśvara*, ignorance, Pure Consciousness or Intelligence etc.

770. "The logical arguments given above" refer to the charge of reciprocal dependence etc.

Again, it is asked when, after the birth of true knowledge, there results destruction of the ignorance abiding in the individual selves, whether the individual self does or does not also meet with destruction. If it meets with destruction, then the final freedom will have to be characterised as the destruction of its (i.e., the individual self's) essential nature.⁷⁷¹ If it does not, there will be no final freedom even after the destruction of that ignorance, for the condition of the individual self, which is other than the essence of the *Brahman*, still remains.

It has also been stated above, that a definite determination in regard to what is purity or impurity etc. can be consistently aimed at in the same manner in which, in relation to the face, cleanliness or uncleanness etc., which are to be observed in gems, swords, mirrors, and other such reflecting media, are so arrived at.⁷⁷²

Here, it has to be considered when the smallness, uncleanness, and other erroneous impressions arising out of limiting adjuncts are put an end to. If it be replied that this happens when swords and other limiting adjuncts are removed, then it is asked whether the reflection in which smallness etc. abide, exists or not at that time. If it exists, then the individual self, which corresponds to that reflection, also exists. In consequence, there results the absence of final freedom. If it does not exist, then, in the same manner, the individual self ceases to be, and consequently final freedom will have to be characterised as destruction of the essence of the individual self.

771. The destruction of the essential nature of the self can be *moksha* only to Buddhists.

772. The analogy of reflection is now criticised. Vāchaspati's comments under *Ved. Sūt.* (II.3.40) appear to be particularly under consideration. It should

also be noted that Vāchaspati does not belong to the so called *prati-bimba* schools according to whom the *jīva* and *Īśvara* are both reflections of the *Brahman*, or the *jīva* is the reflection of the *Īśvara* who is the reflection of the *Brahman*.

Moreover, he to whom there appears any evil of the nature of a wrong aim of life,—to him the removal of such (evils) forms the right object of pursuit. It being so, the question is asked whether the appearance of evil arising from limiting adjuncts results to the *Brahman* who corresponds to the object undergoing reflection, or whether it results to the individual self who corresponds to the reflection, or whether it results to anything else.

In the case of the first two alternatives, the given illustrative example (of the face and its reflection) is not appropriate, because the appearance of smallness and other evils cannot result to the face, or to the reflection of the face. Indeed, neither the face, nor its reflection can have consciousness. If evil appertains to the *Brahman*, then it should also follow that ignorance appertains to the *Brahman*. The third alternative also cannot hold good, because there is no seeing person other than the *Brahman* and the individual self.

Again, it has to be explained who it is that manufactures the individual self, which is produced out of ignorance. Surely, it cannot be ignorance, because it is not intelligence. Nor is it the individual self. Because then it would mean that the thing depends on itself (for its production); and because also the state of the individual self, like that of the silver (erroneously perceived to be produced) in the mother-of-pearl, is capable of being manufactured by ignorance.⁷⁷³ If it be said that the *Brahman* Himself is the manufacturer (of the individual self), then it is the same as saying that the *Brahman* is beset with ignorance.

773. 'Silverness' in the mother-of-pearl is the illusion when the latter is perceived as silver. Some defect (in observation) is the cause of the illusion: and the perceiving subject is the

maker of the illusion. If the *jīva* is the illusion and *avidyā* the defect, then who is the maker of the illusion? The maker cannot be the illusion.

Further, if it is not granted that the *Brahman* is beset with ignorance, then it is asked whether the *Brahman* sees the individual selves or not. If He does not see them, such things as the wonderful creation based on 'seeing' (that is, 'thinking'), the power of differentiating names, forms, etc., cannot belong to the *Brahman*. Again, if He sees them, then the *Brahman*, who is one indivisible uniform mass, cannot see the individual selves without the help of ignorance. Thus, there results ignorance to the *Brahman*.

For this very reason, the view which maintains a distinction between *māyā* (i.e., the means of causing illusion to others) and *avidyā* (i.e., the means of causing illusion to one's self) is also set at naught.⁷⁷⁴ Indeed, the *Brahman*, although He possesses *māyā*, cannot, in the absence of ignorance, possess the capability to see the individual selves. And one who possesses *māyā* cannot deceive others without seeing them. Neither does *māyā* serve the possessor of *māyā* as a means of seeing others; only when others are seen, it serves as a means of deceiving them. Again, you may hold that the *māyā* of the *Brahman*, while it helps Him to see the individual self, forms also the cause of the illusion of the individual self. In such a case, *māyā* enables the *Brahmān*, who is indivisible, uniform and self-luminous, to see others; and is no other than the *avidyā* which is another name for *māyā*.

Again, the view may be held that *avidyā* is the cause of false perception, whereas *māyā* shows that to be falsity,

774. The distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* is made in various ways. *Māyā* is single, while *avidyās* are many. The former is made of *prakṛiti*, where pure *sattva* is dominant; the latter has its *sattva* constituent impure. The former is an adjunct of the Lord, while the latter is the adjunct of the individual self.

The former does not cause delusion to its substrate whose desires are not hindered, unlike in the case of the latter. The Lord is the reflection of the *Brahman* in *māyā* while the individual selves are His reflections in *avidyā*. And so on. The *Vivaraṇa* school sees no difference between *māyā* and *avidyā*.

which, being other than the *Brahman*, is false ; and does not serve Him as the cause of false perception. Therefore, it does not possess the character of *avidyā*. But this is not correct. For otherwise, after it is known that the moon is only one, that which forms the cause of the perception of two moons will have to possess the character of *avidyā*. And if the *Brahman* knows what is other than Himself to be certainly false, He does not deceive that thing. Indeed, no one who is not mad desires to deceive those whom he knows to be unreal.

Again, the view may be held that *avidyā* is the cause of the perception of things which are both undesirable and unreal, whereas *māyā* does not serve the *Brahman* as the cause of the perception of undesirable things. It does not, therefore, possess the character of *avidyā*. But this is not right. The knowledge of two moons does not form the cause of misery, and therefore does not possess the character of being undesirable (or being no object of human pursuit). Nevertheless, it is caused, by *avidyā* itself, and for removing it, men take great pains.

If *māyā* does not form the cause of the perception of what is undesirable, then it (i.e., the *māyā*), not being regarded as deserving destruction, will have to accompany eternally the essential nature of the *Brahman*. It may be replied that this may be so and that no harm will result therefrom. But the harm is indeed the perception of duality, and there will be contradiction of the scriptural texts teaching monism, such as the following: "But where indeed there comes into existence duality as it were Where, however, all has become the Self to him, there who shall see whom by what?" (*Bṛih. Up. II. 4. 14 & IV 5. 15*)

It may again be said that the scriptural passages teaching monism deal with the Highest Reality, whereas *māyā* possesses the character of unreality, and there is,
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therefore, no such contradiction. But it is replied that the perception of *māyā* which is unreal and the association with it, cannot, in the absence of *avidyā*, appropriately result to the *Brahman*, who has the essential nature of unlimited bliss.

Moreover, it may be asked of what use to the *Brahman* is the eternal *māyā*⁷⁷⁵ which is unreal. If it be said that it serves to deceive the individual self, it is again asked of what use is the deception which is no desirable object. If it is replied that it is all mere play, it is again asked of what use mere play is to One who has unlimited bliss. It may, however, be replied that it is only to those persons whose enjoyments (of pleasure) are fully perfect, that mere play is seen in the world to have the character of an object of human pursuit. In the case under consideration, it is not proper to say so. Indeed, the play is unreal and is produced by unreal materials of play which in turn appear to be unreal: by its means as well as by means of its unreal appearance, the pleasure of play cannot be originated in those who are not mad.

And surely, as stated before,⁷⁷⁶ it has to be seen that it is impossible to assume fictitiously the existence of the individual self as the abode of *avidyā*, in contra-distinction to the *Brahman*, who is accepted to be the abode of *māyā*. Therefore, the *Brahman* Himself, divided into various parts by the beginningless *avidyā* associated with Himself, perceives manifoldness as existent within Himself. And this has to be accepted by those who accept the *Brahman* to be without a second.

It has been stated already that a definite determination in regard to bondage, salvation, etc., cannot be appropriately arrived at. This objection is not urged on behalf

775. *Māyā* is not eternal in the sense in which the *Brahman* is so. All that is suggested is that it is not felt to deserve removal or

destruction, and so may be expected to persist indefinitely.

776. The reference is to the fallacies of reciprocal dependence etc., already raised.

of one who holds that the *Brahman* is conditioned by ignorance and for the following reasons. The *Brahman*, who is one only and ignorant, will be finally released from bondage on the destruction of ignorance. And there will therefore be no need at all for definitely determining the distinction of bondage, final release, etc. The definite distinction between who is bound and who is finally released, who is the pupil and who is the teacher, etc., which are all within the practical world of experience—are manufactured by illusion as in the case of the perceiver of dreams.

It is also appropriate and possible for all fictitiously assumed things to arise out of any one *avidyā*, as they do in the case of one who has dream-perception. That is to say, the pupils, the teachers etc., who are perceived indeed by a single dreamer, are invariably manufactured by his ignorance. For this very reason, the fictitious assumption of many kinds of ignorance does not also stand to reason.⁷⁷⁷

The really existent condition of bondage, final release, etc., as well as the differentiation of myself and another, is not accepted by him who holds that the *Brahman* is conditioned by ignorance. But the unreal (condition) can be appropriately had by means of ignorance.

And the syllogistic reasonings (in this connection) are as follows. (1) The apprehension of distinctive conditions of bondage and final release as well as the apprehension of the distinction of oneself and another is manufactured by

777. A broad division of the *Advaitins* is into those who believe in one self and those who believe in many selves. Among those who believe in one self, there are several schools. Here the reference is to those who believe in a single *jīva*, which animates only a single body. The 'bodies in the

world are like the bodies seen in dreams; they are not animated by this self. There is no distinction in this view between released and bound souls. The so called release of Vāmadeva, Śuka and other sages is like a release in dreams.

one's own ignorance; they possess the character of unreality like the apprehension of distinction seen in dreams. (2) All other bodies are also ensouled solely by me, because they possess the character of bodies, like this (my) body. (3) All other bodies are also manufactured by my ignorance, because they possess the character of the body, or because they possess the character of an effect, or because they possess the character of non-intelligence, or because they possess the character of a fictitious thing; like this (my) body. (4) The whole of the intelligent existence, which is the subject-matter of dispute, is altogether myself, because it possesses the character of being intelligent. Whatever is not myself, that is seen to be unintelligent, as for instance a pot.⁷⁷⁸

Therefore the differentiation of oneself and another as well as the differentiation of the bound and the freed, the pupil and the teacher, etc. is all manufactured by one's ignorance.

For even a dualist (Kaṇāda), the distinctive conditions of the bound and the freed are difficult of proof, because the past periods of time known as *kalpas* are infinite in number, and therefore, if in each *kalpa* final freedom accrues to a single individual, all will have to obtain final release, and in consequence there will be none who has not attained final release.

It may be said that there is an infinity⁷⁷⁹ of individual selves, and therefore there exist those who have not

778. The first syllogism sets out the proposition described in the previous paragraph and explained in Note 777. The second stresses that there is only one self. Then it is pointed that there is only a single *avidyā*. Finally, the unity of intelligence or consciousness is brought out. It should be noted that a negative instance is given to prove the last syllogism. This is because all consciousness is the minor term, and the example or

instance will have to be found outside it.

779. If against an infinity of *kalpas* an infinity of souls is counterposed, examination of the concept of infinity becomes necessary. The argument here is refuted presently by the *Vaiśeṣika*. It may also be noted that while the *Advaitin* believes in the infinity of a single self, the *Vaiśeṣika* believes in an infinity of selves.

obtained final release. It is asked what this infinity is. If it be said that it is what cannot be counted, it is replied that, though owing to largeness in number, it cannot be counted by men of small intelligence, it is certainly capable of being counted by the Omniscient Lord. If it is impossible for Him also (to count), He will have no omniscience. It may again be said that the individual selves have no number, and therefore not to know the number, which does not exist, cannot cause the attribution of the absence of omniscience to the Lord. (It is replied that) if the self be differentiated, the negation of the quality of number (in relation to it) cannot be appropriate, thus. The selves do possess the quality of number, because they are differentiated; even as pulses, mustard, pots, cloths etc. (that are differentiated from one another). And if they are differentiated, it follows that like pots etc., the selves will have non-intelligence, the quality of being the non-self and the quality of being destructible.

Moreover, the *Brahman* can have no infinity. Infinity means being devoid of limitations, and according to the view which believes in distinctions, it is impossible to predicate of the *Brahman* that He is devoid of limitation as any definite thing by reason of His being entirely distinct from all other things. Indeed, limitation as any definite thing is nothing other than the existence of other things. For a thing which has the limitation of the character of any definite thing, it is improper to be unlimited by time and place. For pots and other things, which certainly have the limited character of definite things, are also undoubtedly seen to be limited by time and place, because of their being entirely distinct from all other things. Similarly, all the intelligent individual selves as well as the *Brahman*, being possessed of the limitation of the character of a definite thing, are also limited by time and place. And in the result, there arises contradiction with such passages as the following: "The *Brahman* is existence, knowledge, infinity," (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.), which declare the

negation of all kinds of limitations (in regard to the *Brahman*).⁷⁸⁰

Birth, destruction etc., will also accrue to the individual self as well as to the *Brahman*. Indeed, the limitation of time (in regard to a thing) is only the attainment (by it) of origination and destruction.

Therefore, the whole world, beginning with (the four-faced) *Brahmā* and ending with a clump of grass, is the display of the ignorance of the *Brahman*, who is one only and unlimited. The determination etc. of the conditions relating to the putting together of pleasure and pain are also appropriate, as they partake of the nature of ignorance, like the determination of distinctions produced by dream-perception.

Consequently, the one only *Brahman*, who has an eternal, free and self-luminous nature,⁷⁸¹ becomes, under the influence of beginningless ignorance, the seat of superimpositions in the form of the world ; and therefore, there being in reality nothing else than the *Brahman*, the world has identity with him.

It is here stated in reply (by the *Vaiśeṣhikas*) as follows : It has been stated above that the *Brahman*, who is devoid of attributes and is mere self-luminousness, perceives manifoldness in Himself when His own essential nature is veiled by the beginningless ignorance. And it has already been stated before (in reply that this theory) is opposed to all the criteria of truth, and opposed also to his (i.e., the *Advaitin's*) own words, for the reason,

780. The infinity of the *Brahman* is interpreted by the *Advaitin* to mean that He is free from limitation in regard to time and place and as a thing. He exists at all times and places, and no other thing exists. See p. 34, Vol. I. It is urged here that to

concede the reality of anything other than the *Brahman* is to deny Him infinity.

781. What the *Advaitins* mean by the *Brahman's* eternal, free and self-luminous nature is explained in pp. 43-47, Vol. I.

among others, that, if concealment of the nature of the cessation of luminosity happens to One whose essential nature is luminousness and who has no parts, the destruction of His essential nature will be the result, and in consequence, there can possibly be no (such) concealment.⁷⁸²

It has been further stated above that the effect which is other than the cause is stultified by logical reasonings and is therefore an illusion, like the silver falsely perceived to exist in the mother-of-pearl. This is improper, because there is no (such) reasoning. Again, it has been stated above that the cause alone, which persists before the consciousness, possesses the character of reality, and that effects like pots, dishes, etc., which are logically excluded, possess the character of unreality. This (statement) also has been indeed earlier nullified for the following reason, among others, that the logical exclusion from one place of a thing which is seen in another place does not stultify (its reality).⁷⁸³

It has also been stated above that the effect possesses the character of unreality inasmuch as it possesses the character of indescribability either as existence or as non-existence, owing to its being capable of actual perceptual existence and being destructible. This is not right, for the capability for (its) being actually perceived to exist and for (its) destruction does not indeed prove (its) unreality, but (its) being non-eternal.

Whatever thing has been perceived in association with a particular time and place, the cause of its unreality is certainly its stultification in association with that particular time and place only. In the case of a thing which is perceived to exist in association with a different time and different place, its being stultified in association with another time and place proves merely that it is not

782. See p. 142, Vol. I.

783. See Note 754 on p. 343, and also Vol. I, p. 57.

invariably concomitant with such different place and different time, and not that it is unreal. And the counter-syllogism may be stated thus: The effect known as the pot etc., is real, because there is no stultification of it, when there are limiting adjuncts rightly perceived in relation to time, place, etc.; as is the case with the self.⁷⁸⁴

Again, it has been stated above that the effect is not produced out of the essence of the cause in both its unmodified and modified conditions. This is not right, because the origination of an effect is possible out of a cause in association with place, time and other such auxiliaries. The statement above made, that such an association does not happen to the modified as well as the unmodified (cause)—that is also improper; because it is only that which is indeed unmodified before that can possibly be in association with time etc. It may be said that, as immodiability does not vary, the association with place, time etc., links up even earlier. It is replied that association with place, time etc., which is dependent on other causes (like *karma*, God's will etc.) has no dependence upon this (i.e., modification).⁷⁸⁵

Therefore, that cause which has assumed a particular condition known as the association with place, time, etc., produces the effect. This is nothing defective. And it is not possible to deny in any manner whatsoever what is seen unstultified, *viz.*, that the cause has the power of producing the effect.

It has also been stated above that it is not possible either for mere gold, or for its effects like the necklace, or for itself (i.e., gold) forming the abode (of the effects) to

784. In association with a particular time and place, a pot is as real as the self, whose reality is accepted by both the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Advaitin*. Nothing can stultify the pot there and then, even as nothing can stultify the self. Limiting adjuncts other

than time and place are also indicated to deal with such phenomena as delusions in regard to time and place.

785. The reply is here given to the argument that the effect is incapable of logical definition. See pp. 343-344 above:

be capable of producing effects. This is improper ; mere gold etc., associated with the above-mentioned auxiliaries (of time and place), are entirely capable of producing (effects). And it is not possible to affirm that there is no effect seen that is other than the gold which forms the cause. Because the mystic cross (*svastika*) of gold is seen to be other than gold, and because also another thing (than the cause) has been already established by means of a difference in knowledge (in relation to causes and effects), by means of the difference in the words (expressive of both) and by means also of other differences.

And this is no illusion like the silver falsely perceived to exist in the mother-of-pearl and other such things ; because a thing which is perceived between (its) birth and destruction is not seen to be stultified with reference to its association with that particular place and time. And there is not seen any reasoning whatever that is capable of stultifying this perception.⁷⁸⁶ The perception, leading to the recognition of gold even at the time of the perception of the previously unperceived mystic cross (*svastika*), is not contradictory of the persistence before the consciousness of gold as forming the abode of the mystic cross.

And the proof of the unreality of the world with the help of scriptures has indeed been already set at naught. And what has here to be replied to the other view that there is no contradiction of perception (with the scriptures) —all that also has already been clearly explained.⁷⁸⁷

What has also been stated to the effect that all the bodies are ensouled by a single self—that is not right, because then it will lead to the recognition in only one person of pleasures and pains arising in all bodies. Indeed,

786. The implication is that the origination and destruction of a thing prove it only to be non-eternal, not unreal.

787. See page 346 above, and Note 757. The *Advaitin's* argument about the scripture is given in Vol. I, pp. 29-30 and 37-38. The reply to it is given in Vol. I, pp. 90-97.

in the case of Saubhari⁷⁸⁸ and others, by means of one self, the recognition of pleasures etc. arising out of many bodies, was seen in relation to one person. It is impossible to say (as the *Advaitins* do) that the thing 'I' possesses the character of the knower, and that there is no united gathering up of experiences, owing to its variety, and not from the manifoldness of the self. The self is, indeed, the knower, and that (knower) is certainly the thing 'I'. It has already been explained that the material principle of egoity which forms an internal organ of sense is not the knower, on account of its being, as an organ of sense, non-intelligent in the same way in which the body and the external organs of sense are non-intelligent.⁷⁸⁹

It has been also stated above that all bodies possess the character of having been manufactured by the ignorance of only one person for the reason that they have the character of being the body, of being non-intelligent, of being produced effects and of being fictitious fabrications. This statement also is improper, because all bodies do not certainly possess the character of being projected by ignorance, and the negation (of the possession) of such (a character) results from the appropriate explanation that whatever is unstultified possesses the character of reality.

And the statement made to the effect that, as whatever is different from intelligence is seen to possess

788. See p. 155 above and Note 573. Saubhari's soul animating 50 bodies is an exceptional case. It is cited to urge that if one soul animates all bodies, it must experience the pleasures and pains of all embodied beings. The second syllogism on p. 360 is being answered.

789. The *Advaitins* hold that the character of being the knower is superimposed on the one immovable Consciousness and that it is 'seated in the knot of the evolved principle of egoity known as the *ahaṅkāra*'. (Vol. I, p. 45). The 'thing, I,' is thus the

ahaṅkāra or *antaḥkāraṇa*, which is many and varied, and which accounts for the individuality of the experiences of different bodies. But the *Vaiśeṣikas* and *Rāmānuja* maintain the individual self to be the knower. To the former, the self is merely the substrate of knowledge, which 'comes and goes'. To *Rāmānuja*, as set out in Vol. I, pp. 8-90, the self is of the nature of knowledge and also has knowledge for its attribute. This difference does not prevent the two schools of thought from making a united stand against the *Advaitins* here.

non-intelligence, all the intelligent selves are identical—this has also been disproved clearly through the declaration of distinctions (in regard to them) arising out of the determined arrangements relating to (their) pleasures and pains.⁷⁹⁰

What has been mentioned above to the effect that, because things are ensouled by me and are manufactured by means of my ignorance, the thing 'I' is indeed the whole of the totality of intelligent beings and that therefore the thing 'I' is only one—this is the erroneous talk of one who is quite ignorant of the settled conclusions of his own school. In your view, the self is only pure intelligence entirely distinct from such things as 'I', 'you', etc.⁷⁹¹

Moreover, to one who holds the view that everything other than pure intelligence is unreal, any effort at 'hearing' (the scriptures) etc., for the purpose of attaining final freedom, is fruitless, because such (an attempt) is an effect of ignorance, like the effort made for the purpose of seizing etc. the silver etc. in the illusory perception of silver in the mother-of-pearl etc. and in other such perceptions. The effort made for the purpose of attaining final freedom is useless, because it is an effect of knowledge dependent on a fictitious teacher, like the efforts of Suka, Prahlāda, Vāmadeva and others.⁷⁹² Further, the knowledge resulting from scriptural sentences such as "That thou art" (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 8. 7.*) does not remove the bondage (of ignorance), because it is born out of sentences manufactured by ignorance, or because it is itself

790. In this and the preceding paragraphs, the third and fourth syllogisms on p. 360 are answered. A single *avidyā*, it is pointed out, cannot create all the bodies, which are non-eternal, but not unreal. Then the fourth syllogism is refuted.

791. Here and in what follows a reply to the first syllogism on p. 360 appears to be indicated. The argument is: The self, being

distinct from 'I' and 'you', cannot be the thing 'I'. What is then the point of speaking about the projections of 'my ignorance'?

792. Śuka, the son of Vyāsa, was a famous sage. Vāmadeva is celebrated in the *Vedas*. Refer to *Ved Sūt. (I. 1. 31)*. Prahlāda, the son of the wicked Hiranyakasipu, was a great devotee of the Lord in the *Vishṇu* and other *Purāṇas*.

of the nature of ignorance, or because it has its abode in the knower manufactured by ignorance, or because it arises out of the 'hearing' (of the scriptures) dependent upon a fictitious teacher—like the knowledge produced by means of sentences intended to remove bonds forged in dreams.⁷⁹³

Again, the *Brahman*, who is pure intelligence devoid of attributes, is unreal, because He is known by means of the knowledge which is an effect of ignorance, or because He is known by means of the knowledge resident in a knower projected by ignorance, or because He is known by means of the knowledge having the nature of ignorance. Whatever is so (known), that has the characteristic (of unreality), as for example, the city of the Gandharvas, what is perceived in dreams etc.⁷⁹⁴

And the *Brahman*, who is pure intelligence devoid of attributes, is not self-luminous, so as not to desiderate any other means of proving (Himself). And what has been already stated to the effect that self-luminous knowledge is seen to possess the characteristic of being witnessed by the self, this amounts indeed to saying that that (self-luminous knowledge), having the nature of pragmatic fitness in relation to particular things to be known, is seen only in association with the knower. This point has been already explained. Those arguments also, which, being based upon logical skill, are advanced in proof of that (self-luminous knowledge) being attributeless—they also are set aside by means of the reasonings which are stated subsequently (in the context) to the effect that that self-luminous knowledge is a product of ignorance etc.⁷⁹⁵

793. Compare Vol. I, pp 90-93.

794. Compare the three syllogisms in Vol. I, p. 93. 'The city of the Gandharvas' is an idiomatic expression to mean a kind of mirage giving the appearance of a city in the sky.

795. Compare Vol. I, pp. 41, 58 and 62. The self-luminous nature of consciousness is demonstrated solely by means of the fact that perception brings external objects to the light of consciousness.

Further, what is pure intelligence devoid of attributes cannot appropriately possess the characteristic of being the witness of ignorance, nor have the illusion of the projection of the world made up of the material principle of egoity etc; because the characters of a witness, illusion etc., also are to be seen in association with particular knowers and not in association with pure intelligence, and because neither luminosity nor luminousness dependent on one's own self can result in relation to that (pure intelligence devoid of attributes). Luminosity, indeed, is seen to be of the nature of the realisation of the pragmatic fitness of a certain particular thing to a particular person. Indeed, for that very reason, that self-luminousness is predicated by you also in regard to that (pure intelligence devoid of attributes). And luminosity does not accrue to a dissimilar thing (i.e., pure intelligence) which is devoid of attributes.⁷⁹⁶

Again, what is proclaimed in your own schools to the effect that a real effect is seen to take its birth even out of an unreal (cause)—that also has been disproved by your own admission that such effects, being all but unstultified, are real in the world of practical experience, but in the highest sense of reality have the nature of ignorance itself. The same view has been already disproved by us in a general manner, while we were demonstrating that all effects are produced out of a very real cause itself. And you cannot possibly say that these logical reasonings are

796. To Ś ĩkara the *Brahman* is mere *jñapti*, intelligence or awareness, implying no subject-object relations. Rāmānuja says that the self is of the nature of *jñapti*. But there is knowledge only when the knower contacts the object of knowledge. Subject-object relationships are essential. Luminousness is said to be predicated of the attributeless intelligence by the *Advaitin* only on the basis of such relationships. For his views, see Vol. I, pp. 42-43. Rāmānuja

explains their implications later (Vol. I, p. 67). 'To a dissimilar thing' translates the reading '*atādṛṣasya*' of the text; and it refers to the distinction between pure intelligence and other luminous things associated with subjects and objects. Another reading '*tādṛṣasya*', points to a luminous thing which is a knower associated with an object of knowledge. When such a knower loses all attributes, there can be no luminousness.

contradicted by the scripture, because the scripture is the effect of ignorance and has the character of ignorance, and therefore there is nothing particular here in contradistinction to the illustrative examples (regarding the conflict between the different means of proof).⁷⁹⁷

What has been stated above to the effect that, although the *Brahman* is capable of being known by the knowledge relating to unreal things, He is certainly real for the reason that He is seen to have no subsequent stultification—that is not right, because after it is definitely determined that He is capable of being known by the knowledge arising out of an erroneous cause, to say that no subsequent stultification is seen (in regard to Him) is not of any avail. For instance, there is no subsequent stultification seen in relation to the knowledge, “The void (or nothing) alone is the reality”. Nevertheless, what is denoted by that (sentence) possesses the character of unreality, for no reason other than that it is definitely determined to be based upon error.⁷⁹⁸

Moreover, the following scriptural passages, “There is nothing here that is many and varied” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 19) and “The *Brahman* is knowledge, bliss” (*Bṛih. Up.* III. 9. 28), come last of all, after previously negating the whole of the totality of things other than pure intelligence, and therefore it is said that there is here seen no subsequent stultification. But, according to him who holds the view that nothingness alone is the reality, the non-existence of even that (entity of pure intelligence) is upheld, and as it (i.e., that view) relates to what is subsequent to that (entity of pure intelligence), subsequent stultification is seen (with reference to this last-mentioned entity). There can possibly be no negation beyond the nothingness of all

797. See Vol. I, pp. 90-93. The illustrative examples are those of the city of the Gandharvas, fetters in dreams, the perception of silver in the mother-of-pearl etc., recently mentioned.

798. The Advaitins who hold that the *Brahman* can be known by statements about His nature in the scripture are referred to. See Vol. I, pp. 28-37 and 97, and Note 71.

things. Consequently, this (nothingness) alone is seen not to have any subsequent stultification. The erroneous basis, however, is common to perception etc., as also to the knowledge which relates to the negation of all things and is born out of the *Vedānta*.⁷⁹⁹

Therefore, the whole of the totality of knowledge exists in a real knower, and being itself real, possesses the power of proving other particular things. It being so, a portion of knowledge has an erroneous basis, and such error is real, while another portion (thereof) is born out of materials available (therefor) which are free from error and real. So long as this is not accepted, so long there will not be any definite distinction between what is a real and what is an unreal entity, as also no practical transaction belonging to the life of worldly experience. The practical transaction of the life of worldly experience is, indeed, both real and illusory, and is based upon the luminosity which exists in the real knower and has the nature of establishing particular things. That pure existence, which is devoid of attributes, cannot, however, form the cause of the (real and unreal) appearance etc. of real and unreal things, and therefore the practical transactions of worldly life cannot take place at all.⁸⁰⁰

What has been further stated by them to the effect that, as it is impossible for error to arise without a basis, pure existence, which forms the basis of all erroneous superimpositions, has the character of reality—that has been disproved on the ground that it is possible for errors to arise even though the basis (thereof) is of an unreal character, in the same way in which it is possible for errors to arise even though unreality attaches to the misleading

799. Statement precedes negation; and the negation of attributes to the *Brahman* therefore comes last. The *Advaitin* negates attributes and the world, because of negating passages, but the *Mādhyaṃika* negates the attributeless *Brahman* also.

800. Rāmānuja's theory of error is set out at some length under *Pramāṇānupapatti*, the fifth of the seven objections directed against *Advaita* under I. 1. 1. See Vol. I, pp. 144-170.

cause, or what is of the nature of the abode of the misleading cause, or the quality of being the knower, or the knowledge.⁸⁰¹

Again, you may be of opinion that, inasmuch as error is nowhere seen to arise, when its basis has the character of unreality, it has necessarily to be accepted that pure existence is real. But then error is nowhere seen to arise when the misleading cause, or being its abode, or being the knower, or knowledge is unreal. In their case also, in accordance with what is seen, reality has necessarily to be accepted. Thus, there is (here) nothing particular (to justify you in holding your view) other than enthusiasm in regard to it.⁸⁰²

What has been stated above to the effect that, even according to the view which maintains distinctions, inasmuch as the past periods of time known as *kalpas* are infinite in number, all the individual selves must have attained freedom, and there can therefore be possibly none who is bound, and consequently the definite distinctions between the conditions of bondage and final beatitude are impossible to arrive at—this is set aside on the score of the individual selves being infinite in number.

It has also been stated above to the effect, that, if the individual selves have to be different from one another, it is unavoidable that they should possess the quality of number like pulses, mustard, pots, clothes etc. Here (in this case) pots etc. also being infinite in number, the illustrative example is deficient in regard to the predicate sought to be proved. It may be said that in the instances, 'ten pots' and 'a thousand pulses', the quality of being possessed of number is seen to exist. True, but that

801. See Vol. I, pp. 74 and 97. The Vaiseshika here asks the *Mādhyaṃika's* question why illusion cannot rest on an unreal basis.

802. Illusion or error on an unreal basis is not known, according to the *Advaitins*. Unreal misleading causes etc. also cannot produce error, say the Vaiseshikas.

(quality) does not belong to the essential nature of the pots etc. On the other hand, it belongs to the pots etc., which possess the limiting adjuncts of space and time. We shall, however, accept such a quality of being possessed of number in relation to the individual selves. And by this much it will not follow that all (selves) have final freedom, because of the individual selves, in their essential nature (as free of the adjuncts of time and space), being infinite in number.⁸⁰³

What has been stated above to the effect that, if the individual selves are accepted as being differentiated, there will result to them, as in the case of pots etc., the quality of being non-intelligent, the quality of being non-self, and the quality of being liable to destruction—that is improper, because distinction in relation to things of one species does not cause to things of that species the character of things of a different species. Indeed, the distinction relating to pots does not cause to them the character of the cloth.⁸⁰⁴

What has already been stated above to the effect that, if distinction (in relation to the *Brahman*) exists, then, owing to the limitation as a definite thing, the limitations due to place and time also will result to the *Brahman*, and therefore the character of being infinite will not result to the *Brahman*—that is improper, because even in the case of things which are subject to the limitation as a definite

803. The argument is: the individual selves have number, because they are different from one another, like pulses, mustard etc. Several counter-arguments are suggested; (i) The quality of number is dependent, not on the distinction between selves, but on the limiting adjuncts of space and time. (ii) The individual selves, when free of the limiting adjuncts of space and time, have no number. (iii) Similarly, pulses etc. have no number when freed of the limiting adjuncts of space and time. (Hence the illustration in the

argument fails to prove the predicate). And so on.

804. The *Śrūta-prakāśika* suggests the technical steps in the argument. (i) The self becomes the non-self, if differentiated, like the pot. (ii) This is the same as saying: the self is non-differentiated because of its being the self. (iii) This in turn is similar to: the pot is non-differentiated because of its being the pot. Or, whatever is differentiated is not the pot, like cloth. Since pots are in actual fact differentiated, the argument fails;

thing, no invariable rule is seen as to their limitations in regard to time and place, owing to these (latter) limitations being greater or less as the case may be. The extent of the association with time or place has its determination dependent upon other means of proof (than the limitation as a thing). Therefore, the association also of the *Brahman* with all time and all place, which is arrived at through other means of proof (than the limitation of the *Brahman* as a definite thing), is not contrary to reason.⁸⁰⁵

It may be said that infinity will not result to the *Brahman* merely by reason of the limitation as a definite thing, as there will (then) be the absence of freedom from all kinds of limitations. It is replied that this same is also the case with you, who accept that the *Brahman* is totally distinct from ignorance. Therefore, inasmuch as you accept that (pure) existence is entirely distinct from ignorance, then from the (admitted) distinction in regard to the *Brahman*, all the evils arising out of distinction result to you also. If a total distinction (of the *Brahman*) from ignorance is not accepted by you, then the *Brahman* will certainly have to be of the same nature as ignorance; and for that very reason, the passage also, which gives the definition of the *Brahman* to the effect, "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1), will convey a wrong meaning. In fact, if distinction is not admitted to be an entity, then there can be no discrimination between what proves one's views and what disproves another's (i.e., an opponent's views) etc., and in consequence everything will be inappropriate.

805. Limitation as a definite thing (or *vastu-parichchheda*) is defined by the Advaitins as "This (thing) does not become this other (thing)". They claim that merely because of it, the limitations of time and place also result. Rāma-nuja's reply implies the following: (i) Variations are seen in the limitations of time and place, but not in

vastu-parichchheda. (ii) Size and duration in particular cases are not caused by *vastu-parichchheda*, and so it cannot result in the limitations of time and place in general. (iii) In *vastu-parichchheda* there is no attribute whose variations correspond to those in the limitations of time and place.

The establishment of infinity also takes place merely through the absence of the limitations of time and place, and not through the absence of the limitation as a definite thing in addition, because there is no manifestation to consciousness of such a thing (i.e., a kind of infinity which is due to the absence of limitation as a thing) which resembles the horns of a hare (in having no manifestation whatsoever to consciousness). According to him, however, who maintains distinction, the *Brahman* has all things as His modes by reason of His having all the intelligent and non-intelligent things for His body, and therefore He has no limitation (placed on Him) either by Himself or by another.⁸⁰⁶

Accordingly, seeing that the effect, which is thus distinct from the cause, possesses the character of reality, the whole of the world which is the effect of the *Brahman* is undoubtedly other than the *Brahman*.⁸⁰⁷

If it be so arrived at, we state in reply: "The identity (of the world) with Him, is made out from the passage marked with the word '*ārambhaṇa*' and the like" (*Ved. Sū. II. 1. 15*). (The truth) that the world is identical with Him, that is, with the *Brahman* who is the supreme cause, is made out by means of the passages containing the word, *ārambhaṇa* etc.—that is, by means of such passages as explain that (identity).

806. The Vaiśeṣika accepts *vastu-parichchheda*, without admitting the limitations of space and time as its necessary consequence. Even the *Advaitin*, he says, is in the same boat, by accepting the *Brahman* to be distinct from ignorance. (If this ignorance is said to be unreal, then *vastu-parichchheda* is distinction from the highest reality. This distinction, being unreal, endures only till stultification and therefore becomes a limitation of time. If *vastu-parichchheda* is mere distinction, the *Brahman* becomes subject to it.) Rāmānuja, while

accepting distinction, also maintains the *Brahman* to be free from *vastu-parichchheda* as He is capable of being described in grammatical equation with everything in the world. (This is indicated in the last sentence of the paragraph.) This freedom arises from His own infinity, and leads to His being free from limitations of space and time.

807. The Vaiśeṣika sums up, claiming the effect to be different from the cause. He is the main opponent in this section, the *adhikāraṇa-pūrvapakṣin*.

The passage containing the word 'ārambhaṇa' and others (i.e., such passages) have the word 'ārambhaṇa' at their commencement, and they are the following passages. "Modification (i.e., *vikāra*), (as also) name is reached (or attained) (by clay) for the purpose of speech (followed by action); it is (all) real only as clay" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 4); "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1.); "It thought—'May I become manifold and be born'. It created *tejas*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3.); "Entering along with the individual self, which is also the same as Myself..." (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2.); "All these things which are born, my dear one, have their origin in the *Sat* (i.e., in the One Existence), have their abode in the *Sat* and are established in the *Sat*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 4 & 6); and "All this has That for its self. That is existence. That is the Self. That thou art, O *Śvetaketu*" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.) Here, in this context, are implied other similar contexts. Indeed, these passages declare the identity of the world which is made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things with the Suprem *Brahman*.⁰⁸

Thus, in accordance with the passage, "You are indeed dull. Did you ask for (knowledge of) that Ruler by knowing whom what is not thought becomes thought, what is not known becomes known?" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 3.), after previously bearing in mind that the whole world has the *Brahman* for its cause and that the effect is identical with the cause, the proposition is enunciated (by the teacher) that by knowing the *Brahman*, who is the cause, the whole of what forms the effect is known. Then the student, not knowing how the whole effect (of this world) has the *Brahman* alone for its cause, puts

803. These passages, quoted from the *Chhānd Up.* (VI), come after the illustrative examples referred to in the *Ved. Sūt.* (I.4.23) and extend up to the famous declaration, "That thou art".

Rāmānuja splits up *vāchārambhaṇam* into two words, with the implied authority of *ārambhaṇam* standing by itself in the *Sūtra* (II, 1. 15).

questions, as given in the passage, "Who is that Ruler, reverend sir" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 3.), to the effect, whether by knowledge of one thing it is possible for other things to become known. Urged by which, he (i.e., the teacher) becomes desirous of giving the teaching that the world has the *Brahman* alone for its cause, and accordingly shows in the passage, "Just as, my dear child, by one lump of clay all that is made up of clay becomes known" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 4.), how there is entire identity of the effect with the cause as established in ordinary perception. The meaning of the given illustration is that inasmuch as pots, dishes etc., which are produced by a lump of clay, do not possess the character of being any substance other than that (clay), they become fit to be known by means of the knowledge relating to clay. 809

In the passage, "Modification, (as also) name, is reached (or attained) (by clay) for the purpose of speech (followed by action); it is (all) real only as clay" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 4.), he (the teacher) explains the identity of the effect with the cause solely by means of ordinary perception, in order to meet the objection, according to the arguments of the Kāṇādas, that the effect possesses the character of being a different substance from the cause. 'Ārambhaṇam' is (a verbal noun) formed from (the verb) 'ā-rambh', which is the same as 'ā-labh', meaning to be 'touched' (i.e., reached or attained). The verbal noun with the *lyuṣ* affix (*ana*) is formed so as to be in an accusative relation to the verbal root, according to the rule, "The *kṛitya* and *lyuṣ* affixes have a wide application" (*Pāṇini*, III. 3. 113). The meaning of the expression 'vācha' (lit. 'through speech') is 'by reason of the practical realisation preceded by speech'. In fact, the practical realisation relating to the bringing of water etc., as in the instance, 'Bring water by

809. "By knowing one lump of clay" in *Chhānd. Up.* (VI. 1. 4) is explained as "by knowing one lump of clay", It is not the

existence of the lump, but knowledge relating to it that leads to knowledge about things made from it.

a pot,' etc. is preceded by speech. In order that this practical realisation may take place, a '*vikāra*' (or a particular modification) which has a broad base, a hollow inside and such other characteristics, and a *nāmadheya* (or name) which arises out of that (modification), are both reached (or attained) by that same substance of clay.

In order that particular practical realisations such as the bringing of water etc. may take place, the substance clay itself becomes associated with different configurations and different names. Therefore, the pot and other things are real as clay itself, i.e., are real as the substance clay, i.e., are known with the help of the means of knowledge (as being that substance clay) and not as any other substance.⁸¹⁰

Therefore, in relation to clay, gold and other substances themselves, different conceptions, different names etc., are appropriate merely by reason of their assuming different configurations, in the same way in which in relation to one and the same person known as Devadatta, owing to various changes in his conditions, various conceptions, various words, etc. are seen in the expressions, 'He is a boy', 'He is a youth', and 'He is an old man', as also particular effects.⁸¹¹

What has been stated above to the effect that the effect is different from the cause for the reason that there is the practical realisation that the pot is lost even while the clay is in existence—that is set aside on the ground, that production, destruction etc. are seen to be particular

810. '*Ārambhanam*' is equated with '*ārambhanam*' on the phonetic principle that often *l* and *r* are interchangeable. The sentence in which it occurs replies to Śvetaketu's doubt that the illustrative examples given earlier only show the effect to be different from the cause. So he is taught

that the effects of clay are still clay. Rāmānuja feels that the *iti* in *mṛittiketyeva satyam* supports him against the Advaitin, showing the pots to be real as clay and not the clay to be the only real thing.

811. 'Devadatta' here denotes an individual self and not a body.

conditions of that same causal substance. It is right that ~~one~~ and the same substance should have, in its particular conditions, particular words (denotative of it) and particular effects also. For a substance to assume particular conditions is dependent on the activity of the agent, and thus it (i.e., the activity of the agent) has a purpose (to serve).⁸¹²

The objections which arise in regard to the theory of the manifestation (of the effect latent in a cause) are avoided merely by (our) not accepting such (a manifestation). Even if the origination (of the effect) be admitted (out of the cause), the view which says that the effect is existent in the cause is not contradicted, because origination (of the effect) belongs altogether to what really exists (as the cause).

This contradiction is set out: that it (the effect) is already existent (in the cause) and that it is produced. This is the doubt of one who does not know the truth regarding the production and destruction (of things). The association of a substance with a later configuration ~~is~~ the destruction of that same thing in association with a former configuration and is the production of a condition of its own (i.e., of the substance). Therefore, a substance in all conditions being really existent, the view which maintains that the effect is existent (in the cause) is uncontradicted. If it be said that to admit a non-existent configuration leads to the view which holds that the effect is non-existent (in the cause), then even, according to him who holds that the effect is non-existent (in the cause), if the production does not possess the common characteristic which constitutes the class of productions, then the view which says that the effect is existent (in the cause) will find scope for operation. And if it (i.e., one instance of production) possesses the common characteristic constituting the class, (its production

812. Here is the reply to the objection in p. 338 that the identity of cause and effect will make the activity of the agent producing the effect purposeless.

will have to possess a similar quality, and so) there will be a *regressus in infinitum*. In our view, however, as the conditions (of a substance) do not deserve to be in association with separate effects or (separate) cognisability (apart from the effects and cognisability of the substance), that which possesses these states itself goes through production and all other (states).⁸¹³ This view is faultless.

In the same way in which the state of being a pot results through the destruction of the state of being the halves (of that pot), of being powder, and of being a lump (of clay), the state of being manifold results from the dissolution of the state of being one, and from the dissolution of that (state of being manifold) the state of being one ; and there is nothing which is opposed to reason.⁸¹⁴ Similarly, in the passage, "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only without a second" (*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 1), it is said that all this existence indeed, which now, owing to the differentiations of name and form, has assumed the form of the world which has a varied nature, was formerly one only, owing to the absence of the distinction of names and forms ; and it has no second inasmuch as it possesses omnipotence and does not tolerate another presiding entity (over the universe). Thus identity alone is taught. The creation of the world is (then) stated to take place after the Self wills to become manifold in the form of the world, which consists of varied movable and immovable things, like the external element of light and heat and the elements which are to be created, as stated in the text : "It thought, 'May I become manifold and be born'" (*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 2). Therefore, identity is conclusively established between the world which

813. To raise the question about the production (*utpatti*) of the condition called production is to Rāmānuja as much a self-confuting argument as to question about the production of production is to the Vaiśeṣika. In Rāmānuja's view, production is only a particular state or condition, and his condition cannot be cognised

apart from that of which it is a condition.

814. This is a reply to the argument in p. 338 that the difference in number between cause and effect shows the two to be different. Cause and effect are here seen to be two states of the same substance prevailing at different times.

forms the effect and the Supreme *Brahman* who is the supreme cause.⁸¹⁵

To the objection how it is appropriate for the Supreme *Brahman* Himself, who is denoted by the word 'Existence' and is omniscient, who wills the truth and is devoid of evil, to assume the form of the world, which is capable of being pointed out thus, "This is existence indeed"; how the world itself, which is denoted by the word 'existence', can possess oneness (with Him) through the absence of names and forms; how it (i.e., the world) need not require any other presiding entity (than Himself); how it is appropriate for it (i.e., the world) again to possess the power of thinking, which is the same as willing, to become manifold in the condition of being the world made up of wonderful immovable and movable things; and lastly how creation can proceed in accordance with (such) willing—the answer is given in the passage beginning with "The same deity thought, 'Indeed, I shall enter these three deities with this individual self which is also the same as Myself, and evolve the differentiations of names and forms'. ('I shall make each) of them tripartite, tripartite'" (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 3. 2 & 3*).

Here, after pointing out all the non-intelligent things by the expression, "three deities", it is stated that He will make these things possess wonderful names and forms by the entry thereinto of the individual self which has Him for its self. The meaning is that "with the individual self, which is the same as Myself", that is, with the individual self, which has Me for its self, I shall enter as the self and make these (non-intelligent things) possess wonderful names and forms. What is said is that to Himself and to the individual self there results the possession of names and

⁸¹⁵. In the *Chhāndogya* phrase, "one only without a second," one indicates the *Brahman* as the material cause of the world and *advītiya* the identity of the material cause with the efficient

cause. See Vol. I, pp. 99-100. Creation is explained with reference to *Chhānd. Up. (VI. 2. 3)*, which is summed up except for the *vyashṭi śrīshṭi* referred to by *prajāyeya* ('may I be born').

forms through entering (the non-intelligent things) as the self. This is clearly explained in another scriptural passage—“Having created that (world), He became the *sat* and the *tyat*” (*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1)—which says that the world with the individual self is entered into by the Supreme *Brahman* as forming the self (thereof).

Thus what is here recalled to our mind is what is established in the *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa* (i.e., *Bṛih. Up.* III. 7) to the effect that the intelligent and non-intelligent things, both in (their) condition as effect and (their) condition as cause, both when gross and subtle, form the body of the Supreme *Brahman* and that the Supreme *Brahman* forms their self. Hereby the objection raised above is set aside. And the statement regarding the differentiation of names and forms is made in view of the *Brahman* remaining as the self of the non-intelligent thing associated with the individual self.⁸¹⁶

Therefore, it is the *Brahman* Himself, having all the intelligent and non-intelligent things for His body, who is denoted by the word *jagat* (i.e., the world). So the whole passage at whose commencement it is stated that Existence alone, this only was in the beginning, is very appropriate in its primary significance. All the modifications as well as all the erroneous aims of life are found to be in association with the intelligent and non-intelligent things which form His body, and so the *Brahman*'s quality of being devoid of evil and His being a mine of auspicious qualities are both well maintained. Therefore, he (i.e., the *Sūtrakara*) speaks of this immediately afterwards in the aphorism: “He (the *Brahman*), however, is

816. In regard to the scriptural statement that Existence (*Sat*) was only in the beginning, the doubt arises whether this is the *Brahman* or the world. If the *Brahman*, how can He, being perfect, become the imperfect world? If the world, how can it think and will about creating? In answer, creation is

explained in two stages—the evolution of the elements out of primordial matter, and the entry therein of the individual self with the *Brahman* as his self. The “three deities” mean the elements of *tejas*, water and earth. See Vol. I, Note 248. For *sat* and *tyat*, see Vol. I, Note 183.

different (from the individual self) (because the difference (between the two) is declared in the scripture". (*Ved. Sūt. II. 1. 22*).

Similarly, the passage, "All this has That (*Brahman*) for its self" (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 8. 7.*) teaches the identity of all intelligent and non-intelligent things with the *Brahman*; and the same (identity) is summed up in the conclusion, "That thou art" (*Chhānd. Up. VI. 8. 7.*)⁸¹⁷

This identity is similarly made out in passages occurring in the other contexts also: "All this indeed is the *Brahman*" (*Chhānd. Up. III. 14. 1*); "When the *Ātman* indeed is seen, heard, thought about and known, all this, indeed, becomes known" (*Bṛih. Up. IV. 5. 6*); "All this, whatever there is, is this self" (*Bṛih. Up. II. 4. 6 & IV. 5. 7*); "The *Brahman* indeed is all this" (*Bṛih. Up. II. 5. 3*); and "The *Ātman* indeed is all this" (*Chhānd. Up. VII. 25. 2*).

Non-identity is negated in the following passages: "All things abandon (or scorn) him who knows all things apart from the Self" (*Bṛih. Up. II. 4. 6 & IV. 5. 7*); "There is nothing here that is many and varied" (*Bṛih. Up. IV. 4. 19*); and "He who sees this world, as if manifold, obtains death from death (i.e., *samsāra*)" (*Bṛih. Up. IV. 4. 19 & Kaṭh. Up. IV. 10*). To a similar effect is the passage: "Where indeed there is duality, as it were, there one sees another....but where to one, all this has become the Self, there by what (independent organ) can one (independently) see what (independent thing)?" (*Bṛih. Up. IV. 5. 15*). This (passage), while it propounds that one who has no knowledge has the perception of

817. All passages regarded as having been referred to in the *Sūtra* have been quoted earlier: and with one exception—*Chhānd. Up. (VI. 8. 4 & 6)*—they are explained. It is possible that Rāmānuja considered only one

phrase here pertinent—'*sadā-yatanāḥ*' ('having their abode in the *Sat*'); and its purport as reinforced by the next passage, "All this has that (*Brahman*) for its self."

duality whereas one who is wise has the perception of non-duality, declares that the identity (of the *Brahman* with the individual self) has alone the character of truth. Thus, then, by means of the passages commencing with the word 'ārambhaṇa' etc., identity is established between the world and the supreme cause who is the Highest *Brahman*.

The truth here is as follows.⁸¹⁸ The *Brahman* Himself, who, because of His having all the intelligent and non-intelligent things as His body, has them as His modes, is always denoted by all words. Sometimes (i.e., during *pralaya*) He has the intelligent and non-intelligent things as His body, when they are in such a subtle condition as to be incapable of being separately denoted from Him even as forming His body, and (then) the *Brahman* is in the condition of cause. Sometimes also (i.e., during and after creation) He has the intelligent and non-intelligent things as His body, when they are in such a gross condition as to be capable of being practically realised through differentiation in names and forms, and He is (then) the *Brahman* in the condition of effect. Thus, the world which has the character of an effect is identical with the Supreme *Brahman* who is the cause. And between the intelligent and non-intelligent things which form the body (of the *Brahman*) on the one hand, and the *Brahman* who is their Self, on the other hand, both in the condition of cause and in the condition of effect, the definite distinction of good and evil which results from that definite distinction which relates to their respective natures, that is established by hundreds of scriptural texts, has been already mentioned in the aphorism : " There is, however, no such (inconsistency) : because examples (illustrative of the position that the *Brahman* is untainted by evils in both the states of cause and effect) are available ". (*Ved. Sūt.* II. 1. 9).

Those however (i.e., the *Advaitins*) who hold that the identity between the cause and the effect results through

818. Rāmānuja now tries to reconcile the difference between the *Brahman* and the world with their identity as taught here.

admitting an effect that is unreal—according to them, the identity between cause and effect cannot be established, because it is inappropriate for identity to exist between a real thing and an unreal thing. If such were the case, there would be unreality in regard to the *Brahman* or reality in regard to the world.

Again, there are those (i.e., the followers of Bhāskara) who, while undoubtedly admitting that the effect is also real, hold to the view that the distinction between the individual self and the *Brahman* is due to limiting adjuncts, that the identity (between them) is natural, and that between the *Brahman* and the non-intelligent thing, however, both (distinction and identity) also are natural. According to them, there can exist no entity other than the limiting adjuncts and the *Brahman*. The indivisible *Brahman*, who has no parts, is Himself in contact with limiting adjuncts. His essential nature itself undergoes modification in the form of evil; and if it be admitted that it is the power (of the *Brahman*) that undergoes modification, identity results between (that) power and the *Brahman*. For the foregoing reasons, the scriptural passages which maintain the definite distinctions, namely, that the individual self and the *Brahman* are respectively subject to *karma* and devoid of all sin, and so forth, will be contradicted, as well as those (other) scriptural passages which hold that the non-intelligent thing does and the *Brahman* does not undergo modifications etc. ⁸¹⁹

There are again those (i.e., the followers of Yādava-prakāśa) who maintain that the world is not different from the *Brahman* for the following reasons: The substance of pure existence alone, which is devoid of all modifications such as the character of being the enjoyer etc., and which is associated with all power, is the causal *Brahman*. At the time of universal absorption, He has all His particular

⁸¹⁹ Bhāskara's views are dealt with at some length under *Ved. Sūta*. (I. 1. 4). See Vol. I,

pp. 275-281. They are also briefly summed up in Vol. I, Note 235.

experiences of pleasure and pain set at rest, and although self-luminous He remains, like the individual self in dreamless sleep, totally undistinguished from the non-intelligent thing. He remains at the time of creation in three conditions which are parts of Himself and have the forms of the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the controller, like the clayey substance of clay which assumes the forms of pots, dishes etc., and also like the ocean which assumes the forms of foam, waves, bubbles etc. Therefore, the character of being the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the controller, as well as the good and evil arising out of them, are definitely determined respectively to resemble the qualities of being dishes, pots and water-jars as well as to resemble the distinct effects associated with those (qualities). And the oneness of the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the controller as being made up of what is existence is quite appropriate, like the oneness of the pots, dishes, water-jars etc., as being made up of clay. Consequently, the substance of pure existence alone exists in all conditions.

These (followers of Yādavaprakāśa) go against all scriptures, *Smṛitis*, *Itihāsas*, *Purāṇas* and logical reasonings. Indeed, all the Vedic scriptures, together with all the *Smṛitis*, *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas*, establish the *Brahman* who is the lord of all lords, who is always omniscient and omnipotent, who wills the truth and is devoid of evil, who is unlimited by time or place and is bliss unsurpassed in excellence, and who is the supreme cause. But they do not establish that pure existence which is beyond even the Lord and of which the Lord is a part.

Accordingly, there are the following scriptural passages : "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only without a second" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3.) ; "It thought, 'May I become manifold and be born'" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3.) ; "The *Brahman* indeed, this one alone, was in the beginning. Being one, He did not feel strong. He created the Kshatriyas of excellent

form so that they may be superior to others—those Kshatriyas among the gods, Varuṇa, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mṛityu and Iśāna” (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 11); “The Self, indeed, this was in the beginning. There was nothing else blinking (i.e., active). He thought, ‘May I create the world’” (*Ait. Up.* I. 1.); and “Indeed, Nārāyaṇa alone then was, and not Brahmā, nor Iśāna, nor the sky and earth, nor the stars, nor the waters, nor fire, nor the moon, nor the sun. Being alone, He did not feel happy. Of Him who was in the height of meditation. . . .” (*M. Up.* I. 1.).

By means of these and other similar passages, it is made out that Nārāyaṇa Himself, the Lord of all the lords, is the supreme cause. The words, ‘*Sat*’ (existence), ‘*Brahman*’, and ‘*Ātman*’, which are all found mentioned in similar contexts, are particularised by the word, ‘*Nārāyaṇa*’, occurring in a context similar (to the other above-stated contexts), and they reveal Him alone.⁸²⁰ That causality belongs to the Lord Himself is heard declared in the scriptures thus: “(May we know) that greatest Lord, who is the highest among lords. . . . !” (*Śvet. Up.* VI. 7.); and “He is the cause, He is the Lord of what is the lord of senses (i.e., of the individual soul); He has no progenitor and no superior” (*Śvet. Up.* VI. 9.). The *Smṛiti* also, which is attributed to Manu, after introducing the subject-matter in the passage beginning with “Then the self-existent divine Lord—,” says: “After thinking and willing (to the effect that He would become manifest), He, with the desire of creating various kinds of creatures from His own body, created the waters only at first and therein cast his seed” (*Manu*, I. 6 & 8). The *Itihāṣas* and the *Purāṇas* also declare the Highest Person Himself to be

820. Of the three terms, *Sat* (‘Existence’), *Brahman* (‘That which is huge’) and *Ātman* (‘the Self’), denoting the cause of the world, the first is most general, the second is more restrictive, and

the third implies intelligence. When Nārāyaṇa is mentioned, then all doubt and vagueness are at an end. What is indicated by the general terms, *Sat* etc., is now particularised.

the supreme cause in the following and other similar passages: "Nārāyaṇa has the world for His body. He consists of countless selves and He is ancient..... He, wishing to create, created from out of a thousandth part (of Himself) two kinds of beings" (*M.B.* XII. 180. 11 & 12); and "The world was born out of Viṣṇu, and is existent in Him alone" (*V. P.* I. 1. 35).⁸²¹

Again, it is not possible to say that the Lord is pure existence itself; because He is accepted as forming a bit of it, and because also He has the particular attribute of being the controller. Moreover, it is not possible to say that His association with innumerable auspicious attributes like intelligence, bliss etc., is only occasional; because they are all characterised as eternal, owing to their being natural, in the following and other passages: "His supreme power is revealed, indeed, as varied and natural and as consisting of knowledge, strength and action" (*Śvet. Up.* VI. 8); and "He who understands all and who knows all" (*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 9).

Do not say that it is only association with the potential power of intelligence, of bliss etc., that is natural to Him, because it is indicated separately that power is natural to Him and that intelligence, strength, and action are also natural (the epithet 'natural' qualifying both 'power' and 'knowledge, strength and action'), and because also there would have to be (otherwise) a figurative interpretation (in regard to the words 'intelligence etc.').⁸²² It is not possible to say again that, as in the case

821. In the passages now quoted, the cause of the world is declared to be the Lord or Nārāyaṇa, and not the *Sat*.

822. The followers of Yādava-prakāśa believe that the association of the Lord with auspicious attributes is occasional. *Śvet. Up.* VI. 8, where the power of the Lord is referred to as well as His association with intelligence, strength and action, is understood

by them as referring to (i) His supreme power of bringing together what cannot be brought together and doing impossible things and (ii) His association with the capability for intelligence, strength and action. Rāmānuja criticises the view, by pointing out that they impose a restricted meaning on the Lord's power and force a figurative interpretation on His intelligence, strength and action.

of the word 'pāchaka' (or cook) and other such words, the *kṛit* affix denotes merely capability (or potential power) in regard to 'sarvajña' ('He who understands all') and other such words, because it is not the mere *kṛit* affix (in general) that is taught to denote capability, and because also under the aphorism, ("The *kṛit* affix) is used in the sense of capability in association with the words 'hastin', and 'kavāṭa'" (Pāṇini, III.2.54), and other such aphorisms, only a few of the *kṛit* affixes are taught as denoting capability. In the case of 'pāchaka' and other such words on the other hand, a metaphorical meaning has to be accepted as a matter of necessity.⁸²³

Again, the Lord being a particular portion of that (i.e., Existence), if that (i.e., Existence) has to be a whole made up of parts, then as the whole has to be greater than a part, in the same way in which the sea is greater than the waves, there would be contradiction of thousands of passages like the following which relate to the Lord (as the greatest): "(May we know) that Highest Lord, who is the greatest Lord of lords" (Śvet Up. VI. 7); and "There is seen neither His equal nor His superior" (Śvet. Up. VI. 8).

Further, if Pure Existence itself consists of all things, and if it is a whole—then the Lord being a particular portion of that (Existence), the teachings which are given to the effect that He consists of all things and forms the whole, would be contradicted. Indeed, pots and dishes are not made up of water-jars, nor do they form parts of those (water-jars).⁸²⁴ It may, however, be said that, as

823. The *kṛit* affix is used to form nouns denoting agents of actions from verbal roots. Some exceptions to the rule, like the words, 'hastighna' (lit. 'elephant-killer') and 'kavāṭagṇa' (lit. 'door-destroyer'), are mentioned in Pāṇini (II. 2. 54). In usage, they mean respectively a mahout and a thief, persons who are not killers, but who have the capacity to destroy.

824. Pots, dishes and water-jars seem to stand respectively for

the intelligent selves, the non-intelligent things and the Lord. In Yādvaparakāśa's view, a part of Pure Existence divides itself into selves, matter and the Lord. The analogy is of a portion of the mud of the earth being made into pots, dishes and water-jars. Now, selves, matter and the Lord are made up of Existence; but the selves and matter are not made up of the Lord. Pots, dishes and water-jars are made up of mud; but pots and dishes are not made up of water-jars.

Pure Existence is perfect in every one of its parts, it is perfect also in the part known as the Lord, and that therefore all other things consist of Him and form His parts. But this is not so, because Pure Existence being perfect even in a pot, it will follow that the Lord also consists of the pot and forms part of it.

Furthermore, when in such expressions as 'A pot is', 'A cloth is' etc., Pure Existence is understood to be an attribute of things, it cannot appropriately either be a substance or form a cause. Existence is, indeed, the possession of the capability of being an object of practical realisation. The capability of being the object of a contrary practical realisation by a thing which is capable of that particular realisation is non-existence. If the category of substance alone is accepted to be existence, then it will follow that the other categories of action etc. will be non-existence. Even on the principle according to which one kind of grass known as *kāśa* is accepted (in religious ceremonies) in the place of another kind of grass known as *kuśa*, for the reason that the former belongs to the same class as the latter, it is not easy to establish that, in regard to the categories of action etc., all of them possess one and the same kind of existence.⁸²⁵

If through being *sat* (existence) itself all things possess identity (or non-differentiation), they will all be omniscient, and hence the character of all things will be recognised as coming together (in them), from which it follows that there

825. The Pure Existence of *Yādaṃprakāśa* is either an attribute or a substance. If an attribute, it cannot be the causal substance from which the world has evolved. If it is a substance, the categories of action etc. must be deemed non-existent. It cannot be said that existence is primarily a substance but secondarily includes action etc. also, as the grass *kāśa* is used as a substitute for the

grass *kuśa*, when the latter is not available, in religious ceremonies. For existence cannot admit of grades or classes within itself. It may be noted that the *kāśa-kuśa-nyāya* is sometimes used to indicate being driven from one untenable argument to another almost equally untenable. But here the only point is that *kāśa* is unimportant and a substitute for *kuśa*.

will be a confused mixture of all good and evil. And this has been already stated.⁸²⁶ Consequently, identity (between the *Brahman* and the world) exists only in the manner stated above.

It may be said (by the *Vaiśeṣikas*) that different conceptions and words are used in relation to the conditions of childhood, youth, etc., when one and the same person is in association with those different conditions of age; there is also seen such a difference in conceptions and words in relation to clay, wood, gold, etc., where there are different substances. It being so, it is asked how it is determined that the differences in ideas and words respectively relating to causes and effects, like clay, pots etc., are based only on (changes of) condition.⁸²⁷ To this the reply is as follows:—

भावे चोपलब्धेः

Sūtra 16. *Bhāve chopalabdheḥ* (154)

Because during the existence (of the effect) also, there is a perception (of the causal substance).

Because where effects such as ear-rings are in actual existence, there is an actual perception of gold which forms their cause. The meaning is that this is due to the fact that, when it is said "This ear-ring is gold", there is the perception leading to the recognition as gold (of both gold and the ear-rings). The clay and other things are not perceived in this manner in gold etc., which are different substances (from clay etc.). Therefore, that substance

⁸²⁶. See page 333 above under *Ved. Sūti.* (II, 1. 14).

⁸²⁷. The objection is that differences in words, ideas etc. cannot be restricted merely to differences in state; they apply also to different substances. The answer shortly is that they can indicate only differences of state, when there is also at the same time a recognition of identity.

alone which forms the cause is spoken of as the effect, when it assumes different conditions, as in the case of (one and the same person being spoken of at different times as) the boy, the youth etc.

There is, moreover, an additional reason that, even according to the person who holds that they (i.e., the cause and the effect) are distinct substances, it is admitted that there is association (of the cause such as threads) with a different condition (known as being the non-intimate cause which is the union of those threads), and in consequence the differences in the ideas relating to the words expressive of (threads and their union or) such things are all practically realised. Therefore, it is inappropriate to assume a different substance (in the effect).

And this perceptual recognition is not founded upon any generic properties (as is the case when it is said, "This is that same cow"). For there is no perception of another entity, which forms the basis of the class in which such generic properties reside. One and the same substance, which belongs to the class of gold, is seen to exist both in the condition of cause and in the condition of effect.

Again, it is not possible to say that, if there be different substances (as cause and effect), it is only by the persistence of the material cause that recognition can be had (of it) in the effect. When there is difference of substance (between cause and effect), merely because of the persistence of the base, there can be no recognition (of the cause) in the different substance (i.e., the effect) residing in it (i.e., the base).

It may, however, be said that in the case of the scorpion and other effects produced in cowdung and others (i.e., such causes), cowdung etc. are not seen to be recognised. But this is not right. For in this case also there is the recognition (in the effect) of the substance of earth which forms the first cause (of these things).

It may again be said that in smoke, which is the effect of fire, there is not seen any recognition of fire. Be it so. In this case, there may be no recognition (of the cause in the effect). Nevertheless, it is nothing wrong, because fire is merely an instrumental cause (of smoke). Indeed, smoke is produced out of wet fuel in close contact with fire. And the property of odour being common to both (smoke and wet fuel), smoke is certainly the effect of the fuel.⁸²⁸

Therefore, where the effect exists, there also is the perception, "This (effect) is certainly that (cause)". Hence it is made out that these differences in ideas, words etc. (relating to causes and effects) are founded upon a mere change of conditions. Consequently, the effect is identical with the cause.

On account of this also (the effect is identical with the cause) :

सत्वाच्चापरस्य

Sūtra 17. *Sattvāchchāparasya* (155)

Because also of the existence of the other thing (i.e., the effect in the condition of cause).

Because the other thing, that is, the effect, is existent in the condition of cause, the effect is identical with the cause. Indeed, both in daily life as well as in the *Vedas*, it is only the effect that is taught to be the cause. For instance, in the world, it is said: "All these pots,

828. In this *Sūtra*, the recognition of the cause in the effect proves their oneness. The differences between them are of state only, and do not need the assumption of difference in substance. They are not different entities of

the same class like two pots, as two entities are not seen. If they are said to be two substances resting on the same base or material cause, the recognition here is not possible. Two exceptions to recognition are then dealt with.

dishes etc., were only clay in the forenoon." And in the *Vedas* it is declared: "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 19. 1).⁸²⁹

असद्भावेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण

वाक्यशेषाद्युक्तेश्शब्दान्तराच्च

Sūtra 18. *Asavyapadeśānneti chenna dharmāntareṇa vākya-
śeshādyukteśśabdāntarāchcha.* (156)

If it is denied (that there is identity of the cause with the effect) for the reason that the effect is taught to be non-existence. it is replied that it is not so, because it (i.e., such non-existence) is due to another attribute, as is seen from the remainder of the scriptural passage in question, from logical reasoning and from other words used in the scripture.⁸³⁰

It has been said that the existence of the cause in the effect may be made out from the usage of the world as well as from the *Veda*. This is not correct, on account of the teaching about (i.e., the effect being) non-existence, as in the following passages from the scripture: "Non-existence only was this in the beginning" (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 19. 1.); "Non-existence indeed was this in the beginning" (*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1.); and "Indeed in the beginning this was really not anything at all" (*Taitt. Br.* II. 2. 9). And in the world, it is said that all these pots, dishes and other effects were non-existent in the forenoon. Therefore, what has been stated above (by you) is not appropriate.

829. The difference between *Sūtras* 16 and 17 is that knowledge of oneness between cause and effect is dealt with in the former, and a statement of oneness in the latter. Alternatively, the former

points out: "That (cause) is this (effect)". The latter refers to: "This (effect) is that (cause)".

830. Śaṅkara splits this into two *Sūtras*, starting the second with the word, 'yukteḥ'.

If it be argued thus, the reply is given that it is not right to say so. For such teaching is given in view of its other attributes. Indeed, that teaching relating to non-existence is given, because that same effect was in association with a different property. Indeed, it was in association with a different configuration. It is not given, because of its possessing the character of absolute nothingness as per your opinion.

It has been already definitely stated that existence and non-existence are two attributes of substances. Of these, non-existence is an attribute different from the attribute of existence. In regard to the world, which is pointed out by the word "This", name and form constitute the attribute of existence, whereas the opposite of this (attribute), namely, the attribute of non-existence, is the subtle condition (of the world). Therefore, in relation to the world which is associated with name and form, non-existence is the attainment of the subtle condition which is opposed to this.

How is this made out? From the remainder of the scriptural passage and from other words used in the scripture. The remainder of the scriptural passage, which begins with "Indeed in the beginning this was really not anything at all" (*Taitt. Br. II. 2. 9*), runs thus: "That non-existence itself made up its mind, 'May I be existent'" (*Taitt. Br. II. 2. 9*). From the inferential indication of making up the mind, which may be made out from the remainder of this sentence referred to above, the meaning of non-existence has to be determined to be different from utter nothingness. And because the same meaning must be understood in other passages also, the meaning of non-existence has to be determined to be this in passages like "Non-existence only was this" (*Chhând. Up. III. 19. 1*).³³¹

³³¹. In the *Taitt. Br.* passage 'non-existence' is seen, from the sequel, to be different from absolute nothingness. (So, too, in the *Taitt. Up.* passage.) The same

meaning has to be understood in the parallel passage from the *Chhând. Up.*, even though there is here no explanatory sequel.

By means of logical reasoning also, non-existence is made out to be of the nature of a different attribute (of the effect). Indeed, logical reasoning makes it clearly known that existence and non-existence are two attributes of substances. The association of the substance, clay, with a form which has a broad bottom and hollow inside, is the cause of the practical realisation that the pot is existent. The association of that same (clay) with a condition opposite thereto is the cause of the practical realisation that the pot is non-existent. This being so, the condition of being a half of a pot is opposed to that (other condition of being associated with a broad bottom etc.); and therefore the very condition of being the half of a pot is, so far as the condition of the pot is concerned, the cause of the practical realisation of its non-existence. And there is nothing else known as the non-existence of the pot other than this (non-existence described above). Nor can such negation be assumed, because only by that much (of non-existence as is given above) the practical realisation of non-existence can be appropriately experienced.⁸³²

Similarly, by other scriptural passages also, the association of the effect at an anterior time with a different attribute is made out. Such other scriptural passages have already been set out, and they include the following: "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning." (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1). The absolute non-existence (of the effect) has been objected to in the statement: "Dear child, whence indeed can it be thus"? (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 2). And then the conclusion is established: "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning." (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 2). The following

832. The Vaiśeṣikas list seven categories—substance, quality, action, universality, particularity, inherence, and non-existence. Rāṇauja accepts only the first three of these. Non-existence is regarded by him not as an ultimate category, but as an

attribute. It has been already shown by him towards the end of the commentary on II. 1. 15 that existence cannot be either a substance or an action. See Note 825 above. For the different kinds of non-existence, see Note 37, Vol. I.

declaration is very clear on the point: "Indeed, this was then undifferentiated. It has itself been now differentiated by means of names and forms". (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 7.)

Now in illustration of the identity of the effect with the cause, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) points two examples in the two following aphorisms thus.

पटवच्च

Sūtra 19. *Paṭavachcha* (157)

As in the case of the cloth.

Just as the threads themselves, through entering into a particular combination, become a different effect, having a different name, form etc., so too, in that manner, the *Brahman* also (becomes the world).

यथा च प्राणादिः

Sūtra 20. *Yathā cha prāṇādīḥ* (158)

And as in the case of the *prāṇas* etc.

Just as the one and same element of air, after entering into various kinds of activity in the body, is changed into different effects having the names and forms denoted by *prāṇa*, *apāna*, etc.,⁸³³ similarly, the *Brahman*, who is one only, becomes the world, made up of varied immovable and movable things.

Consequently, the identity of the world with the *Brahman* who is its ultimate cause, is a demonstrated conclusion.

⁸³³. See Note 388, Vol. I, for the fivefold activity of the element, 'air'.

ADHIKARAṆA VII

ITARAVYAPADEŚĀDHIKARAṆAM

इतरव्यपदेशाद्विताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः

Sūtra 21. *Itaravyapadeśāddhi-*

tākaraṇādidoshaprasaktiḥ (159)

It may be said that, owing to the other (i.e., the individual self) being described (as identical with the *Brahman*), there will result to Him the evils of not doing what is good (to Himself) etc.

It has been said by those who establish the identity of the world with the *Brahman* that the identity of the individual self also with the *Brahman* is taught in the following and other passages: "Thou art that" (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.); and "This self is the *Brahman*" (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 5.).³⁴

Against this, the following objection is raised.³⁵ If the other, that is, the individual self, is taught in these passages to possess the state of the *Brahman*, then in regard to the *Brahman*, who is associated with omniscience, the attribute of willing the truth and other such

834. "Those who establish the identity of the world with the *Brahman*" include the *Advaitins*, the followers of *Bhedābheda* and the *Viśiṣṭādvaitins*. 'Identity' means different things to them. The problem is how it is to be understood. Is it absolute identity, or is it identity in the sense that

the *Brahman* is the Self and the individual self His body?

835. The objector here seems to be the *Vaiśeṣhika*, alleging inconsistencies and contradictions in the consequences flowing from the assumption of identity between the individual self and the *Brahman*.

qualities, the evil of not creating a world which has the nature of what is good for Himself, the evil of creating a world which has the nature of what is bad for Himself, and other such evils will find occasion to operate.

This world (being a collection of souls) is also a mine of infinite miseries, arising from one's own self (or body), or through natural causes, or through supernatural agencies.⁸³⁶ No intelligent person who is independent will proceed to work for himself such an evil as this. The scriptural passages, which speak of the distinction of the *Brahman* from the individual self, have been given up by you, who speak of the identity between the world and the *Brahman*. If there be distinction (between the world and the *Brahman*), identity (between them) will not result.⁸³⁷

It may, however, be said (by the followers of Bhāskara) that the scriptural passages relating to distinction deal with the distinctions arising out of limiting adjuncts, and that scriptural passages relating to identity deal with an identity which is natural. Here it is to be asked whether the *Brahman*, who is unassociated with limiting adjuncts and forms the cause of the world, knows or does not know the individual self who is naturally non-different from Himself. If He knows him not, His omniscience is defective. If He knows him, then, in regard to the *Brahman*, who knows that the misery of the individual self who is non-different from Himself is His own misery, the taint of the evils, such as not doing what is good for oneself and doing what is bad for oneself, cannot be avoided.

It may again be said that distinction between the individual self and the *Brahman* is due to ignorance and

836. For the three kinds of sense; and on that basis, miseries, see Note 12, Vol. I. *Advaita*, *Bhedābheda* and

837. 'Identity' (*ananyatva*) is *Viśiṣṭādvaita* are criticised. here understood in the *Advaitic*

that the scriptural passages which speak of distinction relate to such (a distinction). In regard to this position, also, the alternatives as well as the results flowing therefrom, which have all been given in connection with the view which maintains that the individual self is ignorant, undergo a similar fate.⁸³⁸

According to the view which holds that the *Brahman* is associated with ignorance, it is not possible for the *Brahman*, who has a self-luminous nature, to be a witness of ignorance, nor is it possible for the creation of the world to take place as from it (i.e., the ignorance or the witnessing of ignorance). If the luminosity is concealed by ignorance, then inasmuch as concealment causes the cessation of luminosity, there will result the destruction of His own nature itself.⁸³⁹ For that luminosity itself is of (His) very nature. Indeed, it has already been stated that a thousand evils, including the evil of the destruction of His own nature, will thus result. Hence it is inconsistent for the *Brahman* to be the cause of the world.

If it be so arrived at, it is replied to (by the *Sūtrakāra* thus).

अधिकन्तु भेदनिर्देशात्

Sūtra 22. *Adhikantu bhedanirdeśāt* (160)

(The *Brahman*) is however other (than the individual self), on account of the difference (between them) which is taught (in the scriptures).

The word 'however' (*tu*) excludes the view which has been set forth above. "The *Brahman* is other." That

838. See pp. 349-358 above.

839. The argument about the concealment of luminosity is set

out in Vol. I, p. 142. It is the second of the seven objections raised by Rāmānuja to *Advaita*. See also pp. 362-363 above.

is, He is distinct from the individual self, who deserves to be associated with the miseries resulting from himself, from natural causes and from supernatural agencies. Why? Because such a distinction is taught in the scripture.

Indeed, the Supreme *Brahman* is taught to be distinct from the individual self in the following and other passages: "He, who dwelling in the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, who controls the self from within—He is your Internal Ruler and Immortal Self" (*Mādh. Bri. Up.* III. 7. 22);⁸⁴⁰ "Knowing the individual self and the Impeller to be different, and being therefore blessed by Him, he attains immortality" (*Svet. Up.* I. 6.); "He is the cause, He is the Lord of what is the lord of the senses" (*Svet. Up.* VI. 9); "One of them eats the sweet *pīṣṭala* fruit, while the Other shines in splendour without eating at all" (*Svet. Up.* IV. 6.); "The two unborn, the Intelligent and the non-intelligent, are the Lord and the non-lord" (*Svet. Up.* I. 9); "Embraced by the Self" (*Bri. Up.* IV. 3. 21); "Ridden upon by the Omniscient Self" (*Bri. Up.* IV. 3. 35); "Out of this *prakṛiti* (or Nature) He who is the owner of the *māyā* creates this world, wherein another being (i.e., the individual self) is bound down by *māyā*" (*Svet. Up.* IV. 9); "He is the Lord of the *prakṛiti* (or Nature) and the individual souls, and the regulator of qualities" (*Svet. Up.* VI. 16); "The Eternal among the eternal, the Intelligent among the intelligent, who, though One, fulfills the desires of the many" (*Svet. Up.* VI. 13); and "He who is moving within the *avyakta*, whose body is the *avyakta*, whom the *avyakta* does not know... He who is moving within the *akshara*, whose body is the *akshara*, and whom the *akshara* does not know... He is the Internal Self of all beings, is devoid of sin, is the Divine Lord, the one Nārāyaṇa." (*Sub. Up.* VII).

840. Rāmānuja quotes this passage to show that the *Brahman* is distinct from the released individual self also. See the *Śrutaprakāśikā* under I. 1. 22.

अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः

Sūtra 23. *Aśmādivachcha tadanupapattiḥ* (161)

As in the case of stones, etc., it (i.e., becoming the *Brahman*) is inappropriate (in relation to the individual self.

Stones, faggots, clod, grass and all other all non-intelligent things, which deserve greatly to be given up and are always subject to modifications, cannot appropriately possess the same essential nature as the *Brahman*, who is faultless, not subject to modifications, the opposite of all evil and the sole seat of auspicious qualities, who is entirely distinct from all things other than Himself, who is infinite and has an essential nature solely of knowledge and bliss, and whose great glories are many and varied. In the same way in which this is so, in that same way the intelligent individual self, who is deserving of association with infinite misery and who resembles a firefly, cannot appropriately attain to the state of the *Brahman*, who is, in accordance with the passage⁸⁴¹ which says that He is devoid of all sin (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5) and so on, made out to be the opposite of all evil and the mine of innumerable auspicious qualities unsurpassed in excellence.

In accordance with the scriptural passage beginning with "He whose body is the self" (*Mādh. Br̥ih. Up.* III. 7. 22.), the individual self forms the body of the *Brahman*, and so the *Brahman*, through having the individual self for His body, exists as the self of that (individual self). Therefore,

⁸⁴¹. The *Chhāndogya* passage, fully quoted on page 121 above, runs: "This Self is devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger and free from thirst, desires the truth and wills the

truth." His desiring the truth and willing the truth indicate that He is a mine of innumerable auspicious qualities. The other qualities of the Self in the passage show Him to be the opposite of all that is evil.

the pointed indication (of the individual self as the *Brahman*) in a grammatical equation has in view the establishment of the *Brahman* having the individual self for His mode. And it is therefore not contradictory of the above view; on the contrary, it declares this very meaning set forth above. And all this has more than once been made clear in support of the aphorisms, "Kāśakṛtsna is of opinion (that the words denoting the individual self denote the Supreme Self also), because of the abidance (of the Supreme Self as the self of the individual self)" (I. 4. 22), and others.⁸⁴²

Therefore, the *Brahman* in all conditions has the intelligent as well as the non-intelligent things for His body. Hence the *Brahman* who has the intelligent and non-intelligent things in their subtle condition as His body is the cause. That same *Brahman* who has the intelligent as well as the non-intelligent things in their gross condition as His body is the effect known as the world. Thus the grammatical equation between the world and the *Brahman* becomes appropriate. The world possesses the character of the effect of the (causal) *Brahman*, and also the character of being identical with Him. There is no confusion of the natures which belong to the non-intelligent thing, the individual self and the *Brahman*, and which consist respectively of being subject to modifications, being subject to misery and being the mine of all auspicious qualities. And there is also no contradiction with any scriptural passage.

According to the scriptural passage, "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only. . ." (*Cihānd. Up. VI. 2. 1*), it necessarily follows that, even in the undifferentiated condition also, the individual self, in association with non-intelligent things, exists in its subtle condition as the body of the *Brahman*. For even then, in that condition also, it exists in a subtle condition, as

842. The other aphorisms in view include II. 1, 9, I. 2. 21 etc.

declared in the two *Sūtras*: "There is no partiality or mercilessness (in Him) because it (i.e., creation) is dependent (on *karma*). The scripture says accordingly." (II. 1. 34); and "If it be said there is no *karma* (or results of work before creation), because of the declaration in the scriptures of the non-distinction (between the individual selves and the *Brahman* prior to creation), it is replied that it is not right to say so; because both (the selves and *karma*) are beginningless. It (i.e., the non-distinction) is appropriate, and it (i.e., the beginninglessness of souls) is also declared in the scriptures" (II. 1. 35). Non-differentiation, however, results appropriately from the absence of the distinctions of name and form. Thus causality undoubtedly results in relation to the *Brahman*.

Those again⁸⁴³ who, having in mind that condition (of the *Brahman*) which is dissociated from ignorance, maintain the distinction (of the *Brahman*) in relation to this same individual self—in their case, all this cannot properly fit in. For to Him (i.e., the *Brahman*) in that condition there do not exist omniscience, lordship over all, the attribute of being the cause of all, the attribute of being the self of all, the attribute of being the controller of all, and similar attributes. And in that same form the distinction of the individual self (from the *Brahman*) is indeed declared to exist by the same scriptural passages. All this is in your opinion the attribute of ignorance.⁸⁴⁴

843. The reference here is to Śāṅkara's statement under II. 1. 22: "That *Brahman* who is omniscient, who is omnipotent, and whose essential nature is eternal, self-luminous, pure and free, is *adhika* or different from the embodied self; and Him we call the creator of the world." Here Rāmānuja asks whether the *Brahman* who is *adhika* is associated with ignorance or dissociated therefrom. The omniscient and omnipotent *Brahman* is manufactured by ignorance; but the *Brahman*

whose essential nature is eternal, self-luminous, pure and free, has nothing to do with ignorance. It is further implied that, according to the *advaitic* analysis of the *Ved. Sūt.*, the II Chapter cannot deal with any differences manufactured by ignorance between the *Brahman* and the embodied self.

844. There is another reading for this sentence which may be translated thus: "Because all this is manufactured by ignorance (it cannot properly fit in)."

Again, under the aphorisms beginning with "The *Brahman* is, however, other (than the individual self) on account of the difference (between them) which is taught (in the scriptures)" (II. 1. 22), what is established by the *Sūtrakāra* is not the mutual distinction (between the Lord manufactured by ignorance and the individual self), which, like the distinction between the silver (falsely superimposed) on the mother-of-pearl (and the mother-of-pearl), belongs to things manufactured by ignorance and is present in the condition of ignorance. But what is accomplished by him thereunder is (to prove) that the *Brahman*, who, in accordance with the injunction that the enquiry about the *Brahman* has to be undertaken, is introduced in the very beginning as the object of enquiry and who is the cause of the world, has to be known in the *Vedānta*; and that any contradiction thereto which may result either from the *Smṛitis* or from logical reasoning is set at naught.

The two aphorisms, "The re-absorption (of the world into the *Brahman*), as in that case (i.e., of the gold and the ear-rings), will lead to the attribution (of modification etc. to the *Brahman*) and come to be therefore inconsistent (with the *Vedānta* teaching of the oneness of cause and effect)" (II. 1. 8), and "There is, however, no (such inconsistency); because examples illustrative (of the position that the *Brahman* is untainted by evil in both the states of cause and effect) are available" (II. 1. 9), give a re-statement of what is established in this section. In that context, indeed, the purport of the whole section is established to be the existence of the relationship of cause and effect between two things entirely distinct from each other. The aphorism, "If it be said that (in case the distinction between cause and effect is accepted, then) the non-existence (of the effect in the cause will have to be accepted), that is not right. Because what is stated thereby is merely that there is no such invariable rule (that like gives birth to like)" (II. 1. 7), merely re-states what is established in the previous section (i.e., the *Ārambhānādhikaraṇa*).

ADHIKARANA VIII

UPASAMHĀRA-DARŚANĀDHIKARANA

उपसंहारदर्शाननेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि

Sūtra 24. *Upasamhāradarśanānneti
chenna kshiravaddhi* (162)

If it is denied (that He is the sole cause), because a collection of materials is seen (even with capable agents and not with the *Brahman*), it is not right to say so. For indeed it (i.e., creation) resembles (the production of) milk.

It has been established that inasmuch as the Highest *Brahman*, who is omniscient and who wills the truth, has all things for His modes for the reason that He has for His body all the intelligent and non-intelligent things both in their gross and in their subtle conditions, it is nothing contradictory to reason that He possesses the character of being all things other (than Himself). Now it will be established that it is not inconsistent for the Supreme *Brahman*, who wills the truth, to be able to create the wonderful world merely by His will.

Those whose powers are limited are seen to stand in need of a collection of materials required for production. From this, how can there be any doubt about omnipotent *Brahman* being the cause of the world on account of His not having a collection of productive materials? It is replied that it is only in one whose apprehension is slow that such a supposition arises thus. In the world, although a person possesses the power of producing particular effects, he is seen to stand in need of the particular instruments of production (required therefor); and therefore, although the Supreme *Brahman* possesses omnipotence, in

the absence of particular instruments of production, He cannot appropriately possess the capability of being the creator of the world. This (supposition) is (here) sought to be dispelled.

Although potters, weavers and others, who are the (efficient) causes of pots, clothes and other effects, possess the capability of producing those (effects), they are seen to possess the capability of the producing agent only after collecting some instruments of production or other. Those who are incapable of producing such (effects), although they may possess the collection of productive materials, are not able to produce those (effects at all). On the contrary, those who are capable (of producing them) produce them in the presence of the instruments of production. This much alone is the difference (between the capable and incapable). The omnipotent *Brahman* also cannot appropriately possess the power of being the creator of all in the absence of the instruments of production required therefor ; and that before creation He did not have any help is taught in the following among other passages : “Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1) ; and “Indeed, *Nārāyaṇa* alone then was” (*Mah. Up.* I.) Thus, it is concluded that the power of being the creator cannot be appropriate (in relation to Him).

This above-mentioned doubt is expressed thus (in this aphorism) : “If it is denied (that He is the sole cause) because a collection of materials is seen (even with capable agents and not with the *Brahman*...” He (i.e., the *Sūtra-kāra* dispels it by saying : “...it is not right to say so. For it (i.e., creation) resembles (the production of) milk.” All the things which are capable of producing effects do not stand in any need of a collection of instruments of production. For instance, milk, water etc. which are capable of producing curds, ice, etc. do not so stand in need of instruments of production in producing those (effects such as curds etc.). In this manner, the *Brahman*, being by

Himself alone capable of producing all things, appropriately possesses the capability of being the creator of all. The word, 'indeed', which points out (the conclusion here) as though it were well-known, is used to show the utter foolishness of the objection raised. It is not for assuming the condition of curds etc. that milk etc. require the help (lit. throwing in) of things like fermented whey etc. On the contrary, this is for the purpose of hastening (the production of curds etc.), as well as for the purpose of (imparting) a particular kind of flavour.

देवादिवदपि लोके

Sūtra 25. *Devādivadapi loke* (163)

He (in creating the universe) is like the gods etc. (who create by their mere will what they desire) in (their own) world.

Just as the gods and others like them create in their own worlds merely by their will all the things they desire, in the same way the Supreme Person creates the whole universe by His will. It has to be understood that the gods and others whose powers are ascertained with the help of the *Veda*, are cited here to serve as illustrative examples, solely with the object of easily understanding the *Brahman*, whose powers (also) are ascertained with the help of the *Veda*.

ADHIKARAṆA IX

KṚISTNAPRASAKTYADHIKARAṆA

कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा

Sūtra 26. *Kṛistnaprasaktirniravayavatva-*

śābdākopo vā (164)

It may be said that it (i.e., the above view) leads either to the whole (indivisible *Brahman* becoming the divisible world) or to the contradiction of the scriptural texts relating to the indivisibility (of the *Brahman*).

It has been stated above that in the condition of cause the *Brahman* was one only (that is), indivisible ; this means that in the condition of cause the *Brahman* was indeed indivisible owing to His being devoid of differentiation into intelligent and non-intelligent things. This is in accordance with the following, among other scriptural passages : “ Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning ” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1) ; “ Indeed, in the beginning, this was really not anything at all ” (*Taitt. Br.* II. 2. 9) ; “ Indeed, the Self, this one only was in the beginning ” (*Ait. Up.* I. 1). It has also been stated that this single, (that is) indivisible, (that is) undifferentiated *Brahman* Himself, after resolving to the effect “ May I become manifold ” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 2), became differentiated into (the elements of) ether, air etc., and also into the individual selves beginning with *Brahmā* (the creator) and ending with a clump of grass. It being so, it is to be accepted that the whole of that same Supreme *Brahman* has been used up in the production of effects. ⁸⁴⁵

Again, it must be said that the intelligent part (of the *Brahman*) is differentiated into the divisions of the individual self and the unintelligent part is differentiated into the divisions made up of (the elements of) ether etc. In

845. The objector here is the Śāṅkhya ; and his criticism is first directed to a view very similar to that of Yādavaprakāśa (See Note 193, Vol. I and pp. 389-390 above). The scriptural texts under reference speak of the *Sat*, the *Ātman* or the *Brahman* as *eka* or one in the state prior to creation. The *Advaitin* understands thereby that nothing else exists besides the

Brahman : *eka* refers to the number ‘one’. Rāmānuja takes *eka* to refer to a subtle state where there are no distinctions of name and form. For the created world is contrasted with that state of the *Brahman* prior to creation. Here the Śāṅkhya seems to take *eka* to mean ‘not having parts or organs’.

that case, the following scriptural passages and other such statements, all of which relate to the indivisibility of the *Brahman*, who forms the (supreme) cause, will be contradicted, that is, will be set at naught : "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning alone and without a second." (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1) : "The *Brahman* (indeed was this in the beginning) one only" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 11); "The Self (indeed was this in the beginning) one only" (*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 17). No doubt, it is accepted (by the *Vedāntin*) that the *Brahman* who has the intelligent and non-intelligent things in the subtle condition as His body, is the cause, and the *Brahman*, who has the intelligent and non-intelligent things in their gross condition as His body is the effect. Even then, it has to be accepted that part of the embodied *Brahman* also forms the effect.⁸⁴⁶ Consequently, the above-mentioned evil (in regard to Him) is unavoidable. It is also inappropriate for Him who is indivisible to become manifold ; and it is again inappropriate that there should be a part of the *Brahman* unused in the production of effects. Therefore, all this seems to be inconsistent. Consequently, it is inappropriate for the *Brahman* to be the cause.

To this objection, the following satisfactory answer is given thus.

श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्

Sūtra 27. *Śruteṣtu Śabdamaṇḍatvāt* (165)

However, the causality of the *Brahman* (does not lead to either of these conclusions) because of the scripture, as it (ie, His being different from all things else) rests (solely) on scriptural texts.

846. Here Rāmānuja's view that the relationship of body and self which exists between the world and the *Brahman* avoids the difficulties inherent in the *Brahman*

becoming the world is criticised. The argument is that a part of the *Brahman* suffers modifications, and therefore the *Brahman* is subject to change.

The word, 'however' (*tu*), removes the evil mentioned above (in regard to the *Brahman*). There is no such inconsistency as mentioned above. Why? From the scripture. Surely, the scripture speaks of the indivisibility of the *Brahman* and also of the varied creation proceeding from Him. The meaning is that, in regard to the matters dealt with in the scripture, they have to be understood as revealed by the scripture. It may, however, be said that even the scripture is incapable of conveying any idea which is self-contradictory like "Sprinkle (water) with fire". Therefore, the *Sūtrakāra* says thus: "as it (i.e., His being different from all things else) rests (solely) on scriptural texts." As it is proved solely by means of the scripture that this entity (the *Brahman*) is dissimilar to all other things, therefore it is not contradictory to reason for Him to be in association with wonderful powers. Consequently, the *Brahman* does not deserve either to be proved or disproved by reasoning that is ordinarily observed.⁸⁴⁷

आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि

Sūtra 28. *Ātmani chaivam vichitrāścha hi* (166)

Thus, even in regard to the individual self (there is no ascription of the attributes of non-intelligent things), because they (i.e., the powers possessed by things) are varied and wonderful.

Moreover, if in this manner an attribute which belongs to one thing is superimposed on another, then the attributes which are seen to belong to non-intelligent things

847. The reply to the Sāṅkhya is the *Śruti* reveals the *Brahman* to be both the cause and the effect. To a further objection that even the *Veda* cannot be accepted if it makes unreasonable statements, the answer is given that

the criterion for reasonableness based on worldly experience cannot be applied to statements about the *Brahman* who is known only on the basis of scriptural texts to be different from all things else.

such as pots etc., will have to taint even the eternal intelligent self which is quite unlike any of those (pots etc.), and he (the *Sūtrakara*) says that the non-ascription of such (alien attributes) results from the wonderful variety of the characteristics of non-intelligent things. Hence the statement : “they (that is, the powers possessed by things) are wonderful and varied.”

For instance, in respect of fire, water etc., which are different from one another, powers like heat etc., which are different from one another, are seen. Similarly, thousands of powers which are unseen here and there (in particular things) exist in the Supreme *Brahman*, who is totally distinct from all that is seen in the world. Thus, there is nothing inappropriate here.

Accordingly, the objection arising from ordinary observation has been raised and reviewed by the venerable Parāśara : “How is it possible for the *Brahman* who is without qualities (such as *sattva*), who is unknowable, pure and devoid of evil by nature, to be known as the agent in the acts of creation etc. (of the world)?” (V. P. I. 3. 1); and it is stated (by way of reply): “O thou, the best of ascetics, there are in all things powers which cannot be brought within the sphere of thinkable (or explicable) knowledge, and for that very same reason, those acts of creation etc. constitute the inherent (inexplicable) powers of the *Brahman*, as heat (constitutes the inherent power) of fire.” (V. P. I. 3. 2-3).⁸⁴⁸

The scripture also says : “Which, indeed, is the wood, and which, indeed, is that tree out of which they fashioned the Heaven and earth? O wise men, question your mind as to which things He presided over—He who bears the worlds. The *Brahman* is the wood, the *Brahman* is that tree out of which He fashioned the Heaven and earth : the *Brahman* who supports the worlds presides

(prior to creation) remains in a very subtle state, deprived of name and form and incapable of being separately spoken about, even though it remains as the body of the *Brahman*. If this is not accepted, it will give rise to rewards for what is not done and no rewards for what is done.

Their beginninglessness is perceived (from scriptural passages like the following) : "The knowing soul is neither born, nor does it die." (*Kaish. Up.* II. 18). And the beginninglessness of the stream of creation is (made out from the following and other scriptural passages) : "The creator (i.e., Brahma) created the sun and the moon as before (i.e., on the occasion of a prior creation)" (*M. Nār. V. 7*) ; "Indeed, this was then undifferentiated. It has now been differentiated by means of names and forms." (*Bṛh. Up.* I. 4. 7). Thus the beginninglessness of the essential nature of the selves is established merely by the declaration in the scriptures of the differentiation by means of names and forms. In the *Smṛiti* also, it is declared : "And know that the *prakṛiti* and the *puruṣa* are both beginningless". (*B. G. XIII. 19*).

Therefore, the *Brahman* alone is the cause of the world, on account of His being different from all things, on account of His being all-powerful, on account of His having sport as the only purpose (in the creation etc., of the world), and on account of His association with a variegated creation in accordance with the *karman*s of the individual selves.

सर्वव्यापकत्वम्

Sūtra 36. *Sarvavāpakaḥ*

(174)

(The *Brahman* is the cause of the world) because of (His) having all the qualities (required for being such a cause).

The deficiency of whatever qualities constituting the cause (of the world) was mentioned and will be mentioned in respect of the *pradhāna*, the atom etc.,—the collection of all those qualities which bring about causality are present in the *Brahman*.⁸⁵⁸ Therefore it is established that the *Brahman* is the cause of the world.

858. Here the conclusion is arrived at as a result of all the *adhyakṣaṇas* so far dealt with.

distinction of place ; and the capability to produce gross substances cannot result to them.⁸⁵⁰

According to the view which holds that the infinitesimal atom is the cause, the atoms are, in the very same manner as set out before, indivisible and unconfined in any subdivision of space. And although they are mutually conjoined together, irrespective of any particular subdivision of space, they are incapable of producing gross effects.

सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात्

Sūtra 30. *Sarvopetā cha taddarśanāt* (168)

And because also He (i.e., the Supreme Deity) is revealed in the scriptures as associated with all (powers).

The Supreme Deity, who is distinct from all other things, is also associated with all powers. In this very same manner, indeed, did the scriptural passages reveal the Supreme Deity : “His supreme power indeed is revealed as varied and natural, and as consisting of knowledge, strength and action.” (*Śvet. Up.* VI. 8).

Again, they first declare that the Supreme Deity is distinct from all other things : “devoid of sin, free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger and free from thirst.” (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5). Then they declare that the Supreme Deity is in association with all powers : that is, He “desires the truth and wills the truth.” (*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5.) To the same effect also is the following passage : “He is mind-made, has life for His body, light for His form, He wills

850. The argument about the qualities of the *prakṛiti* here and the atoms immediately thereafter, proceeds on the basis that if a thing occupies space it must have the dimensions of length, breadth and thickness, and that if it does have them, it is divisible. Indivi-

sible particles, however numerous in number and conjoined together, cannot occupy space and produce gross effects. This question is dealt with at greater length in the *Mahādādhirghādhikaraṇa* (*Ved. Sūt.* II, 2, 10-16).

the truth, is like the *ākāśa*, is all-action, is all desires, all sweet odours, all tastes, has appropriated all this (set of qualities) and is speechless and unanxious." (*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 2.)⁸⁵¹

विकरणत्वान्नेति चेत्तदुक्तम्

Sūtra 31. *Vikaraṇatvānneti chettaduktam* (169)

If it be denied (that the *Brahman* is the cause), owing to his having no organs (and body), this objection has already been answered.

No doubt, the *Brahman* is one only, is distinct from all things and is omnipotent. Nevertheless, He is devoid of sense organs, in accordance with the scriptural passage: "He has neither a body, nor the senses". (*S'vet. Up.* VI. 8.) It may therefore be argued that the production of the effects cannot possibly be due to Him. If it be so held, then in regard to it the reply has already been given under the aphorisms, "However (the causality of the *Brahman* does not lead to either of these conclusions) as it (i.e. His being different from all things else) rests (solely) on scriptural texts" (*Ved. Sū. II. 1. 27*) and "Because they (i.e., the powers possessed by things) are varied and wonderful." (*Ved. Sū. II. 1. 28*). The meaning is that He is solely proved by the *Veda* and is distinct from all things else. That is, He is capable of producing each particular effect even in the absence of the particular organ of sense (required therefor). To the same effect also is the following, among other scriptural passages: "He sees without eyes, He hears without ears, without hands and

851. In *Sūtra 27*, from the *Brahman's* dissimilarity with other things, as declared in the *Veda*, it is inferred that it is not contradictory to reason for Him to be in association with wonderful powers. Thus the declaration about His indivisibility is recon-

ciled with the other declaration about the varied creation proceeding from Him. Now scriptural texts are quoted which actually declare His possession of wonderful powers. The quoted texts have been dealt with already under *Ved. Sū. I. 3. 13-19* and *I. 2. 1-7*.

feet He moves swiftly and grasps things' (*S'vet. Up.* III. 19).⁸⁵²

ADHIKARANA X

PRAYOJANAVATTVĀDHIKARANA

न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात्

Sūtra 32. *Na prayojanavattvāt*

(170)

(He is) not (the cause of the world), because it (i.e., creation) has a purpose.

Although the Lord, who is one only before creation, and who, by reason of His being distinct from all other things, is associated with the powers of all things, is Himself capable of creating the variegated world, nevertheless it does not come about that the Lord is the cause, because the wonderful creation (of the world) has a purpose, and because also the Lord has no purpose whatsoever (in such creation).

Indeed, in the acts of those who do all things after thinking out beforehand, the purpose may be of two kinds, either relating to one self or to another. Surely, the Supreme *Brahman* who has by His own nature fulfilled all desires has no purpose to achieve from the creation of the world. Nor is that (creation) for the sake of another. Indeed, one who has attained all desires becomes useful to another by granting favours to that other. No merciful person⁸⁵³ creates a world so full of varied and infinite miseries beginning with birth out of the womb, old age, death, hells etc. On the contrary, if he created the world out of mercy, he would create it as the sole abode of bliss. Therefore, there being no purpose (served by Him in creating the world), it is inappropriate for the *Brahman* to be the cause.

852. The doubt that the *Brahman* cannot possibly create without auxiliary instruments and materials for production having been dispelled under *Sūtra* 24, the question is now raised whether

He can proceed to create without having organs of sense.

853. In the place of *karuṇāvān* some editions read: '*karuṇayā*'. This can be rendered: 'No person out of mercy ...'.

If it be so argued, we give the following reply.

लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम्

Sūtra 33. *Lokavattu līlākāivalyam* (171)

Mere play is all (His purpose in the creation of the world etc.), as indeed is the case (in regard to a king etc.) in the world.

To one whose desires are all fulfilled and who is perfect throughout, there can be no purpose served other than mere play in the creation of the world,⁸⁵⁴ which is capable of being modified by his will and is made up of varied and wonderful intelligent and non-intelligent things. "As indeed is the case in the world". For instance, in the world, a great king who presides (and rules) over the whole earth consisting of the seven *dvīpas*, notwithstanding his being completely full of courage, heroism and strength, is seen to play with balls and do such other acts solely for the purpose of attending to what is mere play. It is mere play that results to the *Brahman* also from the creation, preservation, destruction etc. of the world, which are all done according to His own will.⁸⁵⁵ Thus it (i.e., our argument) is faultless.

वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्तथा हि दर्शयति

Sūtra 34. *Vaishamyā-nairghṛiṇye na sāpekshatvāttathā hi darśayati* (172)

^{854.} A reading '*kevalam*' for '*kevalā*' is also seen. It would then qualify '*prayojanam*' and not '*līlā*'. The *Śrutaprakāśikā* seeks to explain the force of the two words, '*kevalā*' and '*eva*' by saying that '*kevalā*' implies that there is no wager in this sport of creation and that '*eva*' shows that there are no other incidental and unsought for gains from the sport either.

^{855.} In the prayer with which the *Śrībhāṣya* opens, the *Brahman* is described as one "to whom the creation, preservation, destruction etc. of all the worlds is

(mere) play". Here it is stated that the creation, preservation, destruction etc., of the world result in sport to the *Brahman*. Thus the question arises whether creation etc. are sport by themselves, or whether they result in sport. The *Śrutaprakāśikā* upholds the former view, and the *Bhāvaprakāśikā* argues at length in support. Both here and in the opening prayer, some other things besides creation, preservation and destruction are implied by 'etc.' These include the penetration into the world by the *Brahman* and His control thereof from within.

There is no partiality or mercilessness (in Him) because it (i.e., creation) is dependent (on *karma*). The scripture says accordingly.

No doubt the Supreme Person, who is distinct from the intelligent and non-intelligent things, although He is one and indivisible before creation, may be possibly supposed to create the wonderful world made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things in consequence of His being associated with unthinkable powers. Nevertheless, the evil of partiality will befall Him, owing to His creation being superior, middling and inferior in consisting respectively of gods, animals and men, and immovable things; and mercilessness also is not avoidable in relation to Him, owing to His causing the infliction of fearful miseries (on those beings).

To this, the reply is given thus: “(There is) no (partiality or mercilessness in Him), because it (i.e., creation) is dependent.” Partiality and mercilessness do not befall Him. Why? Because unequal creations stand in need of the *karmas* of the souls of the gods and other beings who are to be created. Indeed, the *Śrutis* and the *Smṛitis* show that the association with the bodies of the gods etc., of the souls of the gods etc., is dependent on the *karma* of each soul thus: “He who does good becomes good, he who commits sin becomes evil. He becomes auspicious by virtuous action and evil by sinful action.” (*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 5.) Similarly, it has been stated by the venerable Parāśara that the power of the past *karmas* of the individual selves to be created is the reason for the differences among the gods etc.: “He (i.e., the *Brahman*) is only the instrumental (or unimportant) cause of those to be created in the act of creation, in respect of which the principal causes are the various powers (i.e., the *karmas*) belonging to those to be created. Leaving out the instrumental cause, it (i.e., the thing to be created) does not need anything else. O best among those performing austerities, a (created) thing attains its proper state by

means of its own potentiality (as determined by its past *karma*).” (V.P. I. 4. 51-52). ‘By its own potentiality’ means that the attainment of the position of a god etc., is due to one’s own *karma*.⁸⁵⁶

न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वादुपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च

Sūtra 35. *Na karmāvibhāgāditi chennānāditvā-
dutpadyate chāpyupalabhyate cha* (173)

If it be said that there is no *karma* (or results of works before creation) because (of the declaration in the scriptures) of the non-distinction (between the individual selves and the *Brahman* prior to creation), it is replied that it is not right to say so; because they (i.e., both the selves and *karma*) are beginningless. It (i.e., the non-distinction) is appropriate, and it (i.e., the beginninglessness of souls) is also declared in the scriptures.⁸⁵⁷

It may be said as follows: Indeed the individual selves did not exist prior to creation. Why? Because there is mention in the scripture of the non-distinction (between the *Brahman* and the selves) as in the passage: “Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning” (*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1). Therefore, on account of their non-existence, their *karmas* did not exist at that time. How then can it be said that inequality in creation is dependent upon it (i.e., *karma*)?

This is not right, on account of the beginninglessness of the selves and the streams of their *karmas*. Even in spite of their beginninglessness, non-distinction is reasonably asserted, because that thing known as the individual soul

856. The *Brahman* is ‘the unimportant cause’, explains the *Śrutaprahāṣikā*, in the sense that He is the general cause. The particular causes for inequalities in creation are the *karmas* of individual selves. The analogy is suggested of water helping differ-

ent seeds to sprout and grow into different plants. Here the seeds are the particular causes, while the water is the general cause.

857. Śaṅkara splits this into two *Sūtras*, starting the second with the word, ‘*utpadyate*’.

over Himself with His mind, I tell you, you wise men." (Tiwit. Br. II. 8. 9).⁸⁴⁹ The meaning is that an objection founded on what is ordinarily observed is untenable in regard to the Supreme *Brahman* who is entirely distinct from all other things.

For the following reason also :—

एतद्वैतम्

Sūtra 29. *Svapākṣhaśāchcha* (167)

Because also there are errors in his (i.e., the objector's) own view.

In his own (i.e., the objector's) view, that is, in the view according to which the *pradhāna* etc. form the cause of the world, the *pradhāna* etc. are not distinct from the things found in the world ; hence errors arising from what is observed in the world will taint it. Therefore, it has to be accepted (even by him) that the *Brahman*, who is distinct from all other things, is Himself the cause. Moreover, the *pradhāna* is indivisible, and it may be asked how such an indivisible entity can at all create the wonderful world made up of *maḥat* etc. It may be said that the qualities of 'goodness,' 'passion' and 'darkness' (or *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) are available as its components. Here it is to be discriminated whether the *pradhāna* is the collection of goodness, passion and darkness, or whether the *pradhāna* is produced by goodness, passion and darkness. In the latter alternative, there is the contradiction of the view accepted by you that the *pradhāna* is the (first) cause. There is also contradiction of the number (of 24 principles) accepted by you. There is, again, contradiction of the theory of the production of effects out of those (qualities), which are indivisible. And according to the view that it (i.e., the *pradhāna*) is a collection of the three qualities, those (qualities), being indivisible, are capable of combination irrespective of any

TRANSLITERATION

THE FOLLOWING IS THE SYSTEM OF
TRANSLITERATION ADOPTED IN THIS WORK.

<i>Vowels.</i>	<i>Equivalents and Pronunciation.</i>		
अ	a	in	mica.
आ	ā	„	father (fāther).
इ	i	„	give.
ई	ī	„	police (polīce).
उ	u	„	put.
ऊ	ū	„	rule (rūle).
ऋ	ri	„	gridiron or critique.
ॠ	ri	„	the above prolonged.
ऌ	lri	„	revelry (revelri).
ॡ	lri	„	the above prolonged.
ए	e	„	prey.
ऐ	ai	„	aisle.
ओ	o	„	note.
औ	'au' like	„	loud.
	'ou'		

<i>Consonants.</i>	<i>Equivalents and Pronunciation.</i>		
क	k	in	kind.
ख	kh	„	ink-horn (inkhorn).
ग	g	„	gun.
घ	gh	„	log-hut (loghut).
ङ	ṅ	„	king
च	ch	„	such.
छ	chh	„	church-hill (churchhill).
ज	j	„	jump
झ	jh	„	hedge-hog (hejhog).

*Consonants.**Equivalents and Pronunciation.*

ञ	ñ	in	singe (siñj).
ट	t	„	cat.
ठ	th	„	ant-hill (anṭhill).
ड	ḍ	„	dance.
ढ	ḍh	„	red-haired (reḍhaired)
ण	ṇ	„	bind.
त	t like th	„	kith.
थ	th	„	nuthook (more dental).
द	d like th	„	this.
ध	dh	„	adhere (more dental).
न	n	„	not.
प	p	„	pot.
फ	ph	„	uphill.
ब	b	„	bear.
भ	bh	„	abhor.
म	m	„	map.
य	y	„	royal.
र	r	„	rod.
ल	l	„	like.
व	v	„	waver.
श	ś	„	s palatalised.
ष	sh	„	rush.
स	s	„	sir.
ह	h	„	hear.
:	ḥ (aspirate)	symbol for the sibilant called <i>visarga</i> , or substitute for final s.	

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS VOLUME

- Ait. Ār.—Aitareya-Āraṇyaka.
Ait. Up.—Aitareya-Upanishad.
A.M. Nār.—Atharva-Mahānārāyaṇa-Upanishad.
Āp. D. S.—Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtras.
B.G.—Bhagavad-Gītā.
Bṛih. Up.—Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad.
Chhānd. Up.—Chhāndogya-Upanishad.
Chūlikā Up.—Chūlikā-Upanishad.
Garbha Up.—Garbha-Upanishad.
G. Dh. S.—Gautama-Dharma-Sūtras.
Kāṇ. Bṛih. Up.—Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad, Kāṇva
[recension].
Kāth. Up.—Kātha-Upanishad.
Kaush. Up.—Kaushītaki-Brāhmaṇa-Upanishad.
Ken. Up.—Kena-Upanishad.
M. B.—Mahābhārata.
Mādhy. Bṛih. Up.—Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad,
Mādhyandina recension.
M. Nār.—Taittirīya-Mahānārāyaṇa-Upanishad.
Mah. Up.—Maha-Upanishad.
Maitri. Up.—Maitri-Upanishad.
Māṇḍ. Up.—Māṇḍūkya-Upanishad.
Manu—Manu-Smṛiti.
Muṇḍ. Up.—Muṇḍaka-Upanishad.
Nṛis. Up.—Nṛisimha-Pūrvatāpanī-Upanishad.
Pāṇini—Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini.
Pr. Up.—Praśna-Upanishad.
Pūr. Mīm.—Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras of Jaimini.
Rām.—Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmiki.
R. V.—Rigveda-Samhitā.

Śat. Br.—Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa.
 Sub. Up.—Subāla-Upanishad.
 Śvet. Up.—Śvetāśvatara-Upanishad.
 Taitt. Ār.—Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka.
 Taitt. Br.—Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa.
 Taitt. Sam.—Taittirīya-Samhitā.
 Taitt. Up.—Taittirīya-Upanishad.
 Vas. Sm.—Vasishṭha-Smṛiti.
 Vāyu Pu.—Vāyu-Purāṇa.
 Ved. Sūt.—Vedānta-Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa.
 V. P.—Vishṇu-Purāṇa.
 Vivaraṇa—Pañchapādikā—Vivarāṇa of Prakāśātman.

The following works, infrequently referred to or quoted, are referred to by their full names :

Bhāmatī of Vāchaspati Miśra.
 Bhāvaprakāśikā of Raṅgarāmanuja.
 Dakṣha-Smṛiti.
 Dramiḍa-Bhāshya.
 Naishkarmya-Siddhi of Sureśvara.
 Nirukta of Yāska.
 Nyāya-Sūtras of Gautama.
 Original Sanskrit Texts of J. Muir.
 Sambandha-Vārtika of Sureśvara.
 Sāṅkhyakārikās of Īśvarakṛishṇa.
 Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha of Appayya Dikshita.
 Śrutaprakāśikā of Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa.
 Tāṇḍya-Brāhmaṇa.
 Uṇādi-Sūtras.
 Vākya of Ṭaṇka.
 Vedānta-dīpa of Rāmānuja.
 Vedānta-sāra of Rāmānuja.
 Vṛitti of Bodhayana.

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(n. = footnote. For example, 44 n. means 'footnote on page 44').

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GLOSSARIAL INDEX

OF

SANSKRIT WORDS AND PROPER NAMES

(Arranged according to the Sanskrit Alphabet)

The reference is to page numbers.

p = page.

n = note.

akalpayat : imperfect third person singular of *klṛip*, to create : hence 'created', 223.

Akshapāda : a name of Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya sytem of philosophy, 324, 324 n. (Some say that the two are different).

Akshara : the Indestructible One or the *Brahman*, 52-64, 107-15, *passim*, 131, 186, 296 n.; undifferentiated matter or a state of *prakṛiti* (on which see Vol. I, Note 185), 52-64, 107-115 *passim*, 205, 271, 281, 289-90, 296 n.; the individual self, 111, 296 n.

Aksharādhikaraṇa : the third section of Chapter I, Part 3, of the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, so called because it establishes the identity of the *Akshara* mentioned in a scriptural passage.

aksharāt parataḥ paraḥ : He is higher than what is higher than the *akshara*, 52, 54.

Agni : the celestial world of fire, 65, 69, 72-3 ; the god of fire, 28, 154, 154 n., 155 n., 158, 215 ; the digestive fire, 74 ; the fire-sacrifice, 209 n.; the Supreme Self, 75-6.

Agnirahasya : a section of the 'Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa', 16.

agnihotra : a Vedic ritual in which an oblation is offered, particularly to Agni, 78-81, 97.

aṅga : a subsidiary part, an auxiliary science, 134 n.

Aṅgiras : a celebrated sage in the *Muṇḍ. Up.*, 56.

ach : a particular affix, 14 n.

achit : the non-sentient or non-intelligent, matter, 237 n.

aja : (masculine) unborn, 217, 220, 227, 229.

ajā : (feminine) unborn, 213-28, *passim*.

ajām ekām : one unborn (feminine), 217.

Ajātaśatru : a king of Kāśi who figures in *Kaush. Up.* (IV) and *Bṛih. Up.* (II. 1) as a teacher of religious and philosophical truths, 242-54.

atachchhabdāt : See p. 87.

atala : lit. "without bottom"; the name of the first of the seven nether worlds, 150 n.

atādṛśasya : of or to a dissimilar thing, 369 n.

ativadati : declares as transcendent, 94 n.

ativādin : one who holds (the object of his worship) as superior (to all other objects of worship) and transcendent, 98-100.

Attrādhikaraṇa, the second section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I.2), dealing with the 'Eater' mentioned in a scriptural passage.

atha : then, thereafter, 254 n.

Atharva : the eldest son of Brahmā the creator ; he is described as the first student and earliest teacher of the science of the *Brahman*, 55-6.

Atharva : the fourth *Veda*.

Atharvasīras : the principal texts of the *Atharva Veda*, 214.

Athāsmīn bhavati : (i) Then it attains union with this individual self ; (ii) Then it attains union with the principal vital air, which is in this (individual self) ; (iii) Then he attains union with this Supreme Self ; 245, 251.

āditi : the eater, hence the individual self which 'eats' the fruits of its deeds, 25.

advitīyā : without a second, 381 n.

Advaita : the monistic school of the *Vedānta*, 191 n. ; 371 n., 399 n., 400 n.

Advaitic : pertaining to *Advaita*, 399 n.

Advaitins : exponents or followers of *Advaita*, *passim*.

Adṛśyatvādi - guṇakādhikaraṇa : the fifth section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 2), dealing with the *Brahman* as possessed of qualities like invisibility etc., 51.

Adṛśya ... dharmokteḥ : 143. See p. 51 for the translation of the aphorism.

adrīṣṭa : lit. unseen ; supersensuous, not immediately preceded by a visible cause, 179 n.

adharma : lit. unrighteousness, hence the means for sin, 211 n. ; that which is not the means, 211.

adhika : lit. additional ; used in the sense of 'different', 404 n.

adhikaraṇa(s) : sections, topics, *passim*.

adhikaraṇa-pūrvapakṣin : the main critic or objector in a particular section of the work, 375 n.

adhidaiva : lit. relating to the deities ; a passage in the *Bṛih. Up.* (III. 7) where the *Brahman* is described as the Internal Ruler of several deities, 45-6.

adhipati : lord, 193 n.

adhiloka : lit. relating to the worlds ; a passage in the *Mādh. Bṛih. Up.* (III. 7), which describes the *Brahman* as the Internal Ruler of all the worlds, 45, 45 n., 46.

adhyātmika : 149. See Vol. I, Note 12.

an : to breathe, 132 n.

ananyatva : non-difference, identity, 341 n., 399 n.

anavasihiṭṭh : because of not existing (there), 33 n.

anādi : having no beginning, 353 n.

aniṣā : she who is not sovereign or independent, material Nature, 88 n.

aniṣāyā : by material Nature, or under her influence, 88.

anukṛiti : because of resemblance, 142 n.

anugrihitam : helped on (by), 57 n.

anubhāna : shining after, 143 n.

anumāna : that which is measured, material Nature, 87, 87 n.

anuvāka(s) : section(s) in the *Vedas* or *Upanishads*, 10, 23, 209, 210 n.

anuvīdya : having understood, 135 n. See Vol. I, p. 16.

Antarādhikaraṇa : the third section of *Ved. Sūtt.* (I.2), where the identity of Him who is within (the eye) is established, 31, 136 n.

antarātmān : He who is within the individual self, 16.

antarikṣa : the intermediate world between heaven and earth, 117-8.

antarikṣa-loka : 118. See previous entry.

Antaryāmin : the *Brahman* as the Internal Controller of all things and selves, 130 n., 165 n.

Antaryāmi - Brāhmaṇa : *Bṛih. Up.* (III. 7), where the theme of the Internal Controller is taught, 45 n., 106, 130, 200, 296 n., 323.

Antaryāmyadhikaraṇa: the fourth section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 2), where the identity of the Internal Controller is established, 44.

antahkaraṇa: the internal organ, identified with the material principle of egoity, 366 n.

anna: lit., what is eaten, food; hence the (undifferentiated subtle) material elements which form objects of enjoyment to the individual selves, 58-9, 59 n.

anyāt: lit., can breathe, 132 n.

Anvāhārya: one of the three sacred fires, being that on the right altar; see Note 439; pp. 34 n., 72, 82 n., 81.

apachchheda-nyāya: 346 n. See Note 30, Vol. I.

aparabrahman: the lower *Brahman* conceived as full of attributes and hence regarded by monistic thinkers to be inferior to the Absolute without attributes, 116 n.

Apaśūdrādhikaraṇa: the ninth section of the *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 3) where the exclusion of the *Sūdra* from scriptural disciplines is discussed, 166.

apāna: one of the five vital airs (on which see Note

388, Vol. I); it is connected with the activities of excretion and evacuation; 74, 132 n.

api: and, even, 143 n.

apiti: dissolution of the world, 322 n.

apuṇya: demerit, 242

apūrva: 153 n. See Note 36, Vol. I.

apohana: removal, faculty of reasoning, 17 n.

Appayya Dikshita: a celebrated writer on Saivism, *Vedānta* and poetics of the 16th century, 347 n.

Abhipratārin: identified with Chitraratha, a Kshatriya prince, 175-6.

abhyātta: participle from *abhyādā*, meaning "has appropriated", 14.

ambara: the ether of space, 107, 109.

ambarānta: that which is beyond the ether, undifferentiated primordial matter, 112 n., 114 n.

Arthāntaratvādivyapadeśādhikaraṇa: the tenth section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 3), where *Ākāśa* in a scriptural passage is identified with the *Brahman*, because it is taught, among other things, to be a different thing, 187.

Aruṇa: father of Uddālaka, mentioned in the *Chhānd. Up.*, 67.

Arjuna: the Pāṇḍava prince to whom Śrī Kṛishṇa teaches the *Gītā*, 206.

arthavāda(s): 36, 148, 151-3, 159 n.; see Note 282 of Vol. I.

arśasa: afflicted with piles, 14 n.

alpa: small, 90-1, 105 n.

avākī: speechless, 14.

avidyā: nescience, spiritual ignorance and illusion, *passim*; distinguished from *māyā*, and regarded as the means of causing illusion to one's self, 356, 356 n.

avibhaktatamas: the primary undifferentiated state of matter in a subtle condition, 282 n. See Note 185, Vol. I.

avyakta: primordial matter from which proceeds the evolution of the constituent elements of the universe, 196, 196 n., 201, 203, 207, 207 n., 208 n., 209, 214, 229 n., 294; the body, 195, 196 n., 201, 203, 206 n., 207; a particular state of primordial matter (on which see Note 185 of Vol. I), 111, 205-6, 281-2, 289-90, 294, 401.

avyaktam ... cha: lit. the manifest and also indeed the unmanifest, 215 n.

avyayībhāva: the indeclinable class of compound words, 87, 87 n.

avyākṛita: that which is undifferentiated, primordial matter, 236-7, 237 n.; the *Brahman*, 240-1.

Aśvapati: a king of the Kekayas, 67, 70.

asat: lit. non-existence, a state of primordial matter 236-7, 239; the *Brahman*, 240.

Asuras: demons in perpetual hostility to the gods, 151, 154.

asmin: masculine locative singular of the pronoun, *idam*, 'this'; 125, 245, 251.

asya: his; the word is the genitive singular of the pronoun 'this' in masculine; 88.

ahaṅkāra: the material principle of egoity (on which see Note 39, Vol. I); pp. 159 n., 201 n., 205 n., 206, 213, 230 n., 231 n., 288; the 'thing, I', 366.

ahaṅkāraśeṣaḥ: teaching (about the *Brahman*) under the conception of the ego, 106 n.

ahamāśeṣaḥ: teaching (about the *Brahman*) as the ego.

Ahalyā: 325. See Note 738 on p. 325.

Ahahāretvā.....gobhirastu: See Note 586 on p. 172.

Ā: a verbal preposition, 279 n.

ākāśā: the fifth of the great material elements which is supposed to fill and pervade the universe, the ether of space, 5 n., 7, 12-13, 13 n., 19, 40 n., 42 n., 80 n., 105-122 *passim*, 131-3, 187-94 *passim*, 435, 311 n., 415; the *Brahman*, 3, 132, 187, 187 n., 189-91, 194, 254; the individual self, 187, 187 n., 192; primordial matter, 108 n., 110.

Ākāśādhikaraṇa: the eighth section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 1), where the *Ākāśā* mentioned in some scriptural statements is identified as the *Brahman*.

ājagmatuḥ: perfect third person dual of *gam* with the preposition *ā*, 252 n.

ātman: the individual self or Supreme Self according to the context, *passim*: the ether as the pervader, 121 n.; the *mahat* as the pervader, 201, 201 n.

ātmani: in the self, 203.

Ātharvaṇikas: followers of the *Atharva-Veda*, 82, 115, 214.

ādi: At the end of or in the middle of a compound word, this means 'beginning with', 'etc.' and so on, 33 n.

Ādityas: a class of gods generally regarded as 12 in number and sometimes supposed to represent the sun in the 12 months of the year, 163 n., 165. •

ādēśa: controller, ruler, 278-9, 279 n.; teaching, 279 n.

ānanda: bliss as the *Brahman*, 10; rapture from power and sovereignty, 104 n.

Ānandamaya: that which consists of bliss, the *Brahman*, 104.

Anandavulli: lit. the creeper of bliss; the name of *Taitt. Up.* (II), 10.

ānumāna: lit. that which is arrived at by logical inference, primordial matter inferred as the cause of the world, 87, 87 n.

ānumānika: that which is logically inferred (as the cause of the world), primordial matter, 194.

Anumānikādhikaraṇa: the first section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 4), where the claim of the Sāṅkhyas that a scriptural passage supports their view about the cause of the world is disproved, 195.

Āpastamba: name of a well known sage and author of aphorisms on law, custom and ritual, 303 n.

ārabh: to touch, reach, seize hold of, 377.

ārambhaṇa: that which is touched, reached or attained, 337, 375-7, 376 n.

Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa: the sixth section of *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 1), where the identity of the world as an effect with its cause, the *Brahman*, is established with the help of a scriptural passage beginning with the word 'ārambhaṇa' and other passages, 337, 405.

ālabh: to touch, reach, seize hold of, 377.

ālabhāṇa: that which is touched, reached or attained, 377.

Āśmarathya: an ancient sage, whose views are sometimes referred to in the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, 76, 77 n., 265-6, 265 n.

Āruṇi: the son of Aruṇa, 177.

āhavanīya: one of the three sacred fires (explained in Note 438), pp. 34 n., 72, 80 n., 81.

Ītaravyapadeśādhikaraṇa: the seventh section of *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 1), where the true significance of the description of the other (i.e., the individual self) (as identical with the *Brahman*) is explained.

iti: thus, 69 n., 378 n.

Itihāsas: traditional records of heroic history; the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, 57, 57 n., 153, 163 n., 168, 170, 272 n., 301, 386-7.

Ityadhidaivatam: See Note 447 on p. 45.

Ityadhilokam: See Note 447 on p. 45.

itvā: chariot, 172 n.

itvān: going, 172 n.

Indra: the chief of the minor gods, 3, 134 n., 135, 151, 154, 154 n., 156, 156 n., 158, 185-6; the Lord, 346.

Indraprāṇādhikaraṇa: the eleventh and concluding section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 1), dealing with the significance of the words 'Indra' and 'prāṇa' in some scriptural passages, 165 n.

indriyas: organs of sense, 234.

imanich: a grammatical affix, 90.

ishika: a kind of reed, 68, 79.

Ikshaṇa: seeing, willing, 237 n.

Īkshatikarmādhikaraṇa: the fourth section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 3), where the identity of the object of the action of seeing in a scriptural passage is determined.

iyaṭuḥ: perfect third person dual of *i(ṇ)* 'to go', meaning 'they two went', 252 n.

Iśāna: lord, ruler, 146 n., 184 n.; Śiva, 387.

Iśvara: the Lord, Śiva, 111 n.; the *Brahman* with attributes, 353 n., 354 n.

Iśvarakṛishṇa: author of a standard exposition of the Śāṅkhya system, 207 n.

Uttambhana: propping up, supporting, 184 n.

utpatti: production, origin, 350 n.

udumbara: a kind of fig tree, sticks or poles made of its wood, 300, 300 n.

Uddālaka: A son of Aruṇa, he figures as a famous teacher in the *Upanishads*, 45 n., 47, 67, 177.

udyoga: effort, 101 n.

udyoga-prayatna: See Note 505 on p. 101.

Upakosala: a devoted student of Satyakāma Jābāla, to whom meditation on the *Brahman* as the Person within the eye is taught, 31-44, *passim*.

upadeśyam: what is to be taught, teaching, 279.

upanayana: initiation (into the *Vedas*), investiture with a sacred thread which indicates a re-birth in spirit and which entitles the boy so invested to learn the *Vedas*, 177, 179, 184.

Upanishads: the philosophical portions of the *Vedas*, *passim*.

upanishadic: pertaining to the *Upanishads*, 95.

upapadyate: is appropriate, 419 n.

Upavayantam ... mushmim-ścha: We protect him from all trouble in this world and the next, 37.

Upasamhāradarśanādhi-karaṇa: the eighth section of the *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 1), showing that the collection of materials seen with producing agents is not necessary to the *Brahman* for the creation of the world, 406.

upāsana: worship through loving meditation; forms thereof, 39 n., 96 n., 104 n., 123 n., 168 n., 209 n., 210 n.

Rig-Veda: the first of the four *Vedas*, 164, 224, 258, 258 n., 259.

ṛita: the fruits of action, 24-5. See also Note 177 and p. 171, Vol. I.

ṛitviks: officiating priests, 61 n., 68.

Eka : one, single, 409 n.
ekala : having a uniform nature, 224.
etatkarma : this produced thing, 243.
etād : this, 59, 246, 246 n., 248, 253.
etadabhūt : did he remain, 253 n.
etadaśayishṭa : did he lie down, 253 n.
etadamṛitam : This is immortal, 105 n.
etadāgāt : did he come, 253 n.
etam : (accusative) this, 128.
etasmāt jīvaghanāt parāt param : (i) him who is higher than the higher individual selves in their totality ; (ii) him who is higher than him who is higher than the individual souls in their totality.
enam : (accusative) this, 49n.
etā ha vai devatāḥ : indeed these deities, 315 n.
eshaḥ : he, this, 16, 49.
esha te ātmā : This is your Self, 49.
esha te 'ntaryāmī : This is your Internal Ruler, 46.
esha tū ativadati : But he (who) declares that his object of worship is transcendent, 99 n.

Om : a sacred syllable understood to denote the Supreme Being, 62 n., 115-20, 211.

oṃkāra : the syllable *om*, 108 n., 115 n.

Auḍulomi : a teacher whose views are sometimes referred to in the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, 265 n., 267-8.

Aupamanyava : a sage interested in the worship of the Vaiśvānara, 67, 70.

Aulūkyā : lit. descended from the owl or 'ulūka'; Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣhika philosophy, so called, because, according to Praśastapāda, Śiva in the form of an owl taught the system to him, 329 n.

Ka : happiness, 40-1, 40 n.

Kaṇāda : the name by which the founder of the Vaiśeṣhika system of philosophy is generally known, 329 n., 338, 339 n., 340 n.

Kapila : the founder of the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy, *passim*.

karuṇayā : through kindness (or mercy), 416 n.

karuṇāvān : one who is merciful, 416 n.

karma : religious works, rites and duties, 148, 153 n., 164 ; what is produced, 243, 246-8, 250; the impressed tendency generated in relation to the soul as a result of acts in previous states of embodied existence, *passim*.

karma-kāṇḍa : the ritualistic portion of the *Vedas*, 179 n.

karmadhāraya : a class of compound words, the members of which are in the same relationship either as adjective and substantive or as substantives in apposition, 129, 129 n.

karma-phala : the fruits of *karma*, 26 n.

Karma-Mīmāṃsā : enquiry into the ritual (of the *Vedas*), as conducted by Jaimini, 1.

kalpa : a period of time equal to 4,320,000,000 solar years; see Note 246, Vol. I; pp. 162, 165, 216, 292, 360, 360 n.

kalpana : production, creation, 223, 223 n.; imaginary mental conception, 223 n.

kavāta : door, 389; -*ghna*, thief, 389 n.

Kākshaseni : the son of Kakshasena; it is an epithet of Abhipratārin, 175-6.

kāṇḍas : sections of the *Vedas*, 158.

Kāṇvas : descendants of the sage, Kaṇva, to whom is attributed a recension of some parts of the *Veda*, 45-6, 45 n., 50-1, 233, 289.

Kāpeyas : descendants of Kapi or Aṅgiras, who were priests of Abhipratārin Chaitraratha, 175-6, 176n.

kāma : desire, 261-2, 263n.; will, 263, 263 n.

kāmāḥ : plural of 'kāma'; lit. desires: here qualities worthy of being desired, 126.

kāraṇa : lit. the cause; the eleven senses, 217 n.

Kāraṇatvādhikaraṇa : the fourth section of *Ved. Sūtr.* (I. 4), dealing with some descriptions of the *Brahman* as the cause of the ether etc., 236.

kārya : lit. effect: here the body, 217 n.

kāla : time, 215 n.

kāśa : a species of grass, used for mats, roofs etc., 390, 390 n.

kāśa-kuśa-nyāya : the principle according to which *kāśa* is substituted for *kuśa*; see Note 325; p. 390, 390 n.

Kāśakṛtsna : a teacher whose views are sometimes referred to in the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, 265 n., 268, 271, 271 n.

Kaśi : the famous city of Banaras, 247 n.

Kuntī : the mother of Arjuna, the Paṇḍava prince, 216-7, 305.

Kullūka : a famous commentator on *Manu*, 23 n.

kuśa : a kind of grass used in religious ceremonies, 81, 390, 390 n.

kṛit : an affix to form nouns from roots, 387.

kṛiti: lit. activity; volition, 101, 101 n.

Kṛitānaprasaktyadhikaraṇa: the ninth section of *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 1) where the objection that if the *Brahman* is the cause of the world, the whole indivisible *Brahman* must become the divisible world, is dealt with.

kṛitya: the affix to form the future passive participle, 377.

Kekayas: a warlike tribe, 67, 70.

Ketu: mythologically, the body of the demon, Saimhikeya: in astronomy, the dragon's tail or the descending node of the moon, 188 n.

kevalam: (neuter), -ā (feminine); mere, 417 n.

Kaushītakins: the followers of Kaushītaka, 242.

kta: an affix, 14.

kratu: sacrifice, worship, 19.

kriḍā: generally sport, pleasure; the joy from gardens, 104 n.

Kshatriya: a member of the military or ruling caste, 21-3, 173-6, 176 n., 260.

Kshapaṇa: one who practises austerities, the Buddha, 329 n.

kshar: to flow out, to come out from, 64.

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kshetrajñā: 'the knower of the field', the individual self, 4, 296 n.

Kha: the ether of space, 40-1, 40 n.

khādya: eatable, 74.

Gandharvas: a kind of demigods: their city means an imaginary city in the sky seen as the result of a mirage, 368 n., 370 n.

Gārgī: a lady who is the daughter of Vachaknu and who puts difficult questions to philosophers in *Bṛih. Up.*, 107-14, *passim*, 131, 186.

gārhapatya: the perpetual household fire, 34 n., 35, 72, 80 n., 81.

guṇas: redeeming moral qualities, 217 n.

guru: spiritual preceptor, 60 n.

gau: matter, 296 n.

Gautama: a sage, the son of Haridrumat and the teacher of Satyakāma in *Chhānd. Up.* (IV. 4), 177 n.; founder of the Nyāya system of philosophy, 319 n., 329 n.; the husband of Ahalyā in the *Rām.*, 325 n.

Ghañ: a suffix, 279 n.

Cha : and, 114 n., 143 n. ;
a syllable, 170 ; however,
223, 306 ; indeed, 238.

chamasa : a cup, particularly
that used in sacrifices
for drinking the *soma*
juice, 213, 218-9, 221.

Chamasādhikaraṇa : the
second section of *Ved.*
Sūt. (I. 4), where the
figurative meaning of the
word, '*chamasa*', in a
scriptural passage is
referred to.

chit : intelligence, con-
sciousness, 183 n. ; the
individual self, 237 n.,
297 n.

chetana : the intelligent
individual self, 326 n.

Chaitraratha : a king other-
wise known as Abhipra-
tārin, 174-6, 176 n.

Chaitrarathin : the same as
Chaitraratha above ; the
word is a patronymic
from '*Chaitraratha*'; 176n.

choshya : suckable, 74 n.

Chhandogas : lit. reciters
in metre, hence chanters
of the *Sāma-Veda*, hence,
teachers or followers of
the doctrines in the
Chhāndogya - Upanishad
attached to the *Sāma-*
Veda, 79, 90, 120.

Jagat : lit. that which
moves ; the world, 382.

Jagadvāchitvādhikaraṇa :
the fifth section of *Ved.*
Sūt. (I. 4), where the
word, '*karman*', in a
scriptural passage is
shown to denote the
world, 242.

Janaka : a famous King of
Videha, who is also
interested in religion and
philosophy, 128.

janas : one of the seven
upper worlds, 150 n.

Jabālā : the mother of
Satyakāma in *Chhānd.*
Up. (IV. 4), 177 n.

Jānaśruti : a king, the son
of Jānaśruta and the
grandson of Putra ; he
figures in the *Chhānd. Up.*
(IV. 1) ; 167-75, *passim*.

Jābālā : the son of Jabālā,
a student and teacher in
the *Upanishads*, 177.

Jina : otherwise known as
Mahāvira, a contemporary
of the Buddha ; he denied
the *Vedas* and taught a
religion of ascetic self-
denial and scrupulous
regard for animal life,
329 n.

jīva : the individual self,
passim.

jīvaghana : the (solid, that
is) embodied, individual
self, 118 ; -*āt* : ablative
singular, meaning "in
regard to the embodied
self", 117 n.

Jainas : the followers of
Jina, 329, 331, 331 n.

Jaimini: a teacher who is often referred to in the *Vedānta-Sūtras*; he may be identical with the author of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*, 75, 78, 162-3, 251; the author of the *Pūr. Mīm. Sūt.*, 148 n.

jñā: lit. the knower; the individual self, 207 n., 229 n.

jñāna: knowledge, 179 n.; the faculty of intellection, 202-3; -e, locative singular, 203.

Jñānakāṇḍa: the philosophical portions of the *Vedas*, 179 n.

Jñānam...niyachchhet: See p. 203.

jyotishṭoma: a *soma* sacrifice, 301.

jyotis: lit: light; the *Brahman*, 144; a sense-organ, 233 n.

jyotirupakramā: the group of things starting with light, 226 n.

Tat: that, 123 n.

tatpuruṣa: lit. "his servant"; a class of compound words in which the last member is defined or qualified by the first without losing its original character or importance, the literal meaning of the word being an example, 87 n., 129 n., 193 n.

tadanukāraḥ: to resemble him, 142.

tadamṛitam: That is immortal, 105 n.

tadā: then, 254 n.

tadākāśam: that (is) the ether of space, 40 n.

taddevāḥ: those deities, 315 n.

tadyachchhet jñāna ātmani: See p. 202; -*sānta ātmani*: See p. 203.

tadvat: as in that case, 317 n.

tantra: a cause which leads to more than one effect, using a word to indicate more than one thing as if it had been used more than once, 234 n.

tanmātras: subtle bases of the five material elements, 230 n., 288 n.

tapas: penance, austerities, 114, 118 n., 153 n., 158; one of the seven upper worlds, 150 n.; knowledge, thinking and willing, -see Note 345, Vol. I—, 58, 189, 237 n., 283 n., 291-2; the *Brahman*, 61.

tapasastat: "from out of *tapas*, it..." ; see 283 n.

tamas: the 'quality' of 'darkness' which makes matter inert, immobile and dull, 215 n., 216, 221, 231 n., 282, 363, 338, 308 n., 413; primordial undifferentiated matter, 205, 223 n., 283, 283 n., 288-90, 290 n.

tamasastat : "from out of *tamas*, it..."; see 283 n.

tādṛṣasya : of a similar thing, 369 n.

tāmasa : characterised by the quality of *tamas*, 159 n., 205 n.

ti : See 139 n.

tu : but, 99 n., 220 n.; on the contrary, 138 n.; however, 251, 306, 314, 322, 322 n.; indeed, 226, 238.

te : your, 49.

tejas : the element of light and heat, 150, 218 n., 224-6, 238, 376, 382 n.

te devāḥ : those deities, 315 n.

te yadantarā : what is between these two, 190 n.

Taittirīyas : the followers of a school of the *Yajur-veda*, founded by Tittiri, 220.

tyat : non-intelligent matter, see Note 183 of Vol. I; pp. 47, 239 n., 291, 293, 382 n.

trināchiketa : a sacrificial fire, or a passage in the *Taitt. Br.* (III. 11. 7. 1-3), 23, 209, 210 n.

tretā : a triad, hence the three sacred fires collectively, 60, 60 n.

tva, -ā (fem.) : some one, 172 n.

Dadichi : a celebrated sage, 151 n.

darvi : a ladle, 114.

daharākāśa : lit. little or subtle ether, the *Brahman*, 120-44, *passim*, 188, 191.

Daharādhikaraṇa : the fifth section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 3), where the identity of the 'little ether' in the heart is established, 120.

dāna : almsgiving, making gifts, 148 n., 153 n.

diś : to point out, to command, 279 n.

drishṭi : seeing, worship through meditation, 73 n.

Devatādhikaraṇa : the seventh section of the *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 3), where the gods are shown as fit to worship the *Brahman*, 147.

Devadatta : a common name among men used in the sense of 'some one', 'any person' etc., 156, 378, 378 n.

daivam : a deity, the Supreme Lord, 200.

Dyubhṛvādyadhikaraṇa : the first section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 3), where the heaven, the earth etc. are shown to have the *Brahman* for their 'abode', 82.

dyubhṛvādyāyatanam etc. : See p. 82; p. 143.

Draṁṣṭa : an ancient commentator, 335.

dvandva : a class of compound words, which unite two or more words in the same case and connected by 'and', 123 n.

- dvirātra* : lit. ; lasting two nights, a kind of sacrifice, 176 n.
- dvīpas* : islands ; in the *purāṇas*, the earth is divided into seven islands named Jambu (within which is India), Plaksha, Śālmali, Kuśa, Krauñcha, Śāka and Pushkara, 417.
- Dhanañjaya* : lit., wealth-winner, a name of Arjuna, 206.
- dharma* : the ordinary means, 211 : duty or means to *puṇya*, 211 n.
- dharma-bhūta-jñāna* : the attribute of knowledge possessed by the individual self (which is itself knowledge as substance), 137 n., 326 n.
- dharma-śāstras* : i. e., *Smṛitis*, works of religious authority dealing with laws and duties, 57, 57 n.
- dhyāna* : meditation, 135 n.
- Na* : no, not, 87 n., 322 n.
- Nachiketas* : a son of Vājaśravasa, who is taught the highest religious truths by the god of death in *Kaṭh. Up.*, 28, 30, 209-10, 210 n.
- Nāchiketa* : a fire sacrifice, see Note 624 ; pp. 28, 30, 209-10, 210 n.
- nānā* : different, 230.
- Nānumānam* : the *pradhāna* is not, see 87 n.
- Nāman* : name, what is described in speech, 91 n.
- nāra* : water, 162.
- Nārada* : a sage, 91 n., 92, 99, 282 n., 303.
- Nārāyaṇa* : a name of God, 4, 47-8, 51, 162, 193 n., 282 n., 289, 303, 305, 307, 307 n., 388, 388 n., 407.
- nididhyāsana* : steady meditation, 23.
- nimitta-kāraṇa* : an instrumental or efficient cause, the agent in creation, 237 n.
- Nimbārka* : a commentator on the *Ved. Sūt.*, who flourished a little later than Rāmānuja, 40 n., 336 n.
- Nirīṣvara-Sāṅkhya* : a school of Sāṅkhya which denies God, 5 n.
- Nirukta* : a standard work on Vedic etymology by Yāska, 170 n.
- nirvahitṛi* : creator, differentiator, one who is the vehicle of, 187 n.
- nishāda* : of a wild, non-Aryan tribe, 129, 129 n.
- nishāda-sthapati* : see Note 540 ; pp. 129, 129 n., 169 n.
- naimittika-pralaya* : occasional dissolution of the universe, where some of the higher worlds remain unaffected, 116 n., 159, 159 n.

Naiyāyikas: the followers of the Nyāya system founded by Gautama, 29, 111 n., 331, 331 n.

Pāñcha(n): five, 229-32.

pañchajanas: groups of five; sense organs, 228-235, *passim*.

pañchajani: a group of five, 229 n., 230.

pañchaphūlyah: groups of five bundles of straw each, 229.

Patañjali: the founder or chief exponent of the Yoga system, 329, 329 n.

pati: lord, 193 n.

patim viśvasya: Him who is the Lord of the universe, 193 n.

patyādi: (i) the words that have *pati* at the beginning; (ii) the beginning of the words ending with *pati*, 193 n.

Padmapāda: a disciple of Śaṅkarāchārya, and the author of a sub-commentary called *Pañchapādikā* on his commentary on the *Ved. Sūt.*, 342 n.

para: superior, 54.

paratva: the quality of being the Highest, 55.

Para(m) Brahman: the Supreme Brahman, 9, 116 n.

Paramātmān: the Supreme Self, 9, 193 n.

Parjanya: the rain-god, one of the Ādityas, 387.

parāt: (i) (adj. qualifying a noun in ablative singular) superior; (ii) (noun in ablative singular) in regard to that which is superior (to), 117 n.

Parāśara: the author of the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa*, 57, 303.

pāchaka: a cook, 389.

Pāṇini: a celebrated grammarian, 170 n.

Pāṇḍaravāsas: lit. the white-robed one; an epithet of *prāṇa*, 252 n.

pātāla: a nether world, 150 n.

pāda: lit. a quarter: one of the four sections into which every chapter of the *Ved. Sūt.* is divided, 255 n.

pāpa: sin, demerit, 211 n., 243.

pitṛis: the manes, 114.

pippala: a fruit or berry; figuratively, the effects of *karma*, 21, 89, 318, 401.

Pippalāda: an ancient teacher in the *Pr. Up.*, 115 n.

puṇya: moral or religious merit, 211 n., 242-3.

purāṇas: see Note 104, Vol. I; pp. 57, 57 n., 153, 163 n., 168, 170, 272 n., 301, 314, 367 n., 386-7.

- puruṣha* : person, the individual self, *passim*; the Supreme Person, 16, 60 n., 72, 74, 75 n., 200, 295, 303.
- pūrvāpakṣha* : lit. the earlier view, a *prima facie* view, an opponent's view stated to be refuted later, *passim*; -in : an objector or critic, *passim*.
- Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* : enquiry into the earlier (i.e., ritualistic) part of the *Vedas*, 169 n.; -kas : those engaged in the enquiry, 148 n.
- Pṛithagvartman* : lit. that which moves in different directions; air, an aspect, part or form of Vaiśvānara, 71, 71 n., 80, 80 n.
- pṛithu* : big, great, 90.
- pṛithvī* : earth as one of the five elements, 218 n.
- peya* : drinkable, 74 n.
- Poutrāyaṇa* : a patronymic from *Poutra*, itself a patronymic from *Putra*; hence a grandson of *Putra*, 170-1.
- prakaraṇa* : context, topic under discussion, 141 n.
- prakṛiti* : primordial matter, material Nature, *passim*; aspect, manifestation, 206; material cause, 277.
- Prakṛityadhikaraṇa* : the 7th section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 4) where the *Brahman* is taught to be the material cause (*prakṛiti*) of the world.
- Prajāpati* : a Vedic god, 154 n., 314 n.; *Brahmā*, the creator, 134-42 *passim*, 151, 157-9, 188.
- prajāyeya* : may I be born, 381 n.
- prajñāna-ghana* : a mass of knowledge, the individual self, the Supreme Self having the individual self for His body, 265 n.
- praṇava* : the mystic syllable 'Om', 62 n., 211.
- Pratardana* : a king whom Indra taught a way of realising God, 249, 250 n.
- pratibimba* : reflected image, 354 n.
- pratishṭhā* : lit. support, an aspect or part of Vaiśvānara, 71, 71 n.
- pratīka* : symbol, 73 n., 91 n.
- pratīkōpāsana* : worship through a symbol, worship of something not the *Brahman* as the *Brahman*, 39 n.
- pradhāna* : primordial, undifferentiated matter, material Nature, *passim*.
- prapāṭhaka* : chapter, 95 n.
- pramāṇa-anupapatti* : failure of the means of proof (viz., perception to establish difference), 181 n., 371 n.
- prameya-anupapatti* : failure to establish the thing to be proved (i.e., difference), 181 n.

pramitādhikaraṇa : the sixth section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 3), where the Person limited (to the size of a thumb) is shown to be the *Brahman*, 144.

prayatna : effort, activity of the will ; see 101 n.

prayojanam : purpose, 417 n.

Prayojanavattvādhikaraṇa : the last and tenth section of the *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 1), where the *Brahman* is shown to be the cause of the world, even though creation seems to have a purpose, 416.

pralaya : dissolution of the universe, 110 n., 223 n., 282, 292, 384.

pravachana : reflection, 23.

praśāsaṇa : supreme command, 279.

Prahlāda : the young son of the Asura king, Hiraṇyakaśipu, who is persecuted by his atheistic father for his devotion to God, as described in the *Vishṇu* and other *Purāṇas*, 367, 367 n.

prākṛita : (adj.) material, 77 n.

prājñā : omniscient, 253.

prāṇ : to breathe, 132 n.

prāṇa : the principal or any vital air, *passim* ; the *Brahman*, 7, 93, 185, 250 n., 251-2, 254, 254 n., 310 ; the individual self, 90-107, 136, 244, 245 n. ; senses, 22041, 221 n., 315 n., the vital airs and

the senses, 313 ; the sense of touch, 233-4.

prāṇa ātmataḥ : The *prāṇa* comes out of the Self, 99 n.

prāṇāya svāhā : 73 ; • see Note 477 on p. 73.

prāṇāhuti : a sacrificial offering made to the vital airs, 78-81.

prāṇe : locative singular of *prāṇa*, 'in the *prāṇa*', 245.

prāṇo brahma : the *prāṇa* is the *Brahman*, 40 n.

prāṇyat : Can he enjoy? ; 132 n.

Prābhākara : followers of the *Mīmāṃsā* teacher, Prabhakara, 1 n.

Badarī : a sacred spot on the Himalayas, 282 n.

barhis : the sacred bed of *kuśa* grass on the altar, 90 n.

bahu : large, great, 90-1.

bahupaśu : resembling cattle, 178, 178 n.

bahula : having greatness, the sky as an aspect of *Vaiśvānara*, 71, 71 n., 80, 80 n.

bahuvrīhi : lit. having much rice : the attributive compound-word, whose members have no independence and which serves to qualify another word, the word in its literal meaning serving as an example, 87 n., 193 n.

bahviḥ ... *sarūpāḥ* : her (acc.) who is creating (or giving birth to) many similar young ones, 221 n.

bahvīm ... *sarūpām* : her (acc.) who is producing numerous similar offspring, 222 n.

Bādarāyaṇa : a teacher of the *Vedānta*, probably identical with the author of the *Ved. Sū.*, 147, 149, 165.

Bādari : a teacher of the *Vedānta*, 77, 77 n.

Bālāki : a teacher who figures in *Kaush. Up.*, 242-54, *passim*.

Buddha : the founder of Buddhism, 29, 329 n.; his followers are referred to in p. 331.

buddhi : the 'great material principle' or *mahat*, 201, 205, 213; the intellect, 24, 198 n., 202 n., 203, 205, 221 n.

bṛihattva : greatness, 9.

Bodhāyana : the author of the *Vṛitti* or an ancient commentary on the *Ved. Sū.*, 8, 12, 96.

brahma : neuter accusative singular of 'Brahman', 314.

brahmajajña : the knower born from the *Brahman*, 26.

Brahman : the Supreme Being, *passim* : matter, 62 n.

brahmapura : the city of the *Brahman*, 123; the city which is the *Brahman*, 126, 127 n.

Brahma-Mīmāṃsā : the enquiry into the *Brahman*, the *Vedānta*, 169 n.

brahma-loka : the world of the *Brahman*, 115, 118-9, 137; the world of *Brahmā* the creator, 116-7; the world which is the *Brahman*, 127-9, 191.

brahma-vidvā : the science of or the teaching about the *Brahman*, 31 n.

brahmāṇḍa : lit. the egg of *Brahmā*; the universe, 160.

brahmopaniṣad : teaching about the *Brahman*, 166.

Brāhmaṇa : a Brahmin, 21-3, 57, 60 n., 168, 175, 177 n., 180-7; *Vedic* injunctions, portions of the *Vedas* dealing with sacrifices, 153; one who attains the *Brahman*, 115.

Bhakti : devotion to God, 17 n.

bhāmani : the shining one, the *Brahman*, 33.

Bhāskara : a philosopher who held the *Brahman* to be both different and non-different from the *Brahman*, and for whose views, see Note 235 of Vol. I; pp. 29, 265 n., 269 n., 336 n., 385, 385 n.

Bhīṣma: the grand-uncle of the Pāṇḍavas in the *Mahabhārata*, 330.

bhuktam: what is eaten, 14 n.

bhuktā brāhmaṇāḥ: The Brāhmaṇas have eaten, 14.

bhūvas: one of the seven higher worlds, 150 n., 157.

bhū: a syllable substituted for *bahu*, 90.

bhūtabhavyasya: of the past and the future, 146 n.

bhūtādi: the *tāmasa* variety of *ahaṅkāra* from which the *tanmātras* are derived, 159, 159 n.; *ahaṅkāra*, 205, 205 n., 290.

bhūman: lit. the Great One: the *Brahman*, 90-107, *passim*; the individual self, 93.

Bhumādhikaraṇa: the 2nd section of the *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 3), where the Great One mentioned in a scriptural passage is identified as the *Brahman*, 90.

bhūṣ, -ḥ: the earth, 150 n., 157.

Bhedābheda: the philosophical system which maintains the individual self to be both different and non-different from the *Brahman*, 347 n., 398 n.

Bhoktrāṇḍattādhikaraṇa: the 5th section of the *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 1), dealing with whether the possession of a body would make the *Brahman* the enjoyer of pleasure and pain, 332.

Madhu: honey, nectar, 164.

madhu-vidyā: the worship of the *Brahman* as the sun-god and as the internal ruler of the sun-god, 165-6, 166 n., 224, 224 n.

Madhva: the great teacher of the *dvaita* school of the *Vedānta*, 40 n., 143, 336 n.

Madhvādhikaraṇa: the eighth section of the *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 3), where the worship of the sun, as the honey of the gods, is shown to be the worship of the *Brahman*, 162, 224 n.

manana: reflection, 23, 96 n., 104 n.

manas: the internal organ of sense, the faculty of attention, 59, 201 n., 221 n., 231 n.

manasi: in the mind, 202 n.

Manu: a famous law-giver 225, 302-11, *passim*.

manomaya: mind-made, capable of being grasped by the pure mind, 5, 6.

mantra : a Vedic hymn (see Note 14, Vol. I), 60, 60 n. 148, 151-3, 158-9, 159 n. : a verse in a *Upanishad*, 62 n., 216-24. *passim*, 230, 232-4, 240.

Maruts : the gods of winds and storms, 163 n.

mahat : an evolute of *prakṛiti* (see Note 39, Vol. I), 64, 64 n., 196-213 *passim*, 214 n., 220 n., 222 n., 230 n., 231 n., 290, 306 n., 413 ; the individual self, 208, 208 n., 212-3.

mahat *udyatam* : 185. See Note 601.

mahataḥ *udyatāt* : See 185 n.

Mahaddīrghādhikaraṇa : the second section of the *Ved. Sū.* (II. 2) where the impossibility of the non-spatial atoms of the Vaiśeshikas giving rise to spatial diatomic and triatomic particles and thence to the universe is demonstrated, 414 n.

mahas : one of the seven higher worlds, 150 n.

mahātala : one of the seven nether worlds, 150 n.

mahāpralaya : the great cosmic dissolution at the end of a *Brahmā*'s life, 159 n.

mahāśāla : owner of a mansion, 56.

mātrā : a prosodial instant, the period of time required for pronouncing a short syllable or short vowel, 115-20, *passim*.

Mādhyandinas : a branch of the Vājasaneyins, 45, 45 n., 50-1, 223, 259.

Mādhyamika : a Nihilistic school of Buddhists, 331 n., 371 n., 372 n.

Māndhātṛi : an ancient king, 155 n.

māyā : will-power, 85, 85 n., *prakṛiti*, 215-6, 216 n., 222-3, 276, 283, 294, 305, 401 ; the cause of the illusory manifestation of the world, 218 n.; cosmic illusion and ignorance, 356-8.

māyin : the possessor of *māyā*, the Lord as the controller of *prakṛiti*, 216, 222.

mithuna : See 104 n.

Mīmāṃsā : enquiry, investigation ; hence applied to the investigation into the ritualistic part of the *Vedas*, as well as that into the philosophical portions, 1, 58.

Mīmāṃsakas : followers of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, 153 n., 161 n.

muñja : a kind of rush or grass, 145.

muhūrta : a unit of time equal to about 48 minutes, 112.

mṛittiketyeva satyam : It is real only as clay, 378 n.

mṛityu : death, 21 ; *prakṛiti*, 205, 289-90, 296 n ; the god of death, 387.

me : my, 16.

Maitreyī : the salvation-seeking wife of the sage, Yājñavalkya, in *Bṛih. Up.* 256, 259, 274.

Maitreyī-Brāhmaṇa : the section of *Bṛih. Up.* dealing with the teaching given to Maitreyī 255, 260, 265 n.

moksha : salvation, final release of the self, 28-9, 39 n., 60 n., 83 n., 132 n., 134 n., 179., 354 n.

Yachchhed vañmanasi : See p. 202.

yaj : to worship, 153.

Yajurveda : the second of the four *Vedas*, being primarily a collection of liturgical forms, 158, 200, 224.

Yat te antarā : what is between these two, 190 n.

yatra : in whom, 82.

yadā : when, 254 n.

yam : a syllable in *satyam*, which is taken to be identical with the root, to control, 139 n.

Yama : the god of death, 30, 210, 210., 387.

yastad veda, yat sa veda : See Note 585 in p. 171.

yasmāt kāraṇāt : for whatever reason, 190 n.

yasya vaitat karma : whose handiwork indeed this is, 246.

yāga : a sacrifice, 153.

Yājñavalkya : a famous sage in the *Upanishads*, 45 n., 128, 259, 272, 272 n., 284.

Yādavaprakāśa : a philosopher holding the soul to be both different and non-different from the *Brahman*, 116, 206 n., 235 n., 265 n., 311, 333, 336 n., 385-6, 388 n., 389 n., 390 n., 409 n.

Yāmuna : Rāmānuja's teachers' teacher, 180 n.

yukteḥ : from logical reasoning, 394 n.

yugas : recurring cycles of time, consisting of *Kṛita*, *Treta*, *Dvāpara*, and *Kali Yugas*, which four together total 4,320,000 years, 292.

Yudhishthira : the eldest of the Pāṇḍava princes in the *Mahābhārata*, 303.

yoga : meditation and mental concentration, 56, 172, 181, 306, 308 ; devotion to God, 307 ; a system of philosophy founded by Patañjali, 329 n.

Yogaṇṣa: the 2nd section of the *Ved. Sū.* (II. 1), where the system of Yoga is refuted, 307.

Yogasmṛiti: a manual on the Yoga system, having the authority of a *Smṛiti*, 307-8, 308 n.

Yogācāra: a system of Buddhist idealism, 331 n.

yogins: those practising *yoga*, 33, 62, 62 n.

yoni: source, 295.

yo yonir yonim: See 222 n.

ra: a suffix, 170.

Raṅgarāmānuja: a learned commentator on the *Upanishads* and author, among other works, of the *Bhāvaprakāśikā*, a valuable gloss on the *Śrutaprakāśikā*, 23 n., 26 n., 132 n., 171 n., 190 n., 279 n., 347 n.

rajas: 'passion', a quality of *prakṛiti*, 215 n., 216, 221, 231 n., 308, 308 n., 413.

rati: See 104 n.

rathakāra: a chariotmaker, a member of a mixed caste who is specially authorised by the scriptures to raise a sacred fire in the rainy season, 169 n.

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rathāṅga: wheel; accessories of the chariot, 198 n.

rayi: wealth, water, 71, 71 n., 80 n., 81.

rasātala: one of the seven nether worlds, 150 n.

rājan: king, 252 n.

rājasa: characterised by dominant *rajas*, 205 n.

Rāmānuja: *passim*

Rāhu: in mythology, a demon swallowing the sun and the moon; in astronomy the dragon's head or the ascending node of the moon, 188, 188 n.

ruchaka: a necklace, a gold coin, 344 n., 350 n.

Rudra: Śiva, 387; -s: his eleven manifestations, 163 n.

rūpaka-vinyasta: that which is put in metaphor, 197 n.

Raikva: the teacher of Jānaśruti in *Chhānd. Up.*, 167-75, *passim*.

raudra: a sacrifice, 129 n.

Laghu-siddhānta: the 'small conclusion' under *Ved. Sū.* (I. 1. 1.) (in Vol. I, pp. 13-24), 272 n.

liṅga: characteristic mark, 141 n., 146 n.

līlā: sport, 417 n.

lehya : lickable, 74 n.

loka : a world, 117, 129; -s : objects of knowledge, 244, 253.

lyut : the *kṛit* affix, 'ana', 377.

Vajra : the thunderbolt regarded as the terrible weapon of Indra, 157, 151 n., 185, 185 n.

vadati : speaks, 94 n.

Varuṇa : a Vedic god, 387.

varṇa : a syllable, hence the syllable 'om', 108 n.

Vasishṭa : a famous sage, 158.

Vasus : a class of gods, 163-6, 227.

vastu-parichchheda : limitation as a thing, 347 n., 375 n.

vāk : speech, 202.

Vākyakāra : Ṭaṅka, an ancient teacher of *Vedānta*, 57 n., 127.

Vākyānvayādhikaraṇa : the 6th section of *Ved. Sūta*. (I. 4) where the connected purport of a scriptural passage is established, 255.

vāñmanasī : speech (acc.) within the mind, 202.

Vāchaknavī : the daughter of Vachaknu, Gārgī, 107 n.

Vāchaspati Miśra : a famous writer of philosophical works of the 9th century, 207 n., 347 n., 357 n., 351 n., 354 n.

vāchā : lit. through speech; for the purpose of speech, 377.

vāchārambhaṇam : is reached for the purpose of speech, 376 n.

Vājasaneyins, *Vājins* : followers of the *Sukla Yajurveda* (to which the *Bṛih. Up.* and the *Sat. Br.* are attached), 45, 73-4, 103, 192, 228.

Vāmadeva : an ancient sage, 359 n., 367, 367 n.

vāmani : one who gives good things, 32.

Vāyu : the god of wind, 153, 315.

Vālmiki : the famous author of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, 325 n.

vikāra : modification, 376 ; -aḥ : emotions causing bondage, 217 n.

vijñānāti : meditates on, 135 n.

vijñāna : lit : understanding; here the individual self, 46, 51.

vijñāna-ghana : a mass of knowledge, the individual self, the Supreme Self having the individual self for His body, 265 n.

vitala : a nether world, 150 n.

Vidura : a wise and saintly uncle of the Pāṇḍavas in the *Mahābhārata*, 168, 170.

vidyā : knowledge, 52, 58 ;
a mode of worship of the
Brahman, 175 n.

Virochana : a king of the
Asuras, 151.

Vilakṣṇatvādhikaraṇa :
the 3rd section of the
Ved. Sūt., where the
distinction of the *Brah-*
man from the world is
discussed, 309.

Viśiṣṭādvaita : the school
of *Vedānta* in which the
primary reality is the
Brahman with attributes
and to which Rāmānuja
belongs, 399 ; -*ins* : its
followers, 398 n.

viśeṣha : a special qualifica-
tion, 67.

viśeṣhaṇa : attribute, predi-
cate, 197 n.

viśeṣhya : substantive,
subject of a predication,
197 n.

viśva : all things, the
universe, 58, 58 n.

viśvarūpa : that which
makes the whole universe
manifest, the sun as an
aspect or form of
Vaiśvānara, 71, 71 n., 80,
80 n.

Viśvāmitra : a famous sage,
158.

Vishṇu : all-pervading God,
22, 30, 119, 151 n., 198-
212 *passim*, 388.

viṇā : a stringed musical
instrument, 272 n.

Vṛttikāra : Bodhāyana, the
author of a *Vṛtti* or
commentary on the *Ved.*
Sūt., 8 n., 12, 96, 166,
166 n.

Veda (s) : the sacred books
of the Hindus, *passim*.

Vedānta : the concluding or
philosophical part of the
Vedas, *passim* ; -*in* : a
follower of the *Vedānta*,
passim.

Vaiśeṣhikas : followers of a
system of philosophy
founded by Kaṇāda and
noted for its category of
viśeṣha or particularity,
329, 331, 337-97 *passim*,
398 n.

Vaiśvānara : the sun-god,
66, 75 ; the element fire,
66, 75 ; the digestive heat
of the stomach, 66, 72-3 ;
the Supreme Self, 66-81
passim, 296 n.

Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇa : the
sixth and last section of
the *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 3), where
the Vaiśvānara, whose
worship is taught in a
scriptural passage, is
shown to be the *Brahman*,
65.

vyakta : lit. the manifest,
the evolved *prakṛiti* or
the evolutes, 207 n., 213,
215 n., 223, 229 n.

vyapadeśāt : because of the
teaching, 191 n., 192.

vyashī : particular, 214 n.

vyashti śīshī : the crea-
tion of individuals, 398 n.

Vyāsa : a famous sage, who is said to have edited the *Vedas*, written the *Mahābhārata*, the *Purāṇas* etc., 367 n.

Saṅkara : the great teacher of the *advaita* school of *Vedānta*, *passim*.

śabda : an expression of the *Vedas*, 146 n.

śarīra : body, 13, 197 n., 204 n.

Sākya : the Buddha who belonged to the Sākya clan, 329 n.

Sāṇḍilya : a sage in the *Chhānd. Up.*, 5 n.

śānach : the *kṛit* affix, 'āna', or 'amāna', used in forming present participles from verbs in *ātmanepada*, 218 n.

śārīrah : the embodied self, 49 n.

śārīraścha : and also the embodied self, 49 n.

śāstras : works of religious authority (see Note 140, Vol. I), 57, 147, 167, 183, 346.

Śibi : the father of Satya-kāma in *Pr. Up.*, 115 n.

śishtāparigrahāḥ : (i) those (views) which are not accepted by disciplined exemplars, (ii) other unacceptable (views), 331 n.

Śishtāparigrahādhikaraṇa : the fourth section of *Ved. Sūt.* (II. 1) where the reasoning against the Sāṅkhyas is shown to apply also to other systems, 330.

Suka : a celebrated sage, 359 n., 367, 367 n.

śuch : to grieve, 170.

Śūdra : a member of the fourth caste, 167-84 *passim*.

Saukeya : a disciple of Uddālaka Āruṇi in *Sat. Br.*, 177.

Saunaka : a famous sage in the *Muṇḍ. Up.*, 56; the same or a different sage in the *Tāṇḍ. Br.*, 176.

śrutāt dūrah : he who is far from the *Vedas*, 170 n.

S'ruti (s) : the revealed *Vedas*, scriptural texts, *passim*.

śloka : stanza, 119, 208.

śvetachchhatreṇa : by means of a white umbrella as a distinguishing mark, 98 n :
-*rājānum adrākṣhit* : he identified (lit. saw) the king by means of a white umbrella, 98 n.

Śvetadvīpa : "the White Island", one of the the special abodes of Nārāyaṇa, 282 n., 378.

Śvetāśvataras : followers of a recension the *Yajurveda*, 215.

Shastī-tatpuruṣa: a *tat-puruṣa* compound of which the first member is in the sixth (or genitive) case, 129.

Saḥ: he, 40 n., 49, 123 n., 240.

samvarga: all-absorber, 175 n.

Samvarga-vidyā: worship of the *Brahman* as the All-absorber, 168 n., 170, 174-5.

samyadvāma: one in whom all desirable things gather together, 32, 34, 38-9.

samsāra: the recurring cycle of birth and death (see note 3 in Vol. I), *passim*.

saṅkalpa: will, 263 n.

Saṅkhyopasaṅgrahādhi-karaṇa: the 3rd section of *Ved. Sūṭ.* (I. 4), where the alleged acceptance, by a scriptural passage, of the number of principles according to the *Sāṅkhya* is discussed, 228.

Sat: the individual self, 47, 139 n., 239, 291, 293, 296 n., 382; the *Brahman*, 128, 253, 382 n., 387, 387 n., 409; primordial matter, 236-7; Pure Existence, 390.

sa te antaryāmyamṛitaḥ: he is your Inner Ruler immortal, 46.

sa te ātmā: He is your Self, 49.

sat-kārya-vāda: the theory that the effect is existent in the cause, 317 n.

sattva-guṇa: a quality of *prakṛiti*, *passim*.

satya: the collection of all embodied souls, 58; etymologically the controller of individual selves and matter, and thus the *Brahman*, 139; the *Brahman*, 95-101 *passim*, 125 n., 129 n., 127 n.; a higher world, 150 n.

Satyakāma: a disciple of Pippalāda in the *Pr. Up.*, 115, 115 n., 119; a student of Gautama in the *Chhand. Up.*, 177 n; the *Brahman*, 125 n.

Satyākāma Jābala: the teacher of Upakosala and identical with the student of Gautama, 31 n., 38.

satyena: (1) by or with truth: (11) specially characterised by (the worship of) Truth, 98-9.

sadāyatanaḥ: those who have their abode in the *Sat*, 383 n.

Sanatkumāra: one of the four sons of *Brahmā* the creator, 91 n., 92, 99.

sandeha: the trunk of the body, 71.

sandhi: union, 210 n.

sannyāsins: ascetics, 193.

sapta(n): seven, 232.

saptarshayaḥ : members of the group of seven *rishis* or sages, who are Marichi, Atri, Aṅgiras, Pulastya, Kratu and Vasishṭa, and who constitute the constellation known as the Great Bear, 232.

samashṭi : general, as opposed to particular, 214 n.

samashṭi-puruṣa : the aggregate of individual selves, 54-5.

saṃ(ñ)jñā : lit. knowledge, here a delusion, 273 n.

saṃprasāda : the individual self (see Note 501), 90, 95, 95 n., 133 n., 135, 139, 139 n.

sayuktvan, -gv- : one who has a cart, one of excellent qualities, 171, 171 n.

sarvajña : all-knower, 389 n.

sarvata eva ... atsyanti : On all sides, they will eat my food, 174 n.

sarvata evam.....atsyanti : On all sides they eat of his food of this kind, 174 n.

Sarvatraprasiddhyadhikarana : the first section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 2), where a scriptural passage is shown to deal with the *Brahman* because He is taught prominently 'in all this', 4.

sarvasya adhipatiḥ : the lord of all, 193 n.

Sarvavyākhyānādhikaraṇa : the last and eighth section of *Ved. Sūt.* (I. 4) where all passages about the cause of the world are asked to be regarded as explained by principles already laid down, 296.

sarvā ha vai devatāḥ : indeed all the deities, 315 n.

sākshātkāra : seeing, direct realisation, 96 n.

Sāṅkhya : a system of philosophy, expounded by Kapila, a follower of the system, *passim*.

sāttvika : characterised by the quality of *sattva*, 201 n., 205 n.

Sādhyas : a kind of gods, 163 n.

sāman : a sacred text to be chanted, a verse of the *Sāma-Veda*, 115, 119.

Sāma-Veda : the third of the four *Vedas*, 224.

sālakshanya : similarity, being of the same species, 317 n.

sāvakāśa balliyan : Between that which has scope and that which has no scope, that which has no scope is the stronger, 302 n.

siddhānta : settled conclusion, 146 n.

su : an affix, 202.

sutala : a nether world, 150 n.

sutejāh, -as : beautifully brilliant, the heaven, 70, 79, 80 n.

Sureśvara : a disciple of Śaṅkara who wrote many philosophical works, 180 n., 350 n.

sushupti : dreamless sleep, 95 n.

sūkta : hymn, 158.

sūtra : aphorism, *passim*.

Sūtrakāra : the author of aphorisms, i.e., the *Ved. Sūt.*, *passim*.

sṛijamāna : producing, 218 n., 219 n.

Somā : a Vedic god, 154 n., 387 ; the *prāṇa*, 252 n.

Saubhari : a sage who multiplied himself into fifty persons, 155, 155 n., 366, 366 n.

sthāna : abode, existence, 33 n.

sthiti : existence, 33 n.

smaryamāṇam : (i) mentioned in the *Smṛitis*, (ii) remembered, recognized, 69 n.

Smṛiti : a metrical law book, a religious work of authority other than the *Veda*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, *passim*.

sva : one's own, 270.

Svachchhandavṛitti : moving or functioning according to desire, 144 n.

sva : a higher world, 150 n.

Svarga : the celestial world of enjoyments, 59, 119, 152 : the world of final release, 209.

svastika : a gold ornament of the shape of a Greek cross with the four arms bent in the same direction, 344, 344 n., 365.

Hara : the individual self regarded as the abductor of *prakṛiti*, 215, 216 n.

hastighna : a mahout, 389 n.

hastin : an elephant.

hāra : a necklace, particularly of pearls, 172 n.

hāretvā : See 172 n.

hita : some veins near the heart, 244, 254 n.

Hiraṇyakaśipu : an Asura emperor, for killing whom God incarnated as 'Narasimha' or the 'Man-lion,' 367 n.

hiraṇmaya : gold, 16.

ERRATA

The more important printing mistakes are noted below :

Page	Line	For	Read
8	8	Let Him	Let him
21	15	movable (world)	movable and immovable (world).
22	10	(that whole)	(the whole)
30	34	(<i>Kaṭh. Up.</i> II. 9)	(<i>Kaṭh. Up.</i> III. 9)
37	10	<i>mushmimśha</i>	<i>mushmimścha</i>
68	3	(<i>Chhānd. Up.</i> II. 5)	(<i>Chhānd. Up.</i> V. II. 5)
75	10, Col. 2	<i>Sūtra</i> 29	<i>Sūtra</i> 27
99	„	VIII. 16. 1)	VII. 16. 1).
115	11	for <i>Ikshatikarmavyapadeśat</i> , read <i>Ikshatikarma vyapadeśat</i> .	
139	13	VIII. 12. 2)	VIII. 3. 4).
145	4, Col. 2	VI. 7	VI. 17.
159	14, Col. 1	By those	By means of those
162	11	Nara	Nāra
165	21	thought	taught
166	19	IV. 14. 1).	IV. 4. 16).
170	30	<i>dha</i>	<i>da</i>
175	23	is declared	is not declared
193	11	form	from
195	3	Ānumānādhikarana	Ānumānikādhikarāṇa
197	24	the self, the body,	the self, among the body,
200	4	add "And He Himself is the supreme object of attainment".	
205	22	intellect	<i>mahat</i>
206	10	(<i>B.G.</i> VII. 4-6)	(<i>B.G.</i> VII. 4-7).
208	23	(<i>Kaṭh. Up.</i> III. 10)	(<i>Kaṭh. Up.</i> III. 15).
„	24	the individual	to the individual
218	9	more	mere
225	12	<i>aja</i>	<i>ajā</i>
232	17	<i>pañchajani</i>	<i>pañchajanyah</i>
270	33	thy self	the self
308	20	by Him	by him
321	26	(<i>Kaṭh. Up.</i> II. 2)	(<i>Kaṭh. Up.</i> II. 22)
329	1, Col. 1	Ulūkya	Aulūkya
377	24	<i>ā-rambh</i>	<i>ā-rabh</i>
„	30	<i>vācha</i>	<i>vāchā</i>
„	1, Col. 1	By knowing one	By one
397	17	the one and	one and the
419	7	<i>duṭpadyate</i>	<i>dupapadyate</i>
„	7, Col. 2	<i>utpadyate</i>	<i>upapadyate</i>